Horsley v. Mobil Oil Corp.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: February 3, 1994
• Docket: 93-1664
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                                     
                                 ____________________
        No. 93-1664
                             JONATHAN C. HORSLEY, et al.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                                MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,

                                      Appellee.

____________________
        No. 93-1736
                             JONATHAN C. HORSLEY, et al.,

                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                                MOBIL OIL CORPORATION,

                                      Appellee.

____________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

____________________

                                        Before

                                 Cyr, Circuit Judge,
                                      _____________

                            Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                    ____________________

                              and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
                                         _____________

____________________

             Christopher M. Perry,  with whom Brendan J. Perry  and Terance P.
             ____________________             ________________      __________
        Perry were on brief for appellants.
        _____
             Brian  P. Flanagan,  with  whom  F. Dore  Hunter  and Flanagan  &
             __________________               _______________      ___________
        Hunter, P.C. were on brief for appellee.
        ____________

____________________
                                   February 3, 1994
                                                     
                                 ____________________

CYR,  Circuit Judge.   We  must  decide whether  either
                    CYR,  Circuit Judge.
                          _____________

          punitive  damages or  damages for  loss  of parental  and spousal

          society allegedly caused by a  nonfatal injury to a seaman aboard

          a vessel in territorial waters are recoverable in an unseaworthi-

          ness action under  the general maritime law.   On plenary review,

          see Gaskell v. The Harvard Coop. Soc'y, 3 F.3d 495, 497 (1st Cir.
          ___ _______    _______________________

          1993), we affirm the summary judgment entered against plaintiffs-

          appellants  based on the  analysis required  under Miles  v. Apex
                                                             _____     ____

          Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990).
          ____________

I
                                          I

                                      BACKGROUND
                                      BACKGROUND
                                      __________

                    Plaintiffs-appellants Jonathan C. Horsley and his wife,

          Elizabeth Horsley, allege that he  sustained a back injury in the

          course of his duties aboard a vessel owned  by defendant-appellee

          Mobil Oil Corporation  while operating in the  territorial waters

          of  the Gulf of  Maine.   Their unseaworthiness  action involves,

          inter alia, claims for  punitive damages by Jonathan C.  Horsley;
          _____ ____

          and damages  for loss of parental society  by their minor son and

          loss of spousal society by Elizabeth Horsley.  The district court

          entered summary judgment for Mobil on all three claims.1

____________________

               1Jurisdiction  over this  interlocutory admiralty  appeal is
          based  on  28 U.S.C.  1292  (a)(3). See  Martha's  Vineyard Scuba
                                              ___  ________________________
          Headquarters, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and  Abandoned Steam
          __________________    ___________________________________________
          Vessel, 833 F.2d 1059, 1064 (1st Cir. 1987).
          ______

                                          2
                                          _

II
                                          II

                                      DISCUSSION
                                      DISCUSSION
                                      __________

                    The Supreme Court  has decided that damages for loss of

          society are not  cognizable in a general maritime  action for the

          wrongful death of a  seaman, because "[i]t would be  inconsistent
                   _____

          with [the  Supreme Court's]  place in  the constitutional  scheme

          were  we to  sanction more  expansive  remedies in  a judicially-

          created cause of action in  which liability is without fault than

          Congress has  allowed in  cases  of death  resulting from  negli-

          gence."   Miles, 498  U.S. at 33.   The  Court reasoned  that the
                    _____

          remedial  limitations  imposed by  Congress in  admiralty actions

          predicated  on negligence likewise  restrict an admiralty court's

          power  to fashion damages  remedies in actions  under the general

          maritime law, such as the present unseaworthiness claim against a

          vessel where liability may be imposed without establishing fault.

          See  Seas Shipping  Co. v.  Sieracki, 328  U.S. 85,  94-95 (1946)
          ___  __________________     ________

          (noting unseaworthiness  "is essentially  a species  of liability

          without fault").  Thus, the  admiralty court's remedial  autonomy

          is "both direct[ed]  and delimit[ed]" by federal  statute, Miles,
                                                                     _____

          498  U.S. at 27, insofar  as Congress has  spoken directly to the

          point in  issue, id.  at 31,  citing Mobil  Oil Corp.  v. Higgin-
                           ___          ______ ________________     _______

          botham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
          ______

                    Two statutes are directly  relevant to general maritime

          claims based on  fatal injury:   the Death on  the High Seas  Act
                           _____

          (DOHSA), 46  U.S.C.   761, et seq., and  the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
                                     __ ____

