[Cite as Holtz v. Gray, 2025-Ohio-5498.]
COURT OF APPEALS PERRY COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARTHA HOLTZ Case No. 25CA00006
Opinion And Judgment Entry Plaintiff – Appellee Appeal from the Perry County Municipal -vs- Court, Case No. CVG2500136
DANIEL GRAY Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry:December 9, 2025
BEFORE: WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN, P.J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J.; DAVID M. GORMLEY, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: WILLIAM FLAUTT for Plaintiff-Appellee; DANIEL GRAY, PRO SE For Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.
{¶1} Appellant Daniel Gray appeals the judgment of the Perry County Municipal
Court, which granted a writ of restitution in favor of Appellee Martha Holtz. Because
Appellant has not provided this Court with a transcript of the municipal-court proceedings,
and because no errors are evident from the record before us, we affirm the judgment.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On February 28, 2025, Appellee served Appellant with a three-day notice
to leave the premises pursuant to R.C. 1923.04. On March 6, 2025, Appellee filed a
forcible entry and detainer complaint against Appellant in the Perry County Municipal Court. The complaint alleges that Appellee owns the premises located at 12190 Custers
Point Road in Thornville, Ohio, and that Appellant is a tenant residing at “Lot A1” of the
campground. Appellee further alleges in her complaint that Appellant failed to pay both
rent and electric charges for August through December of 2024, and for January,
February, and March of 2025.
{¶3} On March 17, 2025, the magistrate conducted a hearing. Appellant did not
provide this Court with a transcript of that hearing. The magistrate’s judgment entry
indicates that both Appellant and Appellee were present at the hearing. In a March 17,
2025, judgment entry, the magistrate made these findings of fact: the court had
jurisdiction over the forcible entry and detainer claim; Appellant was properly served via
personal service; Appellee had a right to possession of the premises; the parties had an
oral lease agreement; Appellant violated the lease by failing to pay rent and/or electric;
and Appellee served Appellant with a “Notice to Vacate the Premises” on February 28,
2025. The magistrate concluded that Appellee was entitled to restitution of the premises,
and set March 28, 2025, as the date by which Appellant was to vacate.
{¶4} On March 28, 2025, Appellant filed a pleading captioned “Motion to
Dismiss,” but the body of the pleading stated he was “appealing the decision of the
magistrate.” Appellant listed the following “objections” to the magistrate’s decision: that
the notice to vacate the premises did not comply with R.C. 1923.04, R.C. 5321.02, R.C.
5321.03, R.C. 5321.06, and R.C. 5321.17; that the notice to leave the premises did not
specify a date to leave the premises as required by R.C. 1923.03; that the notice
contained a “false time” and “false date of issuance” in violation of R.C. 1923.04; that,
pursuant to R.C. 5321.05 and R.C. 5321.03, appellee could not bring an eviction action against a person with a disability; and that the complaint/notice did not contain an
accurate or complete address.
{¶5} On April 21, 2025, the trial court issued a “Notice of Hearing,” setting
Appellant’s “Appeal of the Magistrate’s Decision” for hearing on May 12, 2025, at 10:15
a.m. The docket reflects that a hearing was held on that date, but Appellant did not
provide this Court with a transcript of the hearing.
{¶6} On May 23, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry overruling
Appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopting the magistrate’s decision.
The trial court designated the judgment as a “final appealable order” and ordered
Appellant’s immediate removal from the premises.
{¶7} Later that same day, Appellant filed another pleading captioned “Motion to
Dismiss,” requesting that the eviction be “denied, vacated, and thrown out of court, never
to be revisited and … dismissed with prejudice.” It does not appear from the record that
the trial court ever explicitly ruled on this motion. Accordingly, we presume the trial court
denied the motion. State ex rel. The V Cos. v. Marshall, 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469 (1998);
Primal Life Holdings, LLC v. Soc. Brands, Inc., 2025-Ohio-2746, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.).
{¶8} On June 20, 2025, Appellant filed a motion asking this Court to “compel
preparation of the transcripts of the hearings at the State’s expense.” On June 26, 2025,
this Court denied the motion. On June 27, 2025, Appellant requested reconsideration,
which this Court also denied. Likewise, this Court denied Appellant’s July 7, 2025,
emergency motion to quash the writ of execution.
