Hongsermeier v. Cooper B-Line, Inc.

2026 IL App (5th) 240790-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: January 13, 2026
• Docket: 5-24-0790
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 240790-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/13/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-0790 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the

Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

LYNETTE HONGSERMEIER, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 20-L-1411 ) COOPER B-LINE, INC., ) Honorable ) Sarah D. Smith, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

PRESIDING JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Boie concurred in the judgment. Justice Vaughan dissented.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed where the defendant was found to have violated the Illinois Equal Pay Act of 2003 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. The award of damages pursuant to the Illinois Equal Pay Act and the Illinois Human Rights Act is affirmed.

¶2 Following a bench trial, the defendant, Cooper B-Line, Inc. (B-Line), was found to have

violated the Equal Pay Act of 2003 (Equal Pay Act) (820 ILCS 112/1 et seq. (West 2022)) and the

Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2022)) for paying Lynette

Hongsermeier (Lynette), a female employee, less than a male employee for substantially similar

work. B-Line was ordered to pay Lynette “diminished earnings” damages in the amount of

$2,067.26, including interest, from March 10, 2019, to March 22, 2020, and the amount of

$32,882.28 for damages from March 22, 2023, to June 30, 2025. The circuit court also awarded 1 $10,000 in special damages for emotional distress and for interfering with Lynette’s rights under

the Equal Pay Act and attorney fees and costs. B-Line now appeals, asking that the judgment be

reversed as there was insufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s findings and conclusions,

and Lynette’s causes of action were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations

Act, 1947 (LMRA) (29 U.S.C. § 185 (2018)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 B-Line, Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Eaton corporation, which operates a

manufacturing plant in Troy, Illinois. Lynette has been a long-time employee at B-Line, working

24 years in the shipping department. At all times relevant to the proceedings, B-Line designated

certain employees as “leads” who were responsible for managerial duties as identified by a job

description. From March 10, 2019, to March 22, 2020, Lynette worked as the first shift shipping

lead in the shipping department. During this same time period, Eddie Enriquez (Eddie), a co-

worker, was employed as the second shift shipping lead. Lynette alleged she was paid less than

her male co-employee, Eddie, for performing substantially similar job duties. On October 6, 2020,

Lynette filed her complaint in the circuit court of Madison County against B-Line. 1 In count I,

Lynette alleged gender discrimination in violation of section 2-105 of the Human Rights Act (775

ILCS 5/2-105 (West 2018)). Count II alleged a violation of “the Illinois Wage Payment and

Collection Act (820 ILCS 115 [(West 2018))].” Count III alleged a violation of “the Illinois Equal

Pay Act (820 ILCS 11[2] [(West 2018))].” All of the allegations in Lynette’s complaint related to

her claim that because she was female, she was paid less than Eddie for performing substantially

1 Lynette alleged she had perfected a charge of gender discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and was issued a “Right to Commence Action in Circuit Court,” thereby exhausting her administrative remedies prior to filing her complaint in the circuit court. 2 similar work for the job designated as a lead. Lynette sought compensatory damages and special

damages pursuant to the allegations in her complaint.

¶5 B-Line answered Lynette’s complaint and admitted that:

“At all times it was the policy of Defendant Cooper B-Line, Inc. to designate

‘leads’ for each department. The leads were responsible for supporting the daily

operations of their department and ensuring that the Defendant’s performance

standards were met for matters including safety, quality, and delivery. In addition,

shipping leads were responsible for some managerial duties including assisting

workers in their department with their general needs including personal protective

equipment, receiving materials, and packing and crating goods manufactured by

Defendant. Shipping leads also were expected to maintain key customer

relationships with outsider vendors and drivers receiving goods to be shipped.”

B-Line denied that it was liable for discriminating against Lynette and for the other acts claimed

in her complaint. 2 B-Line further raised affirmative defenses. B-Line claimed that Lynette was

paid according to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Therefore, the CBA dictated the

payment to employees and thus B-Line had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the

difference in pay alleged. Further, because of the CBA, Lynette’s claims were preempted by

section 301 of the LMRA. Additionally, any claim that B-Line violated the Equal Pay Act more

than five years before Lynette filed her complaint was time-barred. B-Line further argued that any

claims relating to count I that were not raised in the administrative charge with the Illinois

B-Line admitted that Lynette had perfected a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department 2

of Human Rights and that she was issued a “Right to Commence Action in Circuit Court,” thereby exhausting her administrative remedies.

3 Department of Human Rights (Department) or that arose more than 300 days prior to the filing of

the administrative charge with the “EEOC/IDHR” were time barred, and finally, that Lynette failed

to mitigate her damages when she failed to accept training that would have resulted in a pay

increase.

¶6 Subsequently, B-Line moved for summary judgment in its favor on all claims asserted by

Lynette. B-Line claimed that Lynette worked as a “shipping coordinator lead in the shipping

department on the first shift from 2015-2020.” B-Line further argued that because Lynette was

paid pursuant to a CBA, resolution of the claims in her complaint required interpretation of the

contract. Therefore, section 301 of the LMRA preempted Lynette’s claims. B-Line also claimed

that Lynette did not follow the grievance procedure under the CBA, and therefore no claim under

the LMRA could proceed because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.

¶7 Lynette responded to the preemption defense, and conceded that count II, the Wage

Payment and Collection Act claim, required interpretation of the contract and was preempted by

the LMRA. She withdrew this count prior to trial. As to counts I and III, Lynette argued that these

claims did not require interpretation of the CBA and were thus not preempted. In addition, Lynette

argued that her claims arose outside of the CBA, and therefore she did not have to follow the

grievance procedure under the CBA. On January 19, 2023, the motion for summary judgment was

heard by the circuit court and denied.

¶8 On March 21, 2023, and April 11, 2023, the circuit court conducted a bench trial on the

merits. Nicholas Knouse was the plaintiff’s first witness. Knouse testified that from 2019 to 2020,

he was the operations manager for B-Line’s Troy, Illinois, plant. Between March of 2019 and

March 2020 the only women working as leads at the Troy plant were in the shipping department.

Knouse explained that in 2019, B-Line completed a reevaluation process of the required number 4 of leads for particular departments as a result of an unrelated union grievance where “multiple

people in the plant [were] being paid lead pay that were not doing the lead role.” The shipping

department employed approximately ten leads. In March 2019 the union and the company

reviewed the payments being made to employees and an attempt at equity in payment for the lead

role was put into effect. At the conclusion of the reevaluation, B-Line prepared and posted job

descriptions to employ only one lead for the first shift and one lead for the second shift. The job

descriptions were identical for the first shift and the second shift.

¶9 Knouse testified that Lynette was awarded a bid in 2019 for the first shift lead. The job

posting for “Shipping Lead, Shift:1,” Lynette’s job, included a description of “responsibilities and

expectations,” and the job posting was introduced into evidence. Knouse explained that Lynette

was chosen because she “demonstrated the skill set to be lead over the shipping coordinators” and

she “performed very well at her role.” Knouse further testified that Lynette had been meeting his

reasonable expectations for the job.

¶ 10 Knouse also identified the job posting for the “Shipping Lead, Shift: 2” that was in effect

in March of 2019. Knouse testified that this was the posting under which Eddie performed his job.

Knouse indicated that the job description for the shipping lead on the second shift set forth the

essential functions of the job, but it was “not all inclusive.” He testified that the second shift had

“additional responsibilities.” Knouse indicated that the responsibilities between the first and

second shift differed because the second shift often had to step up and do the “dual” position, or

train the duals, whereas the first shift shipping lead did not have that responsibility.

¶ 11 Knouse conceded that when the two job descriptions were compared with one another, they

were identical and with an identical pay rate, which was posted as “Shipping Coordinator rate +

$1 (19.96 + $1 for 2019).” He noted that Lynette and Eddie reported to the same plant manager, 5 that they worked in the same shipping department, that the trucks came into the same docks, and

that the same freight was always shipped out. In addition, while in the office, Lynette and Eddie

used similar computers and the same software and forms. They both put in a high degree of effort.

¶ 12 Knouse testified that he was not aware that Eddie got paid $0.40 more per hour until

Lynette walked into his office in September of 2019, to bring the pay disparity to his attention.

Knouse began investigating and asked the Human Resources Department of B-Line (HR) to get

involved. Ultimately, a meeting was held on December 9, 2019, that involved HR and the union

representatives. Knouse did not inform Lynette of the meeting, as he left that to the union

representatives.

¶ 13 Knouse identified the minutes from the December 9, 2019, meeting, which set forth the

attendees. Eddie was present as a union representative and as the individual whose pay was being

discussed. Other attendees included plant managers and union representatives. Knouse was present

with HR personnel. Lynette was not present at the start of the meeting. A discussion was held with

HR personnel regarding the pay disparity between Lynette and Eddie. Eddie was getting paid “a

dollar above the dual” because “a member of management had coded it that way for Eddie and

made an agreement with him.” Knouse explained that a “dual” is a job classification. It refers to

an individual who can operate a crane and a forklift. So, the operator has a “dual responsibility”

between the crane and forklift. There were duals that were assigned to the shipping department. A

dual, according to the CBA, had a certain wage scale. Knouse did not believe that Lynette, as a

part of her job duties, directed the duals in the shipping department.

¶ 14 Knouse testified that Lynette was brought in toward the end of the December 9, 2019,

meeting. Knouse explained that Jennifer Kahl, the union business agent, informed Lynette that the

company was still looking into the pay issue. Kahl had added, that, “We are still having the 6 conversation and needing to work some things out. They may revisit the job description and add

job duties, potentially offering you that job.” Knouse testified that this meant the company was

going to see if it could “reevaluate the lead responsibility on the day shift lead role to add

responsibility to lead the dual operators.”

¶ 15 After the December 2019 meeting, a new job description was prepared for first shift

shipping lead. There was an ongoing discussion in the company regarding what to put in the job

description so that the payment would be the same as Eddie received as second shift lead and got

paid for leading the duals. As a result of discussions within the company, in which Eddie

participated, the job description for the first shift shipping lead was changed. The payment rate

was changed to “Dual Rate + $1 ($20.87 + $1 for 2020).” The new job description did not include

any reference to management of the duals, although there were some changes to the tasks set forth

in the “Departmental Focus.” Knouse believed that Lynette was offered training to become the

first shift shipping lead so she would be paid the same as Eddie, but he had no first-hand knowledge

of this fact.

¶ 16 On cross-examination, Knouse testified that he was currently the plant manager for the

Troy facility. The workers at the plant were members of a union and a collective bargaining

agreement was in place that dictated the salaries for each employee’s job description. He knew

Lynette as an employee who worked as shipping coordinator lead on the day shift, working from

7 a.m. to 3 p.m. The second shift worked from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m., and the overnight shift worked

from 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. Knouse acknowledged that Lynette and Eddie had the same titles as

shipping coordinators but testified that their job duties were different as shipping leads. Knouse

explained that Eddie had the responsibility to step in as a forklift operator when necessary and to

train the newer forklift operators. Eddie could run the crane. He was performing those additional 7 job responsibilities almost every day. Knouse further admitted, however, that Lynette had

customer support team responsibilities on first shift that Eddie did not have. She also had more

direct responsibility to “call in the loads that were going to be done.”

¶ 17 Knouse again explained the restructuring that was done by the company in 2019 pursuant

to a grievance unrelated to this action. The restructuring was performed to ensure that there was

equity throughout the “unionized operation.” After Lynette brought up the pay disparity between

herself and Eddie, there was another restructuring. This time, the company wanted to afford

Lynette the opportunity to learn the same job as the second shift shipping lead. Brittany Robinson,

Lynette’s supervisor, would have had a discussion with Lynette about taking on this new job,

although Knouse was not there personally for the discussion. Knouse testified that Lynette opted

not to take the job and “voluntarily removed herself from the lead.” After Lynette stepped down,

the job was assumed by Jean Burnett, who had the same skill set as Eddie in that she could operate

the forklift and the crane. Burnett was then paid the same as Eddie. Krouse noted that Eddie was

no longer working as the second shift shipping lead. Eddie moved to the day shift and received the

same pay as Lynette, who was still working in the shipping department.

¶ 18 One of Lynette’s co-workers, Robert Landry, testified that he has been with B-Line for 46

years in the shipping department. He described Lynette’s abilities to perform her job duties as

“excellent.” He indicated that Lynette did the “LTL’s—Less Than Truckloads”—for various

trucking companies. She talked to sales and solved problems and made up sheets for the dual

operators. He described it as a “very stressful shift.” Based upon his experience, he opined that

Lynette was performing as shipping lead according to all of the expectations of the job. Landry

testified that he was one of the lead men who was stripped of his pay as a apart of the restructuring

where the shipping department was reduced to having one lead. That is when Lynette got the lead. 8 ¶ 19 Lynette testified that she had been employed at B-Line since October of 1999. She worked

in the shipping department for 13 years, and from March 2019 to March 2020 she held the position

of shipping lead for the first shift. She testified that she performed the work according to the job

posting for the 2019 first shift shipping lead. As shipping lead, her job was to “get things shipped

out the door.” She handled the LTLs and customer service all day long. Lynette explained that she

directed the duals as a part of her job from March 2019 to March 2020. She pulled load tickets

when she came in and created a load sheet which she gave to the duals which told them where to

find the product. Her job was to make sure the product was on the truck. The job was stressful

because trucks are delivering in all directions trying to get the product to the customer. Lynette

further indicated that in directing the duals, she often went to the floor where they were located to

make sure an order was properly filled. Lynette indicated she watched the duals “to make sure they

were operating safely.” Lynette opined that she had “face-to-face direct communication with the

duals.” She would tell them what product goes where for shipping out. She did a lot of

“troubleshooting.” She also went on the truck after it was loaded “to make sure everything was

right.” If something was left off of the truck, she contacted the dual. If something extra was on the

truck, she had to contact the dual to take it off. Lynette testified that she did more work than the

second shift shipping lead because she had the paperwork for the loads ready by second shift.

