House of Lloyd, Inc. v. United States
This text of 11 Ct. Int'l Trade 278 (House of Lloyd, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
[279]*279Opinion and ORder
This motion for leave to intervene as of right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Court of International Trade in this action involving the tariff classification of Christmas tree decorations is filed to protect movant’s interest in a contingent fee contract. The firm of Herrick and Larsen, of which movant was a member, was retained in this action by plaintiff on a contingent fee basis. Upon the firm’s dissolution, notice of substitution was filed designating Herbert P. Larsen as attorney of record.
Applicant urges the court to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 24(a)(2) under which a discharged attorney has the right to intervene in an action in order to protect his interest in a contingent fee contract.1 The Fifth Circuit’s interpretation, set forth in Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, 434 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1974), has been rejected by another circuit, see Laker Airways v. Pan American World Airways, 109 F.R.D. 541 (D.D.C. 1985), and is only reluctantly applied by the Fifth Circuit itself. See Keith v. St. George Packing Co., 806 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[although Gaines may not represent the most persuasive use of Fed. R. Civ. P. 24, it binds us as the law of this circuit until modified [en banc]. We see no basis upon which to distinguish the instant case from Gaines. We find, therefore, that the district court erred in not granting [applicant’s] motion to intervene.”).
Intervention in this court is governed by statute as well as by CIT Rule 24. Congress has provided for the intervention as of right and by leave of the court in various actions. 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j) (1982).2 In classification cases such as this, however, Congress has specifically stated that "no person may intervene in a civil action under section 515 or 516 of the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. §§ 1515, 1516 (1982)].” 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(l)(A)).3 See Stewart-Warner Corp. v. United States, 4. CIT 141, 142 (1982) (intervention in a 516 action is expressly forbidden by 28 U.S.C. § 2631(j)(l)(A)). Cf. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. United States, 2 CIT 254, 255 & n.2, 529 F. Supp. 664, 666 & n.2 (1981) ("[t]he existence of a specific provision [280]*280governing intervention also precludes the applicability of any other provisions or statutes”).4
Applicant will therefore not be granted status as an intervenor in this classification action in order to pursue his contractual interests, if any, in the ultimate resolution of this case. Applicant has several avenues through which he may seek to pursue his claim. Aside from state court actions concerning his contract with plaintiff, or the terms upon which his firm has dissolved, the rules of this court provide that the former attorney of record may be heard by the court on the substitution of attorney, and may move for such relief as he deems appropriate. CIT Rule 75(c). Applicant’s motion pursuant to CIT Rule 24(a)(2) to intervene is denied.
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11 Ct. Int'l Trade 278, 659 F. Supp. 248, 11 C.I.T. 278, 1987 WL 9103, 1987 Ct. Intl. Trade LEXIS 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/house-of-lloyd-inc-v-united-states-cit-1987.