Hot Spot Detector, Inc. v. Rolfes Electronics Corp.

102 N.W.2d 354, 251 Iowa 647, 1960 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 570
CourtSupreme Court of Iowa
DecidedApril 5, 1960
Docket49952
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 102 N.W.2d 354 (Hot Spot Detector, Inc. v. Rolfes Electronics Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Iowa primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hot Spot Detector, Inc. v. Rolfes Electronics Corp., 102 N.W.2d 354, 251 Iowa 647, 1960 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 570 (iowa 1960).

Opinion

Garfield, J.

This is the first appeal submitted to us which involves solely questions arising under our discovery rules, 121 *650 et seq., Rules of Civil Procedure, since they were changed in important respects in 1957. It concerns the propriety of certain written interrogatories filed by defendants under amended rule 121 to which plaintiff filed objections under rule 123.

Plaintiff’s petition in equity seeks to enjoin defendants from utilizing its trade secrets and an accounting for profits and damages of $250,000 from the use thereof. Defendants counterclaimed for damages of $1,000,000 for plaintiff’s alleged use of their trade secrets and violation of federal and state laws forbidding combinations in restraint of trade, monopolies and price fixing. Defendants also sought to enjoin plaintiff from disparaging their products or standing. Defendants then filed their interrogatories and plaintiff its objections thereto.

Plaintiff and defendants each make and sell thermostat controls and reporting systems for grain storage bins and buildings. The two defendants are affiliated companies which market their products under one trade name. The pleadings admit defendants employed ten of plaintiff’s former employees. Plaintiff’s petition alleges they possessed trade secrets used by it in the manufacture and sale of its products which defendants wrongfully acquired and used. Four trade secrets and five confidential papers and diagrams are referred to.

Defendants’ answer denies any wrongful conduct on their part or that plaintiff’s alleged trade secrets and items of confidential information are in fact such. It alleges plaintiff has not come into court with clean hands or proper motives, it has employed two of defendants’ former employees, is engaging in the type of conduct of which it now complains, plaintiff and its parent corporation are engaging in unfair competition, price cutting and other monopolistic practices. Further reference to the counterclaim is unnecessary now.

Defendants’ interrogatories are numbered one to 30. Plaintiff filed written objections to all and each of them. The trial court overruled the objections as to interrogatories 15, 24, 25, 26 and the first sentence of 23, and sustained the objections to the second sentence of 23 and all of the others. We granted each side an appeal, under rule 332, R. C. P., from this order. Plaintiff contends the overruled objections should have been sus *651 tained and defendants that those sustained should have been overruled.

Insofar as now pertinent, rule 121, as amended in 1957, states “a party may # * * file in duplicate not over thirty numbered interrogatories to be answered by such adversary. Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be inquired into under rule 143 * *

Rule 122, which has been in effect since our rules were adopted in 1943 and is important upon this appeal, provides: “Upon application to the court and showing good cause therefor the court may permit filing more than thirty interrogatories and may then specify the number which may be filed * * *.”

Since, according to rule 121, supra, interrogatories are keyed to rule 143 in the scope of material that may be inquired into, we set out the pertinent part of amended rule 143 relating to depositions:

“# * * the deponent may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the examining party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location of any books, documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of the relevant facts; provided that a party shall not be required to list the witnesses he expects to call at the trial. It is not ground for objection that the tesimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”

Wheatley v. Heideman, 251 Iowa 695, 702, 102 N.W.2d 343, 348, considers one phase of our present discovery ■ rules and holds they are to be interpreted broadly and liberally to effect their purpose, the trend being to broaden the scope of discovery so as to give litigants access to all material facts. Also that the test of relevancy under rule 143 is relevancy “to the subject matter involved in the pending action” rather than. in determining admissibility of evidence upon a trial or relevancy to the precise issues in the pleadings and that interrogatories should not be disallowed as irrelevant unless clearly out *652 side the scope of the case. Of course we adhere to these views now.

Although defendants’ interrogatories are, as above stated, numbered one to 30, each number, except perhaps two, is followed by more than one interrogatory — some by as many as five or six. It is fair to say the 30 numbered interrogatories are really more than three times that number. For example interrogatory 1 refers to plaintiff’s ten former employees whom defendants employed and asks that as to each of them plaintiff set forth the alleged trade secrets possessed by each, the date of imparting knowledge thereof to each, by whom such knowledge was imparted to each and state each and every fact and identify each and every document of which plaintiff has knowledge supporting the allegation that each such person knew such information was secret. Incidentally plaintiff’s petition contains no such allegation as that just referred to.

Interrogatory 30 asks, as to each of the four alleged trade secrets and five items of confidential information referred to in plaintiff’s petition, that it state in detail what measures it has taken throughout the period since their acquisition to prevent them from becoming public knowledge, including but not limited to restrictions imposed on its employees’ contacts with outsiders or on access to its plant by outsiders and undertakings by its employees to maintain secrecy with respect thereto. As to each such measure so described in detail, list, identify by date and brief description and state the present whereabouts of each and every document of which plaintiff has knowledge that relates to such measure.

Rule 121 fixes 30 as the maximum number of interrogatories that may be filed as of right. Our rules differ from the federal rules in that the latter prescribe no such limit. Rule 122 plainly contemplates that more than 30 interrogatories may be filed only after application to the trial court and showing good cause therefor. Upon such application and showing the court may permit more than 30 and may then specify the number which may be filed.

So far as the record shows defendants made no application to the court nor showing of good cause at any time for *653 permission to file more than 30 interrogatories, nor was the court asked to specify the number which might be filed. Defendants’ lack of compliance with rule 122 (in effect since 1943) must be deemed substantial, not merely technical. No adequate explanation therefor appears.

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Bluebook (online)
102 N.W.2d 354, 251 Iowa 647, 1960 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 570, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hot-spot-detector-inc-v-rolfes-electronics-corp-iowa-1960.