There was far less paperwork on second shift because “the pickups, the bills, everything’s done.

All they’ve got to do is come in—as the pickups come in, they just load it.”

¶ 20 Lynette recalled that she had an initial meeting with Knouse in September 2019. She told

Knouse she thought it was unfair that Eddie was getting paid more than she was. Lynette testified

that Knouse agreed and indicated he would look into it.

9 ¶ 21 Lynette testified about the meeting held on December 9, 2019. She noted that she had not

been invited to attend beforehand. Knouse had called her up to the conference room to join “a

whole room of people.” Lynette explained that she was not prepared to present her wage claim

because she did not know the meeting was occurring. She would have wanted her union

representative with her. In addition, she would have called some co-workers as witnesses and had

written down what she wanted to say. She did not have the opportunity to do so. Lynette testified,

“I mean, I just walked into everybody there and it was almost over.” The business agent, Kahl,

told Lynette that “they would change a few things.” Lynette was never told what they wanted to

change. Lynette denied that Robinson offered any further training opportunities for the new dual

responsibilities that were created in March 2020.

¶ 22 With regard to her claim for damages from March 10, 2019, to March 22, 2020, Lynette

calculated her diminished earnings by taking the difference between Eddie’s pay and her pay,

which was figured at $0.40 per hour on regular time and $0.60 per hour on overtime, and then

multiplied that amount by 57 weeks. She calculated a pay difference of $2,067.20, including

interest. Lynette also calculated her diminished earnings from March 23, 2020, through June 30,

2025. She explained that she used the end date of June 30, 2025, because she had to retire at 67,

and this represented the date of her retirement. Lynette acknowledged that in calculating this pay,

she averaged the number of regular hours she worked and averaged her overtime hours and added

the one-dollar loss that she no longer received as shipping lead, which totaled $32,882.28,

excluding interest.

¶ 23 Lynette indicated she did not bid for the first shift shipping lead when the job was posted

in 2020 because she was hurt by how she had been treated by B-Line. At this point in time, from

March 2019 to March 2020 only women were the first shift shipping leads in the plant. All of the 10 men were getting paid a dollar over what she was paid. Eddie told Lynette that he was getting paid

more than she was as a second shift shipping lead. Lynette found it was unfair that Eddie received

higher pay for performing the same job, and that prompted her to see Knouse. Lynette also thought

it was unfair that the company decided Eddie was leading the duals and she was not.

¶ 24 On cross-examination, Lynette acknowledged that the applicable CBA contract language

during the time she alleged a pay disparity required that “when an employee is appointed as a lead

man by the company, he shall receive a premium of $1 per hour above the highest job classification

normally under his direction.” In her opinion, as first shift shipping lead, she had always led the

duals. However, at the meeting she attended in December 2019 she was informed by those present,

including her union representatives and Eddie, that the job Eddie performed was different than the

job she was performing. As a result, the company agreed with the union’s decision to give a

different pay rate for the second shift shipping lead than she received as first shift shipping lead.

Lynette was asked about the charge of discrimination she had made with the Department. She

acknowledged that she did not raise gender but claimed she was not being paid properly under the

collective bargaining agreement. She thought the company had misinterpreted the CBA. Lynette

believed she should have been paid over the dual classification, not the shipping coordinator

classification.

¶ 25 Lynette admitted that she had never worked the second shift, although the shift times

occasionally overlapped; that she did not operate a crane or forklift; and that she had not made a

claim based upon gender in her complaint regarding wage disparity. In 2020, Lynette stepped

down from the shipping coordinator lead position. She testified that the company “did not

forcefully remove” her from the position. Another woman, Burnett, took over that position. Burnett

was certified to operate a crane and forklift and could train a dual if necessary. 11 ¶ 26 On redirect examination, Lynette again identified her charge with the Department. She

pointed out that she claimed “sex” was the basis for her charge of discrimination.

¶ 27 Lynette’s counsel next called Carrie Zylstra-Skinner, the corporate representative for B-

Line. Zylstra-Skinner testified that the reason Eddie was paid more was because he was paid a

dollar over the rate for the highest class under his direction, which would have been the duals. In

2019, Eddie was leading the duals. In 2019, when Eddie and Lynette took over the shipping leads,

Lynette was paid a dollar over the shipping coordinator wage rate, while Eddie was paid a dollar

over the wage rate for the dual operators. This was so even though the job descriptions for both

the first shift shipping lead and second shift shipping lead indicated payment would be made at the

rate of one dollar over the shipping coordinator rate. Zylstra-Skinner could not produce a document

from B-Line that approved the increased pay to Eddie for leading the duals. She could not explain

why the job postings were the same and did not include Eddie’s responsibilities for leading the

duals. She distinguished between Lynette’s job duties and Eddie’s job duties regarding “lead” the

duals. “It’s very different, though, to provide a load sheet that says what loads go into which truck

versus actually actively being out there to facilitate and direct and help assist with putting the loads

onto the truck.” She admitted, however, that in order to determine “the standard of what constitutes

leading the duals,” it “is fair to say” that this decision is outside of the terms of the CBA. She

agreed that in determining whether particular employees lead the duals, there is no interpretation

of language in the CBA. Only the wage rates are in the CBA.

¶ 28 B-Line kept records of the training, and Zylstra-Skinner identified the kind of record

maintained by B-Line. However, the company did not produce any training records for Eddie as a

part of discovery. Eddie’s training responsibilities for the duals were considered as on-the-job

12 training where he showed the new hires the safety requirements around operating forklifts and

cranes.

¶ 29 In response to questions from the court, Zylstra-Skinner testified that the union contract

had a wage table that always paid pursuant to a certain job classification. Zylstra-Skinner explained

that “if someone flexes into a higher class, they would receive the higher pay,” but if “someone

flexes down, they still maintain their higher rate. So, you always maintain that higher rate.” After

the restructuring in 2019, even though the job descriptions were to be paid as a “shipping

classification plus $1 more,” Eddie maintained the higher rate because of his job duties. “Eddie

would have had to have flexed into doing additional responsibilities from the dual standpoint, from

dual support, from dual lead, because there’s not as many people available” on second shift. She

explained that when she used the term, “flex,” it meant “stepping into a new classification.” So,

although Eddie was a shipping coordinator, he had to also direct the duals and do dual

responsibilities as well. In order for an employee to flex into the additional job responsibilities

after the 2019 restructuring, it would have taken a manager’s approval, and the approval would

have been verbal. But even when the restructuring happened in 2019, “there was no impact on pay.

It’s always the same, you know, a dollar over the highest class that is normally under their

direction.” Zylstra-Skinner stated that the reason Eddie was paid a dollar more than set forth in the

job description was because he was “leading duals.” Therefore, if management made the

determination that an employee was leading the duals, then the CBA controlled what the wage

classification should be.

¶ 30 The circuit court also inquired as to whether B-Line had any policies that required

documentation of all on-the-job training to be kept. Zylstra-Skinner indicated there were no

policies, but the records would be kept electronically with HR. 13 ¶ 31 On cross-examination, B-Line’s counsel asked Zylstra-Skinner whether the provision in

section 11.04 of the CBA regarding payment of “a premium of $1 per hour above the highest job

classification normally under his direction” required an interpretation of what was meant by

“normally under his direction.” She responded that the grievance process could be used by an

employee who wanted clarification of an ambiguous term in the collective bargaining agreement.

Zylstra-Skinner explained the three-step grievance process that was outlined in the CBA that could

be used to resolve disputes with an employee. If the grievance process did not resolve the dispute,

there would be an additional step of arbitration. In Lynette’s case, she had not filed a grievance

under the CBA after the meeting held with the company and union representative in December of

2019.

¶ 32 Zylstra-Skinner identified a chart she had assembled that showed Eddie was paid more

from 2013 through 2019 than other shipping coordinator leads. Eddie was being paid the higher

amount for supervising the duals. In 2019, B-Line showed that Burnett was being paid the same

amount as Eddie, as she was now supervising the duals on first shift. Burnett could operate a crane

and forklift, she would do inspections, evaluations, and could train duals. Zylstra-Skinner

identified a list of responsibilities that Eddie performed on second shift, that Lynette did not. The

list indicated that Eddie “operates forklift and overhead crane, directs other operators of forklift

and overhead, loads trucks and directs the loads and paperwork, completes inspection checks, lead

reporting of dual safety measures, dock process lead, show duals how to do the job.” In her opinion,

Lynette did not perform any of those tasks as a lead. Zylstra-Skinner further indicated that as a

result of the December 2019 meeting, the union was involved in the decision regarding the

appropriate pay that Eddie was receiving. It was determined that Eddie’s tasks were different than

Lynette’s and that Eddie “leads over the duals, so [he] should get a dollar over that class.” Zylstra- 14 Skinner further indicated that the company did not make unilateral decisions about pay without

consulting the union.

¶ 33 On redirect by Lynette’s counsel, Zylstra-Skinner agreed that section 11.04 of the CBA

referred to payments for classifications “normally under his direction.” She admitted that the notes

from the meeting in December 2019 did not indicate there was any discussion regarding the

interpretation of the phrase, “normally under his direction.” With regard to the grievance process,

if a grievance had been filed, a meeting would have been held, and Lynette would have had the

right to be present throughout. Zylstra-Skinner considered the December 9, 2019, meeting as a

“discussion” and not part of a formal grievance process. She believed that it was up to the union

to bring Lynette to that meeting.

¶ 34 Zylstra-Skinner further admitted that during the 57 weeks Lynette alleged a pay disparity,

only women worked the first shift as shipping leads, and Eddie worked the second shift shipping

lead. Eddie was paid a dollar more than the women because he led the duals. When asked whether

the term, “flex,” appeared in the CBA, Zylstra-Skinner indicated she did not know, but that she

used the term as a “descriptive word.” It meant, “moving someone from one class to another or

leading one department over another.” It refers to classifications in the wage table. She further

testified that there was no job description for a “dual lead.” It would be a “lead over the duals”

because a dual is a job classification, not a department. And at the December 2019 meeting, there

was discussion about the “lead over the duals” by the union. This referred to the “higher job

classification than the shipping coordinator classification.”

¶ 35 At the conclusion of Lynette’s evidence, B-Line recalled Knouse, the plant manager.

Knouse first acknowledged there were two structural changes that occurred at B-Line—one in

2019 and one in 2020. After the structural change at the plant in March 2019 a decision was made 15 to repost the number of leads required for various jobs. Three people applied for the first position,

including Lynette, who went through the interview process and was selected. At the time of this

position restructuring, Knouse did not know that Eddie performed different tasks as second shift

lead. Therefore, the job descriptions in March 2019 for the first shift lead and the second shift lead

did not account for the differences in job duties.

¶ 36 In September of 2019, Lynette came to Knouse and indicated she was not being paid the

same as Eddie. Knouse contacted Elizabeth Slife, in HR, who looked into the issue. No grievance

was filed. A meeting was held in December of 2019, where the feedback from the participants,

including the union, was that Eddie performed different job functions where he led the duals and

Lynette led the shipping coordinator class. “So in that December review, the BA and the HR team

and I discussed if we could re-evaluate the lead responsibility on day shift to then include

responsibilities to enable Lynn to be able to lead the duals.” In addition to reevaluating the job

description, a discussion was had that an effort should be made to get Lynette more training so that

she could get the same pay as Eddie. The business agent for the union, Kahl, explained to Lynette

during the December 2019 meeting that Eddie was being paid more than Lynette, but that this

“was not known to anyone sitting at the table until [Lynette] brought it to their attention.” Kahl

further indicated that Lynette performed different job duties than Eddie. Lynette had not filed a

grievance, so the process of having her at the meeting was not followed.

¶ 37 After the meeting, HR took a look at the job structure on the first shift and the second shift.

The job description for the first shift shipping lead was changed to include the requirement that

the lead: “Lead members of the shipping, receiving, pack, crate, and HDG departments.” The pay

rate for the first shift shipping lead was changed to one dollar above the dual classification rather

than the shipping coordinator classification. Knouse claimed that the newly posted job description 16 was amended in March of 2020, to reflect the additional responsibilities to have a lead over the

duals on the day shift. Knouse thought that Lynette was given the opportunity to train for the

position that had more responsibilities, but she stepped down as first shift shipping coordinator

lead. Knouse did not have any first-hand knowledge regarding what was said to Lynette, as this

was handled by the shipping supervisor, Robinson. 3 After Lynette stepped down, B-Line then

posted the newly revised lead job for the first shift, which was filled by a woman. Additional job

duties were added to the March 2020 job description to make sure the first shift lead could lead

the duals. Knouse maintained that Lynette was offered the opportunity to make the same amount

of money as Eddie by undergoing training on using a crane and leading a dual.

¶ 38 Knouse testified that Eddie no longer worked as second shift lead because he took a

position on the first shift in the shipping department. Eddie now works with Lynette and makes

the same pay as Lynette. Burnett gets paid more than both Eddie and Lynette because Burnett is

first shift shipping lead. The wage scale was determined by the CBA.

