HotSpot Therapeutics, Inc. v. Nurix Therapeutics, Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 6 7 HOTSPOT THERAPEUTICS, INC., Case No. 22-cv-04109-TSH

8 Plaintiff, ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF/COUNTERCLAIM 9 v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY DISCOVERY (PUBLIC REDACTED 10 NURIX THERAPEUTICS, INC., VERSION OF ECF NO. 101) 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. Nos. 72, 73, 80, 88, 89, 90, 96

12 14 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant HotSpot Therapeutics, 15 Inc.’s (“HotSpot’s”) Motion to stay discovery until Nurix Therapeutics, Inc. (“Nurix”) satisfies the 16 pre-discovery requirement to identify the trade secrets it alleges to be misappropriated by HotSpot 17 (ECF No. 73) and related Administrative Motions to Seal (ECF Nos. 72, 80, 90). On March 16, 18 2023, Nurix filed Opposition. ECF No. 81. On March 23, 2023, HotSpot filed a Reply. ECF No. 19 91. Additionally pending is a Motion to strike portions of Nurix’s Opposition (ECF No. 89) and 20 related Administrative Motions to Seal (ECF Nos. 88, 96). On April 6, 2023, Nurix filed 21 Opposition to the Motion to strike (ECF No. 97) and on April 13, 2023, HotSpot filed a Reply 22 (ECF No. 100). 23 Having considered the parties’ positions, relevant legal authority, and the record in this 24 case, the Court issues the following order GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 25 the parties’ administrative motions to seal, DENYING HotSpot’s Motion to Strike, and 26 GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART HotSpot’s Motion to Stay Discovery. 1 DNA-encoded libraries (DELs), and a “DELigase platform” to target proteins to treat cancer and 2 diseases. ECF No. 50 (Counterclaims) ¶ 9. DEL technology can be used to accelerate the process 3 of discovering new drugs, and DELs are large collections of small molecules that are screened 4 against targets to identify drug-like molecules. Id. ¶ 12. 5 In September 2015, Nurix and Macroceutics, Inc. (“Macroceutics”) entered into a 6 collaborative agreement (“the Agreement”). ECF No. 73 at 9; ECF No. 81 at 6. Nurix alleges that 7 during the collaboration Nurix shared its confidential and trade secret information with 8 Macroceutics. ECF No. 81 at 6. According to Nurix’s counterclaims, these trade secrets involved 9 chemistry designs, aqueous chemical synthesis, combinatorial chemistry, purification methods, 10 quality control methods, encoding designs, and Nurix’s DNATag software. ECF No. 50 ¶ 20. 11 In August 2019, HotSpot acquired Macroceutics. Id. ¶ 31. The Agreement applies to 12 HotSpot as successor in interest to Macroceutics. Id. ¶ 32. Nurix alleges HotSpot used Nurix’s 13 confidential and proprietary information, without notice to or permission of Nurix, to design or 14 build DELs. Id. ¶ 50. 15 On July 13, 2022, HotSpot filed the instant action, seeking declaratory judgment of 1) no 16 misappropriation under the Defend Trade Secrets Act (“DTSA”); 2) no misappropriation under the 17 California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“CUTSA”); and 3) no breach of contract. Id. ¶¶ 64-85. On 18 November 23, 2022, Nurix filed an Amended Answer to Complaint and Counterclaims (“First 19 Amended Answer”). ECF No. 50. On December 7, 2022 HotSpot filed a Motion to Dismiss 20 Nurix’s Amended Counterclaims, and on February 3, 2023, the Court issued an Order granting in 21 part and denying in part dismissal. ECF Nos. 57, 65. As a result of the February 3, 2023 Order, 22 Nurix’s remaining Counterclaims are as follows: 1) Misappropriation of Trade Secrets under the 23 DTSA; 2) Misappropriation of Trade Secrets under the CUTSA; 3) Breach of Contract; and 4) 24 Intentional Interference with Performance of a Contract (“IIPC”). ECF Nos. 50, 65. 