Horne v. Commissioner

52 T.C. 572, 1969 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 97
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJune 30, 1969
DocketDocket No. 1543-68
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 52 T.C. 572 (Horne v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Horne v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 572, 1969 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 97 (tax 1969).

Opinion

OPINION

Section 151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that in the case of an individual there shall be allowed as a deduction an exemption of $600 for each dependent whose gross income for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins is less than $600 or who is a child of the taxpayer who has not attained the age of 19 or who is a student.1 Section 152(a) defines the term “dependent” as including a son of the taxpayer over half of whose support, for the calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, was received from the taxpayer.2

The respondent’s determination that the claimed exemption is not allowable is presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of proving it wrong. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, and Bernard C. Rivers, 33 T.C. 935.

The petitioner points out that the word “support” as used in section 152(a) is not defined and therefore contends that it must be considered as having been used in its ordinary sense which he contends includes only the items necessary to maintain life, namely, food, shelter, and clothing, and possibly medical attention. It is his position that such term does not include education. The petitioner further points out that the statute requires that the person claiming the exemption must have provided more than half of the dependent’s support, and not more than half of the cost of such sujiport. He thus in effect questions the validity of section 1.152-1 (a) (2) (i) of the Income Tax Regs.3 in providing that education is to be considered as a part of support and in providing that generally the amount of an item of support will be the amount of expense incurred or, if the item of support is in the form of property or lodging, its fair market value.

The petitioner points out that for about 28 weeks of the taxable year 1965 he furnished his son all his meals, laundry services, and a private room with full access to all facilities of the petitioner’s home (that in fact the room was available to the son for the full 52 weeks), and that for the full year he furnished all his clothing and all medical expenses, whereas all the supjiort which the son himself furnished was meals and lodging and laundry services for only about 24 weeks of that year.

The petitioner therefore contends that it should be considered that he furnished more than one-half of his son’s support during the taxable year. He concedes that he may well have spent less money than his son but states that nevertheless he furnished considerably more support. He states that cost is an equitable measure of support only if all parties concerned purchase support at the same level of trade, as at wholesale or retail. He argues that the son, being transient at the time of supporting himself, was forced to purchase his support at retail, whereas he, the petitioner, in furnishing support, made purchases at the lowest possible,cost commensurate with quality. He testified in effect that the type or quality of room and board which he furnished his son was approximately equal to that which the son paid for while away from Atlanta.

Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, sec. 25, no exemption was permitted if the claimed dependent had gross income of $600 or more. Section 151(e) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 for the first time provided for such an exemption even though the claimed dependent had gross income of $600 or more if the claimed dependent was a child of the taxpayer and had not attained the age of 19 or, irrespective of age, if the child was a student. It is to be further noted that section 152(d) sets forth a “Special Support Test in Case of Students,” which provides, that in the case of any individual who is a son, stepson, daughter, or stepdaughter of the taxpayer and who is a student, amounts received as scholarships shall not be taken into account in determining whether such individual received more than half of his support from the taxpayer. To us, these enactments indicate that Congress intended that education should be considered as an item of support. But for this specific enactment of section 152(d) it seems clear that amounts received as scholarships would be taken into account in determining the total support of the claimed dependent. It logically follows that any amounts expended by either the taxpayer or the claimed dependent for education are to be considered as a part of such claimed dependent’s total support.

This conclusion is, we think, supported by the statements made in the congressional committee reports with respect to the enactment of sections 151(e) (1) (B) and 152(d) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.4

We think section 1.152-1 (a) (2) of the regulations correctly includes education as an item of support. It is well established that Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly, inconsistent with the revenue statutes, and that they constitute' contemporaneous constructions by those charged with administration- of these statutes which should not be overruled except for weighty reasons. Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, and Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, and cases therein cited. The regulations are not unreasonable or plainly inconsistent with the Internal Revenue Code in providing that the term “support” includes education. In addition, we have heretofore held that amounts paid for education at parochial schools constitute amounts spent for support. See Bernard C. Rivers, supra, and Martha J. Blyth, 21 T.C. 275.

It is our conclusion that Ae items of education (tuition and books) which the son himself furnished must be included in determining his overall support for the year 1965. When such item is taken into consideration, along with the support which the son furnished for himself in the form of room and board and laundry service while away from Atlanta, it cannot be concluded that the petitioner has shown that he furnished more than half of his son’s support for that year, even under petitioner’s proposed method of compairing the amount of support furnished by him with the amount furnished by the son. In view of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to express any opinion with regard to the petitioner’s basic contention that the amount of support furnished is not to be measured by the cost of the items of support.

It may be added that there has been no proof adduced which would permit us to determine, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations, the amount of support furnished by either the petitioner or his son, inasmuch as there is no evidence as to amounts expended by either (except for a $70 dental bill paid by petitioner on account of his son) or as to the fair market value of the lodging or any property furnished by the petitioner.

In view of the foregoing, the respondent’s disallowance of the claimed dependency exemption is approved.

Decision will be entered for the respondent.

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1981 T.C. Memo. 102 (U.S. Tax Court, 1981)
Taitt v. Commissioner
1978 T.C. Memo. 264 (U.S. Tax Court, 1978)
McCauley v. Commissioner
56 T.C. 48 (U.S. Tax Court, 1971)
Lewis v. Commissioner
1969 T.C. Memo. 262 (U.S. Tax Court, 1969)
Horne v. Commissioner
52 T.C. 572 (U.S. Tax Court, 1969)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
52 T.C. 572, 1969 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 97, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/horne-v-commissioner-tax-1969.