¶ 39 On cross-examination, Knouse again admitted that the 2019 job descriptions for the first

shift shipping lead and second shift shipping lead were the same. The justification for paying Eddie

for leading the duals from March of 2019 to December of 2019, was a retroactive decision, made

based upon the union and the company believing that Eddie “did the job of being a lead over a

dual.” Knouse further acknowledged that when there are reviews, such as occurred at the

December 2019 meeting, if Lynette did not know about it, she “may not have been prepared to

speak.” But the reviews are open, so if Lynette had anything to say, there was nothing that would

3 Brittany Robinson did not testify at trial. 17 have prevented her from speaking up. The notes from that meeting indicated, however, that no one

asked Lynette to support her claim.

¶ 40 At the conclusion of Knouse’s testimony, B-Line rested its case. The parties submitted

various exhibits that were admitted into evidence. Lynette had no rebuttal witnesses and rested her

case. Lynette’s counsel argued in closing that B-Line violated the Equal Pay Act because Lynette

was performing substantially similar work as Eddie. The problem was that in March 2019 when

the job descriptions for shipping lead first shift and shipping lead second shift were posted, and

contained identical descriptions, B-Line did not know that Eddie was being paid more. Lynette

argued that B-Line did not know that Eddie was being paid more until September 2019 when

Lynette brought it to Knouse’s attention, and then a justification had to be found for having made

this payment to Eddie. Lynette further argued that it was fundamentally unfair to Lynette not to

have her at the December 9, 2019, meeting, and not to allow her notice and an opportunity to be

heard. As a result, she was deprived of her right not to be interfered with in respect to making her

claim. Instead, she was simply told about the difference in job duties between first shift and second

shift, which was based on Eddie leading the duals. After that meeting, it took until March 2020 for

B-Line to change the job posting to add job duties to the first shift shipping lead position. B-Line

claimed that Lynette was offered the new job for first shift lead on February 18, 2020, but the

evidence was that this would have occurred prior to the new job description being put into place.

Lynette argued that B-Line had violated the Equal Pay Act, which is a strict liability statute. A

person of one gender cannot be paid more than a person of another gender for performing

substantially similar work. Lynette claimed she had suffered damages in the amount of $2,067.21

for 57 weeks as a result of the pay discrepancy between March 2019 and March 2020. Further,

because of the new position, and the way Lynette had been treated by B-Line, she argued that she 18 was entitled to damages in the amount of $32,882,28. This represented her diminished earnings

from the time of the new job posting on March 29, 2020, to June 29, 2025, the date of Lynette’s

67th birthday, which would be the date of her retirement. Lynette further argued that B-Line had

violated the Human Rights Act in that Lynette was in a protected class and she was performing

her duties within expectations. Eddie, a person outside of her class, was treated more favorably.

Thus, the burden shifted to B-Line to show a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for paying Eddie

more than Lynette. Lynette asked for damages in the amount of $10,000 to compensate Lynette

for the way B-Line treated her. Lynette also requested attorney fees and costs.

¶ 41 B-Line’s counsel also made a closing argument. B-Line relied on the fact that there was a

CBA in place that determined how much each of the employees was paid. The CBA directed an

additional payment of one dollar above the highest job classification “normally under his

direction.” Eddie had duals normally under his direction and he was paid according to the CBA.

After the first restructuring in 2019, there was one shipping lead for the first shift and one shipping

lead for the second shift in the shipping department. B-Line was unaware of the pay disparity until

Lynette complained that Eddie was being paid differently. In December 2019 there was a meeting,

where Lynette was told she does not perform the same job duties as Eddie. Therefore, Eddie was

paid more, pursuant to the CBA. The union representative told Lynette in the meeting that she was

going to be offered training to have the opportunity for an even playing field, but Lynette turned

that opportunity down. When Lynette decided to step down as a lead shipping coordinator, B-Line

hired Burnett, a woman, as first shift lead shipping coordinator who also leads the duals. Further,

Lynette did not follow the process set forth in the CBA for bringing grievances regarding her

complaint involving contract interpretation. B-Line asked that Lynette’s claims be denied and

judgment be entered for B-Line. 19 ¶ 42 After closing arguments, the circuit court took the matter under advisement. On October

23, 2023, the circuit court issued a written ruling, containing findings of fact and conclusions of

law. The circuit court concluded that during the period from March 10, 2019, to March 22, 2020,

B-Line violated “the Illinois Equal Pay Act (820 ILCS 112/) (‘IEPA’)” through pay discrimination

and found gender discrimination under “the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/) (‘IHRA’)”

by paying Eddie more than Lynette for “performing the substantially similar duties.” Pursuant to

the Equal Pay Act, the circuit court awarded damages in the amount of $2,067.26, including

interest, for the period of March 10, 2019, to March 22, 2020, for the pay disparity between Lynette

and Eddie. For the period from March 23, 2020, to June 30, 2025, the circuit court awarded

diminished earnings damages in the amount of $32,882.28, excluding interest. These damages

reflected the additional sum Lynette would have earned if she had continued to work as first shift

shipping lead to the date of her retirement. Further, the circuit court awarded Lynette special

damages for her emotional distress in the amount of $10,000 for the way B-Line treated her after

she reported the pay disparity, including a finding that B-Line “interfered” with Lynette’s exercise

of her rights under the Equal Pay Act. The circuit court’s award of damages was pursuant to the

Equal Pay Act, although the circuit court indicated the same amount of damages was sustained

because of B-Line’s violation of the Human Rights Act. No additional damages were awarded

pursuant to the Human Right Act, except that attorney fees and cost were awarded pursuant to both

claims. On November 22, 2023, Lynette’s counsel filed a petition for attorney fees and costs

pursuant to the Equal Pay Act and the Human Rights Act. On May 28, 2024, the circuit court

awarded attorney fees in the amount of $118,014.43 and $5,011.31 in costs.

20 ¶ 43 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 44 On appeal, B-Line argues that the circuit court erred in finding gender discrimination under

the Human Rights Act, that Lynette failed to present sufficient evidence to support a verdict on

her Equal Pay Act claim, that the circuit court erred in awarding damages for the time period after

Lynette voluntarily stepped down from a lead position, and that the claims are preempted by the

LMRA.

¶ 45 A. Standard of Review

¶ 46 This case involves the construction and application of several statutes, including the Equal

Pay Act, the Human Rights Act and the LMRA. Questions of statutory construction are reviewed

de novo. King Auto Sales, Inc. v. Act Now Towing, 2021 IL App (5th) 200143, ¶ 16. When

construing statutory provisions, a court’s primary goal is to determine and give effect to the intent

of the legislature. King Auto Sales, Inc., 2021 IL App (5th) 200143, ¶ 17. The best indicator of

legislative intent is the express language of the pertinent provisions of the statute. King Auto Sales,

Inc., 2021 IL App (5th) 200143, ¶ 16. If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, a court

will apply the statute as written without resort to other aids for construction. Nowak v. City of

Country Club Hills, 2011 IL 111838, ¶ 11. If, however, the statutory language is ambiguous, the

court may look beyond its express language and rely on extrinsic aids of statutory construction.

Nowak, 2011 IL 111838, ¶ 11. In construing a statute, “the court may consider the reason for the

law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of

construing the statute one way or the other.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mosby v. Ingalls

Memorial Hospital, 2023 IL 129081, ¶ 31. Statutes that relate to the same subject or are part of the

same legislative scheme must also be considered together. King Auto Sales, Inc., 2021 IL App

(5th) 200143, ¶ 18. These statutes should be read in a way that is consistent with one another. King 21 Auto Sales, Inc., 2021 IL App (5th) 200143, ¶ 18. Finally, a court must consider the consequences

that would flow from its interpretation and presume that the legislature did not intend results that

are unjust or absurd. King Auto Sales, Inc., 2021 IL App (5th) 200143, ¶ 18.

¶ 47 When a challenge is made to the trial court’s ruling following a bench trial, the standard of

review is whether the trial court’s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People

ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v. 2000 W. Madison Liquor Corp., 394 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817

(2009). A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite

conclusion is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on

evidence. 2000 W. Madison Liquor Corp., 394 Ill. App. 3d at 817-18. As the trier of fact, the trial

court is in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to determine the weight to be

given to their testimony, and to resolve any inconsistencies and conflicts. 2000 W. Madison Liquor

Corp., 394 Ill. App. 3d at 818. A reviewing court should not substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court unless the judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 2000 W. Madison

Liquor Corp., 394 Ill. App. 3d at 817.

¶ 48 B. Equal Pay Act

¶ 49 The Equal Pay Act went into effect on January 1, 2004 (Pub. Act 93-6, § 1 (eff. Jan. 1,

2004)). The law prohibits gender-based differences in pay. Section 10(a) of the Equal Pay Act

(820 ILCS 112/10(a) (West 2022)) addresses prohibited acts and provides in part as follows:

“(a) No employer may discriminate between employees on the basis of sex

by paying wages to an employee at a rate less than the rate at which the employer

pays wages to another employee of the opposite sex for the same or substantially

similar work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and

22 responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions, except

where the payment is made under:

(1) a seniority system;

(2) a merit system;

(3) a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or

(4) a differential based on any other factor other than: (i) sex or (ii) a factor

that would constitute unlawful discrimination under the Illinois Human

Rights Act.” 820 ILCS 112/10(a) (West 2022)

The circuit court determined B-Line violated the Equal Pay Act from March 10, 2019, through

March 22, 2020, based on a finding that Eddie, the second shift shipping lead, was receiving higher

wages than Lynette, the first shift shipping lead, during that period. The circuit court focused on

three elements of the Equal Pay Act: (1) whether the employees were performing substantially

similar work on jobs, (2) which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and (3) which were

performed under similar working conditions. See 820 ILCS 112/10 (West 2022). On appeal, B-

Line initially argues that Lynette performed a substantially different job from Eddie (her

comparator) and was paid differently on a factor other than sex. Therefore, Lynette could not

establish a violation of the Equal Pay Act.

¶ 50 1. Substantially Similar Work

¶ 51 With regard to B-Line’s first argument, the circuit court found that Lynette and Eddie were

performing “substantially similar duties.” The CBA required that B-Line pay the shipping lead

one dollar above the highest job classification “normally under his direction.” Lynette, as the first

shift shipping lead, was paid $20.46 hourly, a dollar above the classification of shipping

coordinator, while Eddie, the second shift shipping lead was paid $20.87, a dollar above the 23 classification of dual operator. The first shift shipping lead job was performed by Lynette, a female,

where the second shift shipping lead was performed by Eddie, a male.

¶ 52 B-Line argues that the circuit court erred when it relied on the March 2019 job postings

and found that Lynette’s job responsibilities were substantially similar to Eddie’s job duties. B-

Line claims that the circuit court failed to compare the actual responsibilities of the job and instead

relied on the fact that “the 2019 job postings were identical and listed the exact same duties.” B-

Line’s argument ignores the circuit court’s findings.

¶ 53 In its written order, the circuit court referred to the job postings as part of the evidence in

determining that Lynette and Eddie performed substantially similar work. The circuit court also

relied on the testimony of Knouse, the plant manager, who testified that from March 2019 to March

2020 Lynette and Eddie worked under the same job title of shipping lead “which included the same

job duties and responsibilities as set forth in the job posting.” The circuit court went on to find

that:

“[Lynette] and Eddie worked under the same Plant Manager, in the same Shipping Department, and at the same Troy plant. Both were responsible for loading the same freight, on the same trucks, using the same docks. Both used the same shipping office, the same computers and software, and completed the same company forms. Mr. Knouse stated that the Shipping Lead job office work and computer skills were the same for 1st and 2nd Shifts.”

¶ 54 The circuit court explicitly considered B-Line’s argument that Eddie’s work as shipping

lead was substantially different because of his ability to operate a crane and a forklift, thereby

requiring a special skill set that justified paying Eddie a dollar above the dual operators. The circuit

court looked at the March 2019 restructuring of the lead positions and noted that if B-Line thought

this skill set justified a higher rate of pay, it would have been included in the 2019 job description.

Further, once B-Line was made aware of the disparity in pay between Lynette and Eddie, B-Line

24 did not include the operation of the forklift as part of the March 2020 job responsibilities for second

shift shipping lead.

¶ 55 The circuit court also concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that Eddie’s

responsibilities included training the dual operators. No records regarding Eddie’s time spent

training dual operators were offered into evidence. The circuit court concluded that whatever job

training Eddie performed was “too insubstantial to make the two Shipping Lead jobs unequal.”

Therefore, the circuit court’s conclusion that Lynette and Eddie were performing substantially

similar work was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 56 2. Equal Skill, Effort, and Responsibility

¶ 57 B-Line also claims that the circuit court failed to consider the equality of the “skill effort

and responsibility” for each of the jobs, and look at the actual work performed, as required by the

Equal Pay Act. This claim is also belied by the circuit court’s written order. The circuit court

specifically considered the additional skill Eddie possessed in his ability to operate a forklift and

crane. The circuit court found that these skills were not necessary for the performance of his job

as shipping lead from March 10, 2019, to March 22, 2020. To aid in its interpretation of Illinois’s

Equal Pay Act, the circuit court looked to the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963, which is part of the

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2018). The circuit court noted that this

act “is nearly identical in prohibiting an employer from discriminating between employees on the

basis of sex by paying unequal wages. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).” In addition, the circuit court

indicated that “[s]ection 1620 of the Code of Federal Regulations, titled, ‘Equal Pay Act,’

interprets various provisions of the Federal Equal Pay Act and is regularly applied to the IEPA.”

