HOT SYSTEMS, LLC v. SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS; NEOLOGY, INC.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: June 15, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-00738
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HOT SYSTEMS, LLC, a Nevada limited Case No.: 26-cv-00738-H-BJW liability company, 12 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ Plaintiff, 13 MOTION TO DISMISS v. 14 [Doc. No. 12.] SAN DIEGO ASSOCIATION OF 15 GOVERNMENTS, a California public 16 agency; and NEOLOGY, INC., a Delaware corporation, 17 Defendants. 18

19 On April 20, 2026, Defendants San Diego Association of Governments and 20 Neology, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff Hot Systems, LLC’s complaint pursuant 21 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 12.) On 22 May 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 23 (Doc. No. 19.) On May 29, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended response in opposition. (Doc. 24 No. 22.) On June 1, 2026, the Court took the motion to dismiss under submission. (Doc. 25 No. 23.) On June 3, 2026, Defendants filed their reply. (Doc. No. 24.) For the reasons 26 below, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 Background 2 The following factual background is taken from the allegations in Plaintiff’s 3 complaint. Plaintiff is the legal owner by assignment of U.S. Patent Nos. 10,810,578 (“the 4 ’578 patent”) and 11,270,182 (“the ’182 patent) (collectively, “the asserted patents”). 5 (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s founder and CEO is the inventor of switchable toll 6 transponder technology, including the asserted patents. (Id. ¶¶ 2–3.) Plaintiff alleges that 7 Defendants have infringed or have contributed to the infringement of the asserted patents 8 by manufacturing, advertising, selling, and offering to sell switchable toll transponder 9 products and/or services, including the FasTrak Flex. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 18–20, 37, 49, 59.) 10 The asserted patents are related, have nearly identical specifications, and are both 11 entitled “RFID Financial Device Including Mechanical Switch.” U.S. Patent No. 12 10,810,578, at [54] (filed Oct. 20, 2020); U.S. Patent No. 11,270,182, at [54] (filed Mar. 8, 13 2022). The asserted patents generally relate to “the field of communication devices 14 including radio frequency identification (RFID) tags.” ’182 Patent col. 2 ll. 20–21. 15 The specification explains: 16 RFID tags are typically small, flexible, and low profile devices that can be affixed to items for electronic tracking and information storage purposes. 17 An RFID tag can be read by an RFID reader when the RFID tag is brought 18 within a certain vicinity of the reader while the reader is broadcasting an appropriate signal. . . . 19 RFID tags generate a return radio frequency signal that may include an 20 encoded copy of information stored within the RFID tag. As RFID tags 21 achieve more wide spread use they will become ubiquitous on forms of tagging, labeling, identification, and be included in personal and business 22 effects, such as passports, driver’s licenses, keys, cell phones, credit cards, 23 PDAs, and so forth. For example, an RFID tag may be incorporated in a driver’s license to store personal information about the licensee or in a product 24 label to track inventory. 25 A problem with using RFID tags to store security, confidential and/or 26 personal information is that an RFID reader can read any RFID tags that pass within its range. Even if data is encrypted, this creates a possibility of 27 unauthorized access to the personal data and other information stored in the 28 RFID tag. 1 Id. at col. 2 ll. 25–59. 2 The asserted patents attempt to solve that problem by disclosing “a remotely 3 powered RFID (radio frequency identity) tag having an electronically controlled switch.” 4 Id. at col. 4 ll. 22–24. In some embodiments of the invention, “when the switch is in an 5 off state, the RFID tag will not transmit and when the switch is in an on state the RFID tag 6 will transmit in response to an RF (radio frequency) signal. In some embodiments, the 7 switch includes multiple on states in which different information or signals are transmitted 8 responsive to the state of the switch.” Id. at col. 4 ll. 25–31. 9 As an exemplary claim, independent claim 1 of the ’182 patent recites: 10 A radio frequency identification (RFID) system comprising: 11 an antenna; 12 a switchable RFID tag configured to operate in both a first ON state and a second ON state, and to transmit different information in the first ON state 13 relative to the second ON state; and 14 a mechanical switch configured to change the RFID tag from the first ON state 15 to the second ON state, wherein the antenna is configured to transmit the different information via a first radio frequency (RF) signal in the first ON 16 state and a second RF signal in the second ON state, wherein the information 17 transmitted in the first ON state indicates that the RFID tag is in the first ON state. 18 Id. at col. 33 ll. 38–52. 19 By the present motion, Defendants move pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 12(b)(6) to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 6– 21 7.) Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiff fails to state claims for patent infringement 22 against them because all the asserted claims in the asserted patents are directed to patent 23 ineligible subject matter and, thus, are invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Id.) 24 Discussion 25 I. Legal Standards for a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss 26 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal 27 sufficiency of the pleadings and allows a court to dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff has 28 1 failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Conservation Force v. Salazar, 2 646 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 3 2001)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading that states a claim 4 for relief contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 5 entitled to relief.” The function of this pleading requirement is to “‘give the defendant fair 6 notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. 7 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). 8 A complaint will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it contains “enough 9 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial 10 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 11 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. 12 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a 13 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 15 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “While legal conclusions 16 can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” 17 Id. at 679. Accordingly, dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper where the claim 18 “lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” 19 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008); see Los 20 Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017). 21 In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a district court must “‘accept the 22 factual allegations of the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable 23 to the plaintiff.’” Los Angeles Lakers, 869 F.3d at 800 (quoting AE ex rel. Hernandez v.

24 Cty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2012)). But a court need not accept “legal 25 conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Further, it is improper for a court to assume 26 the claimant “can prove facts which it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated 27 the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. 28 v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 1 In addition, a court may consider documents incorporated into the complaint by 2 reference and items that are proper subjects of judicial notice. See Coto Settlement v. 3 Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). If the court dismisses a complaint for 4 failure to state a claim, it must then determine whether to grant leave to amend. See Doe 5 v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995); Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 6 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010). 7 II. Analysis 8 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for patent infringement should be dismissed 9 because all of the asserted claims are directed to patent-ineligible abstract ideas and are, 10 thus, invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 101. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 6–7, 16–27.) Further, Defendants 11 contend that independent claims 1 and 14 of the ’182 patent should be used as 12 representative claims to assess the validity of the asserted claims under § 101. (See id. at 13 12–16.) 14 In response, Plaintiff contends that the challenged claims are not directed to an 15 abstract idea; rather, they are directed to a specific and concrete technology improvement: 16 the integration of a mechanical switch into a RFID toll transponder. (Doc. No. 22 at 1, 10– 17 17.) Plaintiff also challenges Defendants’ attempt to use two representative claims to 18 challenge the validity of all of the asserted claims. (See id. at 8–10.) 19 A. Legal Standards Governing Patent Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 20 Section 101 of the Patent Act defines patent-eligible subject matter as “any new and 21 useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 22 improvement thereof.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court has “‘long held that this 23 provision contains an important implicit exception[:] Laws of nature, natural phenomena, 24 and abstract ideas are not patentable.’” Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 25 Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab’ys, 26 Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012)). “This exception reflects the concern that patent law not 27 inhibit further discovery by improperly tying up the future use of these building blocks of 28 human ingenuity.” PersonalWeb Techs. LLC v. Google LLC, 8 F.4th 1310, 1314 (Fed. 1 Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 2 U.S. 208, 216 (2014)); see also CareDx, Inc. v. Natera, Inc., 40 F.4th 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 3 2022) (“These exceptions exist because monopolizing the basic tools of scientific work 4 ‘might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it.’” (quoting Mayo, 5 566 U.S. at 71)). 