{¶9} Appellant appeals the judgment of the Perry County Municipal Court, and
assigns the following as error: {¶10} “I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE RULES OF EVICTION AND
FORCIBLE ENTRY FOR MANUFACTURED HOME PARKS WERE IGNORED,
SPECIFICALLY O.R.C. 1923.04, AND O.R.C. 5321.02, .03, 06, AND .17?”
{¶11} “II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AND CIVIL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND CIVIL RIGHTS BY
THE PLAINTIFF’S DENIAL OF ACCOMODATIONS FOR A PERSON WITH
DISABILITIES, O.R.C. 4112.02(H)?”
{¶12} “III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUNDS FOR BREACH OF ORAL
CONTRACT PROTECTED AND OUTLINED IN O.R.C. 2305.07?”
{¶13} “IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY DENYING THE APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR VIOLATIONS OF O.R.C. 4781.38, .39, WHICH DEEM THE
LEASE AGREEMENT VOID AB INITIO NEGATING NON-PAYMENT OF RENT AS
CAUSE FOR EVICTION AS WELL AS SHOWING UNJUST ENRICHMENT BY THE
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE?”
{¶14} “V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SERVING A STALE EVICTION
NOTICE AND WRIT OF EXECUTION WITH A JUDGMENT DATE OF MAY 30, 2025,
AND WITH AN EXECUTION DATE OF MARCH 28, 2025, NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH
O.R.C. 3733.091 WHICH IMPLIES THAT PROCEDURES OF CHAPTER 1923 MUST BE
FOLLOWED?” I.
{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court
committed error in overruling his objections to the magistrate’s decision/motion to dismiss
because “the rules of eviction and forcible entry for manufactured home parks were
ignored,” specifically R.C. 1923.04 and R.C. 5321.02, .03, .06, and .17.
{¶16} Under R.C. 1923.02(A), persons subject to forcible entry and detainer
actions include, “tenants or manufactured home park residents holding over their terms”
or “tenants or manufactured home park residents in possession under an oral tenancy,
who are in default in the payment of rent as provided in division (B).” R.C. 1923.02(B)
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[Cite as Holtz v. Gray, 2025-Ohio-5498.]
COURT OF APPEALS PERRY COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARTHA HOLTZ Case No. 25CA00006
Opinion And Judgment Entry Plaintiff – Appellee Appeal from the Perry County Municipal -vs- Court, Case No. CVG2500136
DANIEL GRAY Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant – Appellant Date of Judgment Entry:December 9, 2025
BEFORE: WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN, P.J., KEVIN W. POPHAM, J.; DAVID M. GORMLEY, Appellate Judges
APPEARANCES: WILLIAM FLAUTT for Plaintiff-Appellee; DANIEL GRAY, PRO SE For Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.
{¶1} Appellant Daniel Gray appeals the judgment of the Perry County Municipal
Court, which granted a writ of restitution in favor of Appellee Martha Holtz. Because
Appellant has not provided this Court with a transcript of the municipal-court proceedings,
and because no errors are evident from the record before us, we affirm the judgment.
Facts & Procedural History
{¶2} On February 28, 2025, Appellee served Appellant with a three-day notice
to leave the premises pursuant to R.C. 1923.04. On March 6, 2025, Appellee filed a
forcible entry and detainer complaint against Appellant in the Perry County Municipal Court. The complaint alleges that Appellee owns the premises located at 12190 Custers
Point Road in Thornville, Ohio, and that Appellant is a tenant residing at “Lot A1” of the
campground. Appellee further alleges in her complaint that Appellant failed to pay both
rent and electric charges for August through December of 2024, and for January,
February, and March of 2025.
{¶3} On March 17, 2025, the magistrate conducted a hearing. Appellant did not
provide this Court with a transcript of that hearing. The magistrate’s judgment entry
indicates that both Appellant and Appellee were present at the hearing. In a March 17,
2025, judgment entry, the magistrate made these findings of fact: the court had
jurisdiction over the forcible entry and detainer claim; Appellant was properly served via
personal service; Appellee had a right to possession of the premises; the parties had an
oral lease agreement; Appellant violated the lease by failing to pay rent and/or electric;
and Appellee served Appellant with a “Notice to Vacate the Premises” on February 28,
2025. The magistrate concluded that Appellee was entitled to restitution of the premises,
and set March 28, 2025, as the date by which Appellant was to vacate.
