Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.

474 F. Supp. 193, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 915
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Missouri
DecidedJune 29, 1979
Docket73 C 14(2)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 474 F. Supp. 193 (Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F. Supp. 193, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 915 (E.D. Mo. 1979).

Opinion

474 F.Supp. 193 (1979)

Philip W. HOUGHTON, Plaintiff,
and
Ray Marshall, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Intervenor-Plaintiff,
v.
McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION, Defendant.

No. 73 C 14(2).

United States District Court, E. D. Missouri, E. D.

June 29, 1979.

John J. Schlueter, Davidson & Schlueter, St. Louis, Mo., Gilbert Drucker, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.

Veryl L. Riddle, Bryan, Cave, McPheeters & McRoberts, St. Louis, Mo., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

WANGELIN, District Judge.

This cause was tried to the Court sitting without a jury, beginning on November 6, 1978, pursuant to the Opinion and Mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit dated April 20, 1977, as amended June 1, 1977, Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977).

*194 This action was brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (the "ADEA") by plaintiff Philip W. Houghton. Houghton's complaint alleged that defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation (McDonnell) had violated § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), by removing him from flight status and terminating his employment, thus entitling him to injunctive and monetary relief. The Secretary of Labor (the "Secretary") thereafter intervened, alleging in his complaint that McDonnell had violated, and continues to violate, sections 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(2) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) and (2). The Secretary's complaint seeks injunctive relief.

The Mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit entered in this case states:

If on remand it is found that Houghton is still physically capable of safely and effectively performing the duties of Chief Production Test Pilot, he must be reinstated to that position . . . [I]n the event the District Court finds on remand that Houghton is unable at that time to physically qualify for the position of Chief Production Test Pilot, it should then determine from the evidence when such disability occurred and fix the damages accordingly . . .

553 F.2d at 565.

On November 3, 1978, the Eighth Circuit denied plaintiff's motion to clarify the above Mandate, deleting any reference to reinstatement.

The plain meaning of the Order remanding this case is that although defendant did not meet the burden of proof applied by that court with respect to the bona fide occupational qualification defense, § 4(f)(1) of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) on the evidence introduced, plaintiff was not automatically entitled to the protection, and defendant was not automatically subject to the prohibition of the age seventy (70) rule contained in 29 U.S.C. § 631(a). This is interpreted by the court as a salient inference that at some point age may be a bona fide occupational qualification for plaintiff Houghton.

Whether plaintiff is still physically capable of qualifying for Chief Production Test Pilot is a question appurtenant only to plaintiff's abilities as extrapolated from age-related factors.

However, any determination as to plaintiff's ability to safely and effectively function as Chief Production Test Pilot at a given time is inextricably bound up with:

(1) whether psychological and physiological changes due to age can be tested with sufficient reliability to justify the possible safety risks involved in requiring employment of older pilots (apparently up to age 70, 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)) in the cockpits of some of the most esoteric and potentially dangerous machinery ever conceived by man. See Rombough v. Federal Aviation Administration, 594 F.2d 893, 899 (2nd Cir. 1979); Starr v. Federal Aviation Administration, 589 F.2d 307, 314 (7th Cir. 1979); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom.; Brennan v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 419 U.S. 1122, 95 S.Ct. 805, 42 L.Ed.2d 822 (1975);

(2) in the absence of the reliable testing methods outlined above, whether any adequate system of error management can be implemented which equivalently protects the public safety while simultaneously promoting "employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age" and prohibiting "arbitrary discrimination". See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b).

This Court does not interpret the Mandate as specifying McDonnell's medical requirements, including an FAA Class II Medical Certificate, as the standards by which to determine if plaintiff is still physically capable of safely and effectively performing the duties of Chief Production Test Pilot. A motion for just such an interpretation was denied by the Eighth Circuit, and this Court is further influenced by the fact that McDonnell had not theretofore been presented with a similar situation in that *195 plaintiff Houghton, in 1971, was almost four years older than any other test pilot who had ever flown for defendant.

The parties were advised by the Court that evidence from both trials would comprise the record herein, subject to objections by both parties taken with the case. After consideration of the record in light of the Mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the Court hereby makes and enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. Certain findings contained at 413 F.Supp. 1230, D.C., are reaffirmed below.

Findings of Fact

1. Plaintiff Philip W. Houghton was born on October 1, 1919, and now resides in St. Louis County, Missouri.

2. The intervenor-plaintiff is the Secretary of Labor.

3. Defendant McDonnell Douglas Corporation is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Maryland, having its principal office and place of business in the State of Missouri. At all relevant times defendant has been an employer subject to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., by virtue of 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).

4.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
474 F. Supp. 193, 20 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 915, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/houghton-v-mcdonnell-douglas-corp-moed-1979.