Holman v. First American Title Insurance Company

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2311
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

KWAME K. HOLMAN, MARILYN M. WHITE, Case No. 24-cv-2311 (JMC) Plaintiffs,

v.

FIRST AMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Kwame Holman and Marilyn White brought suit against Defendant First

American Title Insurance Company for breach of contract and negligence arising out of First

American’s conduct in discovering and curing a title defect on Plaintiffs’ property. Defendants

now move to dismiss the negligence count, ECF 12, and Plaintiffs have moved for summary

judgment on the same count, ECF 11.

The Court holds that Plaintiffs do not state a viable claim for negligence. Their complaint

does not plausibly allege that First American owed the Plaintiffs any duty of care outside of its

contractual obligations. The Court will accordingly GRANT First American’s partial motion to

dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligence count for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs’ partial motion for

summary judgment on the same claim is DENIED as moot. 1

1 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

1 I. BACKGROUND 2

In 1999, Plaintiff Kwame Holman purchased a title insurance policy from First American

for a property in Southeast Washington, D.C., of which he was the sole owner. ECF 9 ¶ 4. The

policy insured Holman against loss or damage sustained by, among other reasons, “[t]itle to the

[property] . . . being vested” in anyone other than the policyholder, “[a]ny defect . . . in the title,”

or “[u]nmarketability of the title.” Id. ¶ 4; see also ECF 9-1 at 1 (policy attached to complaint as

exhibit). When Holman subsequently married Marilyn White, her name was added to the property

as co-owner. ECF 9 ¶ 6.

Sometime later, Holman and White decided to sell the property. Id. They entered a contract

for sale with two buyers, with the closing scheduled for September 10, 2021. Id. However,

problems arose. The closing was put on hold after First American discovered a defect in the title

of the property, in the form of a potential outstanding interest of a prior owner who had passed

away in 1986. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs then filed a claim with First American, which acknowledged that

the issue was covered by the insurance policy and hired an attorney to resolve the missing interest.

Id. ¶ 8. At the same time, First American told Plaintiffs that process would potentially be time

consuming, and the cost might exceed Plaintiffs’ policy limit of $169,000. Id. ¶ 9. First American

was right about the timing—it took the company’s attorney more than two years to resolve the

defect. Id. ¶ 10. As the process dragged on and Plaintiffs’ monthly costs for the property continued

to mount, Plaintiffs hired their own law firm with hopes to expedite the resolution of the title issue.

Id. ¶¶ 10–11. Plaintiffs’ attorney was unable to resolve the title defect. Id. ¶ 11.

2 The Court draws the facts from Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, ECF 9, as it must when resolving a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

2 The defect was eventually resolved in August 2023 when First American’s attorney

negotiated the transfer of the missing interest from the former owner’s estate to the Plaintiffs for

$15,000. Id. ¶ 15. The updated deed was recorded on September 15, 2023. Id. At that point, the

original buyers of the house sought to complete the purchase at the sale price agreed on with

Plaintiffs in September 2021. Id. ¶ 16. But the value of the property had increased during the time

it took to cure the title defect, and Plaintiffs were eager to sell at a higher price. Id. ¶ 17. They hired

an attorney who negotiated an agreement with the buyers to terminate the contract in exchange for

paying back $45,000 of the buyers’ $50,000 deposit. Id. ¶ 19. Plaintiffs then turned to First

American and requested that it pay the $45,000 settlement on their behalf under the terms of their

insurance policy. Id. ¶ 21. First American refused. Id. It cited the liability clause of Plaintiffs’

policy, which states that if First American cures a defect “in a reasonably diligent manner” it is not

“liable for any loss or damage caused thereby.” Id. Plaintiffs ultimately paid the $45,000 out of

their own pockets, plus their attorney’s fees. Id. ¶¶ 22–23.

Plaintiffs subsequently initiated this action in the Superior Court of the District of

Columbia. ECF 1 ¶ 1. On August 7, 2024, First American removed the case to this Court on the

grounds of diversity jurisdiction. Id. ¶ 8. Count One of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint alleges that

First American breached the terms of Plaintiffs’ insurance policy by failing to discover a defect in

the Plaintiffs’ title and cure that defect in a timely manner. ECF 9 ¶ 30. Count Two is a negligence

claim. Plaintiffs claim that First American owed Plaintiffs a duty to discover and remedy any title

defects and negligently breached that duty. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs allege that as a direct result of First

American’s negligence, they were deprived of the opportunity to sell their house at an earlier date

and sustained damages they would not have incurred otherwise had the sale concluded. Id. ¶ 32.

Before First American responded to the amended complaint, Plaintiffs also moved for partial

3 summary judgment on only the negligence count. See generally ECF 11. First American then

moved to dismiss the negligence count for failure to state a claim. ECF 12. First American contends

that it owed no duty to Plaintiffs independent of its contractual obligations, and thus any claim

based on First American’s alleged failure to reasonably and diligently discover and cure the title

defect can only be brought as a contract claim. ECF 12-1 at 4–5. First American also opposes

Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on the negligence count. ECF 13.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s complaint; it

does not require a court to assess the truth of what is asserted or determine whether a plaintiff has

any evidence to back up what is in the complaint.” Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 173

(D.C. Cir. 2017). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to

“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “[T]he Court need not accept

inferences drawn by [a] plaintiff if those inferences are not supported by the facts set out in the

complaint, nor must the court accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations.” Hettinga v.

United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must have ‘facial plausibility,’ meaning it must ‘plead[] factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Id. (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs allege that First American was negligent in discovering and curing their title

defect in a reasonable and timely manner. ECF 9 ¶ 32. “A federal court sitting in diversity must

apply the substantive law of the jurisdiction in which it sits.” Metz v. BAE Sys. Tech. Sols. & Servs.

4 Inc., 774 F.3d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 3 To state a negligence claim under District of Columbia

law, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) the

defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach proximately caused damage to the interests of the

plaintiff. Sigmund v. Starwood Urb. Retail VI, LLC, 617 F.3d 512, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing

District of Columbia v. Beretta, U.S.A., Corp., 872 A.2d 633, 642 n.3 (D.C. 2005) (en banc)). The

plaintiff “must specify a negligent act and characterize the duty whose breach might have resulted

in negligence liability.” District of Columbia v. White, 442 A.2d 159, 162 (D.C. 1982). “The

question of whether a duty exists is a legal one capable of resolution at” the motion to dismiss

stage. Bibum v. Wilson, No. 23-cv-1587, 2024 WL 1328416, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 28, 2024) (citing

Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 811 (D.C. 2011)).

Plaintiffs’ negligence claim fails at the first prong because their complaint does not

plausibly allege that First American owed them any duty of care outside of its contractual

obligations. First American’s policy provided Plaintiffs with coverage for “[a]ny defect in or lien

or encumbrance on the title.” ECF 9 ¶ 4. Further, the limitation of liability clause provided that if

First American resolves a defect “in a reasonably diligent manner by any method” it will not be

liable for any loss or damage caused by the defect. Id. ¶ 21. In the District of Columbia, “[t]he

failure to perform a contractual obligation typically does not give rise to a cause of action in tort.”

Jones v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins., 443 F. Supp. 2d 3, 5 (D.D.C. 2006). For a plaintiff to

plausibly state a tort claim for conduct that is also a breach of contract, “the tort must exist in its

own right independent of the contract, and any duty upon which the tort is based must flow from

considerations other than the contractual relationship.” Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d

1, 18 (D.D.C. 2019) (quoting Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 A.2d 1080, 1089

3 The Parties do not dispute that District of Columbia law applies to Plaintiffs’ claims.

5 (D.C. 2008)). This rule applies with full force to allegations of negligence arising out of the

handling of insurance claims. “The fact . . . that an insured alleges that the insurance company was

negligent in the handling of a claim does not mean that there is a separate cause of action sounding

in tort for negligence, but rather that the insured may recover damages . . . under a breach of

contract theory.” Choharis, 961 A.2d at 1089 n.12; cf. Fogg v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 89 A.3d

510, 513–14 (D.C. 2014) (holding, in the title insurance context, that “entering into a contractual

relationship with the insured” does not “create[] a fiduciary duty beyond the terms of the title

insurance policy”).