{¶4} On March 28, 2025, Appellant filed a pleading captioned “Motion to
Dismiss,” but the body of the pleading stated he was “appealing the decision of the
magistrate.” Appellant listed the following “objections” to the magistrate’s decision: that
the notice to vacate the premises did not comply with R.C. 1923.04, R.C. 5321.02, R.C.
5321.03, R.C. 5321.06, and R.C. 5321.17; that the notice to leave the premises did not
specify a date to leave the premises as required by R.C. 1923.03; that the notice
contained a “false time” and “false date of issuance” in violation of R.C. 1923.04; that,
pursuant to R.C. 5321.05 and R.C. 5321.03, appellee could not bring an eviction action against a person with a disability; and that the complaint/notice did not contain an
accurate or complete address.
{¶5} On April 21, 2025, the trial court issued a “Notice of Hearing,” setting
Appellant’s “Appeal of the Magistrate’s Decision” for hearing on May 12, 2025, at 10:15
a.m. The docket reflects that a hearing was held on that date, but Appellant did not
provide this Court with a transcript of the hearing.
{¶6} On May 23, 2025, the trial court issued a judgment entry overruling
Appellant’s objections to the magistrate’s decision and adopting the magistrate’s decision.
The trial court designated the judgment as a “final appealable order” and ordered
Appellant’s immediate removal from the premises.
{¶7} Later that same day, Appellant filed another pleading captioned “Motion to
Dismiss,” requesting that the eviction be “denied, vacated, and thrown out of court, never
to be revisited and … dismissed with prejudice.” It does not appear from the record that
the trial court ever explicitly ruled on this motion. Accordingly, we presume the trial court
denied the motion. State ex rel. The V Cos. v. Marshall, 81 Ohio St.3d 467, 469 (1998);
Primal Life Holdings, LLC v. Soc. Brands, Inc., 2025-Ohio-2746, ¶ 33 (5th Dist.).
{¶8} On June 20, 2025, Appellant filed a motion asking this Court to “compel
preparation of the transcripts of the hearings at the State’s expense.” On June 26, 2025,
this Court denied the motion. On June 27, 2025, Appellant requested reconsideration,
which this Court also denied. Likewise, this Court denied Appellant’s July 7, 2025,
emergency motion to quash the writ of execution.
{¶9} Appellant appeals the judgment of the Perry County Municipal Court, and
assigns the following as error: {¶10} “I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE RULES OF EVICTION AND
FORCIBLE ENTRY FOR MANUFACTURED HOME PARKS WERE IGNORED,
SPECIFICALLY O.R.C. 1923.04, AND O.R.C. 5321.02, .03, 06, AND .17?”
{¶11} “II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS AND CIVIL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND CIVIL RIGHTS BY
THE PLAINTIFF’S DENIAL OF ACCOMODATIONS FOR A PERSON WITH
DISABILITIES, O.R.C. 4112.02(H)?”
{¶12} “III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE APPELLANT’S
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUNDS FOR BREACH OF ORAL
CONTRACT PROTECTED AND OUTLINED IN O.R.C. 2305.07?”
{¶13} “IV. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY DENYING THE APPELLANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR VIOLATIONS OF O.R.C. 4781.38, .39, WHICH DEEM THE
LEASE AGREEMENT VOID AB INITIO NEGATING NON-PAYMENT OF RENT AS
CAUSE FOR EVICTION AS WELL AS SHOWING UNJUST ENRICHMENT BY THE
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE?”
{¶14} “V. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SERVING A STALE EVICTION
NOTICE AND WRIT OF EXECUTION WITH A JUDGMENT DATE OF MAY 30, 2025,
AND WITH AN EXECUTION DATE OF MARCH 28, 2025, NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH
O.R.C. 3733.091 WHICH IMPLIES THAT PROCEDURES OF CHAPTER 1923 MUST BE
FOLLOWED?” I.
{¶15} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues that the trial court
committed error in overruling his objections to the magistrate’s decision/motion to dismiss
because “the rules of eviction and forcible entry for manufactured home parks were
ignored,” specifically R.C. 1923.04 and R.C. 5321.02, .03, .06, and .17.
{¶16} Under R.C. 1923.02(A), persons subject to forcible entry and detainer
actions include, “tenants or manufactured home park residents holding over their terms”
or “tenants or manufactured home park residents in possession under an oral tenancy,
who are in default in the payment of rent as provided in division (B).” R.C. 1923.02(B)
further provides that if a tenant or manufactured home park resident under an oral tenancy
is in default in payment of rent, the tenant “forfeits the right of occupancy,” and the landlord
may terminate the tenancy by notifying the tenant, as required by R.C. 1923.04, to leave
the premises.