The circuit court looked to the provisions of Title 29, § 1620.15 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(29 C.F.R. § 1620.15 (2024)) and assessed the equality of skill required in performance of 25 Lynette’s job as first shift shipping lead and Eddie’s job as second shift shipping lead. Section

1620.15(a) provides in part, “Possession of a skill not needed to meet the requirements of the job

cannot be considered in making a determination regarding the equality of skill.” 29

C.F.R. § 1620.15(a) (2024). The circuit court concluded that the operation of the forklift was not

an essential function of the job of shipping lead, and so it could not be considered in determining

whether Lynette’s job and Eddie’s job were substantially similar and whether there was a

difference in the skill requirement for the two jobs.

¶ 58 The circuit court also considered the amount of effort put in by Lynette and Eddie. The

circuit court relied on section 1620.16(a) of the Code of Federal Regulations (29 C.F.R.

§ 1620.16(a) (2024)), which provides in part, “Effort is concerned with the measurement of

physical or mental exertion needed for the performance of the job.” 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a) (2024).

The circuit court found there was no evidence of any difference in effort required of the first shift

shipping lead compared to the second shift shipping lead. In fact, Knouse testified that both Lynette

and Eddie put forth a “high degree of work effort.” Likewise, there was no evidence of a difference

in responsibility between the two jobs. Therefore, the circuit court concluded that the two jobs

required equal skill, effort, and responsibility. We agree.

¶ 59 3. Working Conditions

¶ 60 Finally, the circuit court looked at the working conditions that the shipping leads were

operating under. The circuit court defined working conditions as “surroundings and hazards.”

There were no hazardous conditions identified at trial for either shift. In fact, the testimony was

that the first shift shipping lead and the second shift shipping lead used the same workspace, the

same shipping floor and the same docks. The two leads used the same office, the same computers

26 and the same software. The circuit court found the working conditions were substantially similar.

We find this conclusion was supported by the evidence.

¶ 61 Considering the foregoing, the circuit court found that Lynette had established the essential

elements of her claim under the Equal Pay Act. We agree. Lynette showed that the working

conditions for the first shift shipping lead and the second shift shipping lead were substantially

similar from March 10, 2019, to March 22, 2020. Therefore, the circuit court determined that B-

Line violated the Equal Pay Act when it paid Eddie more than it paid Lynette during that period.

The circuit court’s determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 62 4. Other Factors

¶ 63 B-Line counters by claiming there was no violation based on the pay differential because

the Equal Pay Act sets forth certain conditions which B-Line asserts as affirmative defenses. Here,

B-Line relies on the exception which states that it could prove the pay disparity was “a differential

based on any other factor other than *** sex.” 820 ILCS 112/10(a)(4) (West 2022). Specifically,

B-Line claims that the CBA valued dual operators at $0.40 higher per hour than shipping

coordinators. B-Line claims that the union and the company jointly interpreted the CBA to

conclude that Eddie performed the additional tasks of leading the dual operators and that Lynette

did not. Therefore, Eddie was entitled to the higher payment. B-Line was under the obligation to

prove the affirmative defense.

¶ 64 The circuit court evaluated B-Line’s claim that the CBA required that Lynette be paid

differently than Eddie and determined that the decision was made “retroactively” at the December

9, 2019, meeting to justify the payment to Eddie. As the circuit court noted, the minutes of the

December 9, 2019, meeting do not speak to the terms of the CBA, which would have interpreted

the question of whether the duals were “normally under his [Eddie’s] direction.” Instead, the 27 parties in attendance at the meeting discussed Eddie’s job duties and whether he led the dual

operators. The same discussion did not occur with regard to Lynette’s duties. Moreover, B-Line

could not produce a witness with personal knowledge of the factor upon which the payment to

Eddie was made at the time it was decided in 2013. Neither Knouse nor Zylstra-Skinner could

explain the nature of the agreement under which B-Line made the decision to pay Eddie at the

higher rate. Therefore, “the factor upon which the differential was based is unknown” and there

was insufficient evidence to show that payment was based on a factor other than sex. In light of

the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court’s determination that B-Line did not carry the

burden of proving its affirmative defense was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Further, we agree with the circuit court that B-Line violated the Equal Pay Act.

¶ 65 5. Damages

¶ 66 Having found that B-Line violated the Equal Pay Act, the circuit court considered damages

available under the statute. The circuit court first looked to the Equal Pay Act and determined

Lynette was entitled to recover “the entire amount of any underpayment with interest” together

with costs and reasonable attorney fees. 820 ILCS 112/30(a) (West 2022). The circuit court

examined the methodology used by Lynette to calculate her diminution in earnings and agreed that

Lynette had suffered damages in the amount of $2,067.26 from March 10, 2019, to March 22,

2020. The circuit court then considered the amount of damages Lynette claimed to have suffered

from March 23, 2020, the day she stepped down as first shift shipping lead, to June 30, 2025, the

date of her anticipated retirement. Lynette had calculated the amount of her loss as $32,882.28,

exclusive of interest. The circuit court concluded that the methodology used to calculate these

damages was sound and awarded damages for diminished earnings in this amount.

28 ¶ 67 B-Line disagrees with the award of $32,882.28, claiming that Lynette is not entitled to back

pay under the Equal Pay Act because she voluntarily resigned her shipping coordinator lead

position on March 23, 2020. B-Line points to Lynette’s testimony that she stepped down from the

shipping lead position based upon her own decision and the company did not forcibly remove her

from the lead position. B-Line also claims Lynette did not prove that her workplace was so

intolerable she had to resign. Rather, she continued to work in the shipping department through the

date of trial. Further, Lynette did not accept the position of first shift shipping lead in 2020 when

it was offered to her.

¶ 68 B-Line ignores the plain language of the Equal Pay Act, which provides for damages for

violations of its provisions. 820 ILCS 112/30 (West 2022). If an employer pays employees “less

than the wage to which he or she is entitled in violation of Section 10 or 11 of this Act, the

employee may recover in a civil action the entire amount of any underpayment together with

interest, ***, and the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as may be allowed by the court and as

necessary to make the employee whole.” 820 ILCS 112/30(a) (West 2022).

¶ 69 B-Line argues that Lynette was not entitled to damages for stepping down from her position

as first shift shipping lead because she cannot show she was actually or constructively discharged.

“Constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an employee’s working

conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced to resign involuntarily, and when that happens,

the employer is liable for any illegal conduct as if it had formally discharged the aggrieved

employee.” Steele v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 160 Ill. App. 3d 577, 581 (1987). The Steele

court relied on the test used by various federal courts under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976)) in determining the circumstances of constructive

29 discharge. Steele, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 581. The Steele court adopted the “reasonable person”

standard applied in the federal courts:

“ ‘Before a “constructive discharge” may be found, entitling the employee to

quit working altogether rather than accepting a transfer which he thinks is violative

of his constitutional rights, the trier of fact must be satisfied that the new working

conditions would have been so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in

the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign.’ ” Steele, 160 Ill. App.

3d at 581 (quoting Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir.

1977)).

¶ 70 Here, the circuit court found that B-Line had violated the Equal Pay Act by paying Lynette

differently than Eddie for performing substantially the same work. Lynette calculated the sums she

would have received if she continued to serve as shipping lead. Based upon her calculations, the

circuit court found that Lynette had suffered diminished earnings damages from March 23, 2020,

to June 30, 2025, in the amount of $32,882.28. Considering the testimony and proof before the

circuit court, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the circuit court’s award of

diminished earnings for March 23, 2020, to June 30, 2025.

¶ 71 The testimony revealed that B-Line reevaluated its job description for first shift shipping

lead in March 2020. The revised job duty included the lead of the dual operators. Knouse testified

that he believed Lynette was offered the position, although she did not have the training for the

job. Lynette denied she was offered the job. Knouse did not explain how or why Lynette could be

offered the job that she was not qualified to accept. Therefore, there was evidence from which to

find that this change in the job description essentially eliminated Lynette from the job she had held

prior to the March 2020 reorganization. The circuit court could reasonably find that Lynette’s 30 decision not to bid on the first shift shipping lead in March 2020 was causally related to B-Line’s

denial of Lynette’s rights under the Equal Pay Act and the Human Rights Act. Lynette testified

that she was devastated by the treatment she received from B-Line after making her informal

complaint to Knouse. B-Line and the union participated in a meeting on December 9, 2019, to

discuss the unequal payment claim, excluding Lynette. Lynette was not given the opportunity to

be heard on the inequity of pay or justify her job position, as the union and B-Line had already

decided that Eddie would be paid more than Lynette based upon his lead of the duals. B-Line

interfered with Lynette’s claim under the Equal Pay Act and Lynette indicated she was humiliated.

Therefore, the evidence is sufficient to find that a reasonable person in Lynette’s shoes would have

felt compelled to resign. Accordingly, the circuit court’s award of the diminished damages in the

amount of $32,882.28 was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 72 Next, the circuit court determined whether an award of special damages for interference

with Lynette’s exercise of her rights under the Equal Pay Act was warranted. See 820 ILCS

112/10(b), 30(a-5) (West 2022). The circuit court accepted the testimony that Lynette was

humiliated by the conduct of holding the December 9, 2019, meeting to address her unequal pay

claim, without notice to Lynette, only calling her into the meeting after the issues had been

discussed and decided upon. The circuit court concluded that basic notions of fairness were absent,

such as notice, the opportunity to be heard and the opportunity to present her case that as first shift

shipping lead she also directed the dual operators. The circuit court awarded Lynette the sum of

$10,000 as special damages for B-Line’s interference with Lynette’s Equal Pay Act claim and her

emotional distress. B-Line has made no argument to the contrary in this appeal. We agree that this

award was warranted.

31 ¶ 73 C. The Illinois Human Rights Act

¶ 74 In count I of the complaint, Lynette pleaded a violation of the Human Rights Act (775

ILCS 5/1-102 (West 2022)). The circuit court considered that in order to make a prima facie

showing of gender discrimination, Lynette had to prove (1) she was a member of a protected class;

(2) she was meeting her employer’s legitimate employment expectations; (3) she was subjected to

an adverse employment action; and (4) a similarly situated employee, who was not a member of

the protected group, was treated more favorably. After consideration of all the evidence, the circuit

court found that B-Line violated the Human Rights Act through gender discrimination.

¶ 75 On appeal, B-Line agrees that to establish a claim of gender discrimination under the

Human Rights Act, Lynette must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was

meeting her employer’s legitimate business expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment

action, and (4) the employer treated similarly situated employees outside the class more favorably,

citing Terada v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140170, ¶ 25. There is no dispute that Lynette is

a member of a protected class, or that she was meeting her employer’s business expectations. The

circuit court found Lynette had suffered an adverse employment action as a result of the

underpayment of wages to Lynette from March 10, 2019, to March 22, 2020.

¶ 76 1. Similarly Situated Employee

¶ 77 B-Line claims, however, that there is no evidence that Lynette was similarly situated as

Eddie. In order to prevail by showing a similarly situated employee was treated differently, Lynette

must show the purported comparator was “directly comparable to her in all material respects so as

to eliminate other possible explanatory variables.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gamble v.

County of Cook, 106 F.4th 622, 626 (7th Cir. 2024); Motley v. Human Rights Comm’n, 263 Ill. App.

32 3d 367, 373 (1994) (“The Illinois Appellate Court has previously relied upon Federal cases arising

under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [citation.]”).

¶ 78 B-Line claims that Eddie’s job could not have been similarly situated to Lynette’s because

Eddie did different job tasks and had different responsibilities. B-Line claims that on the second

shift, Eddie operated the forklift and overhead crane, directed other operators on the forklift and

overhead crane, loaded trucks, directed the loads, completed inspection checks, reported dual

operator safety measures, established a dock check process, and showed dual operators how to do

their job.

¶ 79 Despite these representations by B-Line, the evidence at trial was not so clear. No

documentation was introduced regarding the alleged training Eddie provided. The circuit court

found the evidence lacking regarding the amount of time Eddie spent training the dual operators.

The defining job descriptions for 2019 were identical for the first shift shipping lead and the second

shift shipping lead. “There was no evidence quantifying the dates, times, the percentage time

[Eddie] operated the forklift other than to suggest that [Eddie] filled in for a Dual Operator who

did not report for a scheduled shift.” The circuit court determined that Eddie would have been the

best person to testify regarding the job differences he performed, but he was not called as a witness.

The circuit court found that operating the forklift was not an essential function of the shipping

lead. And there was no inclusion of these job duties in the job description during either the March

2019 restructuring or the March 2020 restructuring. Moreover, Lynette testified she did much of

the same work as Eddie. Therefore, the circuit court’s finding that the employees were similarly

situated was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 80 Additionally, the circuit court’s finding that Eddie was treated more favorably is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence. It is undisputed that Eddie was paid more than Lynette for 33 what the circuit court concluded was substantially similar work. Therefore, Lynette made a

prima facie showing that B-Line violated the Human Rights Act.

¶ 81 2. Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason

¶ 82 Having found that Lynette made a showing that B-Line violated Human Rights Act, the

burden shifted to B-Line to show a “legitimate nondiscriminatory reason” why Eddie was paid

more than Lynette as shipping lead. B-Line claims it has shown such a reason based upon the

express terms of the CBA, which allowed Lynette to be paid less because she did not have the

same responsibilities as Eddie. The circuit court found that B-Line did not articulate a legitimate

nondiscriminatory reason for the payment made to Eddie as early as 2013. No one from

management could explain why Eddie was paid more prior to 2019, and why the disparity

continued after the 2019 restructuring of the job description for shipping lead. Eddie’s pay was

increased in 2013 and continued until Lynette made a complaint without any member of B-Line’s

management knowing why this increase was paid. Without any evidence offered by B-Line, the

circuit court found there was no legitimate nondiscriminatory reason why Eddie was paid more,

and judgment was entered for Lynette on her Human Rights Act claim.