6 “The Supreme Court has established a two-step framework for evaluating patent 7 eligibility under § 101.” Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., 50 F.4th 1371, 8 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (citing Alice, 573 U.S. at 217). Under step one, the court 9 “determine[s] whether the claim is ‘directed to’ a ‘patent-ineligible concept,’ such as an 10 abstract idea.” Coop. Ent., Inc. v. Kollective Tech., Inc., 50 F.4th 127, 130 (Fed. Cir. 2022) 11 (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 217). If so, the court proceeds to step two and “examine[s] ‘the 12 elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an “inventive concept” sufficient to 13 “transform” the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.’” Id. (quoting 14 Alice, 573 U.S. at 221). Specifically, the court determines “whether the claim elements, 15 individually and as an ordered combination, contain an inventive concept, which is more 16 than merely implementing an abstract idea using ‘well-understood, routine, [and] 17 conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Id. (quoting Content Extraction 18 & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 776 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. 19 Cir. 2014)). 20 “Patent eligibility is a question of law that may involve underlying questions of fact. 21 PersonalWeb, 8 F.4th at 1314; see Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 22 2018). “Thus, patent eligibility may be resolved at the Rule 12 stage only if there are no 23 plausible factual disputes after drawing all reasonable inferences from the intrinsic and 24 Rule 12 record in favor of the non-movant.” Coop. Ent., 50 F.4th at 130 (collecting cases). 25 “But ‘not every § 101 determination contains genuine disputes over the underlying facts 26 material to the § 101 inquiry.’ Indeed, that inquiry ‘may be, and frequently has been, 27 resolved on a Rule 12(b)(6) or (c) motion where the undisputed facts, considered under the 28 standards required by that Rule, require a holding of ineligibility under the substantive 1 standards of law.’” PersonalWeb, 8 F.4th at 1314 (citations omitted). 2 The party challenging the validity of the asserted patents bears the burden of proof 3 under the § 101 two-step framework. See Illumina, Inc. v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc., 967 4 F.3d 1319, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 5 95 (2011) (“‘[T]he burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall 6 rest on the party asserting such invalidity.’” (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 282)). Further, any fact 7 pertinent to the § 101 eligibility analysis must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 8 See Berkheimer, 881 F.3d at 1368; see also Microsoft, 564 U.S. at 95 (holding that § 282 9 requires that an invalidity defense “be proved by clear and convincing evidence”). 10 B. Step One of the § 101 Eligibility Analysis 11 The Court begins its analysis of Defendants’ challenge to the validity of the asserted 12 claims of the patents by analyzing step one of the § 101 two-step inquiry. Under step one, 13 the court determines whether the asserted claims are “‘directed to’ a ‘patent-ineligible 14 concept,’ such as an abstract idea.” Coop. Ent., 50 F.4th at 130 (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. 15 at 217). The Federal Circuit has “‘approached the Step 1 directed to inquiry by asking 16 what the patent asserts to be the focus of the claimed advance over the prior art. In 17 conducting that inquiry, [courts] must focus on the language of the asserted claims 18 themselves, considered in light of the specification.’” Yu v. Apple Inc., 1 F.4th 1040, 1043 19 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (quoting TecSec, Inc. v. Adobe Inc., 978 F.3d 1278, 1292 20 (Fed. Cir. 2020)); see also CardioNet, LLC v. InfoBionic, Inc, 955 F.3d 1358, 1372–73 21 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“In determining what the claims are directed to and whether they are 22 directed to an abstract idea, a court may well consult the plain claim language, written 23 description, and prosecution history.”). The step one inquiry “presents a legal question that 24 can be answered based on the intrinsic evidence.” CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1372. 25 The Federal Circuit has cautioned that the step one “directed to” inquiry does not 26 “simply ask whether the claims involve a patent-ineligible concept, because essentially 27 every routinely patent-eligible claim involving physical products and actions involves a 28 law of nature and/or natural phenomenon—after all, they take place in the physical world.” 1 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus, courts must 2 “be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims by looking at them generally and failing to 3 account for the specific requirements of the claims.” CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1371; see In 4 re TLI Commc’ns LLC Pat. Litig., 823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “Rather, the 5 ‘directed to’ inquiry applies a stage-one filter to claims, considered in light of the 6 specification, based on whether ‘their character as a whole is directed to excluded subject 7 matter.’” Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1335 (quoting Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 8 790 F.3d 1343, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). “If the focus of the claim is a specific and concrete 9 technological advance, for example an improvement to a technological process or in the 10 underlying operation of a machine, [the court’s] inquiry ends and the claim is eligible.” 11 Adasa Inc. v. Avery Dennison Corp., 55 F.4th 900, 908 (Fed. Cir. 2022). 12 Defendants assert that the representative claims are directed to the abstract idea of 13 “processing and communicating selected options based on a user’s selection, such as for a 14 financial transaction.” (Doc. No. 12-1 at 1.) A review of the intrinsic record for the 15 asserted patents shows that Defendants are incorrect. Instead, the asserted patents are 16 directed to a switchable RFID tag, which is a specific and concrete technological advance. 17 The Federal Circuit has explained that a patent’s specification is often helpful in 18 illuminating what a claim is directed to and what is the claimed advance over the prior art. 19 Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 935 F.3d 1341, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 20 The asserted patents’ specification explains that a problem with using prior art RFID tags 21 to store confidential or personal information “is that an RFID reader can read any RFID 22 tags that pass within its range. Even if data is encrypted, this creates a possibility of 23 unauthorized access to the personal data and other information stored in the RFID tag.” 24 ’182 Patent col. 2 ll. 54–59. The asserted patents aim to solve this problem with the prior 25 art by disclosing a switchable RFID tag. See id. at col. 4 l. 21 to col. 5 l. 36; see also id. at 26 col. 9 ll. 62–64 (explaining that prior art RFID tags did not include a switch), at [54] (“RFID 27 Financial Device Including Mechanical Switch”). Thus, the specification of the asserted 28 patents illustrates that the claimed inventions are directed to a switchable RFID tag device. 1 That the claims are directed to a switchable RFID tag device is also supported by a 2 review of the claim language. Independent claim 1 of the ’182 Patent recites a RFID 3 systems comprising “a switchable RFID” and “a mechanical switch.” Id. at col. 33 ll. 38– 4 52. Similarly, independent claim 14 of the ’182 Patent recites a method, including the step 5 of “setting a mechanical switch” where the “switch” is configured to selected between a 6 plurality of ON states of a RFID tag. Id. at col. 34 ll. 18–24. As such, the intrinsic record 7 of the asserted patents makes clear that the challenged claims are directed to a switchable 8 RFID tag. Further, a switchable RFID tag is a specific and concrete technological advance 9 to a mechanical device – not an abstract idea. See Adasa, 55 F.4th at 908 (explaining that 10 when the claims focus “on a specific and concrete technological advance,” they are not 11 directed to a patent-ineligible concept). 12 Defendants contend that the asserted patents do not claim any improvements or 13 advancements to RFID tags. (Doc. No. 12-1 at 6–7, 18, 25.) That is incorrect. The intrinsic 14 record explains that prior art RFIDs did not include switches, and including a switch in a 15 RFID tag helps alleviate the problem in the prior art of possible unauthorized access to 16 confidential and/or personal data.1 See ’182 Patent col. 2 ll. 54–59, col. 9 ll. 62–64. Thus, 17 a switchable RFID tag is a concrete improvement/advancement in RFID tag devices, and 18 the way they operate. 19 Further, all of the case law cited by Defendants is easily distinguishable from the 20 asserted patents in this case. (See Doc. No. 12-1 at 23–24.) In Smart Sys. Innovations, 21 LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., the challenged claims were directed to the formation of 22 financial transactions and not any specific concrete or technology advance. 873 F.3d 1364, 23 24 25 1 In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the claimed inventions include “a variety of improvements related to the security and versatility of RFID identification and payment 26 device.” (Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 14.) In its opposition, Plaintiff contends that the claim 27 switchable RFID tags also improve upon the prior art by providing “the ability to charge different amounts based on the occupancy of the vehicle which changes traffic patterns.” 28 1 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2017). The Federal Circuit noted that the asserted claims were not “directed 2 to a new type of bankcard, turnstile, or database.” Id. at 1372. Similarly, in ChargePoint, 3 Inc. v. SemaConnect, Inc., the Federal Circuit noted that the patent’s specification never 4 suggested “the charging station itself is improved from a technical perspective, or that it 5 would operate differently than it otherwise could.” 920 F.3d 759, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2019). In 6 W. View Rsch., LLC v. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, the district court found that the 7 claims were directed to an abstract idea, in part, because “[t]he physical components of the 8 claims, such as an antenna or interrogator apparatus, a radio frequency device, a processing 9 apparatus, a personal electronic device are generic descriptions of well-known components 10 used to carry out th[e] abstract function.” 