MeerimON, J.,
(after stating the facts). Unquestionably, if the Court can give the provisions of the statute in question effect, by any reasonable interpretation of them, consistent with the
Constitution, it is its obvious duty to do so. Courts never de-ntare statutes and statutory provisions in conflict with the Constitution, and therefore void, except where they are plainly so. They are presumed to be valid, and every reasonable doubt is to be given in favor of their validity. The Court cannot allow plausible arguments and speculative opinions to overthrow them, and thus defeat the legislative iutent.
The first assigned ground of objection to the statute is clearly untenable. The tux in question was levied just as were all the other county taxes, for an ordinary and lawful county purpose, and by the same uniform rule, upon the
ad valorem
assessment of all the taxable property in the county. The purpose was to raise county revenue, to be expended in constructing, amending and keeping in repair, the public roads, bridges, ferries, aud fords in the county. The statute, in effect, apportions the revenue raised by the tax, to the township — not necessarily to the road district — from which it was collected. This distribution could not destroy the uniformity of the tax levy by which it was raised. We cannot see any reason why the apportionment of the revenue, as indicated, should affect the uniformity of the tax levy at all, much less why it should destroy and render it void. The intention seems to have been to allow the tax payers and the people of the township, paying the money, to have, as nearly as practicable, the direct benefit of it. There is no constitutional provision that forbids this to be done.
The second ground of objection assigned is, that the statute violates the Constitution in that it authorizes a tax on account of the public roads to be imposed upon the property of the tax payiug citizens of the town of Charlotte, and requires that no part of the revenue raised from such tax, and indeed that no part of the revenue of the county for purposes of roads, shall be expended within the corporate limits of that- town, for like purposes.
It is contended that this provision is unequal and unjust.
The Constitution does not prohibit such inequality. While it is very true, that there must be equality and uuiformity in imposing the burden of taxation upon property subject to it, so that each tax payer shall pay the same proportionate tax on the same species of
property
taxed, that every other tax payer pays, and the tax must be levied
ad valorem,
this rule of equality does-not apply to the distribution of the revenue arising from such taxation. It is to be observed, that the objection here, is not to-the method or rule observed in levying the tax — the levy, as we-have seen, was by uniform rule, and regular. But the objection-is to the distribution of the revenue to be raised by the tax imposed.
Now, the necessities, wants, purposes and interests of government are such, that it is practically impossible to distribute its-revenues equally among those who pay taxes. Indeed, this-cannot, in most instances be approximately done, not even to the localities from which most of it is taken. The State may, sometimes must, expend large sums of money in one section, for-proper and necessary purposes, while it expends very little in another, when perhaps the greater part of the taxes were paid by tax payers in the latter. This is an essential inequality, arising from the diversified and multiplied wants and necessities of government. Its very nature renders such inequality necessary. A constitutional provision forbidding it, would defeat, at all events greatly hinder, the purposes and aims of government.
Such inequality prevails in the State government, and as well, and for the like reasons, in the county government. It may turn out-, oftentimes does, that a large part of the county revenues must be expended in one locality in the county, to build a road,, construct a bridge, erect a work-house or the like, essential to the general and common good of the-people of the county.
The statute under consideration undertakes to distribute the-revenue arising from the taxes for the purposes of roads, to the townships — not necessarily in equal parts to the several road districts — from which it is to come. This seems to be a distinctive-
purpose. The taxes collected, and all fines and penalties, are to be so distributed and applied, following up the general and leading purpose of the statute, to give “the supervision and control -of the public roads” to the justices of the peace respectively, of the several townships. Hence, it is provided in §19, that “the township trustees, in determining the division of this fund, shall be governed, not by the miles of roads in each district, but by the necessities of the roads, the convenience of getting material, the quality of material necessary to make substantial repairs, etc., and thus make a just and equitable division of said funds between the several districts.” And to effectuate this purpose the better, it is provided in §17, “that the chairman of the board of commissioners shall make out a list of the names of each tax payer, of the amount of the road tax with which each stands ■charged, and transmit the same to the supervisor of the proper district.” The tax payer and the sum of money thus due from him, being thus designated, he may discharge the sum of money so due “by labor on the public highways withiu the district where the same is charged, nothin the time designated in this act, at the rate of one dollar per day,” etc. But if the tax due is not thus discharged in labor, the township trustees will distribute the cash fund, when it shall be collected by the sheriff, to the several road districts, in the township as above indicated.