            688, both enacted in 1920.  DOHSA makes specific provision only

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                                          _

for the  recovery of damages for  pecuniary loss.   See 46 U.S.C.
                                            _________         ___

            762 ("The recovery . . . shall  be a fair and just compensation

          for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit

          the  suit is brought  . . . .").  Notwithstanding  that the fatal

          injury at issue in Miles did not take place on the high seas, the
                             _____

          Supreme Court considered DOHSA indicative of congressional intent

          in cases involving fatal injuries to seamen in territorial waters

          as well.  Miles, 498 U.S. at 31.
                    _____

                    Since the  Jones Act does  afford a right of  action to

          dependents  of seamen fatally  injured in territorial  waters, it

          formed the  principal focus of  inquiry in Miles.   The Jones Act
                                                     _____

          simply incorporated by reference the remedial  scheme established

          twelve years  earlier under  the Federal  Employee Liability  Act

          (FELA), 46  U.S.C.   688.   FELA, the  progenitor of  all federal

          liability  schemes, simultaneously  afforded a  uniform  cause of

          action  for  railroad  workers  and  dispensed  with  traditional

          master-and-servant defenses.   See  generally Rogers  v. Missouri
                                         ___  _________ ______     ________

          Pac.  R. Co., 352 U.S. 500 (1957).   FELA's language is unhelpful
          ____________

          on  its  face, however,  as  it  simply provides  for  "damages,"

          without further elaboration.  45 U.S.C.   51.

                    This  seeming  dead-end  is  averted, nevertheless,  by

          Congress's adoption and incorporation, in  the Jones Act, of  the

          remedial  scheme previously established  under FELA.   The courts
                           __________

          may assume that  Congress, at the time it enacted  the Jones Act,

          was cognizant of  the decisional law developed under  FELA during

          the twelve-year  interim between the  enactment of the  two stat-

4
                                          _

utes.   Miles, 498 U.S. at 32; see generally Cannon v. University
                  _____                  ___ _________ ______    __________

          of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,  696-97 (1979) ("It is always appropri-
          __________

          ate  to assume  that  our  elected  representatives,  like  other

          citizens, know the law . . . .").

                    The  Miles  Court  relied extensively  on  just  such a
                         _____

          decision,  see Michigan  Cent. R.  Co. v.  Vreeland, 227  U.S. 59
                     ___ _______________________     ________

          (1913),  which revealed  yet another  evolutionary  layer in  the

          development of wrongful death statutes:

                        In  [Vreeland] the  Court explained  that
                             ________
                    the language of the FELA wrongful death  pro-
                    vision  is essentially  identical to  that of
                    Lord  Campbell's Act,  9 &  10  Vict. ch.  93
                    (1846),  the  first wrongful  death  statute.
                    Lord Campbell's  Act also  did not limit  ex-
                    ____ __________  ___
                    plicitly the "damages"  to be recovered,  but
                    that  Act and  the many  state statutes  that
                    followed it consistently had been interpreted
                                ____________ ___ ____ ___________
                    as  providing  recovery  only  for  pecuniary
                    __  _________  ________  ____  ___  _________
                    loss.
                    ____

          Miles, 498 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added), citing Vreeland, 227 U.S.
          _____                                   ______ ________

          at 69-71.   Finally, the Miles Court retraced  the development of
                                   _____

          wrongful  death statutes  into  the  Twentieth  Century  and  the

          meaning of the unelaborated FELA term "damages" became clear:

                    When  Congress  passed  the  Jones  Act,  the
                    Vreeland gloss on FELA,  and the hoary tradi-
                    ________
                    tion behind  it, were well  established.  In-
                    corporating  FELA  unaltered into  the  Jones
                    Act, Congress must have  intended to incorpo-
                    rate the  pecuniary limitation on  damages as
                    well.   We assume  that Congress is  aware of
                    existing  law  when  it  passes  legislation.
                    There is no recovery for loss of society in a
                    Jones Act wrongful death action.