226 F. Supp. 3d 1071, 1078 (S.D. Cal. 2016) 11 (“the claims recite known RFID tag and reader systems”). In contrast to those cases, the 12 asserted patents in this case are directed to a new type of physical RFID tag device – one 13 with a switch – that operates differently from prior art RFID tags in light of the inclusion 14 of that switch in order to achieve a better result than the prior art – better protection against 15 unauthorized access to confidential and/or personal data. 16 In Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 935 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 17 2019), the “only described difference between the prior art movable barrier operator 18 systems and the claimed movable barrier operator system was that the status information 19 about the system is communicated wirelessly.” In contrast, here, the difference between 20 challenged claims and the prior art RFID tags is the inclusion of a switch – a concrete and 21 tangible advancement to the device. 22 In sum, the challenged claims of the asserted patents are directed to a specific and 23 concrete technological advance – a switchable RFID tag. As such, the claims are not 24 directed to an abstract idea. See Adasa, 55 F.4th at 908. Further, because the challenged 25 claims are not directed to a patent-ineligible concept under step one of the § 101 inquiry, 26 “the claims satisfy § 101 and [the Court] need not proceed to the second step. The claims 27 are patent eligible under § 101.” CardioNet, 955 F.3d at 1368 (citation omitted); see Rapid 28 Litig. Mgmt. Ltd. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d 1042, 1047 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“If the answer 1 [to the step one inquiry] is no, the inquiry is over: the claim falls within the ambit of § 2 101.”). 3 C. Alice Step Two 4 Although the Court need not address step two of the Alice test, see CardioNet, 955 5 F.3d at 1368, the challenged claims are also valid under step two of the Alice test. Under 6 step two, the Court asks “whether the claims do significantly more than simply describe 7 the abstract method and thus transform the abstract idea into patentable subject matter.” 8 Affinity Labs, 838 F.3d at 1262 (cleaned up). At step two, the court determines “whether 9 the claim elements, individually and as an ordered combination, contain an inventive 10 concept, which is more than merely implementing an abstract idea using ‘well-understood, 11 routine, [and] conventional activities previously known to the industry.’” Coop. Ent., 50 12 F.4th at 130. 13 Even if the challenged claims were directed to an abstract idea, the claims do not 14 merely implement an abstract idea using well understood, routine, and conventional 15 activities. The specification of the asserted patents explains that switchable RFID tags 16 were not known in the prior art. ’182 Patent col. 9 ll. 62–64. Thus, at the time of the 17 invention, use of a switchable RFID tags was not well understood, routine, or conventional 18 activity.2 As such, step two of the Alice test also demonstrates that the challenged claims 19

20 2 Defendants contend that the switch that is added the claimed switchable RFID tags 21 is “an off-the-shelf mechanical switch.” ECF No. 12-1 at 7. Defendants have not provided the Court with any evidence showing this is true. Cf Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 22 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The question of whether a claim element or combination of 23 elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.”). Nor could they because a court generally cannot consider 24 matters beyond the pleadings in deciding a motion to dismiss. See Khoja v. Orexigen 25 Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Generally, district courts may not consider material outside the pleadings when assessing the sufficiency of a complaint under 26 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Am. Contractors Indem. Co. v. 27 United States, 570 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“On a motion to dismiss, the court generally may not consider materials outside the pleadings.”). Further, even if a 28 1 || are patent eligible under § 101. 2 In sum, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that the claims of the asserted patents 3 || are invalid under § 101. As a result, the Court denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss. 4 Conclusion 5 For the reasons above, the Court denies Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss 6 || Plaintiff's complaint. Defendants must file their answers to Plaintiff's complaint within 7 || fourteen (14) days from the date this order is filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A). 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 || DATED: June 15, 2026 \ul 10 MARILYN ©. HUFF, Distri ge 1] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 || 27 ||inventive concept can be found in the non-conventional and non-generic arrangement of 28 known, conventional pieces.”” Realtime Adaptive Streaming L.L.C. v. Sling TV, L.L.C., 113 F.4th 1348, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2024).