25 On December 30, 2022, Nurix served its “Identification of Asserted Trade Secrets 26 Pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 2019.210” (“§ 2019.210 Disclosure”). ECF No. 81 at 8; ECF 27 No. 73 at 11, 73-5, Exhibit B. On March 2, 2023, HotSpot filed the instant Motion to Stay 1 Motion to Seal Portions of HotSpot’s Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF No. 72). On March 16, 2 2023, Nurix filed an Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF No. 81), as well as 3 an Administrative Motion to Seal Portions of Nurix’s Opposition (ECF No. 80). On March 23, 4 2023, HotSpot filed a Reply (ECF No. 91), as well as an Administrative Motion to Seal Portions 5 of HotSpot’s Reply (ECF No. 90). On March 27, 2023, Nurix filed Support for the Administrative 6 Motion to Seal Portions of HotSpot’s Reply. ECF No. 92. 7 On March 23, 2023, HotSpot filed a Motion to Strike Portions of Nurix’s Opposition (ECF 8 No. 89), as well as an Administrative Motion to Seal Portions of HotSpot’s Motion to Strike (ECF 9 No. 88). On April 6, 2023, Nurix filed an Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 10 97), as well as an Administrative Motion to Seal Nurix’s Opposition (ECF No. 96). On April 13, 11 2023, HotSpot filed a Reply. ECF No. 100. 13 Pending before the Court are the following motions to seal: 14 1. HotSpot’s Motion to Seal Portions of its Motion to Stay Discovery Pending a Complete 15 § 2019.210 Disclosure, ECF No. 72; 16 2. Nurix’s Motion to Seal Portions of its Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Stay 17 Discovery, ECF No. 80; 18 3. HotSpot’s Motion to Seal Portions of its Reply, ECF No. 90; 19 4. HotSpot’s Motion to Seal Portions of its Motion to Strike Portions of Nurix’s 20 Opposition, ECF No. 88; and 21 5. Nurix’s Motion to Seal Portions of its Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Strike, ECF 22 No. 96. 23 “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records 24 and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City and Cnty. of 25 Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 26 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)). Consequently, filings that are “more than tangentially related to the 27 merits of a case” may be sealed only upon a showing of “compelling reasons” for sealing. Ctr. for 1 showing under Rule 26(c) will suffice to keep sealed records attached to non-dispositive motions.” 2 Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1180 (9th Cir. 2006). See Prolifiq 3 Software Inc. v. Veeva Sys. Inc., No. C 13-03644 SI, 2014 WL 2527148, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 4 2014) (applying “good cause” standard to joint discovery letter related to § 2019.210 disclosure). 5 Here, the parties seek to seal portions of their motions and briefings that describe the 6 contents of the Agreement, mediation between the parties, and Nurix’s alleged trade secrets. The 7 Court agrees that there is good cause to seal the requested portions relating to the Agreement, 8 confidential mediation communications, and alleged trade secrets. See Regis Metro Associates, 9 Inc. v. NBR Co., LLC, Case No. 20-cv-2309-DMR, 2022 WL 267443, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Jan 28, 10 2022) (granting motion to seal because “[a]ll of the documents contain sensitive business 11 information or may be subject to confidentiality agreements”); Nicolosi Distributing, Inc. v. 12 Finishmaster, Inc., Case No. 18-v-03587-BLF, 2018 WL 10758114, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 13 2018) (applying compelling reason standard and determining “compelling reasons exist to seal 14 [contracts] because they contain proprietary and confidential business information, including 15 potential trade secrets and business practices, such as product rates and purchase requirements.”); 16 Snapkeys, Ltd. v. Google LLC, No. 19-CV-02658-LHK, 2021 WL 1951250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 17 14, 2021) (applying compelling reasons standard and noting “courts have found compelling 18 reasons to seal information regarding a company’s proprietary technology when the disclosure of 19 that information would result in competitive harm.”). The Court has previously sealed the entirety 20 of the Agreement. ECF Nos. 9, 20, 46, 52, 65. See Synchronos Techs., Inc. v. Dropbox Inc., Case 21 No. 16-cv-0119-HSG, 2020 WL 759528, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) (“[T]he sealing requests 22 seek to seal information materially identical to prior sealing requests, which this Court granted. 