¶ 83 The circuit court also found that B-Line’s contention that Eddie was paid at a higher rate

because he “led the duals” was not legitimate and was pretextual. The circuit court identified six

reasons for its finding, including that the decision in 2019 was reached retroactively, “interpreting

a decision made in 2013 in a way that conveniently resulted in a way where Defendant paid no

back pay to the Plaintiff (or several other Shipping Leads) and no pay withheld from Eddie

Enriquez for being paid an inflated rate.” The circuit court also found that the “Defendant’s

conclusion was inconsistent with the fact that each other Department Lead, who were all male,

were paid a dollar above the highest classification in their Department, despite the fact that those 34 Leads did not operate machines or train employees on these machines.” B-Line had attempted to

“surreptitiously” use the CBA as a basis for its conclusion without referencing whether the dual

operators were normally under the direction of the shipping leads. Instead, the query was whether

Eddie led the duals, which does not appear in the CBA. Furthermore, B-Line excluded Lynette

from the December 9, 2019, meeting, so there was no one to testify whether the duals were actually

under Lynette’s direction. B-Line, however, permitted Eddie to attend the December 9, 2019,

meeting in a capacity as a witness, to testify that he led the duals, and as a union representative,

which “was a conflict of interest and completely inappropriate.” And, finally, the circuit court

found that B-Line based its conclusion on the fact that Eddie operated the forklift, although B-Line

did not make this a job duty in the 2020 shipping lead job posting. We agree with the circuit court’s

findings and conclude that the circuit court’s judgment for Lynette on her claim under the Human

Rights Act is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 84 3. Damages

¶ 85 The circuit court found that Lynette had sustained damages under the Human Rights Act

claim as a consequence of her gender discrimination claim. The circuit court had already awarded

damages pursuant to the Equal Pay Act claim. Therefore, the circuit court determined that Lynette

was not entitled to collect additional damages under her Human Rights Act claim, except for

attorney fees and costs.

¶ 86 D. LMRA

¶ 87 Finally, B-Line claims that Lynette cannot be entitled to a judgment under the Equal Pay

Act or the Human Rights Act because her claims were preempted under section 301 of the LMRA.

To determine whether a claim filed pursuant to a state statute or common law tort is preempted,

the court examines the character of the claim. Gelb v. Air Con Refrigeration & Heating, Inc., 356 35 Ill. App. 3d 686, 692 (2005). When “resolution of a state-law claim depends on an interpretation

of the collective bargaining agreement, the claim will be preempted.” Gelb, 356 Ill. App. 3d at

693. B-Line argues that Lynette’s claims are preempted because the resolution of her claims rely

on the interpretation of the CBA. B-Line argues there is no dispute that the wage rates for shipping

coordinator leads are controlled by the CBA between the company and the union. Under the terms

of the CBA, the company lacks the discretion to pay employees differently than what the CBA

requires. B-Line claims that if there are questions under the contract as to what level of pay is

appropriate, that decision is made under the terms of the contract and the union is heavily involved

in all discussions and determinations. B-Line’s continuing argument is that Eddie was paid more

than Lynette because of the contract interpretation setting different wages for different tasks. Under

the CBA, the company must pay the lead based upon the highest job classification “normally under

his direction,” which, for Eddie, according to B-Line, would have been the dual operators. The

company and union made the determination that, for the period from March 2019 onward, the highest

classification under Eddie’s direction was the dual operator and the highest classification under

Lynette’s direction was the shipping coordinator and they should get paid $1 above those

respective job classifications.

¶ 88 The circuit court found these arguments unavailing and we agree. The circuit court found

Lynette’s claims under the Equal Pay Act and the Human Rights Act to be “outside the parameter

of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.” In making such a finding, we note that the CBA did not

describe the job duties of leading the dual operators. No one from B-Line could explain why Eddie

was being paid more, commencing in 2013, than the amounts represented by the CBA.

36 ¶ 89 The circuit court utilized the test enunciated by our supreme court in Ryherd v. General

Cable Co., 124 Ill. 2d 418, 426 (1988), to determine whether a claim is preempted. There, the

supreme court stated:

“The test which emerges is simple: if the employee could not bring the claim

‘but for’ the collective-bargaining agreement, the claim is preempted. Conversely,

section 301 does not preempt ‘state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights

or obligations, independent of a labor contract.’ ” Ryherd, 124 Ill. 2d at 426

(quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 212 (1985)).

¶ 90 Applying this test, the circuit court found that Lynette’s claims under the Equal Pay Act

and the Human Rights Act did not require an analysis of the CBA. The circuit court determined

that these claims arose under state law and were independent of the CBA. “The essential elements

of each cause of action are not found in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.” The circuit court

found that both the Equal Pay Act and the Human Rights Act “set forth our State’s clearly

mandated public policies to be free from unequal pay and gender discrimination.” The circuit court

concluded that neither the Equal Pay Act nor the Human Rights Act were preempted by section

301 of the LMRA. We agree.

¶ 91 B-Line also argues that Lynette’s claims should be dismissed because she did not follow

the grievance procedures of the CBA. Therefore, she did not exhaust her administrative remedies

under the CBA. It is true that federal labor policy provides that “when resolution of a state law

claim depends on an analysis of the terms of the agreement, the claim must either be arbitrated as

required by the collective bargaining agreement or dismissed as preempted under section 301 of

the Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000)).” Kostecki v. Dominick’s Finer

Foods, Inc., of Illinois, 361 Ill. App. 3d 362, 368 (2005). However, B-Line’s reference to the CBA 37 is not enough to preempt a state law claim. If the claim raises a matter that is purely a question of

state law and is entirely independent of any understanding of the terms of a collective bargaining

agreement, it may proceed as a state law claim. Kostecki, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 368; Gelb, 356 Ill.

App. 3d at 692-93 (citing Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 124-25 (1994)). Inasmuch as we

agree with the circuit court that the CBA did not control the claims made by Lynette, we conclude

that she was not required to follow the grievance procedures of the CBA.

¶ 92 Finally, we must address several issues raised by the dissent. First, the dissent opines that

Lynette’s Equal Pay Act claim and Human Rights Act claim are preempted by section 301 of the

LMRA, and, as such, she was required to follow the grievance procedure in the CBA. The dissent

alternatively posits that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Lynette’s

claim for constructive discharge, and even if there was jurisdiction, the claim fails. Finally, despite

acknowledging that B-Line did not request appellate review of the interference award or attorney

fee award in its initial brief and thereby forfeited the argument, the dissent would, nevertheless,

vacate the awards. Notably, not once does the dissent consider or give proper deference to the

extensive factual findings made by the circuit court as dictated by the applicable standard of

review. Instead, the dissent artfully articulates general principles of law and then applies its own

findings in support of its conclusions. Because the dissent’s analysis of the facts is not supported

by the record, the dissent’s conclusions are ill-advised.

¶ 93 Initially, we consider the dissent’s conclusion that Lynette’s claims were preempted by

section 301 of the LMRA. After reciting the general principles of federal preemption, the dissent

acknowledges our supreme court’s decision in Ryherd. The dissent correctly notes that in Ryherd,

our supreme court agreed that federal preemption cannot be avoided by simply recasting a claim

for breach of a collective bargaining agreement as a state tort or contract claim but then fails to 38 recite and apply the test enunciated in Ryherd to the facts in this case. As noted earlier, the test

was simple: “if the employee could not bring the claim ‘but for’ the collective-bargaining

agreement, the claim is preempted. Conversely, section 301 does not preempt ‘state rules that

proscribe conduct, or establish rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.’ ” Ryherd,

124 Ill. 2d at 426 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212). Here, Lynette’s state law claims were

not dependent upon the CBA. Even the dissent recognizes that the pleadings did not involve the

CBA. In support of its finding that the claims were preempted, the dissent refers not to the

pleadings at issue before the circuit court, but rather to the complaint Lynette filed with the

Department and the right to sue letter issued by the Department. The dissent stretches beyond the

pleadings before the circuit court to find that Lynette had recast her claim for breach of the CBA

as a state tort claim.

¶ 94 The dissent views Lynette’s case from the wrong perspective. Specifically, the dissent

concludes that Lynette’s wage disparity claims “stem directly from the language in the CBA that

sets forth how leads are to be paid.” Infra ¶ 125. This is not supported by the record. Lynette

alleged and testified that she believed Eddie was paid more than Lynette because of her gender.

No one from B-Line could explain why Eddie was paid more. Knouse, the plant manager, had no

knowledge that Eddie was paid more until Lynette made her complaint. The documentary evidence

showed that after the restructuring in 2019, the job descriptions for first and second shift lead were

identical and the rates of pay for each shift were the same. Knouse testified that at the time the job

descriptions were posted in 2019, he did not know that Eddie was being paid more than the rates

reflected in the job postings. No one referred to the CBA to explain why Eddie was treated

differently. B-Line referred to the CBA retrospectively, as an affirmative defense, to attempt to

justify the increase in the rate of pay for leads. But B-Line’s own designated corporate 39 representative, Zylstra-Skinner, testified that “no interpretation of language in the CBA” was

required to determine who led the duals. Thus, based upon the testimony and the evidence offered

at trial, the circuit court reasonably concluded that Lynette’s claims did not arise out of the CBA

and were wholly independent of that agreement.

¶ 95 The dissent acknowledges that “the CBA fails to further explain how the phrase ‘job

classification normally under [the lead’s] direction’ is determined.” The dissent concludes that the

absence of explanatory language created an ambiguity in the contract that the circuit court failed

to address. Infra ¶ 125. It is important to point out that B-Line did not raise this issue. Thus, the

dissent again stretches outside the record to raise and then address a matter not raised by the parties.

Here again, the dissent fails to accept that Lynette’s claims did not implicate the CBA and that the

resolution of those claims did not require interpretation of the CBA. Indeed, B-Line’s corporate

representative, Zylstra-Skinner, testified that the notes of the December 9, 2019, meeting, “did not

indicate there was any discussion regarding the interpretation of the phrase, ‘normally under [the

lead’s] direction.’ ” Had the interpretation of this phrase been the determinative issue, surely it

would have been discussed by the union and B-Line at the December 9, 2019, meeting.

¶ 96 It is also important to remember that Eddie did not testify at trial. Whether Eddie supervised

the duals and to what extent he performed the job was described by Lynette. Lynette testified that

she performed substantially the same work as Eddie and that she also supervised the duals.

Lynette’s testimony was not rebutted. After considering the testimony and the exbibits offered, the

circuit court made extensive findings, comparing the work performed by Lynette and Eddie, and

determined the work to be substantially similar. Nevertheless, the dissent disregards the trial

testimony and the findings of the circuit court, and instead makes its own finding that the union

and B-Line, as signatories of the CBA, had the most knowledge about the actual job duties and 40 which job classifications Eddie and Lynette “normally directed” and that those parties “agreed that

Eddie and Lynette’s pay rates should be different because Eddie was supervising the duals and

Lynette was not.” The dissent offers its impression that Lynette’s claims were based on the CBA

and therefore preempted. Infra ¶ 126. In doing so, the dissent improperly substituted its judgment

for that of the circuit court on matters of credibility and the weight to be given the evidence. In

this case, the circuit court determined that Lynette’s state law claims were not preempted by section

301 of the LMRA. After reviewing the record, we do not find that the circuit court’s findings were

against the manifest weight of the evidence or that its determination was erroneous.

¶ 97 Next, the dissent finds that Lynette was obligated to exhaust her administrative remedies

pursuant to the grievance procedures of the CBA. The cornerstone of the dissent’s finding rests

upon its conclusion that section 301 of the LMRA preempted Lynette’s claims. The dissent relies,

as it did with preemption, on cases in which the circuit court concluded that an employee’s claims

arose from a collective bargaining agreement. Generally, the exhaustion of administrative

remedies is “a procedural prerequisite to maintaining a section 301 action.” Gelb, 356 Ill. App. 3d

at 695. However, the mere existence of a dispute between an employee and an employer does not

render the disputed matter subject to a CBA. Gelb, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 695. If the claim, on its face,

is governed by the contract, then the employee must follow the grievance process in the contract.

Gelb, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 695. However, “as long as [a] state-law claim can be resolved without

interpreting the [CBA] itself, the claim is ‘independent’ of the [CBA] for § 301 pre-emption

purposes” and, thus, may be addressed under state law no matter whether arbitration has been

exhausted. See Soltysik v. Parsec, Inc., 2022 IL App (2d) 200563, ¶ 47 (quoting Lingle v. Norge

Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410-11 (1988)).

41 ¶ 98 Here, Lynette’s claims were not preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Nevertheless, the

dissent repeatedly casts Lynette’s claims as simple wage disputes and opines that “Lynette’s claims

of gender discrimination stemmed from an alleged erroneous interpretation of the CBA that altered

‘the terms and conditions of her employment’ ” by affecting her wages.” This represents a myopic

view of the evidence at trial. As outlined in this order, the evidence at trial established that Lynette

was not paid the same rate of pay for the same job identified by B-Line in its job descriptions.

Lynette’s testimony that she performed substantially the same work as Eddie was unrebutted by

Eddie, as he did not testify at trial. There was no testimony offered by Lynette’s supervisor or

anyone in authority during the relevant time period that explained why Eddie was paid more for a

job that was described as identical to the job performed by Lynette. The circuit court found that

Eddie’s testimony would have been the best evidence of what his job duties were and why he was

paid a higher wage over the other shift leads during the extended period of time involved. B-Line

failed to call Eddie or any other witnesses to explain why the original decision to pay Eddie

additional compensation was made. B-Line did not rely upon any language in the CBA to explain

the decision. Thus, the dissent’s conclusion that Lynette’s claim was a wage dispute that arose out

of the CBA is not supported by the evidence in the record.

