House v. Erwin

524 P.2d 911, 83 Wash. 2d 898, 1974 Wash. LEXIS 967
CourtWashington Supreme Court
DecidedJune 20, 1974
Docket42255
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 524 P.2d 911 (House v. Erwin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Washington Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
House v. Erwin, 524 P.2d 911, 83 Wash. 2d 898, 1974 Wash. LEXIS 967 (Wash. 1974).

Opinions

Wright, J.

Plaintiff, a real estate broker, brought this action in the Okanogan County Superior Court to recover a real estate commission from defendants. Plaintiff prevailed in the trial court. The matter was appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division Three, and there the judgment was reversed. House v. Erwin, 5 Wn. App. 737, 490 P.2d 883 (1971). Plaintiff petitioned this court to review and his petition was granted.

Because the designations of “appellant” and “respondent” might prove confusing, we shall refer to the parties as “plaintiff” and “defendant.”

Plaintiff is a licensed real estate broker with an office in Okanogan county between Okanogan and Omak. On February 24, 1969, the defendants, Harold Erwin and Chris E. Albrecht, signed a document which was intended to be a nonexclusive real estate listing agreement. The defendant, Effie M. Albrecht, wife of Chris E. Albrecht, did not sign the agreement but was present at the signing, at several [900]*900conversations, and talked to plaintiff on the telephone on a number of occasions. The trial court found that she ratified the agreement. Such finding was not challenged, and, therefore, is not now before the court.

The question of whether the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale, likewise, is not before the court. The trial court found, “the plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.” The Court of Appeals did not consider that matter, saying “it is unnecessary for us to decide whether plaintiff was the procuring cause of the sale.” The finding of the trial court was based on substantial evidence and we are firmly committed to the rule that a finding of fact by the trial court will not be disturbed if based on substantial evidence. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959); Coy v. Raabe, 77 Wn.2d 322, 462 P.2d 214 (1969); Sylvester v. Imhoff, 81 Wn.2d 637, 503 P.2d 734 (1972).

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court on the issue of the sufficiency of the legal description contained in the real estate broker’s employment contract, commonly known as a “listing agreement.” House v. Erwin, supra. That was the only matter relied upon by the Court of Appeals for reversal and it is the only question before this court.

Defendants contend the description is inadequate to comply with RCW 19.36.010. The contract is shown in the accompanying illustration.

The trial court found:
The Court further finds that the said agreement did have attached to it a proper legal description of the real and personal property, and that the plaintiff was authorized under the agreement to attach said description, and he did attach the same in accordance with the authority given him.

The finding of the trial court is based on substantial evidence. As stated above we are firmly committed to the rule that a finding of fact of a trial court will not be disturbed if based on substantial evidence. The quoted find[901]*901ing brings this case within the rule permitting the broker to insert a correct legal description when specifically au[902]*902thorized to so do. Edwards v. Meader, 34 Wn.2d 921, 210 P.2d 1019 (1949); Noah v. Montford, 77 Wn.2d 459, 463 P.2d 129 (1969); McKoin v. Kunes, 5 Wn. App. 731, 490 P.2d 735 (1971).

[901]

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House v. Erwin
524 P.2d 911 (Washington Supreme Court, 1974)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
524 P.2d 911, 83 Wash. 2d 898, 1974 Wash. LEXIS 967, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/house-v-erwin-wash-1974.