23 The Court sees no reason why it should here find that information it previously deemed sealable 24 no longer meets the ‘compelling reasons’ standard.”). Under the lesser good cause standard, the 25 information sought sealed is largely appropriately identified. 26 The Court does not agree, however, that there is good cause to seal all of the information 27 HotSpot demarcated as part of its Motion to Strike. As discussed below, the Court does not find 1 communications. As such, the Court does not find good cause to seal the portions of HotSpot’s 2 Motion to Strike and Declaration of Robert Frederickson III in support of the Motion to Strike that 3 quote Nurix’s statements in Opposition. See ECF Nos. 89, 89-1. 4 In sum, under the lesser good cause standard, the information sought is proper to seal 5 where it describes the contents of the Agreement, which the Court has already sealed, information 6 pertaining to confidential mediation communications, as well as Nurix’s description of its 7 purported trade secrets, which contains proprietary and confidential information. 8 The Court has reviewed the requested portions to be sealed and finds the parties’ requests are 9 narrowly tailored to this information, except for HotSpot’s Motion to Strike and corresponding 10 Declaration of Robert Frederickson III, to the extent they seek to seal portions of Nurix’s 11 Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Stay. 12 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS HotSpot’s Motion to Seal Portions of its Motion to Stay 13 Discovery Pending a Complete § 2019.210 Disclosure (ECF No. 72), Nurix’s Motion to Seal 14 Portions of its Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF No. 80), HotSpot’s 15 Motion to Seal Portions of its Reply (ECF No. 90), and Nurix’s Motion to Seal Portions of its 16 Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 96), and seals the following: 17 1. HotSpot’s Motion to Stay Discovery Pending a Complete § 2019.210 Disclosure, 18 portions highlighted in yellow and blue 3:1-6, 3:11-14, 3:21-22, 4:9-13, 4:15-22, 5:18-20, 5:24-25, 19 6:1, 6:5-15, 6:19, 6:21-23, 6:27, 7:1-2, 7:6-8, 7:11, 7:16-21, 7:24-27, 8:3, 8:5, 8:7-10, 8:14-15, 20 8:18-20, 9:8, 9:12, 13:5-17, 14:8-10, 14:13-16, 15:3-4, 15:7-8, 16:24-25, 17:1-12, 17:14-23, 18:1- 21 4; 22 2. Exhibits A-K to the Declaration of Robert Frederickson III in support of HotSpot’s 23 Motion to Stay, ECF Nos. 73-2–73-12; 24 3. Nurix’s Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Stay Discovery, portions highlighted in 25 green and blue 2:6-8, 2:10-15, 2:19-20, 2:22-27, 3:1-2, 3:5, 3:15-17, 7:8-11, 7:14-16, 14:8-9, 17:3, 26 17:5-13; 27 4. HotSpot’s Reply to its Motion to Stay Discovery, portions highlighted in yellow and 1 23, 8:25-28; and 2 5. Nurix’s Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Strike, portions highlighted in green 4:22- 3 25, 4:27-28. 4 The Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART HotSpot’s administrative motion 5 to seal its Motion to Strike Portions of Nurix’s Opposition (ECF No. 88). The Court seals the 6 following: 7 1. HotSpot’s Motion to Strike Portions of Nurix’s Opposition, portions highlighted in 8 yellow (1:5-6, 1:13-14, 1:18-19, 1:28-2:6, 2:20-25, 3:1-6, 4:2, 4:11, 5:6-15, 5:18-19, 5:23-6:4, 6:8- 9 11); 10 2. Declaration of Robert Frederickson III in support of HotSpot’s Motion to Strike, 11 portions highlighted in yellow (1:8-2:4, 2:6-7, 2:13-14, 2:15, 3:11-17); and 12 3. Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Robert Frederickson III in support of HotSpot’s Motion 13 to Strike. 14 The Court does not seal HotSpot’s Motion to Strike, highlighted portions 1:11, 3:14-28, 15 nor the Declaration of Robert Frederickson III in support of HotSpot’s Motion to Strike, 16 highlighted portions 2:9-12. The Court ORDERS Hotspot to file in the public record redacted 17 versions of its Motion to Strike and the Frederickson Declaration that conform to this order within 18 seven days. 20 HotSpot seeks to strike portions of Nurix’s Opposition to HotSpot’s Motion to Stay 21 Discovery (ECF No. 81), and the Declaration of Karen Boyd in Support of Nurix’s Opposition 22 (ECF No. 82). ECF No. 89. HotSpot argues that these documents improperly rely on confidential 23 mediation-related discussions by putting those discussions at issue. Id. at 5. Nurix responds that 24 the information disclosed in its filings is not confidential because it pertains to discussions about 25 discovery and not mediation. ECF No. 97. 