¶ 99 The dissent acknowledges that Lynette alleged she “performed the same lead duties as the

men *** without receiving the dual rate and extra dollar promised to all leads” in her Human

Rights Act claim. The dissent then states, “Indubitably, the ‘promise’ stems from the language

under the CBA.” Infra ¶ 135. We find the dissent’s summary dismissal of Lynette’s gender

discrimination claim troubling because the dissent ignores the trial testimony while it clings to the

concept that this is a simple wage dispute under the CBA. The dissent concedes that Lynette’s

Equal Pay Act claim “seems to stray from CBA governance.” But then, the dissent quickly works 42 its way around this perceived glitch in its theory by again going outside of the record to find that

the determination of Lynette’s correct wages required consideration of “the employees working

under Lynette” and the “frequency of Lynette’s direction over each of those classifications,” and

as such required the application and interpretation of the CBA. Infra ¶ 135. The dissent’s findings

are not based upon the testimony offered at trial. Here, the circuit court considered the evidence

and determined that Lynette’s claim did not depend upon the existence of the CBA and that there

was no section 301 preemption. Thus, Lynette was not obligated to follow the grievance

procedures set forth in the CBA.

¶ 100 The dissent also addresses the damages awarded to Lynette. The dissent agrees that Lynette

made a prima facie case for employment discrimination under the Equal Pay Act. The dissent then

turns to section 10 of the Equal Pay Act which allows for differences in pay under the statute. 820

ILCS 112/10 (West 2022). The dissent concludes that “B-Line’s evidence revealed that Eddie and

Lynette were properly paid under the CBA noting that a leadman received ‘a premium of one

(1) dollar per hour above the highest job classification normally under his direction.’ ” (Emphasis

added.) Infra ¶ 140. The dissent bases its conclusion on its own finding that “the Union and the

company agreed that the duals held the highest job classification under Eddie’s direction, and the

shipping coordinator was the highest classification under Lynette’s direction.” (Emphasis added.)

Infra ¶ 141. Here again, the dissent gives no deference to the circuit court’s factual findings and

credibility determinations. Instead, the dissent substitutes its own judgment for that of the circuit

court and makes the ultimate finding that Eddie and Lynette were properly paid under the CBA.

¶ 101 Next, the dissent states that even if it ignores the CBA, “it is clear that Eddie was paid more

than Lynette based on additional job-related aspects of his position.” Infra ¶ 141. The dissent posits

that though Lynette made a prima facie showing of her claim under the Equal Pay Act, B-Line 43 rebutted the presumption because the Equal Pay Act allowed for additional pay based upon these

additional job-related aspects of his position. The dissent concludes that the circuit court’s decision

to award damages for the period of 2019 to 2020 was contrary to law and therefore against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Infra ¶ 142. Whether Lynette performed substantially the same

work was a factual question for the circuit court as the trier of fact. The circuit court heard the

testimony from the witnesses and assessed their demeanor as they testified. The circuit court was

in the best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to assess the weight to be given the

testimony, and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. In this case, Lynette described the relative

duties performed by the shipping leads on the first and second shift. She testified that she directed

the duals and described the tasks that she performed. The job descriptions for the positions were

identical, as was the rate of pay set forth in the job posting. In its defense, B-Line interjected the

difference between the job duties of Lynette and Eddie, and claimed that Eddie supervised the

duals, although this duty was not included in the job description. Lynette rebutted that evidence.

She testified that she, too, supervised the duals. Thus, the circuit court’s decision to award damages

for the period of 2019 to 2020 under the Equal Pay Act was neither contrary to law, nor against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 102 In addition, the dissent contends that Lynette failed to make a prima facie case under the

Human Rights Act. The dissent criticizes the circuit court for its insufficient analysis of the

“similarly situated employee” requirement. After setting forth the factors to be used in such an

analysis, the dissent finds that the circuit court restricted its determination to whether the

employees held the same job description and failed to consider the remaining factors. The dissent

then offers its own determination, finding that it appeared Lynette and Eddie were not held to the

same standards since Eddie “ran forklifts and cranes, spent substantially more time on the floor 44 compared to plaintiff, and also trained some of the dual operators.” The dissent also found that

“Eddie had additional qualifications that Lynette did not share and Eddie performed additional

duties based on the additional qualifications.” Infra ¶ 144. A review of the circuit court’s written

order indicates that the circuit court did not limit its consideration to the job descriptions offered

at trial. The circuit court noted that Lynette and Eddie used the same computers, completed the

same shipping forms, worked on the same shipping floor, and directed the loading of the same

freight in same manner. The circuit court also found that there was no evidence regarding the dates,

times, and percentage of time that Eddie operated a forklift or filled in for a dual operator. After

considering the evidence as a whole and analyzing the law, the circuit court found that B-Line’s

contention that Eddie was paid at a higher rate than Lynette because he led the duals and operated

forklifts was pretextual and not legitimate. Based on this record, the circuit court’s finding that

Lynette and Eddie were similarly situated employees was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 103 The dissent also disputes the award of “front pay” as diminished earnings damages. The

dissent suggests that Lynette’s complaint contained no claim for relief under a theory of

constructive discharge. Because constructive discharge was not pled in the complaint, the dissent

questions the circuit court’s jurisdiction to issue an award, although it acknowledges that Lynette

could have made an amendment to conform the pleadings to the proofs at trial under section 2-616

of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-616 (West 2022)). Here, the dissent seems to confuse

subject matter jurisdiction with the legal sufficiency of the pleadings.

¶ 104 Subject matter jurisdiction refers to “the power of a court to hear and determine cases of

the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota

Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325, 334 (2002). To invoke the circuit court’s subject matter 45 jurisdiction, a party need only present a justiciable matter, meaning “a controversy appropriate for

review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching

upon the legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests.” Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199

Ill. 2d at 335. Subject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal sufficiency of the

pleadings. In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d 295, 301 (2010); Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 334. Nor

is it affected by an erroneous decision of the circuit court. People ex rel. Scott v. Janson, 57 Ill. 2d

451, 459-60 (1974). Again, the only consideration is whether the alleged claim falls within the

general class of cases that the court has the inherent power to hear and determine. In re Luis R.,

239 Ill. 2d at 301.

¶ 105 In this case, Lynette filed claims under the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-101 (West

2022)) and the Equal Pay Act (820 ILCS 112/10 (West 2022)). The circuit court had subject matter

jurisdiction to hear and determine Lynette’s claims because the circuit court’s jurisdiction extends

to the general class of cases arising under these statutes. Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 340.

The dissent suggests that there were “defective allegations and non-existent allegations” regarding

underpayment in the complaint, and therefore, that the lack of a justiciable matter stripped the

circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction, citing Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill. App. 3d 701, 707

(1994). The dissent’s reliance on Ligon is misplaced.

¶ 106 In Ligon, the circuit court, sua sponte, made a determination of child custody at a hearing

on the mother’s request for an adjudication of parenting and child support. The appellate court

found that the circuit court’s order was void because the court exceeded its authority where the

mother had not sought any relief pertaining to custody and the father had not filed a petition or

counterclaim seeking custody. Ligon, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 707. Unlike Ligon, Lynette’s claims under

the Equal Pay Act and the Illinois Human Rights Act were properly pleaded and at issue before 46 the circuit court. In addition, the record reveals that the parties conducted extensive discovery

related to Lynette’s claims, including her claim for damages. Notably, in plaintiff’s supplemental

answers to defendant’s first set of interrogatories, Lynette indicated she would seek damages for

“emotional humiliation and distress,” as well as punitive damages and attorney fees for prevailing

in the litigation. In plaintiff’s 213(f) disclosures (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 213(f) (eff. Jan. 1, 2018)), Lynette

indicated she would seek damages because she “experienced humiliation, sadness, frustration, and

emotional distress resulting from Defendant’s violations of the Equal Pay Act and the Human

Rights Act, together with Defendant’s retaliation, and suffered loss of dignity from being deprived

wages only because she is a woman.” Lynette further noted that B-Line “retaliated” against her by

unlawfully interfering with her exercise of her rights under the Equal Pay Act and Human Rights

Act and “humiliated her by holding a meeting on December 9, 2019, without notice” to Lynette,

and that she would seek punitive damages. Accordingly, the circuit court had subject matter

jurisdiction to hear and decide Lynette’s claim and to determine damages.

¶ 107 The dissent further posits that even if it is wrong in its assessment of subject matter

jurisdiction, it could not affirm the damage award for constructive discharge. Again, the dissent

recites general tenets from case law that describe the relief that can be granted under a theory of

constructive discharge. The dissent finds that Lynette did not present any evidence that she was

subjected to personal insults, “profanity-laden tirades, defamatory comments, vulgar language” or

threats to her personal safety. Infra ¶ 158. However, intolerable working conditions are not limited

to the conduct identified by the dissent, and the dissent’s conclusion that Lynette’s evidence did

not even reach the level of “merely intolerable” is based upon a subjective assessment of the

testimony.

47 ¶ 108 Constructive discharge occurs when working conditions are so intolerable or the employee

is so mistreated at work that a reasonable person in the employee’s position would be forced to

quit. Steele, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 581. Constructive discharge also occurs when an employer altered

one of its employees’ working conditions to the point where the employee had effectively been

fired and compelled to leave. Raintree Health Care Center v. Human Rights Comm’n, 275 Ill. App.

3d 387, 395 (1995). In Raintree Health Care Center, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 387, the appellate court

found a sufficient basis for a constructive discharge claim where the Human Rights Commission

determined that the employer’s actions precluded the employee from performing his normal job

duties and “deprived him of the salary he would have earned.” The employer’s actions “amounted

to, at a minimum, a constructive discharge and clearly constituted an adverse employment action.”

Raintree Health Care Center, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 396. In Raintree, the employee was also not

allowed to return to work. This case is analogous to Raintree in that there was evidence that B-

Line’s action in creating a new job description for the first shift lead adversely impacted Lynette

and excluded her from that employment position. There was evidence that Lynette was not

qualified to return to her position after B-Line changed the job description because she could not

operate a forklift or a crane. Lynette indicated she was never offered the newly described job as

first shift lead and that she was never offered additional training. Lynette claimed the disparity in

pay was unfair. Lynette testified that she was “humiliated” and “devastated” by the way B-Line

treated her subsequent to her report of the disparity in pay. In light of everything that had occurred,

she did not apply for the first shift lead position.

¶ 109 It bears repeating that a reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its

judgment for that of the trier of fact. The circuit court heard from Lynette and the other witnesses.

The circuit court found that B-Line violated Lynette’s rights and humiliated Lynette by holding 48 the December 2019 meeting to address her unequal pay claim without notice or representation and

by calling Lynette into the meeting only after the matter was discussed and decided. The circuit

court found that a reasonable person in Lynette’s position may have felt compelled to change jobs.

The circuit court’s findings of fact and credibility determinations are entitled to deference. The

circuit court’s decision to award diminished earnings damages was not against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

¶ 110 Finally, the dissent directs its attention to the award of special damages in the amount of

$10,000 along with attorney fees and costs totaling $123,025.74, pursuant to section 30(a-5) of the

Equal Pay Act (820 ILCS 112/30(a-5) (West 2022)). The dissent acknowledges that B-Line failed

to request appellate review of this award in its initial brief, thereby precluding appellate review.

Forfeiture aside, the dissent concludes that the award should be vacated, reasserting its opinion

that the claim was preempted under section 301 of the LMRA and that Lynette was required to

follow the grievance procedures in the CBA. Because we have previously determined that

Lynette’s claims are not preempted and because B-Line has forfeited review of the damages award,

no further discussion is required.

¶ 111 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 112 In sum, Lynette’s claims under the Equal Pay Act and the Human Rights Act are not

preempted under section 301 of the LMRA. The circuit court’s findings that B-Line violated the

Equal Pay Act and the Human Rights Act and that Lynette sustained damages as result of B-Line’s

violation are supported by the evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The

circuit court’s findings that Lynette is entitled to the sum of $2,067.26, including interest, for

diminished earnings for the period from March 10, 2019, to March 22, 2020, the sum of $32,882.28

for diminished earnings payable in the future, exclusive of interest, from March 22, 2023, to June 49 30, 2025, and an award of $10,000 in special damages for interference with Lynette’s rights under

the Equal Pay Act, plus $118,014.43 in attorney fees and $5,011.31 in costs, are not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. This

cause is remanded to the circuit court of Madison County to lift the stay of enforcement of money

judgment entered pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 305(a) (eff. July 1, 2017), and for further

proceedings as necessary to enforce the judgment.

¶ 113 Affirmed and remanded with directions.

¶ 114 JUSTICE VAUGHAN, dissenting:

¶ 115 I disagree with my colleagues’ affirmation of the trial court’s decision. It is my opinion

that Lynette’s claim was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act

(LMRA) (29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2018)) as well as Lynette’s failure to follow the grievance procedure

delineated in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA). As such, I believe, the circuit

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to render any decision in this case. It is also my opinion

that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to address or award Lynette’s claim for

constructive discharge for the period from 2020 to 2025, and, even if the court had jurisdiction,

the evidence submitted was insufficient to affirm the $32,882.28 award. Finally, it is also my

opinion that the underpayment earnings award for $2,067.26 for the period from 2019 to 2020 was

insufficiently supported and the “interference” and attorney fee awards, of $10,000 and

$123,025.74, respectively, should be vacated.

