Hopkins County, Kentucky v. Jacob Adams

CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedJuly 2, 2026
Docket2025-CA-0953
StatusUnpublished

This text of Hopkins County, Kentucky v. Jacob Adams (Hopkins County, Kentucky v. Jacob Adams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hopkins County, Kentucky v. Jacob Adams, (Ky. Ct. App. 2026).

Opinion

RENDERED: JULY 2, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2025-CA-0953-MR

HOPKINS COUNTY, KENTUCKY APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM HOPKINS CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER B. OGLESBY, JUDGE ACTION NO. 25-CI-00367

JACOB ADAMS; KENTUCKY FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; AND MADISON ADAMS APPELLEES

OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING

** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, ECKERLE, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: Hopkins County appeals from the Hopkins Circuit Court’s

denial of its motion to dismiss based upon sovereign immunity. Because we hold

that Hopkins County’s participation in the Kentucky Association of Counties All

Lines Trust Fund (“KALF”) does not constitute a limited waiver of its sovereign immunity under KRS1 67.180, we reverse and remand for the circuit court to

dismiss the complaint against Hopkins County with prejudice.

BACKGROUND

Jacob Adams (“Adams”), an employee of Hopkins County, was

injured in a motor vehicle accident while operating a Hopkins County vehicle in

the scope of his employment. He subsequently filed a complaint in Hopkins

Circuit Court seeking uninsured motorist benefits from his own insurance provider,

Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, and the county’s insurance

provider, KALF.2 The complaint also named Hopkins County as a party, because

KALF “provides uninsured motorist coverage to Hopkins County, Kentucky,

which is the primary insurance in this matter.”

Hopkins County moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting its

sovereign immunity. Adams responded that Hopkins County had waived its

immunity to the limited extent allowed by KRS 67.180 by purchasing insurance,

citing Independence Bank v. Welch, 636 S.W.3d 528, 530 (Ky. 2021). According

to Adams, the statute “allows a suit to be maintained against the county for the sole

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 2 Adams’ complaint incorrectly named the Kentucky Association of Counties, Inc., (“KACo”), a non-profit organized under the authority of KRS 65.210 et seq., the Interlocal Cooperation Act. KACo operates the Kentucky All Lines Trust Fund. At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Hopkins County represented that it would not oppose Adams amending his complaint to add KALF, the insurance entity, as a party.

-2- purpose of collecting the insurance that the county maintains for the benefit of its

employees.” Following a hearing, the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss,

and this interlocutory appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The issue of whether Hopkins County has waived its sovereign

immunity requires us to interpret KRS 67.180. “Statutory interpretation is a

question of law, which we review de novo.” Welch, 636 S.W.3d at 531.

ANALYSIS

“The waiver of sovereign immunity is exclusively a legislative

matter.” Welch, 636 S.W.3d at 532 (citing Withers v. Univ. of Ky., 939 S.W.2d

340, 344 (Ky. 1997)). Kentucky courts “will find waiver only where stated by the

most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as

[will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Withers, 939 S.W.2d

at 346 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). KRS 67.180(1) permits

Kentucky counties, in their discretion, and for the “protection of the public and its

employees” to “purchase policies of insurance of all kinds deemed advisable,

covering vehicles operated by the county, and compensation insurance covering

employees of the county receiving injuries arising out of and in the course of

employment.” KRS 67.180(2) goes on to provide that

Suits instituted on such policies may be maintained against the county only for the purpose of obtaining a

-3- judgment which when final shall measure the liability of the insurance carrier to the injured party for whose benefit the insurance policy was issued, but not to be enforced or collectible against the county or fiscal court or the members thereof.

Kentucky courts have interpreted subsection (2) as “provid[ing] an

express, but limited, waiver of sovereign immunity because it permits suits against

the county but only to obtain a judgment to measure the liability of the insurance

carrier to the injured party.” Welch, 636 S.W.3d at 532; see also Monroe Cnty. v.

Rouse, 274 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Ky. 1954) (recognizing that KRS 67.180(2) modified

the common law rule of sovereign immunity by authorizing a suit against the

county for the sole purpose of measuring the liability of the county’s insurance

provider); Ginter v. Montgomery Cnty., 327 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Ky. 1959) (holding

that “[S]ubsection (2) of KRS 67.180 clearly recognizes the immunity doctrine in

providing that a suit on such a policy is maintainable against the county only for

the purpose of obtaining a judgment which shall measure the liability of the

insurance carrier, and shall not be enforced or collectible against the county or the

fiscal court.”). Our Supreme Court has held that “[t]he legislative intent [of KRS

67.180] is clear . . . that a waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to the narrow

circumstances where the county has purchased an insurance policy, in which case

suit can be instituted on that policy.” Welch, 636 S.W.3d at 533–34.

-4- Hopkins County argues that its participation in KALF (a self-

insurance fund) does not waive its sovereign immunity, citing Welch. In Welch,

our Supreme Court considered whether a county’s maintenance of a self-insurance

policy waives its immunity under KRS 67.180. The Court held that “purchase

policies of insurance” is an “operative phrase” in the statute and looked to the

definitions of “insurance” and “self-insurance,” noting that with self-insurance,

unlike other forms of insurance, there is no contract with an insurance company.

Id. at 534 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)). Another factor

distinguishing self-insurance from insurance, as identified by the Court, is the lack

of risk shifting in self-insurance. Finally, the Court observed that “KRS 67.180(1)

authorizes the fiscal court to ‘purchase policies of insurance of all kinds’ and

LFUCG’s self-insurance policy was not purchased[,] . . . [r]ather, the self-

insurance policy and fund were created by LFUCG.” Id.

Considering these differences and the statute’s operative language, the

Court concluded that

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Related

Commonwealth Board of Claims v. Harris
59 S.W.3d 896 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2001)
Yanero v. Davis
65 S.W.3d 510 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 2001)
Ginter v. Montgomery County
327 S.W.2d 98 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1959)
Withers v. University of Kentucky
939 S.W.2d 340 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1997)
Monroe County v. Rouse
274 S.W.2d 477 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1954)
Franklin County, Ky. v. Malone
957 S.W.2d 195 (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1997)

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