26 Courts have used their inherent power to strike “inappropriate materials such as 27 confidential mediation and settlement information that are improperly part of the public record.” 1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010); id. at *14 (“[U]nder its inherent powers this Court may strike a 2 paragraph from a case management document that discloses confidential settlement negotiations.... 3 [Plaintiff’s] reference to settlement negotiations in [that document] would be inadmissible under 4 Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 408” and thus “should be stricken.”). 5 The parties had a private mediation session on July 12, 2022 prior to commencement of 6 this litigation on July 13, 2022, as well as a private mediation session on March 28, 2023. ECF 7 Nos. 97 at 2; 1 ¶ 62; 79. As an initial matter, there is not consensus among the parties as to what 8 laws, rules, and contract provisions apply to resolution of this motion. HotSpot invokes the 9 Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) Local Rules, but they explicitly do not govern private 10 mediation. See ADR L.R. 3-4(b) (“Private ADR proceedings, however, are not subject to the 11 provisions of ADR Local Rules including attendance, confidentiality, enforcement, and 12 immunity.”). There is a dispute between the parties as to the applicability of a confidentiality 13 agreement, and HotSpot fails to address Nurix’s argument that this agreement does not govern 14 statements made on March 9, 2023. See ECF No. 97 at 5, n.2. Further, HotSpot invokes both 15 federal and California authority in its Motion to Strike, while Nurix relies solely on California law. 16 Whether under the confidentiality agreement, California law, or federal law, this Court 17 does not find the contested statements in Nurix’s Opposition and the Declaration of Karen Boyd in 18 Support of Nurix’s Opposition impermissibly disclose conduct or statements pertaining to the 19 mediation. “[T]he timing, context, and content of the communication all must be considered” in 20 determining whether a party has met its burden to show a communication should be subject to 21 mediation confidentiality. Wimsatt v. Superior Ct., 152 Cal. App. 4th 137, 161 (2007). While 22 there is some evidence that this conversation served to facilitate mediation, there is also evidence 23 that was not the only purpose and that the parties had been discussing discovery issues before any 24 direction by Judge Bongiovanni in the parties’ related New Jersey litigation. See, e.g., ECF No. 25 97-2 (setting up a phone call to discuss HotSpot’s document production and interrogatory 26 responses). Nurix’s statements appear tangential, at best, to the mediation discussions between the 27 parties as they largely address resolution of an ongoing discovery dispute at the center of 1 the mediation and, presumably, to resolution of the underlying claims. See Jones, 2010 WL 2 4055928, at *14 (applying federal law and striking portions of a filing pertaining to a case 3 management conference because the pro se plaintiff disclosed post-mediation settlement 4 negotiations because they would be inadmissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 5 408); Wimsatt, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 158-61 (finding disclosure of a mediation brief and emails 6 communications clarifying the brief to be protected). While Nurix’s statement that HotSpot 7 “stonewalled Nurix’s attempts to resolve this dispute informally” prior to commencement of this 8 action more closely relates to mediation and settlement negotiations, the Court does not consider 9 such a broad characterization to amount to an improper disclosure of mediation conduct or 10 communications. The Court also notes a lack of prejudice as the Court does not consider Nurix’s 11 statements relevant to resolution of the Motion to Stay. 12 Accordingly, HotSpot’s Motion to Strike is DENIED. 