Hopkins v. Hopkins

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Hopkins v. Hopkins

623 So. 2d 586, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8827, 1993 WL 321727

CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida

DecidedAugust 25, 1993

DocketNo. 93-0903

StatusPublished

This text of 623 So. 2d 586 (Hopkins v. Hopkins) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hopkins v. Hopkins, 623 So. 2d 586, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8827, 1993 WL 321727 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

We reverse a temporary injunction restraining appellant from disposing of personal property described in the complaint as “inventory, including motor vehicles, equipment, trade fixtures, tools, parts and accessories,” because an injunction should not be granted for the retention of personal property unless the property is unique. Esposito v. Homing, 416 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The property described in this complaint does not meet that requirement. In addition, the temporary injunction is defective because it fails to “specify the reasons for entry,” as required by rule 1.610(c), Fla. R.Civ.P. and Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Greenspoon & Marder, P.A., 551 So.2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).

Reversed.

HERSEY and KLEIN, JJ., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur.

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PER CURIAM.

We reverse a temporary injunction restraining appellant from disposing of personal property described in the complaint as “inventory, including motor vehicles, equipment, trade fixtures, tools, parts and accessories,” because an injunction should not be granted for the retention of personal property unless the property is unique. Esposito v. Homing, 416 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982). The property described in this complaint does not meet that requirement. In addition, the temporary injunction is defective because it fails to “specify the reasons for entry,” as required by rule 1.610(c), Fla. R.Civ.P. and Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc. v. Greenspoon & Marder, P.A., 551 So.2d 584 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).

Reversed.

HERSEY and KLEIN, JJ., and DOWNEY, JAMES C., Senior Judge, concur.

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623 So. 2d 586, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 8827, 1993 WL 321727, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hopkins-v-hopkins-fladistctapp-1993.

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