Hop Wah v. Crosby

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided August 9, 2023·No. 1:23-cv-01420·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK JOHN HOP WAH, Plaintiff, -against- ADEYEMI ADEBOLA, DHS Police Officer; CORDELL CROSBY, DHS Police Officer; CYRUS VANCE, former New York County 23-CV-1420 (LGS) District Attorney; ALVIN BRAGG, current New ORDER OF SERVICE York County District Attorney; JAMES ZALETA, Assistant District Attorney; KELLI CLANCY, Assistant District Attorney; AARON GINANDES, Assistant District Attorney; MARK DUGGAN, Investigator for the District Attorney; VASILIKI KARLIS, Dental Physician, Defendants.

LORNA G. SCHOFIELD, District Judge:

Plaintiff John Hop Wah brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated his rights. He names as Defendants (1) Adeyemi Adebola and (2) Cordell Crosby, a New York City Department of Homeless Services (“DHS”) police officer employed by Bellevue Men’s Shelter; (3) Cyrus Vance, the former New York County District Attorney; (4) Alvin Bragg, the current New York County District Attorney; (5) James Zaleta, Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”); (6) Aaron Ginandes, ADA; (7) Kelli Clancy, ADA; (8) Mark Duggan, an investigator for the District Attorney and (9) Vasiliki Karlis, a dental physician at Bellevue Hospital. By order dated February 23, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. As set forth in this order, the Court (1) dismisses Defendants Vance, Bragg, Zaleta, Ginandes, Clancy, and Duggan for prosecutorial immunity; (2) dismisses Defendant Karlis for witness immunity; (3) directs service on Defendants Adebola and Crosby and (4) refers Plaintiff to the New York Legal Assistance Group.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW A court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of a complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); see Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2003); accord Clark v. Schroeder, 847 F. App’x 92, 93 n.1 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order). A court must also dismiss a complaint when the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, pro se pleadings “must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Barnes v.

City of New York, 68 F.4th 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2023).1 But the special solicitude in pro se cases has its limits; to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. See Harnage v. Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2019) (“[T]he basic requirements of Rule 8 apply to self-represented and counseled plaintiffs alike.”). To withstand a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Kaplan v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 999 F.3d 842, 854 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

678 (2009)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

1 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alterations, emphases, footnotes and citations are omitted. conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; accord Dane v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 974 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2020). It is not enough for a plaintiff to allege facts that are consistent with liability; the complaint must “nudge[ ]” claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007);

accord Bensch v. Est. of Umar, 2 F.4th 70, 80 (2d Cir. 2021). To survive dismissal, “plaintiffs must provide the grounds upon which their claim rests through factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Rich v. Fox News Network, LLC, 939 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2019). II. DISCUSSION A. District Attorneys, Assistant District Attorneys, and District Attorney Investigator

The claims against Defendants Vance, Bragg, Zaleta, Ginandes, Clancy, and Duggan are barred by prosecutorial immunity and therefore dismissed. Prosecutors are immune from civil suit for damages in their individual capacities for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature, but rather are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Anilao v. Spota, 27 F.4th 855, 864 (2d Cir. 2022); see Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2019) (“Absolute immunity bars § 1983 suits against prosecutors for their role in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case.”). Absolute immunity is analyzed under a “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.” See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993); accord Harris v. Denully, No. 23 Civ. 4601, 2023 WL 4534473, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2023). In addition, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Ogunkoya, 913 F.3d at 70 (2d Cir. 2019). Absolute immunity also applies to “employees who assist [the] prosecutor and who act under that prosecutor’s direction in performing functions closely tied to the judicial process.” Washington v. Napolitano, 29 F.4th 93, 103 (2d Cir. 2022). Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983 for damages against Defendants Vance, Bragg, Zaleta,

Ginandes, Clancy, and Duggan arise from their criminal prosecution of Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s assertions of bad faith and bias are insufficient to overcome Defendants’ entitlement to immunity. Plaintiff’s claims are therefore dismissed under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity and as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (iii); Collazo v. Pagano, 656 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding claims dismissed for prosecutorial immunity are frivolous under the IFP statute); accord Walden v. New York Cnty. Dist. Attorney's Off., No. 17 Civ. 9370, 2018 WL 11464574, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2018).

B. Defendant Karlis, Dental Physician Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Karlis are also dismissed. Witnesses are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for damages for their testimony, even if their testimony was false. See Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 366-69 (2012); accord Morales v. City of New York, 752 F.3d 234

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