Holliman v. New York State Department of Correctional Services

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Holliman v. New York State Department of Correctional Services

66 A.D.3d 1075, 885 N.Y.S.2d 444

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 1, 2009

StatusPublished

This text of 66 A.D.3d 1075 (Holliman v. New York State Department of Correctional Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Holliman v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 66 A.D.3d 1075, 885 N.Y.S.2d 444 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Platkin, J.), entered December 1, 2008 in Ulster County, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of respondent calculating petitioner’s prison sentence.

[1076]*1076In August 2001, petitioner was sentenced as a second felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 25 to 50 years following his conviction of various drug-related crimes. Neither the sentencing minutes nor the commitment order specified the manner in which the sentences imposed were to run relative to petitioner’s prior undischarged prison term. Respondent calculated petitioner’s 2001 sentences as running consecutively to his undischarged prison term, prompting petitioner to commence this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to challenge that computation. Supreme Court annulled respondent’s determination and ordered that petitioner be resentenced. This appeal by respondent ensued.

Where a statute mandates the imposition of a consecutive sentence, the sentencing court is deemed to have imposed the consecutive sentence the law requires—even in the absence of an express judicial directive to that effect (see People ex rel. Gill v Greene, 12 NY3d 1, 4 [2009]; People ex rel. Gathers v Artus, 63 AD3d 1435 [2009]; People ex rel. Hunter v Yelich, 63 AD3d 1424 [2009]; People ex rel. Styles v Rabsatt, 63 AD3d 1365 [2009]). As there is no dispute that petitioner was subject to the consecutive sentencing provisions of Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a)—indeed, petitioner conceded this point in his petition—we discern no error in respondent’s computation of his sentence (see Matter of Grey v Fischer, 63 AD3d 1431 [2009]; People ex rel. Taylor v Brown, 62 AD3d 1063, 1064 [2009]). Accordingly, Supreme Court’s judgment is reversed and the petition is dismissed.

Peters, J.P, Rose, Lahtinen, Kane and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Platkin, J.), entered December 1, 2008 in Ulster County, which granted petitioner’s application, in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, to annul a determination of respondent calculating petitioner’s prison sentence.

[1076]*1076In August 2001, petitioner was sentenced as a second felony offender to an aggregate prison term of 25 to 50 years following his conviction of various drug-related crimes. Neither the sentencing minutes nor the commitment order specified the manner in which the sentences imposed were to run relative to petitioner’s prior undischarged prison term. Respondent calculated petitioner’s 2001 sentences as running consecutively to his undischarged prison term, prompting petitioner to commence this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to challenge that computation. Supreme Court annulled respondent’s determination and ordered that petitioner be resentenced. This appeal by respondent ensued.

Where a statute mandates the imposition of a consecutive sentence, the sentencing court is deemed to have imposed the consecutive sentence the law requires—even in the absence of an express judicial directive to that effect (see People ex rel. Gill v Greene, 12 NY3d 1, 4 [2009]; People ex rel. Gathers v Artus, 63 AD3d 1435 [2009]; People ex rel. Hunter v Yelich, 63 AD3d 1424 [2009]; People ex rel. Styles v Rabsatt, 63 AD3d 1365 [2009]). As there is no dispute that petitioner was subject to the consecutive sentencing provisions of Penal Law § 70.25 (2-a)—indeed, petitioner conceded this point in his petition—we discern no error in respondent’s computation of his sentence (see Matter of Grey v Fischer, 63 AD3d 1431 [2009]; People ex rel. Taylor v Brown, 62 AD3d 1063, 1064 [2009]). Accordingly, Supreme Court’s judgment is reversed and the petition is dismissed.

Peters, J.P, Rose, Lahtinen, Kane and Malone Jr., JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, without costs, and petition dismissed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

66 A.D.3d 1075, 885 N.Y.S.2d 444, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holliman-v-new-york-state-department-of-correctional-services-nyappdiv-2009.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack