Holmes v. Jennison

39 U.S. 614
Supreme Court of the United States·Decided July 1, 1840·No. No. II·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Opinion of

Mr. Justice Baldwin.

.Concurring most fully and cordially in the opinions'delivered by those of my brethren, who are opposed to any action by this Court on this case, I have nothing to add to the reasons assigned by them respectively, lest it might imply my want of Confidence in the grounds which they have taken; and in my mind maintained.with conclusive force. There are, however, two subjects of high consideration involved in this case, which I feel constrained to notice; as my opinion would have been, governed by them had there been no other grounds for my declining to interfere with the order of the Supreme Court of Vermont, remanding the relator to the custody, whence he was brought before them by the writ of habeas corpus.

X. The Constitution of the United States confers no' power on any department of the federal government, to prevent a state or its officers from sending out of its territory a person in the situation of Holmes the relator.

2: That a writ of error does lie from this to a state Court, to revise their proceedings on a writ of habeas corpus.

That the treaty-making power of the Constitution, is competent to bind the states by a stipulation to surrender fugitives from justice, is not denied by any; nor that where such power is executed by a treaty, a state is under an obligation to surrender : but that while such power remains dormant or contingent, the obligation does not exist, and that Congress have no power to impose it, has been too clearly established by my brethren, to leave it in my power to add to the weight of their reasoning. But while I admit the competency of the treaty-making power to compel, I utterly deny its power to prevent the expulsion of a fugitive from justice from the territory of a state, pursuant to its laws, or the general authority vested in its executive or other appropriate officers, to administer and enforce its regulations of internal police.

This distinction between the power to compel, and the power to prevent the surrender of a fugitive, is visible in the whole frame of the Constitution, as well in the general lines which it designates, in separating the powers of the federal and state governments, by grants, prohibitions, and separations, as by its more specific provisions.

There cannot be found a clause in the whole instrument, which in terns or by any fair construction, can be made'to bring the power to compel a state not to surrender, within any enumerated subject over which Congress can legislate; unless it is sought as one of a vagrant nature, to be exercised under such of the various items specified, as may be suggested by a train of ingenious, refined, and subtle reasoning, from one implication to another, till there is found some hook whereby to connect this with some granted power.' Nay, it is cautiously omitted in the prohibition on the states, to use any language, which can be tortured into a reference to the subject matter; and as the nature of the treaty-making power precludes any enumeration of the subjects of its exercise, it is left with no other prescribed limitation, than, that treaties to have their constitutional effect, must be made “under the authority of the United States.” This power must then be called into action, and [615]*615act on the subject, before a state can bp. deprived of the right to surrender, or retain a fugitive at its pleasure; a right which each' state possessed in its plenitude, on the dissolution of the articles of confederacy, and which remained unimpaired, till it became party to the Constitution, on its adoption by the people thereof, whereby they held the power subject to such restraints, as treaty stipulations might impose in future. Without such stipulation the whole subject matter of fugitives of any description, from a foreign nation, or any of its colonies or dependencies, is reserved to the respective states, as fully as before the Constitution; but, with such stipulation in a treaty, I admit the state is as much bound to make the surrender, as if it had been a subject of express delegation of power to the President and Senate; or as if the same provision had been made in relation to foreign fugitives from justice, or service, as those from the respective states, but which is guardedly omitted.

,- In the second clause of the second section of the fourth article, the Constitution provides, that « A person charged in any. state with treason, felony, or other crime, who. shall flee from justice and be found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state from which he fled.” A corresponding provision is made for fugitives from service or labour; and Congress, by the act of 1793,'have prescribed the mode in which the provision of the Constitution shall be carried into effect. 1 Story, 284, 285.

It will not be pretended that these provisions do not impose upon the states of this Union, an obligation as imperative, and impair their reserved rights to the same extent, as a similar stipulation in a treaty between the United States and any foreign state; let it then be assumed that there was such a treaty with Great Britain, in relation to fugitives from justice in Canada; and a stronger case cannot be supposed; the question it involves is not difficult of solution.

The object and great purpose of the Constitution and Congress, in one case, and of the treaty in the other, is to make it the duty of the state and its officers to make the surrender on a demand; but it does not follow that It may not be done voluntarily or without demand; to take the fugitive to the border and force him to pass the line, whether the authorities of the adjacent states or provinces are desirous, or even willing to receive him or not, is but an ordinary police power- This is the true point in issue; whether a state is prohibited by,the Constitution, from doing of its own accord, an act which it is bound to do, whenever demanded pursuant to a law or a treaty of the United States; and which it might do or refuse, if the subject was neither within the law or treaty-making power of the United States. Had no provision been made for the reclamation of fugitives from the states, there could be no pretence for denying to the states an unlimited discretion over the whole subject; the Constitution has put one single limitation on this discretion, in case of a demand from the executive of another state; leaving that discretion as free and full where no demand is made, as if the Constitution had been wholly silent on the subject. And if it had been so silent, the only difference would have been, that though there would-have been no obligation to surrender on a demand, there would have been the same right and .power to do it, as now exists in each state in respect to their respective fugitives;. or as would, exist under a treaty-making provision for the reciprocal delivery of fugitives from the Canadas, or the states.

■ No injunction of the Constitution can be violated, nor the faith of treaties impaired, by each state or province refusing to be made a Botany Bay, an asylum or even the receptacle of the vagabonds; the criminals, or convicts of the other; any duty of state to state, of state to the Union, and the United States to foreign powers; is fully and faithfully executed by the performance of the duties and stipulations imposed or made. But no political community, no municipal corporation, can be under any obligation to suffer a moral pestilence to pollute its air, or contagion, of the most corrupting and demoralizing influence, to spread among its citizens, by the [616]

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Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 614 (1840).

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