Hollinsworth v. Hollinsworth

2008 SD 102, 757 N.W.2d 422, 2008 S.D. LEXIS 141, 2008 WL 4749925
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 29, 2008
Docket24811
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 2008 SD 102 (Hollinsworth v. Hollinsworth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hollinsworth v. Hollinsworth, 2008 SD 102, 757 N.W.2d 422, 2008 S.D. LEXIS 141, 2008 WL 4749925 (S.D. 2008).

Opinion

MEIERHENRY, Justice.

[¶ 1.] Marnie Hollinsworth Lammle (Mother) appeals the circuit court’s order reducing child support owed by Jackie Hollinsworth (Father). Mother claims that the circuit court erred (1) by deviating downward from the child support schedule based on Mother’s underemployment and (2) by not deviating upward based on Father’s alleged voluntary act of reducing his income. We reverse the circuit court’s decision on issue (1) and affirm on issue (2).

FACTS

[¶ 2.] The parties were married on May 2, 1987. Mother worked as a dental assis *424 tant until the birth of the parties’ first child in 1994. She then left the workforce to care for the child. She remained out of the workforce until after the birth of the parties’ second child in 1996, when she became employed part-time. During the parties’ marriage, Mother earned her Bachelor’s Degree in Biology and began study towards a Master’s Degree in Education, which she completed after the divorce.

[¶ 3.] The couple divorced in 2001. At the time of the divorce, they lived in Aberdeen, South Dakota. The divorce decree granted the parties joint custody of the two children, with Mother having primary physical custody. Father’s child support obligation was set at $1,010.50 per month. 1

[¶ 4.] In May of 2007, the custodial arrangement changed and the oldest child decided to live with Father in Aberdeen, South Dakota. Mother had remarried and moved to Watertown, South Dakota, and had another child from the subsequent marriage. A stipulation and order changed custody of the parties’ oldest child and ordered that child support be recalculated pursuant to SDCL 25-7-6.23. 2

[¶ 5.] Shortly thereafter, Father petitioned for a referee hearing to re-calculate the child support amount. At the time of the referee hearing, Mother worked part-time for South Dakota Game, Fish and Parks at less than minimum wage. Consequently, the referee imputed her income at minimum wage in the amount of $884 gross monthly income. The referee determined that Father’s gross monthly income was $5,859. Based on these figures, the referee set Father’s child support obligation at $752 per month. 3 Both parties had requested a deviation. Mother requested a deviation per SDCL 25-7-6.10(5) because of her obligation to support her subsequent child. Father requested a deviation per SDCL 25-7-6.10(6) claiming that Mother voluntarily reduced her income by not working full-time utilizing her Masters degree. The referee denied both parties’ deviation requests in its report to the circuit court.

*425 [¶ 6.] Father objected to the referee’s report in circuit court. His objections relevant to this appeal were: (1) that his income had decreased because his job status had changed since the referee hearing, and (2) that the referee erred in imputing minimum wage to Mother rather than imputing a salary more suitable to her education level. Mother did not object to the referee’s first report.

[¶ 7.] To show his reduced income, Father presented evidence to the circuit court that his previous employer, a construction contractor, had terminated his employment for no fault of Father’s, but as part of a business decision. As part of Father’s termination, his employer offered to pay 90 days severance pay plus a $25,000 bonus if Father signed a contract not to compete as a construction contractor. Father decided to forgo the severance pay offer and start his own construction company in competition with his previous employer during the 90-day period.

[¶ 8.] Ruling on Father’s objections, the circuit court rejected the referee’s report and remanded the matter to the referee for a new hearing with directions (1) to consider Father’s reduced income and (2) to consider whether a deviation should be granted for the voluntarily reduction of income by either party, i.e. Mother’s underemployment and Father’s decision to forego the severance pay. As a result of the new hearing, the referee issued a second report in which the referee calculated Father’s monthly child support obligation at $552 based on his annual income of $70,000. 4 The referee again denied both parties’ requests for deviation.

[¶ 9.] Father objected to the referee’s second report claiming that the referee erred by not granting a deviation based on Mother’s underemployment per SDCL 25-7-6.10(6). Likewise, Mother objected to the referee’s second report on the basis that the referee should have deviated from the schedule because Father voluntarily reduced his income per SDCL 25-7-6.10(6) by rejecting the severance pay and non-compete agreement.

[¶ 10.] Upon review, the circuit court modified the referee’s report to grant Father’s deviation request. The circuit court utilized SDCL 25-7-6.10(6) to determine that Mother was voluntarily underemployed. The court determined that Mother voluntarily elected to work part-time for approximately $10,000 per year rather than to work at a higher paying job more commensurate with her Master’s Degree in Education. Based on Mother’s underemployment, the court granted Father a downward deviation of $152 resulting in a child support obligation of $400 for Father. The circuit court affirmed the referee’s denial of Mother’s deviation request. Mother appeals raising two issues.

ISSUES
1) Whether the circuit court erred when it granted Father a deviation based upon Mother’s voluntary underemployment.
*426 2) Whether the circuit court erred by not granting a deviation based on Father’s voluntary rejection of his employer’s severance pay offer.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 11.] “We review the decision to grant or deny child support under the abuse of discretion standard.” Kauth v. Bartlett, 2008 SD 20, ¶ 8, 746 N.W.2d 747, 750 (citing Miller v. Jacobsen, 2006 SD 33, ¶ 18, 714 N.W.2d 69, 76) (additional citations omitted). When reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, we review de novo. Id. ¶ 9, 746 N.W.2d at 750 (citations omitted). “Statutes are to be construed to give effect to each statute [ ] so as to have them exist in harmony. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the intention of the law is to be primarily ascertained from the language expressed in the statute.” Id. ¶ 9, 746 N.W.2d at 750-51 (citing Huber v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 2006 SD 96, ¶ 14, 724 N.W.2d 175, 179 (quoting

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2008 SD 102, 757 N.W.2d 422, 2008 S.D. LEXIS 141, 2008 WL 4749925, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hollinsworth-v-hollinsworth-sd-2008.