The duties that First American is alleged to have negligently breached are ones that arise

only from the insurance contract. In their negligence count, Plaintiffs allege that First American

owed them a duty to “conduct a professional title search of their property, [and] to discover any

defects in it, if any, that would render their title unmarketable.” ECF 9 ¶ 32. They also claim First

American owed them a duty to cure those defects in “a reasonabl[e], diligent, and timely[]

manner.” Id. Their breach of contract claim is nearly identical: Plaintiffs allege that First American

“fail[ed] to discover[] the defect in the Plaintiffs’ title” and “failed to cure Plaintiffs’ title defect[]

in a timely manner.” Id. ¶ 30. Both the contract and negligence claims are premised on the same

alleged obligations of First American to discover and resolve any title defects. “The plain text of

th[ese] allegation[s]—that there is a duty pursuant to the insurer-insured relationship—is a dead

giveaway that the claim arises from the insurance contract.” HRH Servs., LLC v. Travelers Indem.

Co., No. 23-cv-2300, 2024 WL 5246521, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2024) (citing Choharis, 961 A.2d

at 1089). Plaintiffs use the same “allegation[s] to support both [their] tort and contract claims,

which further illustrates the interdependency of the claims.” Id. Plaintiffs’ tort claims thus amount

to an allegation that First American negligently breached the terms of their contract. But again,

6 “the mere negligent breach of a contract . . . is not enough to sustain an action sounding in tort.”

Hunter ex rel. A.H. v. District of Columbia, 64 F. Supp. 3d 158, 186 n.18 (D.D.C. 2014); Jones v.

NVR Incorporation, No. 20-cv-453, 2020 WL 2064085, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 2020) (granting

motion to dismiss negligence claim where plaintiff did not allege a legal duty independent of the

contractual duty to “build a structurally safe and sound home”).

Plaintiffs do not point to any independent act of negligence by First American in their

opposition. See Choharis, 961 A.2d at 1089 (requiring that the injury to the plaintiff be “an

independent injury over and above the mere disappointment of plaintiff’s hope to receive his

contracted-for benefit”). Plaintiffs assert that First American’s conduct was “an independent act

of negligence” but provide no basis to conclude that First American breached a duty that is separate

and distinct from its contractual obligations. ECF 14 ¶¶ 5–6. The Court is “not required . . . to

accept inferences unsupported by the facts alleged or legal conclusions that are cast as factual

allegations.” Rann v. Chao, 154 F. Supp. 2d 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2001). Plaintiffs’ bare assertion that

First American’s duties were independent from the contract, without providing any allegations to

support that conclusion, is not sufficient to meet the pleading standard necessary to survive a

motion to dismiss. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Nor do Plaintiffs cite to any caselaw supporting

their assertion that First American owed it some duty outside of the Parties’ contractual

relationship.

The Court will thus grant First American’s 12(b)(6) motion and dismiss Plaintiffs’

negligence claim. Because this claim is no longer before the Court, Plaintiffs’ partial motion for

summary judgment on that same claim must be denied as moot. See, e.g., Carty v. CVS Pharmacy,

LLC, 264 F. Supp. 3d 190, 198 n.8 (D.D.C. 2017) (denying plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment as moot when it regarded a claim that was “no longer . . . before the court”).

7 * * *

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s partial motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim, ECF 12, is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs’ partial motion for

summary judgment, ECF 11, is DENIED as moot. It is further ORDERED that Plaintiffs’

negligence claim is dismissed with prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge

Date: December 3, 2025