          Id.
          ___

                    Uniformity  provided  the companion  rationale  for the

          Miles decision.   See Moragne  v. States Marine Lines,  Inc., 398
          _____             ___ _______     __________________________

                                          5
                                          _

U.S. 375, 402 (1970) ("admiralty  law should be 'a system  of law

          coextensive  with,   and  operating   uniformly  in,   the  whole

          country.'"  (quoting The Lottawanna, 88  U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575
                               ______________

          (1875))).  As noted, damages  awarded under DOHSA are  restricted

          to pecuniary  loss.   Miles cautions  that  the traditional  gap-
                                _____

          filling function of  the admiralty court is to  be exercised only

          in furtherance of the presumed congressional objective of unifor-

          mity:

                    We no  longer live in an era  when seamen and
                    their loved  ones must look  primarily to the
                    courts as a source  of substantive legal pro-
                    tection from injury  and death; Congress  and
                    the  States  have legislated  extensively  in
                    these areas.  In this era, an admiralty court
                    should  look primarily  to these  legislative
                    enactments for policy guidance.   We may sup-
                                                      __ ___ ____
                    plement these statutory  remedies where doing
                    _______ _____ _________  ________ _____ _____
                    so would achieve  the uniform vindication  of
                    __ _____ _______  ___ _______ ___________  __
                    such policies  consistent with  our constitu-
                    ____ ________  __________ ____  ___ _________
                    tional mandate, but we must also keep strict-
                    ______ _______  ___ __ ____ ____ ____ _______
                    ly within the limits imposed by Congress.
                    __ ______ ___ ______ _______ __ ________

          Miles, 498 U.S. at 27  (emphasis added).  Thus, Miles "restore[d]
          _____                                           _____

          a uniform rule  applicable to all actions for  the wrongful death

          of  a seaman, whether under DOHSA, the  Jones Act, or the general

          maritime law[,]" by limiting damages in wrongful death actions to

          the amount of pecuniary loss.  Miles, 498 U.S. at 33. 
                                         _____

A.   Damages in Nonfatal-Injury Cases
          A.   Damages in Nonfatal-Injury Cases
               ________________________________

                    The  district  court  relied  primarily  on  Murray  v.
                                                                 ______

          Anthony J. Bertucci  Constr. Co., 958 F.2d 127  (5th Cir.), cert.
          ________________________________                            ____

          denied, 113  S. Ct. 190  (1992), in holding that  Miles precludes
          ______                                            _____

          punitive damages and damages for  loss of society under the Jones

          Act.  See  also Smith v. Trinidad  Corp., 992 F.2d 996  (9th Cir.
                ___  ____ _____    _______________

                                          6
                                          _

1993) (adopting  Murray reasoning)  (per curiam);  and Lollie  v.
                           ______                            ___ ______

          Brown Marine Serv., Inc., 995  F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1993) (same).
          ________________________

          For the reasons discussed below, we agree.

                    Under  the  analysis  obligated  by Miles,  we  inquire
                                                        _____

          whether Congress has preempted all interpretive discretion on the

          part of the  admiralty court    as the  traditional protector and

          benefactor of its  wards    in extending damages  relief for non-
                                                                       ___

          pecuniary  loss in the  present context.  At  the outset, we note

          distinctions  pertinent to  our inquiry.   First, since  DOHSA is

          inapplicable to nonfatal injuries sustained  by a seaman aboard a

          vessel operating in territorial waters, it has no  direct bearing

          on the damages remedies presently at issue.  Accordingly, whatev-

          er direct  analogic bearing DOHSA  had in Miles is  diminished in
                                                    _____

          the present context.  Second, as concerns the Jones Act, Vreeland
                                                                   ________

          is inapposite  to the  availability of  damages for  nonpecuniary
                                                               ___

          loss in cases involving nonfatal injuries.2  The Miles methodolo-
                                  ___                      _____
                              
          ____________________

               2At a time  when wrongful death statutes were  very much the
          exception, the Vreeland  Court explicitly distanced its  analysis
                         ________
          from that involved in nonfatal injury cases:

                    This  [wrongful  death]  cause  of action  is
                    independent of any cause of action the  dece-
                    dent had,  and includes  no damages  which he
                    might have recovered for his injury if he had
                    survived.   It is  one beyond that  which the
                    decedent had    one proceeding on all togeth-
                                    ___ __________ __ ___ _______
                    er different principles.
                    __ _________ __________

          Vreeland, 227 U.S.  at 68 (emphasis added).   These "all together
          ________
          different principles,"  of course,  derived from  Lord Campbell's
          Act,  the first wrongful  death statute:  "It  is a liability for
          the loss  and damage  sustained by relatives  dependent upon  the
          decedent.  It  is therefore a liability for  the pecuniary damage
          resulting to them, and for that only."  Id.  In sum, the evidence
                                                  ___
          directly adduced by the Miles Court is not particularly probative
                                  _____

                                          7
                                          _

gy takes us beyond Vreeland, however.
                             ________

                    In  Igneri v. Cie.  de Transports Oceaniques,  323 F.2d
                        ______    ______________________________