14 A. Legal Standard 15 “In any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret . . . , before commencing 16 discovery relating to the trade secret, the party alleging the misappropriation shall identify the 17 trade secret with reasonable particularity . . . .” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2019.210. The parties do 18 not contest that § 2019.210 applies here. See generally ECF Nos. 73, 81. “‘Reasonable 19 particularity’ mandated by section 2019.210 does not mean that the party alleging 20 misappropriation has to define every minute detail of its claimed trade secret at the outset of the 21 litigation.” Advanced Modular Sputtering, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 132 Cal. App. 4th 826, 835 22 (2005). “Rather, it means that the plaintiff must make some showing that is reasonable, i.e., fair, 23 proper, just and rational[,] . . . under all of the circumstances to identify its alleged trade secret in a 24 manner that will allow the trial court to control the scope of subsequent discovery, protect all 25 parties’ proprietary information, and allow them a fair opportunity to prepare and present their 26 best case or defense at a trial on the merits.” Id. at 836. “‘Reasonable particularity’ should be 27 understood in light of the purposes of § 2019.210: meritless trade secret complaints. Second, it prevents plaintiffs from 1 using the discovery process as a means to obtain the defendant’s trade secrets. [Citations.] Third, the rule assists the court in framing the 2 appropriate scope of discovery and in determining whether plaintiff’s discovery requests fall within that scope. [Citations.] Fourth, it 3 enables defendants to form complete and well-reasoned defenses, ensuring that they need not wait until the eve of trial to effectively 4 defend against charges of trade secret misappropriation.’ 5 Lilith Games (Shanghai) Co. v. uCool, Inc., No. 15-CV-01267-SC, 2015 WL 4149066, at *4 6 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2015) (quoting Advanced Modular, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 833-834). 7 “The degree of ‘particularity’ that is ‘reasonable’ will differ, depending on the alleged 8 trade secrets at issue in each case.” Id. Where the alleged trade secrets “consist of incremental 9 variations on, or advances in the state of the art in a highly specialized technical field, a more 10 exacting level of particularity may be required to distinguish the alleged trade secrets from matters 11 already known to persons skilled in that field.” Id; see also Perlan Therapeutics, Inc. v. Superior 12 Court, 178 Cal. App. 4th 1333, 1350 (2009) (applying the more exacting standard where the trade 13 secret involved “developing protein based treatments for viral infections . . . .”). “A court ‘must 14 exercise its sound discretion in determining how much disclosure is necessary to comply with 15 section 2019.210 under the circumstances of the case.’” Alta Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 16 18CV00404LHKVKD, 2019 WL 176261, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2019) (quoting Perlan, 178 17 Cal. App.4th at 1349). Trade secret “identification is to be liberally construed, and reasonable 18 doubts concerning its sufficiency are to be resolved in favor of allowing discovery to commence.” 19 Brescia v. Angelin, 172 Cal. App. 4th 133, 152 (2009) (citing Advanced Modular, 132 Cal. App. 20 4th at 836-37). 21 B. Discussion 22 1. Reasonable Particularity 23 HotSpot argues that Nurix’s § 2019.210 disclosure is overly vague and fails to identify 24 trade secrets with reasonable particularity. ECF No. 73 at 19-20. Nurix’s § 2019.210 disclosure 25 provides seven, numbered trade secret categories as well as subcategories, such as 1(a). ECF No. 26 73-5, Exhibit B. Specifically, HotSpot contests Nurix’s § 2019.210 disclosures as to trade secrets 27 1(b), 2(a), 3, 4, and 5(c). ECF No. 73 at 9. Nurix argues that its disclosure is sufficiently 1 11. 