What ive have said serves to show that the inequality complained of, is not such as comes within any constitutional inhibition, and the statute is not void on that account. It is not necessary to advert to the advantages the tax payers of Charlotte must gain by the expenditure of the revenue arising from the faxes they are required to pay, in improving the roads that lead ■directly into their town, and the further advantage they have in being exempt from performing four days labor on the public roads, that the tax payer living in a road district must perform, or pay three dollars in cash. This does not áffiect the merits of the objection just disposed of.
The third ground of objection is, that the tax payer outside of the corporate limits of Charlotte, may discharge the taxes due
from him in labor, while the tax payer in town cannot. The objection is unfounded. The tax payer in Charlotte has the right to, and may, discharge the tax due from him in labor on the roads, just as may any other like tax payer residing outside that town. As we have seen, the revenue arising from the tax is to be applied in the township from which it comes. To this end, a list of the tax payers, and the tax due from each, must be sent to the supervisor of the proper road district, as above indicated.
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MeerimON, J.,
(after stating the facts). Unquestionably, if the Court can give the provisions of the statute in question effect, by any reasonable interpretation of them, consistent with the
Constitution, it is its obvious duty to do so. Courts never de-ntare statutes and statutory provisions in conflict with the Constitution, and therefore void, except where they are plainly so. They are presumed to be valid, and every reasonable doubt is to be given in favor of their validity. The Court cannot allow plausible arguments and speculative opinions to overthrow them, and thus defeat the legislative iutent.
The first assigned ground of objection to the statute is clearly untenable. The tux in question was levied just as were all the other county taxes, for an ordinary and lawful county purpose, and by the same uniform rule, upon the
ad valorem
assessment of all the taxable property in the county. The purpose was to raise county revenue, to be expended in constructing, amending and keeping in repair, the public roads, bridges, ferries, aud fords in the county. The statute, in effect, apportions the revenue raised by the tax, to the township — not necessarily to the road district — from which it was collected. This distribution could not destroy the uniformity of the tax levy by which it was raised. We cannot see any reason why the apportionment of the revenue, as indicated, should affect the uniformity of the tax levy at all, much less why it should destroy and render it void. The intention seems to have been to allow the tax payers and the people of the township, paying the money, to have, as nearly as practicable, the direct benefit of it. There is no constitutional provision that forbids this to be done.
The second ground of objection assigned is, that the statute violates the Constitution in that it authorizes a tax on account of the public roads to be imposed upon the property of the tax payiug citizens of the town of Charlotte, and requires that no part of the revenue raised from such tax, and indeed that no part of the revenue of the county for purposes of roads, shall be expended within the corporate limits of that- town, for like purposes.
It is contended that this provision is unequal and unjust.
The Constitution does not prohibit such inequality. While it is very true, that there must be equality and uuiformity in imposing the burden of taxation upon property subject to it, so that each tax payer shall pay the same proportionate tax on the same species of
property
taxed, that every other tax payer pays, and the tax must be levied
ad valorem,
this rule of equality does-not apply to the distribution of the revenue arising from such taxation. It is to be observed, that the objection here, is not to-the method or rule observed in levying the tax — the levy, as we-have seen, was by uniform rule, and regular. But the objection-is to the distribution of the revenue to be raised by the tax imposed.
Now, the necessities, wants, purposes and interests of government are such, that it is practically impossible to distribute its-revenues equally among those who pay taxes. Indeed, this-cannot, in most instances be approximately done, not even to the localities from which most of it is taken. The State may, sometimes must, expend large sums of money in one section, for-proper and necessary purposes, while it expends very little in another, when perhaps the greater part of the taxes were paid by tax payers in the latter. This is an essential inequality, arising from the diversified and multiplied wants and necessities of government. Its very nature renders such inequality necessary. A constitutional provision forbidding it, would defeat, at all events greatly hinder, the purposes and aims of government.
