Holtz v. Gray
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
PERRY COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARTHA HOLTZ Case No. 25CA00006
Opinion And Judgment Entry Plaintiff – Appellee
Appeal from the Perry County Municipal -vs- Court, Case No. CVG2500136
DANIEL GRAY Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry:December 9, 2025
BEFORE: WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN, P.J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J.; DAVID M. GORMLEY, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: WILLIAM FLAUTT for Plaintiff-Appellee; DANIEL GRAY, PRO SE For Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.
{¶1} Appellant Daniel Gray appeals the judgment of the Perry County Municipal Court, which granted a writ of restitution in favor of Appellee Martha Holtz. Because Appellant has not provided this Court with a transcript of the municipal-court proceedings, and because no errors are evident from the record before us, we affirm the judgment.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On February 28, 2025, Appellee served Appellant with a three-day notice to leave the premises pursuant to R.C. 1923.04. On March 6, 2025, Appellee filed a forcible entry and detainer complaint against Appellant in the Perry County Municipal
Court. The complaint alleges that Appellee owns the premises located at 12190 Custers Point Road in Thornville, Ohio, and that Appellant is a tenant residing at “Lot A1” of the campground. Appellee further alleges in her complaint that Appellant failed to pay both rent and electric charges for August through December of 2024, and for January, February, and March of 2025.
{¶3} On March 17, 2025, the magistrate conducted a hearing. Appellant did not provide this Court with a transcript of that hearing. The magistrate’s judgment entry indicates that both Appellant and Appellee were present at the hearing. In a March 17, 2025, judgment entry, the magistrate made these findings of fact: the court had jurisdiction over the forcible entry and detainer claim; Appellant was properly served via personal service; Appellee had a right to possession of the premises; the parties had an oral lease agreement; Appellant violated the lease by failing to pay rent and/or electric; and Appellee served Appellant with a “Notice to Vacate the Premises” on February 28, 2025. The magistrate concluded that Appellee was entitled to restitution of the premises, and set March 28, 2025, as the date by which Appellant was to vacate.
{¶4} On March 28, 2025, Appellant filed a pleading captioned “Motion to Dismiss,” but the body of the pleading stated he was “appealing the decision of the magistrate.” Appellant listed the following “objections” to the magistrate’s decision: that the notice to vacate the premises did not comply with R.C. 1923.04, R.C. 5321.02, R.C. 5321.03, R.C. 5321.06, and R.C. 5321.17; that the notice to leave the premises did not specify a date to leave the premises as required by R.C. 1923.03; that the notice contained a “false time” and “false date of issuance” in violation of R.C. 1923.04; that, pursuant to R.C. 5321.05 and R.C. 5321.03, appellee could not bring an eviction action against a person with a disability; and that the complaint/notice did not contain an accurate or complete address.
{¶5} On April 21, 2025, the trial court issued a “Notice of Hearing,” setting Appellant’s “Appeal of the Magistrate’s Decision” for hearing on May 12, 2025, at 10:15 a.m. The docket reflects that a hearing was held on that date, but Appellant did not provide this Court with a transcript of the hearing.
{¶6} On May 23, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry overruling Appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopting the magistrate’s decision. The trial court designated the judgment as a “final appealable order” and ordered Appellant’s immediate removal from the premises.
{¶7} Later that same day, Appellant filed another pleading captioned “Motion to Dismiss,” requesting that the eviction be “denied, vacated, and thrown out of court, never to be revisited and … dismissed with prejudice.” It does not appear from the record that the trial court ever explicitly ruled on this motion. Accordingly, we presume the trial court denied the motion. State ex rel. The V Cos. v. Marshall, 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469 (1998); Primal Life Holdings, LLC v. Soc. Brands, Inc., 2025-Ohio-2746, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.).
{¶8} On June 20, 2025, Appellant filed a motion asking this Court to “compel preparation of the transcripts of the hearings at the State’s expense.” On June 26, 2025, this Court denied the motion. On June 27, 2025, Appellant requested reconsideration, which this Court also denied. Likewise, this Court denied Appellant’s July 7, 2025, emergency motion to quash the writ of execution.
{¶9} Appellant appeals the judgment of the Perry County Municipal Court, and assigns the following as error:
{¶10} “I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE RULES OF EVICTION AND FORCIBLE ENTRY FOR MANUFACTURED HOME PARKS WERE IGNORED, SPECIFICALLY O.R.C. 1923.04, AND O.R.C. 5321.02, .03, 06, AND .17?”
{¶11} “II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND CIVIL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND CIVIL RIGHTS BY THE PLAINTIFF’S DENIAL OF ACCOMODATIONS FOR A PERSON WITH DISABILITIES, O.R.C. 4112.02(H)?”
{¶12} “III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUNDS FOR BREACH OF ORAL CONTRACT PROTECTED AND OUTLINED IN O.R.C. 2305.07?”
{¶13} “IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY DENYING THE APPELLANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR VIOLATIONS OF O.R.C. 4781.38, .39, WHICH DEEM THE LEASE AGREEMENT VOID AB INITIO NEGATING NON-PAYMENT OF RENT AS CAUSE FOR EVICTION AS WELL AS SHOWING UNJUST ENRICHMENT BY THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE?”
{¶14} “V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SERVING A STALE EVICTION NOTICE AND WRIT OF EXECUTION WITH A JUDGMENT DATE OF MAY 30, 2025, AND WITH AN EXECUTION DATE OF MARCH 28, 2025, NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH O.R.C. 3733.091 WHICH IMPLIES THAT PROCEDURES OF CHAPTER 1923 MUST BE FOLLOWED?”
I.
{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court committed error in overruling his objections to the magistrate’s decision/motion to dismiss because “the rules of eviction and forcible entry for manufactured home parks were ignored,” specifically R.C. 1923.04 and R.C. 5321.02, .03, .06, and .17.
{¶16} Under R.C. 1923.02(A), persons subject to forcible entry and detainer actions include, “tenants or manufactured home park residents holding over their terms” or “tenants or manufactured home park residents in possession under an oral tenancy, who are in default in the payment of rent as provided in division (B).” R.C. 1923.02(B) further provides that if a tenant or manufactured home park resident under an oral tenancy is in default in payment of rent, the tenant “forfeits the right of occupancy,” and the landlord may terminate the tenancy by notifying the tenant, as required by R.C. 1923.04, to leave the premises.
{¶17} Upon review of the record transmitted to this Court, we find Appellee provided the three-day notice required by R.C. 1923.04 and that this notice contained all the language mandated by the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not “ignore” any portion of R.C. 1923.04. Likewise, the trial court did not “ignore” R.C. 5321.03, which expressly authorizes a landlord to bring an action for possession of the premises when a tenant is in default in the payment of rent.
{¶18} Appellant’s remaining arguments relating to R.C. 5321.02 (retaliatory conduct by landlord), R.C. 5321.06 (terms and conditions of rental agreement), and R.C. 5321.17 (termination of tenancy) cannot be reviewed without reference to the record of the trial court proceedings.
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