¶ 116 A. LMRA Exemption

¶ 117 “Questions of federal preemption and statutory interpretation present questions of law that

are subject to de novo review.” Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 237 Ill. 2d 30, 39 (2010). The

50 Illinois Supreme Court listed three instances in which federal law preempts state law under the

supremacy clause. Id. at 39-40. These include:

“(1) express preemption—where Congress has expressly preempted state

action; (2) implied field preemption—where Congress has implemented a

comprehensive regulatory scheme in an area, thus removing the entire field from

the state realm; or (3) implied conflict preemption—where state action actually

conflicts with federal law.” Id.

“The complete preemption doctrine is a doctrine of federal jurisdiction which, under appropriate

circumstances, permits recharacterization of a plaintiff’s state law claim as a federal claim so that

removal is proper.” Bishop v. Burgard, 198 Ill. 2d 495, 503 (2002).

¶ 118 “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing

employees in an industry affecting commerce *** may be brought in any district court of the

United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or

without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2018). This statutory language

is the basis for the consensus that “where a collective bargaining agreement exists between

employers and employees who are parties to litigation, their disputes fall within the exclusive

purview of federal labor laws, not state laws.” Gelb v. Air Con Refrigeration & Heating, Inc., 356

Ill. App. 3d 686, 692 (2005). Assuredly, not all union claims are exempt. Id.

¶ 119 Whether section 301 of the LMRA preempts a state law claim entails a “ ‘case-by-case

factual analysis.’ ” Byrne v. Hayes Beer Distributing Co., 2018 IL App (1st) 172612, ¶ 21 (quoting

In re Bentz Metal Products Co., 253 F.3d 283, 285 (7th Cir. 2001)). To determine “whether a claim

filed pursuant to state statute or common law tort is preempted, we examine the character of the

claim.” Gelb, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 692. Only if the claim is entirely independent of any understanding 51 of the terms of CBA can the claim proceed as a state law claim. Id. Conversely, if the claim is

predicated on the rights provided under the CBA, and require interpretation of the CBA or its

terms, the claim is preempted. Id.

¶ 120 The Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that “section 301 preemption, unlike other kinds

of labor law preemption, has as its goal the creation of a uniform body of Federal labor law.”

Ryherd v. General Cable Co., 124 Ill. 2d 418, 424-25 (1988). It further noted, “that section 301

preemption cannot be avoided merely by recasting a claim for breach of a collective-bargaining

agreement as a State tort claim.” Id. at 425. Putting the “matter in another way, where the tort

claim rests on breach of a duty which would not exist in the absence of the collective-bargaining

agreement [citation], the tort claim is preempted. Id. at 425-26. Our supreme court and the U.S.

Supreme Court agree that state and federal cases may overlap, and the determinant issue is whether

the “ ‘claim can be resolved without interpreting the [collective bargaining] agreement itself.’ ”

Id. at 429-30 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1998)).

¶ 121 The Lingle Court addressed the underlying basis for its previous decisions noting, “ ‘A rule

that permitted an individual to sidestep available grievance procedures would cause arbitration to

lose most of its effectiveness’ [and] ‘eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor contract law under

section 301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the labor

contract in the first instance.’ ” Lingle, 486 U.S. at 411 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,

471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985)). The Court continued, stating, “Today’s decision should make clear that

interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements remains firmly in the arbitral realm; judges can

determine questions of state law involving labor-management relations only if such questions do

not require construing collective-bargaining agreements.” Id.

52 ¶ 122 Here, copies of the CBA in effect for the period from 2018-2020, as well as prior versions

of the CBA, are found in the record. In addition to Lynette and B-Line’s counsel posing questions

to the witnesses about the various versions of the CBA, the circuit court also inquired into the CBA

and the language therein. It is undisputed that Lynette’s circuit court claims were presented solely

as gender discrimination claims—with no reference to the CBA—in the complaint that alleged

violations under the IDHR and Equal Pay Act. However, Lynette’s allegations in the IDHR

complaint, which also claimed, “gender discrimination,” specifically referenced the CBA language

that “all leadmen shall receive a premium of one dollar per hour above the highest job classification

normally under their direction.” Lynette’s IDHR complaint also alleged that, “The discrimination

occurred when the Respondent erroneously interpreted the collective bargaining agreement so

that a woman was not able to receive her benefits where a man was.” (Emphasis added.) Lynette’s

IDHR complaint further alleged that she “was not paid the premium according to the collective

bargaining agreement, thereby altering the terms and conditions of her employment.” (Emphasis

added.) Finally, Lynette’s IDHR complaint also alleged that she performed the same or similar

work as Eddie and stated that Eddie “has always been paid the ‘leadman’ premium as listed in the

collective bargaining agreement.”

¶ 123 It is clear that Lynette’s basis for the right-to-sue letter was, in her own words, the altered

terms and conditions of employment due to her employer’s erroneous interpretation of the CBA. I

cannot ignore the altered allegations from the original iteration with the IDHR to its current form.

Nor can I ignore the fact that Lynette’s counsel actually objected to the admission of Lynette’s

Human Rights Act complaint at trial. It is apparent to me that Lynette’s counsel is doing exactly

what was prohibited in Ryherd by “recasting [Lynette’s] claim for breach of a collective-

bargaining agreement as a State tort claim.” Ryherd, 124 Ill. 2d at 425. 53 ¶ 124 I do not find it relevant that the CBA failed to contain the job duties of each position at a

company as the job or duties a company wants an employee to perform are not subject to Union

approval. Conversely, how the employee is paid for performing the job duties does require Union

approval as shown by the CBA. In Illinois, a “CBA is a contract and thus is interpreted in

accordance with principles of contract law.” Barron v. City of Chicago, 2025 IL App (1st) 240066,

¶ 30. “[L]anguage of a contract alone ***, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best

indication of the parties’ intent.” Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 233 (2007). “If the language

of the contract is susceptible to more than one meaning, it is ambiguous.” Id. In such cases, “a

court may consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties’ intent.” Id.

¶ 125 Here, the circuit court found that Lynette’s claims were not based on rights created by the

CBA and her state law claims did not require interpretation of the CBA. I disagree. As shown

above, Lynette’s claims of a wage disparity stem directly from the language in the CBA that sets

forth how leads are to be paid. My colleagues correctly note the CBA fails to further explain how

the phrase “job classification normally under [the lead’s] direction” is determined. Typically,

where terms of a contract are missing, a court may supply the missing term. See Restatement

(Second) of Contracts § 204 (1981) (“When the parties to a bargain sufficiently defined to be a

contract have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a determination of their rights

and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is supplied by the court.”); see also

Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority, 2016 IL 117638, ¶ 91. Here, however, the circuit court

neither addressed the ambiguous phrase nor attempted to supply or define the terms of the CBA,

on which Lynette’s claims were founded.

¶ 126 Nor did the circuit court address the fact that the Union and B-Line—the two signatory

parties of the CBA who were undoubtedly aware of the CBA’s intent—agreed that Eddie and 54 Lynette’s pay rates should be different because Eddie was supervising the duals and Lynette was

not. Unquestionably, the Union and B-Line were the two parties who had the most knowledge of

Eddie and Lynette’s actual job duties and which job classifications Eddie and Lynette “normally

directed” during the course of their work. As such, it is my impression that the circuit court’s

finding that the claims were not based on the CBA was erroneous and, instead, I believe

preemption of Lynette’s claim is required under the LMRA.

¶ 127 B. Failure to Follow Grievance Procedures

¶ 128 The circuit court also found that because Lynette’s claims were not grounded in the CBA

that Lynette was not required to follow the grievance procedures in the CBA. Again, I disagree.

¶ 129 “Where a collective bargaining agreement establishes a grievance and arbitration

procedure for disputes arising out of the agreement, an employee alleging a violation of the

agreement must attempt to exhaust his or her contractual remedies before seeking judicial relief.”

Kostecki v. Dominick’s Finer Foods, Inc., of Illinois, 361 Ill. App. 3d 362, 369 (2005) (citing Gelb,

356 Ill. App. 3d at 695). If the claim is one that is governed by the contract, the grievance

procedures must be followed. Id. at 370. If not, the complainant may file suit in court. Id. at 370.

“ ‘Where a collective bargaining agreement adequately addresses an aspect of employee

compensation or other working conditions, a state statute will defer to the collective bargaining

agreement’s grievance procedures.’ ” Id. at 369-70 (quoting Gelb, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 695, citing

Daniels v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 277 Ill. App. 3d 968, 973 (1996)). An

employee lacks standing to pursue judicial relief without first exhausting the remedies provided

by the CBA when the claim arises out of the CBA. Id.

¶ 130 One of the CBA’s listed purposes is “to establish, through collective bargaining, rates of

pay, hours of employment, working conditions, and to establish procedures for the handling of any 55 grievances that may arise between the Parties.” The CBA defines a grievance as “a difference of

opinion, disagreement or dispute between the Employer and the Employee *** with respect to the

meaning and application of the terms of this Agreement.” Here, as shown above, Lynette’s claims

of gender discrimination stemmed from an alleged erroneous interpretation of the CBA that altered

“the terms and conditions of her employment” by affecting her wages. Lynette’s statements clearly

fall within the definition of grievance as described in the CBA.

¶ 131 The grievance procedure in the CBA contains four steps, with the last addressing

arbitration. The first step involves the employee advising a steward of the issue and either the

employee or the steward presenting the grievance to the employee’s supervisor. Here, it was

undisputed that Lynette posed the wage discrepancy issue to Knouse in September 2019.

¶ 132 The grievance procedure found in the CBA states that if the matter is not resolved following

the first step, a formal written grievance on a Union form, dated and signed by the employee

specifying the provision of the CBA that was allegedly violated, is required. Although the specific

provision at issue was the wage section found in article 11 of the CBA, no formal grievance was

ever filed by Lynette.

¶ 133 Filing the grievance triggers a company meeting with specified personnel and deadlines

that only requires the presence of the aggrieved employee, “if requested.” The third step involves

a referral to Human Resources and another meeting with predetermined participants as listed in

the CBA. Once again, the grievant employee’s presence is not required and the employee will only

be involved in the meeting, “if requested.” If the issue remains unresolved, the option of arbitration

is provided with details on how that should occur.

¶ 134 As noted above, the CBA addresses the wages of the employees. Section 4 of article 11

states, “When an Employee is appointed as a leadman by the Company, he shall receive a premium 56 of one (1) dollar per hour above the highest job classification normally under his direction.” The

CBA also contains the wage schedule for job classifications referenced in section 11.04. The wage

schedule reveals that shipping coordinators received an hourly wage approximately 41 cents to 43

cents per hour less than dual operators between 2018 and 2021. There was no dispute that the

appropriate pay for a union employee was determined pursuant to the CBA based on the

employee’s classification and duties performed.

¶ 135 Here, Lynette asserted two claims; one under the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS

5/1-101 et seq. (West 2022)) and the other under the Illinois Equal Pay Act (820 ILCS 112/1 et seq.

(West 2022)). Under the Human Rights Act, Lynette asserted that she “performed the same lead

duties as the men *** without receiving the dual rate and extra dollar promised to all leads.”

Indubitably, the “promise” stems from the language under the CBA. Under the Equal Pay Act

claim, Lynette alleged that she was paid “at a rate less than the rate at which the employer paid to

male employees for the same or substantially similar work on jobs the performance of which

requires substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibilities.” While this seems to stray from

CBA governance, it must be remembered that the parties agreed that Lynette’s pay rate was

governed by the CBA. Further, to determine Lynette’s correct wage, the wages of the employees

working under Lynette must also be considered along with the frequency of Lynette’s direction

over each of those classifications. As such, the allegations require application and interpretation

of the CBA which I believe required Lynette to follow the grievance procedures set forth in the

CBA.

¶ 136 “The ultimate purpose of a CBA is to express the common understanding of the terms and

conditions of employment.” Matthews, 2016 IL 117638, ¶ 72. It was undisputed that Lynette failed

to avail herself of the administrative remedy provided in the CBA and therefore did not exhaust 57 her contractual remedies in a manner that would allow this claim to proceed. As such, I find the

circuit court’s holding that Lynette “was not legally obligated to file a grievance” and exhaust her

contractual remedies in error. The case should have been dismissed so the proper administrative

procedures could be followed and any claims remaining unresolved after completing those

procedures, would be heard by a federal district court as required by law.

¶ 137 C. Damages

¶ 138 1. Award for period from 2019-2020

¶ 139 To establish a prima facie case of wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (case law

allows for consideration of claims under the Federal Equal Pay Act (see Jafri v. Signal Funding,

LLC, 2022 WL 17718429 (7th Cir. 2022)), a plaintiff must show that her work demanded the same

(1) responsibilities and (2) skills as the higher-paid male employees. Jaburek v. Foxx, 813 F.3d

626, 632 (7th Cir. 2016). A male employee, paid more for “equal work requiring substantially

similar skill, effort and responsibilities” performed under similar working conditions, is a

comparator under the Equal Pay Act. Id. As such, I agree that Lynette made a prima facie case for

employment discrimination under the Equal Pay Act.