2 Courts have found disclosures listing “concepts” or “categories of information” fail to 3 meet the “reasonable particularity” standard of disclosure. Loop AI Labs Inc. v. Gatti, 195 F. 4 Supp. 3d 1107, 1114 (N.D. Cal. 2016); see also InteliClear, LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc., 978 5 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting in the summary judgment context a plaintiff may not simply 6 “identify categories of trade secrets they intend to pursue at trial.”); Soc. Apps, LLC v. Zynga, Inc., 7 No. 4:11-CV-04910 YGR, 2012 WL 2203063, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2012) (“A description of 8 the category, or even of the subcategories of information within a category, does not comply with 9 the requirement to identify the actual matter that is claimed to be a trade secret.”). Nurix argues 10 that its § 2019.210 disclosure provides “high-level descriptions of Nurix’s trade secrets” alongside 11 technical disclosures in the form of citations to particular documents, and that together these 12 disclosures are reasonably particular. ECF No. 81 at 10-11. “As a general matter, identification of 13 a trade secret may include a reference to a specific document or portion of a document, so long as 14 the trade secret is described with reasonable particularity.” Alta Devices, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 15 No. 18-cv-00404-LHK (VKD), 2019 WL 176261, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2019). 16 The Court finds that the challenged trade secrets are impermissibly vague. Trade secret 17 1(b) includes all “[REDACTED]” of every type. Subsections (i) to (iv) go on to refer to 18 [REDACTED]. But those four subsections are merely included in the claimed trade secret, which 19 again is “[REDACTED].” However, [REDACTED] is a subject matter, not a trade secret, and 20 trade secret 1(b) is carefully crafted to exclude nothing within that subject matter. It is not helpful 21 to be told that “[d]ocuments reflecting Nurix’s [REDACTED] include” the list provided because 22 with no meaningful description of what the trade secret is, HotSpot doesn’t know what to look for 23 in the documents. 24 The Court thinks that subsections (i), (ii) and (iii) of trade secret 1(b) could be adequate 25 descriptions of a trade secret, provided that the cited documents meaningfully describe these 26 items. Each of those subsections describes a type of [REDACTED] in enough detail that citations 27 to appropriate documents should give HotSpot sufficient direction to ascertain the claimed trade 1 description of what techniques and criteria are the claimed trade secret. In any event, as trade 2 secret 1(b) is not limited to anything narrower than “[REDACTED],” and includes subsection (iv), 3 which is itself vague, the Court finds trade secret 1(b) vague. 4 Trade secret 2(a) – “[REDACTED]” – doesn’t describe anything. In plain English, this 5 trade secret says nothing more than “solutions to a problem.” And listing certain types of 6 solutions ([REDACTED]) does not add content to the disclosure because they all follow the word 7 “including.” There is nothing necessarily wrong with saying that documents that reflect a trade 8 secret “include” a particular list, as a trade secret identification cannot be expected to list every 9 document that contains them. But here, Nurix has combined a non-limiting list of documents with 10 a meaningless description of the trade secret, and that combination does not serve to identify 11 anything. 12 Similarly, trade secret 3 is “[REDACTED].” The next two sentences begin with “[f]or 13 instance” and “[a]s a particular example,” which perform no limiting function This leaves the 14 trade secret as “[REDACTED],” with no definition of what that means and no limits on what that 15 includes. As with trade secret 2(a), telling HotSpot that documents reflecting this undefined trade 16 secret “include” a particular list does not help to impose any metes and bounds on the trade secret. 17 Trade secret 4 (“[REDACTED]” some examples) has the same problem. 