Such inequality prevails in the State government, and as well, and for the like reasons, in the county government. It may turn out-, oftentimes does, that a large part of the county revenues must be expended in one locality in the county, to build a road,, construct a bridge, erect a work-house or the like, essential to the general and common good of the-people of the county.
The statute under consideration undertakes to distribute the-revenue arising from the taxes for the purposes of roads, to the townships — not necessarily in equal parts to the several road districts — from which it is to come. This seems to be a distinctive-
purpose. The taxes collected, and all fines and penalties, are to be so distributed and applied, following up the general and leading purpose of the statute, to give “the supervision and control -of the public roads” to the justices of the peace respectively, of the several townships. Hence, it is provided in §19, that “the township trustees, in determining the division of this fund, shall be governed, not by the miles of roads in each district, but by the necessities of the roads, the convenience of getting material, the quality of material necessary to make substantial repairs, etc., and thus make a just and equitable division of said funds between the several districts.” And to effectuate this purpose the better, it is provided in §17, “that the chairman of the board of commissioners shall make out a list of the names of each tax payer, of the amount of the road tax with which each stands ■charged, and transmit the same to the supervisor of the proper district.” The tax payer and the sum of money thus due from him, being thus designated, he may discharge the sum of money so due “by labor on the public highways withiu the district where the same is charged, nothin the time designated in this act, at the rate of one dollar per day,” etc. But if the tax due is not thus discharged in labor, the township trustees will distribute the cash fund, when it shall be collected by the sheriff, to the several road districts, in the township as above indicated.
What ive have said serves to show that the inequality complained of, is not such as comes within any constitutional inhibition, and the statute is not void on that account. It is not necessary to advert to the advantages the tax payers of Charlotte must gain by the expenditure of the revenue arising from the faxes they are required to pay, in improving the roads that lead ■directly into their town, and the further advantage they have in being exempt from performing four days labor on the public roads, that the tax payer living in a road district must perform, or pay three dollars in cash. This does not áffiect the merits of the objection just disposed of.
The third ground of objection is, that the tax payer outside of the corporate limits of Charlotte, may discharge the taxes due
from him in labor, while the tax payer in town cannot. The objection is unfounded. The tax payer in Charlotte has the right to, and may, discharge the tax due from him in labor on the roads, just as may any other like tax payer residing outside that town. As we have seen, the revenue arising from the tax is to be applied in the township from which it comes. To this end, a list of the tax payers, and the tax due from each, must be sent to the supervisor of the proper road district, as above indicated. The taxes so designated, are to be distributed aud apportioned by the township trustees to the several road districts, as provided in the last clause of §19, of the statute above recited. The tax due from the tax payers in Charlotte will be thus apportioned to a road district in Charlotte township, and each may discharge the tax due from him, by labor on the roads in the district to which his tax may be assigned. The language of the statute (§19), is, “Any person * * * * * may discharge the tax due from him on the public highways within the di.-trict where the same is
charged,”
&c. When the tax due is apportioned by the township trustees, the tax “is charged,” in the sense of the statute, in the road district to which it is so apportioned. If the township trustees have not so apportioned the taxes due, they ought to do so, so that the taxpayer may exercise his right to discharge the tax due from him in labor. This interpretation,, it seeins to us, is not unreasonable, and it gives just effect to the statute. If it be said, that the distribution of the revenue arising from the tax is cumbersome, it must be said in reply, that the statute is not clear in much of its details. But apart from what we have said, it is questionable how far a difference in the method of the payment of taxes properly levied, comes within any inhibition of the Constitution. We express no opinion in that respect.
We think the Court erred in granting the injunction, and the order granting it must be reversed. To that end, let this opinion be certified to the Superior Court according to law.
Error. Revei'sed.