{¶17} Upon review of the record transmitted to this Court, we find Appellee
provided the three-day notice required by R.C. 1923.04 and that this notice contained all
the language mandated by the statute. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did
not “ignore” any portion of R.C. 1923.04. Likewise, the trial court did not “ignore” R.C.
5321.03, which expressly authorizes a landlord to bring an action for possession of the
premises when a tenant is in default in the payment of rent.
{¶18} Appellant’s remaining arguments relating to R.C. 5321.02 (retaliatory
conduct by landlord), R.C. 5321.06 (terms and conditions of rental agreement), and R.C.
5321.17 (termination of tenancy) cannot be reviewed without reference to the record of
the trial court proceedings. {¶19} Appellant was required to provide a transcript of the lower-court
proceedings because he “bears the burden of showing error by reference to matters in
the record.” Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories, 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 199 (1980). “When
portions of the transcript necessary for resolution of assigned errors are omitted from the
record, the reviewing court has nothing to pass upon and thus, as to those assigned
errors, the court has no choice but to presume the validity of the lower court’s proceedings
and affirm.” Id.
{¶20} The record from the trial court has been transmitted to this Court. That
record contains a printout of the docket, as well as copies of each filing from the parties
and the trial court, but it does not contain a transcript of the hearing held before the
magistrate on March 17, 2025, any of the exhibits that were introduced on that date, or a
transcript of the objections hearing held before the trial judge on May 12, 2025. Because
we do not have a complete record of what occurred in the trial court, vis-à-vis a transcript
of what transpired at the oral hearings – necessary for the resolution of assigned errors,
we presume the regularity of the proceedings below and affirm. Appellant’s first
assignment of error is overruled.
II., III., IV.
{¶21} In his second, third, and fourth assignments of error, Appellant contends the
trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss/objections to the magistrate’s order
because Appellee allegedly breached an oral contract, violated various provisions of R.C.
Chapter 4781, and failed to provide appropriate accommodations under R.C. 4112.02(H).
In his appellate brief, Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to dismiss/objections to the magistrate’s order because Appellee purportedly violated numerous provisions of the Ohio Revised Code and the United States Code,
including R.C. Chapters 2909, 2913, 4112, and 4781; R.C. 5321.02 and 5321.04; and 18
U.S.C. 1708, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 18 U.S.C. 1702, and 42 U.S.C. 3601.
{¶22} These alleged errors cannot be resolved without reference to the record
from the trial court below. As detailed above, Appellant was required to provide a
transcript of the lower-court proceedings. Knapp, 61 Ohio St.2d at 199. Again, because
we do not have a complete record what occurred in the trial court properly before us,
including transcripts necessary for the resolution of assigned errors, we presume the
regularity of the proceedings below and affirm. Appellant’s second, third, and fourth
assignments of error are overruled.
V.
{¶23} In his fifth assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred by
serving a “stale eviction notice and writ” containing an incorrect judgment date. The
document to which Appellant appears to refer is not a judgment entry issued by the trial
court. Rather, it is a “Writ of Restitution Execution” issued by the Perry County Clerk of
Courts and directed to the bailiff and/or sheriff, instructing them to execute the writ of
restitution previously issued by the trial court.
{¶24} The magistrate issued a writ of restitution on March 17, 2025. The trial court
adopted and incorporated the magistrate’s decision on May 23, 2025, ordering the
immediate removal of appellant from the premises. Thus, the trial court did not improperly
serve or issue a “stale” notice or writ. Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶25} We note that appellant has attempted to supplement his arguments with
factual information included within and attached to his appellate brief. This Court has no means to verify whether this information was submitted to the trial court; therefore, we
have not considered it. Moreover, to the extent the evidence Appellant references
constitutes new material not before the trial court when it rendered its May 23, 2025,
judgment, we cannot consider such evidence in resolving this appeal. Roote v. Hibernia
Apts. I, LLC, 2020-Ohio-5401, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.). Appellate review is limited to the record
as it existed at the time the trial court entered judgment. Franks v. Rankin, 2012-Ohio-
1920, ¶ 73 (10th Dist.).
{¶26} Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s assignments of errors are overruled.
For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Perry County Municipal
Court is affirmed. Costs to Appellant.
By: Popham, J.
Hoffman, P.J. and
Gormley, J., concur