¶ 140 However, the Equal Pay Act allows differences in pay if it is (1) not based on or derived

from a differential in compensation based on sex or another protected characteristic; (2) is job-

related with respect to the position and consistent with a business necessity; and (3) accounts for

the differential. 820 ILCS 112/10 (West 2022). B-Line’s evidence revealed that Eddie and Lynette

were properly paid under the CBA noting that a leadman received “a premium of one (1) dollar

per hour above the highest job classification normally under his direction.” Both the Union and

the company agreed that the duals held the highest job classification under Eddie’s direction, and

the shipping coordinator was the highest classification under Lynette’s direction. 58 ¶ 141 However, even if I ignore the CBA it is clear that Eddie was paid more than Lynette based

on additional job-related aspects of his position The additional work performed by Eddie, included

operating forklifts and overhead cranes, directing other operators of forklift and overhead cranes,

loading trucks, directing the loads, inspection checks, training duals how to perform the job,

reporting of dual safety measures, and dock process lead responsibilities. No matter how often

Eddie performed those tasks, it was undisputed that Lynette never performed those tasks.

¶ 142 Therefore, while I agree that Lynette invoked the rebuttable presumption with her

prima facie case, it is my opinion that the presumption is rebutted, as a matter of law, because the

law allows for additional payment for regular or occasional differences in duties. Id. I also note

that the circuit court’s reliance on the CBA language to ignore the additional duties, is further

evidence that Lynette’s claim improperly avoided exemption. Therefore, it is my impression that

the trial court’s decision to award damages for the period 2019 to 2020 period under the Equal Pay

Act was contrary to law and therefore against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 143 I also disagree that Lynette met the requirements of a prima facie case under the Human

Rights Act. See Terada v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2015 IL App (5th) 140170, ¶ 25. It is my opinion that

insufficient analysis of the similarly situated employee requirement was provided. In order to be

similarly situated employees, Lynette must show that she and Eddie were “ ‘directly comparable

*** in all material respects.’ ” David v. Board of Trustees, 846 F.3d 216, 226 (7th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 981 (7th Cir. 2014)). Relevant factors in

making this determination include: “ ‘whether the employees (i) held the same job description, (ii)

were subject to the same standards, (iii) were subordinate to the same supervisor, and (iv) had

comparable experience, education, and other qualifications—provided the employer considered

59 these latter factors in making the personnel decision.’ ” Id. (quoting Warren v. Solo Cup Co., 516

F.3d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 2008)).

¶ 144 Here, the circuit court never moved beyond the first factor addressing the job description.

The record is unclear as to whether Eddie and Lynette were held to the same standards; admittedly

it appears they were not since Eddie also ran forklifts and cranes, spent substantially more time on

the floor compared to plaintiff, and also trained some of the dual operators. I also note that there

was no consideration of whether Eddie and Lynette shared the same supervisor. Further, as set

forth above, Eddie had additional qualifications that Lynette did not share and Eddie performed

additional duties based on the additional qualifications.

¶ 145 Therefore, I can only conclude that the circuit court failed to consider all the relevant

factors in determining whether Eddie was a substantially similar employee as three of the four

factors were not considered by the court. As such, I find the circuit court’s decision arbitrary and

therefore against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, even if I believed the case was not

preempted, and Lynette was not required to follow the grievance procedures, I would still vacate

the circuit court’s findings and remand the case back to the circuit for consideration of the relevant

factors for this issue.

¶ 146 2. Award for period from 2020-2025

¶ 147 The trial court also awarded Lynette $32,882.28 in “front pay” as diminished earnings for

the period from March 29, 2020, to June 29, 2025, because Lynette was no longer working as a

first shift shipping lead. In legal terms, the award is based on the concept of constructive

discharge. 4 See Steele v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 160 Ill. App. 3d 577, 581 (1987).

Generally, two types of discharge exist: actual and constructive (see Hertzberg v. SRAM Corp., 4

261 F.3d 651, 659 (7th Cir. 2001)), although failure to promote or a demotion have also been accepted as 60 Constructive discharge occurs when, from the standpoint of a reasonable employee, an employer

makes employment so intolerable or unbearable that an employee is compelled to resign. Motley

v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 263 Ill. App. 3d 367, 373 (1994). To create such hostile work

environment, “the misconduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of

[the victim’s] employment and create an abusive work environment.” (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id. at 374. “The working conditions must have been so onerous or demeaning the

employee has effectively been fired *** and compelled to leave.” Id.

¶ 148 First, no fact or allegation supporting or even inferring constructive discharge is found in

the complaint. Nothing in either count I or count III alleged that Lynette was no longer working in

the first shift shipping lead position, that her employment environment was hostile, or that she was

no longer working the shipping lead position due to said hostile work environment. Without even

the barest of allegations, I question the trial court’s jurisdiction to issue an award for constructive

discharge, especially without an amendment of the complaint to comport with the evidence (see

735 ILCS 5/2-616 (West 2022)).

¶ 149 “Subject matter jurisdiction is defined solely as the power of a court to hear and determine

cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.” LVNV Funding, LLC v.

Trice, 2015 IL 116129, ¶ 39. In order “[t]o invoke a circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a

petition or complaint need only ‘alleg[e] the existence of a justiciable matter.’ ” In re Luis R., 239

Ill. 2d 295, 301 (2010) (quoting In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d 408, 426 (2009)). “[A] ‘justiciable matter’

is ‘a controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed

examples of “detrimental employment action.” See Bauer v. Hubbard, 228 Ill. App. 3d 780, 787 (1992). The parties agree that Lynette was not actually discharged by the company; therefore, only constructive discharge is at issue in this case. 61 to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal

interests.’ ” Id. (quoting Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325,

335 (2002)). “Subject matter jurisdiction does not depend upon the legal sufficiency of the

pleadings.” Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 340. “Indeed, even a defectively stated claim is

sufficient to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d at 301.

¶ 150 Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, and the issue may be raised at any time.

Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 333-34. Indeed, reviewing courts are obligated to consider

jurisdictional issues (id. at 334), regardless of whether the issue of jurisdiction was raised by the

parties. People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 36-37 (2009); Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers

Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009). “[I]n order to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of

the circuit court, a plaintiff’s case, as framed by the complaint or petition, must present a justiciable

matter.” Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 334. The court’s authority to exercise its jurisdiction

and resolve a justifiable question is found in the nature of the case as set forth in the complaint and

the relief sought. People v. Western Tire Auto Stores, Inc., 32 Ill. 2d 527, 530 (1965). “To invoke

a circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction, a petition or complaint need only ‘alleg[e] the existence

of a justiciable matter.’ ” In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d at 301 (quoting In re M.W., 232 Ill. 2d at 426).

¶ 151 Whether a justiciable matter is presented, for purposes of establishing subject matter

jurisdiction in the circuit court, is determined by the courts on a case-by-case basis. McCormick v.

Robertson, 2015 IL 118230, ¶ 21 (citing Ferguson v. Patton, 2013 IL 112488, ¶ 22). Failures to

abide by technical or statutory pleading requirements do not affect subject matter jurisdiction and

are instead pleading deficiencies subject to dismissal. See DeLuna v. Treister, 185 Ill. 2d 565, 579-

80 (1999) (addressing section 2-622 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-622 (West

1998))) and the court’s decision in In re Custody of Sexton, 84 Ill. 2d 312 (1981). 62 ¶ 152 However, defective allegations and nonexistent allegations are not the same and the latter,

unlike the former, do not cloak a court with a justiciable issue and the accompanying jurisdiction.

See Ligon v. Williams, 264 Ill. App. 3d 701, 707 (1994). There is nothing “definite and concrete”

about nonpled facts and allegations for an unalleged claim found in a complaint with a broadly

worded and vague prayer for relief. See In re Luis R., 239 Ill. 2d at 301 (quoting In re M.W., 232

Ill. 2d at 426); In re Marriage of Britton, 2022 IL App (5th) 210065, ¶ 39 (quoting Ligon, 264 Ill.

App. 3d at 707).

¶ 153 “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of the court to adjudge concerning the

general question involved [citation] as well as the power to grant the particular relief requested.”

In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64 (1993). “A party cannot be granted relief in the absence of

corresponding pleadings; if a justiciable issue is not presented to the court through proper

pleadings, the court cannot sua sponte adjudicate an issue.” Suriano v. Lafeber, 386 Ill. App. 3d

490, 492 (2008). Any such order entered by the court is void, as the court has exceeded its

jurisdiction. Id.

¶ 154 “The issues in a case are created by the pleadings and allegations, to which the proof must

correspond, and a party cannot have relief under proof without allegations.” In re Jackson, 243 Ill.

App. 3d 631, 651 (1993) (citing Partel, Inc. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 106 Ill. App. 3d 962,

966 (1982)). Due process requires that both parties know in advance of a proceeding which issues

will be tried at that proceeding. Delarosa v. Approved Auto Sales, Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 623, 627

(2002).

¶ 155 The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently tied the definition of subject

matter jurisdiction to the “justiciable issues” placed before the court. See Belleville Toyota, Inc.,

199 Ill. 2d at 340; Ferguson, 2013 IL 112488, ¶ 21; McCormick, 2015 IL 118230, ¶ 23. The 63 justiciable issues are governed by the pleadings filed in the court. Ligon, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 707;

Suriano, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 492; In re Custody of Ayala, 344 Ill. App. 3d 574, 584 (2003); In re

Marriage of Fox, 191 Ill. App. 3d 514, 520 (1989). The pleadings frame the issues for the trial

court and circumscribe the relief the court is empowered to order. Ligon, 264 Ill. App. 3d at 707;

People ex rel. Jackson v. Mannie, 393 Ill. App. 3d 745, 750 (2009). Therefore, it is my opinion

that an award of damages, for which neither facts, nor a cause of action, is found in the pleadings,

cannot be affirmed because no justiciable matter—as it relates to the award—was placed before

the court providing it with subject matter jurisdiction. To find otherwise violates procedural due

process and ignores the ever present need to preserve the integrity of the judicial process.

¶ 156 However, even if I accepted my colleagues’ position that Lynette’s request for

underpayment in the complaint’s prayer for relief was sufficient to give rise to a constructive

discharge claim, I still could not affirm the award for constructive discharge.

¶ 157 “It is difficult for a plaintiff to show a constructive discharge.” Cooper-Schut v. Visteon

Automotive Systems, 361 F.3d 421, 428 (7th Cir. 2004). Constructive discharge occurs where the

working conditions are so intolerable or the employee is so mistreated at work that a reasonable

person in the employee’s position would be forced to quit. Steele, 160 Ill. App. 3d at 581; Jordan

v. City of Gary, Indiana, 396 F.3d 825, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). Working conditions underlying a

constructive discharge claim are egregious and require actions involving more than profanity or

defamatory language. See Tutman v. WBBM-TV, Inc./CBS, Inc., 209 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir.

2000).

¶ 158 Here, there was no evidence of personal threats affecting Lynette’s safety. Nor was there

evidence of any profanity-laden tirades, defamatory comments, vulgar language or even a personal

insult to Lynette. Instead, the evidence revealed that Lynette voluntarily resigned from the first 64 shift shipping lead position on March 2, 2020, and took another position at the company, because

she was upset that she was not being paid the same as Eddie because it was “unfair.”

¶ 159 There was no evidence that Lynette was reassigned because she complained about being

paid less than Eddie and there was no evidence that Lynette was mocked or ridiculed at her job.

Lynette stated she was “devastated” by the company’s decision reached at the December 19, 2019,

meeting; however, by her own admission, Lynette’s job change was a personal choice because she

was upset with the company. Such evidence is insufficient as a matter of law because case law

requires the underlying working conditions be “more than merely intolerable” to award damages

for a constructive discharge claim. Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 489 (7th Cir. 1996). Here, the

evidence does not even reach the level of “merely intolerable.” As such, I would vacate the

$32,882.28 constructive discharge award for the period from March 29, 2020, to June 29, 2025, as

was provided under the Equal Pay Act.

¶ 160 I would also deny relief for the same legal concept under the Human Rights Act count

which was equally devoid of any facts alleging that Lynette no longer worked as the first-shift or

that her work environment was so odious that a reasonable person was compelled to leave their

employment. However, even if those allegations, or any allegation, had been included in the

complaint, there was no evidence submitted to prove or even infer that Lynette’s work environment

was offensive, obscene, shocking, repugnant or even loathsome. As such, I find that no award for

constructive discharge encompassing the period from March 29, 2020, to June 29, 2025, is

warranted in this case.

¶ 161 3. Award for “Interference”

¶ 162 The trial court also awarded special damages under section 30(a-5) of the Equal Pay Act

(820 ILCS 112/30(a-5) (West 2022)) in the amount of $10,000 along with attorney fees and costs 65 totaling $123,025.74. Section 30(a-5) allows a court to award “special damages not to exceed

$10,000 *** as necessary to make the employee whole.” Id. However, such award is only available

if the employer violates section 10(b), 10(b-10), or 10(b-20) (820 ILCS 112/10(b), (b-10), (b-20)

(West 2022)) of the Equal Pay Act. Id. Here, I agree with my colleagues that no request for review

of the interference or attorney fee award was requested in the initial brief and therefore review of

these issues are precluded. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are

forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief ***.”). Regardless, because it is my opinion that

this claim was precluded by section 301 of the LMRA, and that Lynette was required to follow the

grievance procedures in the CBA, I would also vacate the awards of $10,000 for interference and

$123,025.74 in attorney fees.

¶ 163 Finally, while I acknowledge the majority’s disagreement with, and mordant response to

my dissent, I simply disagree. Lynette’s CBA was an employment contract negotiated by her union

with her employer, Cooper B-Line. That contract set forth the steps necessary to address

grievances that allegedly violated the terms and conditions of her employment. Those same

violations were the basis of this case and her right to sue letter obtained from the State. In my

humble opinion, the majority’s position erodes the importance and relevance of contractual

obligations, usurps the authority of the contracting parties of any CBA, and significantly

undermines the importance of grievance procedures found in every union CBA in this State.

¶ 164 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.