          257 (2d Cir.  1963), the Second Circuit inquired  into the avail-

          ability of damages  for loss of society  under the Jones  Act and

          concluded as follows:

                    The  failure of the Jones Act to confer . . .
                    a  right   [to  loss   of  society/consortium
                    damages]  on the spouse of a seaman cannot be
                    dismissed as an inadvertence.   The policy of
                    the  Federal  Employees  Liability  Act,  the
                    regime which the Jones Act made applicable to
                    seamen,  was  that  the new  remedy  for  the
                    employee was to be exclusive and that  claims
                    of relatives recognized by  state law were to
                    be abrogated; the FELA had been thus authori-
                                  ___ ____ ___ ____ ____ ________
                    tatively construed  before the Jones  Act was
                    ________ _________  ______ ___ _____  ___ ___
                    passed.
                    ______

          Igneri, 323 F.2d at 266 (emphasis added), citing New York Cent. &
          ______                                    ______ ________________

          H. R.R. v. Tonsellito, 244  U.S. 360 (1917) (FELA precludes claim
          _______    __________

          brought  by father for "loss of services" of minor son injured in

          course of employment with railroad).   Finally, the thrust of the

          Supreme  Court's holding  in Tonsellito  is that  FELA  affords a
                                       __________

          remedy to  injured workers    and  only to workers,  not to their

          relatives:  "Congress having declared  when, how far, and to whom

          carriers shall be liable on account of accidents in the specified

          class,  such liability  can  neither  be  extended  nor  abridged

          . . . ."  New York Cent. & H. R.R., 244 U.S. 360, 362 (1917); see
                    ________________________                            ___

          also New York  Cent. R.R. v. Winfield, 244  U.S. 147 (1917); Erie
          ____ ____________________    ________                        ____

          R.R.  v. Winfield,  244 U.S.  170 (1917).   Thus,  the Tonsellito
          ____     ________                                      __________

          rationale  ineluctably precludes  the present claims  for damages

____________________

          beyond the discrete confines of wrongful death actions.

                                          8
                                          _

for loss of parental and spousal society.3

                     Similarly,  compelling  evidence   precludes  Jonathan

          Horsley's claim for punitive damages.  "It has been the unanimous

          judgment of  the courts since  before the enactment of  the Jones
                                  _____  ______ ___ _________ __  ___ _____

          Act  that punitive  damages  are  not  recoverable  under"  FELA.
          ___

          Miller v. American  President Lines,  Ltd., 989  F.2d 1450,  1457
          ______    ________________________________

          (6th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added), citing Kozar v. Chesapeake & O.
                                            ______ _____    _______________

          R. Co.,  449 F.2d 1238,  1240-43 (6th Cir. 1971)  (citing cases).
          ______

          Once again,  therefore, since  the Supreme  Court's authoritative

          interpretation  of FELA  antedated enactment  of  the Jones  Act,

          Miles  mandates  the  conclusion that  punitive  damages  are not
          _____

          available in  an  unseaworthiness action  under general  maritime

          law.

III
                                         III

                                      CONCLUSION
                                      CONCLUSION
                                      __________

                    Under the analysis  prescribed in Miles v.  Apex Marine
                                                      _____     ___________

          Corp., 498  U.S. 19 (1990), an admiralty court may not extend the
          _____

          remedies available in an unseaworthiness action under the general

          maritime law to  include punitive damages or damages  for loss of

          parental or  spousal society.   Accordingly,  the district  court
                              
          ____________________

               3No court of appeals recognizes a claim for loss of parental
          society under general maritime law.  Murray, 958 F.2d at 132 n.3,
                                               ______
          citing De Loach v.  Companhia de Navegacao Lloyd Brasileiro,  782
          ______ ________     _______________________________________
          F.2d  438 (3d Cir. 1986); and Madore  v. Ingram Tank Ships, Inc.,
                                    ___ ______     _______________________
          732 F.2d  475 (5th Cir.  1984)).  Moreover, the  cognizability of
          such claims in a minority of the states,  Prosser & Keeton, Torts
                                                                      _____
            125  (5th ed.  1984), would  provide no  basis under  Miles for
                                                                  _____
          recognizing such  a remedy  in an  action for unseaworthiness    
          closely akin to  a strict liability claim    where it is not even
          widely available in nonadmiralty actions.

                                          9
                                          _

judgment must be affirmed.

                    Affirmed.  The parties shall bear their own costs.
                    ________   ______________________________________

                    SO ORDERED.
                    SO ORDERED.
                    __ _______

10
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