Hormel v. United States

11 F.R.D. 376, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3639
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 5, 1951
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 11 F.R.D. 376 (Hormel v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hormel v. United States, 11 F.R.D. 376, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3639 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).

Opinion

S. H. KAUFMAN, District Judge.

This is a motion, pursuant to Rule 24(b) -(2) 1 of the Federal,Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., to intervene as a party plaintiff in an action brought under Rule 23(a) (3) 2

In the original action, instituted on November 30, 1950, plaintiff claims to be acting on behalf of himself and all other persons similarly situated.

The question at issue in the action is the right of the United States to apply divL dends declared by the Veterans’ Administration on National Service Life Insurance policies against indebtedness incurred "by the -veteran- ■ as a result of the payment [377]*377by the Administration of premiums and interest on the veteran’s commercial life insurance policies.

The applicant for intervention states in support of his motion that he is a member of the class for which the original action was instituted and that there are common questions of law and fact affecting the rights of both parties although the relief sought is different’in amount.'

Defendant contends that the motion should be denied because to grant it would be permitting a suit against the United States without compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) 3, since the moving party is a resident of New Jersey.

The simple requirement of Rule 24(b) (2) that the applicant’s claim and the main action have a common question of law or fact has been met. It does not appear that if the application were granted the original parties would be unduly prejudiced. There remains only the question of whether or not the court may order intervention in' view of the venue requirements of § 1402(a).-

The authority to institute a suit against the United States in the event' of a disagreement regarding a claim arising out of a contract o'f insurance with the Veterans’ Administration is given by 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 445 and 817. § 817 makes §' 445 applicable to suits upon claims made in' connection with National Service Life Insurance. 38 U.S.C.A. § 445 provides: “In the event of disagreement as to claim * * * under a contract of insurance between the Veterans’ Administration and any person or persons claiming thereunder an action on the claim may be brought against the United States either in the district court of the United States for the District of Columbia or in the district court of the United States in and for the district in which such persons or any one of them resides * * This section has been construed as permitting intervention. Marsh v. United States, 4 Cir., 1938, 97 F.2d 327.

. In Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 1926, 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 29, Judge Cardozo stated: “The exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to"add to its rigor ;by refinement of -construction where consent has been, announced.” That quotation is pertinent to the problem presented in this case. Furthermore, it would' be illogical to hold that in a class suit, where independent grounds of jurisdiction are not required, all parties would have to meet the venue provisions. See 4 Moore, Federal Practice 148 (2d Ed. 1950): “And where the action is a class suit, whether true, hybrid or spurious, venue should not be a barrier to intervention by other members of the class, even though intervention is permissive. Independent grounds of federal jurisdiction'are not required in such a case, and the same should be true as to venue; particularly in the spurious class suit, if the class action is to serve its purpose venue objections to intervention cannot be sustained.”

Motion granted; settle order on notice.

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17 F.R.D. 303 (S.D. New York, 1955)

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Bluebook (online)
11 F.R.D. 376, 1951 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3639, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hormel-v-united-states-nysd-1951.