Horsehead Industries, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc.

258 F.3d 132, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20811, 52 ERC (BNA) 1897, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15934, 2001 WL 811648
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedJuly 17, 2001
Docket99-3865
StatusPublished
Cited by99 cases

This text of 258 F.3d 132 (Horsehead Industries, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Horsehead Industries, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 258 F.3d 132, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20811, 52 ERC (BNA) 1897, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15934, 2001 WL 811648 (3d Cir. 2001).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

AMBRO, Circuit Judge.

The issue presented in this appeal is whether a state court judgment, which requires Horsehead Industries, Inc. (“Horsehead”) contractually to indemnify Paramount Communications, Inc. (“Paramount”) for all environmental costs arising from Horsehead’s purchase of certain Paramount operations, subsequently can be used by Paramount collaterally to es-top Horsehead’s federal CERCLA contribution claim. As a threshold matter, we conclude that, under New York law, the state court declaratory judgment requiring Horsehead to indemnify Paramount is sufficiently final to be given preclusive effect, despite the fact that damages have yet to be decided. Applying New York’s principles of collateral estoppel, we find that the scope of the indemnity provision is sufficiently broad to encompass the identical issues in the federal CERCLA contribution case, and that the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue before the New York courts. We therefore affirm the decision of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (“District Court”) granting preclusive effect to the judgment of the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division.

I. Background

At the heart of this appeal is the interplay between two sources of liability for the cost to remedy environmental damage — a contractual indemnification provision and statutory liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9627, 9651-9675, 6911a; and 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-12, 4661-62. With respect to the *135 former, parties to a contract can indemnify each other for the costs stemming from environmental liabilities, and those clauses will be interpreted under traditional contract law principles. Where sufficient consideration exists—either as a benefit to the promisor, or a detriment to the prom-isee—the indemnification clause is enforceable. See Holt v. Feigenbaum, 52 N.Y.2d 291, 437 N.Y.S.2d 654, 419 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y.1981) (holding that a written promise to indemnify co-shareholders against disproportionate loss was supported by legally sufficient consideration and therefore was enforceable).

Parties may also be statutorily liable to the federal Government for cleanup costs under CERCLA, a determination made in a suit filed by the Government against potentially responsible parties. The purpose of CERCLA is “to assure that the current and future costs associated with hazardous waste facilities, including post-closure costs, will be adequately financed and, to the greatest extent possible, borne by the owners and operators of such facilities.” See 42 U.S.C. § 9607; OHM Remediation Services v. Evans Cooperage Co., Inc., 116 F.3d 1574 (5th Cir.1997) (noting CERCLA’s broad, remedial purpose to facilitate prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to shift costs of environmental response from taxpayers to parties who benefitted from wastes that caused harm). To effect this purpose, Congress cast the liability net wide to capture all potentially responsible parties. 1

Under CERCLA, if a purchaser were found liable for cleanup costs, it could then seek cost recovery or contribution from the seller absent an indemnification agreement to the contrary. See Nicholas A. Robinson, Environmental Regulation of Real Property § 22.03[2] (1998). Where such an indemnity agreement was entered into, contractual and statutory liability for remediation co-exist. In this context, CERCLA recognizes the parties’ right contractually to indemnify each other, although § 107(e)(1) does not permit the transfer of statutory liability vis a vis the Government;

No indemnification, hold harmless, or similar agreement or conveyance shall be effective to transfer from the owner or operator of any vessel or facility or from any person who may be liable for a release or threat of release under this section, to any other person the liability under this section. Nothing in this subsection shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party to such agreement for any liability under this section.

42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1). While the parties remain jointly and severally liable for cleanup responsibility, the statute permits, inter alia, the allocation of the costs for cleanup via indemnification agreements. *136 See SmithKline Beecham Corp., v. Rohm and Haas Co., et al., 89 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir.1996) (citing Beazer East, Inc., v. Mead Corp., 34 F.3d 206, 211 (3d Cir.1994)). Of course, “statutory liability under CERCLA endures even if contractual liability is later determined to be nonexistent.” GNB Battery Technologies, Inc., v. Gould, Inc., 65 F.3d 615, 621 (7th Cir.1996).

In this appeal, the contractual liability and statutory liability for the remediation of environmental damage are allegedly in conflict because the New York state courts determined the contractual liability, including CERCLA contribution claims, to flow one way — to Horsehead — while the statutory liability is joint and several.

II. Factual and Procedural History With this background, we turn to the facts before us. 2

Since the late 19th century, the New Jersey Zinc Company (“NJZ”) conducted zinc ore smelting operations in the vicinity of Palmerton, Pennsylvania. 3 These smelting operations did not employ air emissions control equipment or devices to prevent the leaching of hazardous wastes into the soil, groundwater or watercourses. “As a result, the areas in which the smelting took place suffered drastic on-site and off-site contamination and degradation, including the formation of slag heaps permeated with heavy metals, known as ‘cinder banks’, which, at Palmerton alone, contained approximately 30 million tons of residue.” Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Horsehead Industries, Inc., 231 A.D.2d 40, 660 N.Y.S.2d 718, 719 (App.Div.1997).

In the late 1970s, Gulf and Western Industries, Inc. (G & W), Paramount’s predecessor in interest, purchased NJZ. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed CERCLA. As a result, “the cinder banks became a regulatory concern because heavy metals were leaching into the soil and into nearby waterways.” Id.

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258 F.3d 132, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20811, 52 ERC (BNA) 1897, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15934, 2001 WL 811648, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/horsehead-industries-inc-v-paramount-communications-inc-ca3-2001.