18 Topic 5(c) (“[REDACTED]”), followed by a “for example” and a “[t]his includes,” and 19 then by a statement that “[d]couments demonstrating Nurix’s [REDACTED] include” the 20 following, also leaves the trade secret with no metes or bounds. And it doesn’t help that the last 21 document in the list is “[REDACTED].” The “especially at” formulation goes out of its way to 22 imply the trade secret is on other pages too. 23 For all of these trade secrets, Nurix’s disclosures fail to provide sufficient information to 24 “permit the [counter-]defendant to ascertain at least the boundaries within which the secret lies.” 25 Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab’y, Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 26, 44 (2014) (quoting 26 Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal. App. 2d 244, 253 (1968)). 27 2. Stay of Discovery 1 stay all discovery until Nurix provides an amended trade secret identification that complies with § 2 2019.210. ECF No. 73 at 2. Nurix argues that the Court should not stay all discovery, but rather 3 stay discovery as to the trade secrets described without reasonable particularity. ECF No. 81 at 4 19-20. Nurix also argues that discovery should be permitted for the breach of contract and 5 intentional interference with performance of a contract claims. Id. at 20-21. 6 Pursuant to § 2019.210 “[i]n any action alleging the misappropriation of a trade secret 7 under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act . . . before commencing discovery relating to the trade 8 secret,” the party must identify the trade secret with reasonable particularity. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 9 § 2019.210 (emphasis added). As the Court previously determined that Nurix’s intentional 10 interference with performance of a contract claim stands independently of its trade secret claims, 11 the Court permits discovery as to that claim. See ECF No. 65 at 12-13; ECF No. 50 ¶¶ 152, 157; 12 Loop AI Labs Inc v. Gatti, No. 15-CV-00798-HSG(DMR), 2015 WL 9269758, at *4 (N.D. Cal. 13 Dec. 21, 2015) (permitting discovery for claims based on tortious interference not based on any 14 allegations of trade secret misappropriation). Similarly, the Court permits discovery on the 15 portions of Nurix’s breach of contract claim that do not depend on trade secret misappropriation, 16 but stays discovery on the portions that do depend on trade secret misappropriation, and stays 17 discovery on the CUTSA and DTSA claims, which relate to Nurix’s trade secrets. See Advanced 18 Modular, 132 Cal. App. 4th at 834 (finding discovery may not proceed on a breach of contract 19 claim where plaintiff alleged defendants “breached their confidentiality agreements with Sputtered 20 Films by disclosing the trade secrets to AMS” as the contract allegation is factually dependent on 21 the misappropriation allegation). While Nurix argues that discovery on the reasonably particular 22 trade secrets should be permitted to move forward, Nurix does not cite to any caselaw interpreting 23 the statute so narrowly, and Court declines to do so. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS stay of 24 discovery as to Nurix’s CUTSA and DTSA claims and as to part of the breach of contract claim. 25 The Court DENIES stay of discovery as to Nurix’s intentional interference with performance of a 26 contract claim and as to its breach of contract claim to the extent it does not depend on trade secret 27 misappropriation. VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, HotSpot’s Motion to Stay Discovery until Nurix satisfies the § 2 2019.210 disclosure requirement is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. HotSpot’s 3 administrative motion to seal its Motion to Strike Portions of Nurix’s Opposition is GRANTED 4 IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The parties’ other Administrative Motions to Seal (ECF Nos. 5 72, 80, 90, 96) are GRANTED. The Court DENIES HotSpot’s Motion to Strike. Nurix shall 6 serve a statement identifying the trade secrets at issue within 21 days of the date of this order. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: April 18, 2023 10 7 1 \ | □ □ 11 THOMAS S. HIXSON United States Magistrate Judge Ss

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