Kasworth R. Baker, Judge.
Appellant Sheree Holland-sworth appeals the entry of an order by the Benton County Chancery Court that denied her request to relocate out of state with the children and changed custody from her to her ex-husband, appellee Keith Knyzewski. Sheree argues that the chancellor’s decision is clearly erroneous. We agree and reverse and remand.
A chancellor’s decision is reviewed de novo, but the chancellor’s findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. See Wagner v. Wagner, 74 Ark. App. 135, 45 S.W.3d 852 (2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed. Id. Under these facts, we are left with such a conviction.
The parties divorced on October 10, 2000. There were two children born of the marriage, Ethan, born February 1, 1996, and Katherine, born February 17, 1998. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Sheree had primary custody of the two children. Nonetheless, the parties, subsequent to the entry of the decree, agreed that each would have physical custody of the children one-half of the time until the oldest child entered kindergarten in the fall of 2001. Sheree remarried on December 31, 2000, and planned to relocate with the children to be with her new husband, Brian Hollandsworth, in Clarksville, Tennessee. On January 11, 2001, Keith filed a petition for a change of custody. Sheree filed a response asking for permission to relocate on January 17. The petitions were heard on April 26, 2001, and the judge entered an order granting a change of custody on May 21, 2001.
Keith lived in Rogers, Arkansas, with his parents. He worked nights, and was dependent upon his parents for the children’s care and supervision. When asked whether he would facilitate visitation with Sheree’s side of the family if he prevailed, Keith assured the chancellor that he would encourage it. However, he was concerned that if Sheree’s petition to relocate was granted, the children might have to move from Clarksville eventually due to Brian’s career in the military. He was also concerned that the children would be leaving their family and friends and would have to make new friends in Tennessee. Keith agreed that Sheree would be devastated if she could not move the children with her, as he would be if they were permitted to move away, but thought that the children’s needs would be better served in northwest Arkansas.
Sheree and her new husband Brian were expecting a child in October 2001. Sheree had worked as a waitress in northwest Arkansas but, due to Brian’s financial stability, she would have the opportunity to be a stay-at-home mother in Tennessee. She thought that the children would benefit from a two-parent household and the opportunity to have a relationship with their half-sibling. Sheree stated that Brian was a good step-parent and a good provider. She thought the children would be devastated if she were not permitted to take them. Both parties complimented the other on their parenting skills and on their ability to see to the children’s needs.
The chancellor announced her findings at the conclusion of the hearing, finding that Sheree’s petition should be denied, and Keith’s petition should be granted. Her findings included: that Sheree had the threshold burden of showing some real advantage to herself and the children in the proposed move; that she failed in that burden; that the children enjoyed a strong connection to their father, their extended family, and to northwest Arkansas; and that they had spent extensive amounts of time with their father since the divorce. The chancellor determined that neither party had improper motives for their respective requests and that Sheree would likely comply with any modified visitation orders, but the children’s best interests would not be served by permitting Sheree to relocate with them. This appeal followed.
Although the chancellor considered to some extent the factors articulated in Staab v. Hurst, 44 Ark. App. 128, 868 S.W.2d 517 (1994), her decision was clearly based on the finding that appellant, Sheree Hollandsworth, failed to meet the threshold burden of proving a real advantage to both the children and herself in the move. In reaching this conclusion, the chancellor relied heavily on this court’s holding in Hickmon v. Hickmon, 70 Ark. App. 438, 19 S.W.3d 624 (2000). However, the chancellor erred as a matter of law in holding that Sheree must, as a threshold matter, prove a real advantage specific to the children in the proposed move, and erred in interpreting Hickmon to require such proof. See Haas v. Haas, 74 Ark. App. 49, 44 S.W.3d 773 (2001) (reversing chancellor who indicated that custodial parent was required to show advantage unique to minor child). Hickmon held that a custodial parent seeking to relocate with the parties’ minor children must first meet the burden of demonstrating some real advantage to the children and himself or herself from the move. Hickmon, 70 Ark. App. at 445, 19 S.W.3d at 629. Because the factual concerns of visitation with the father and extended family were similar to the facts in Hickmon, the chancellor stated that she “felt compelled” to deny the mother’s request to relocate. Yet, we upheld the chancellor in Hickmon primarily on the basis that the psychologists who testified were tinited in their opinions that the move would have a detrimental psychological effect on the children. Hickmon, 70 Ark. App. at 446, 19 S.W.3d at 629-30; see also Parker v. Parker, 75 Ark. App. 90, 55 S.W.3d 773 (2001). The record in this case contains no evidence that the move would be psychologically detrimental to the children, and a correct analysis of the Staab factors favors granting the petition to relocate.
In Staab v. Hurst, 44 Ark. App. 128, 133-35, 868 S.W.2d 517, 519-20 (1994), we articulated a framework by which courts should be guided in deciding relocation disputes. We said therein that achieving the “best interests of the child” remains the ultimate objective in resolving all child custody and related matters, and we adopted the rationale announced in D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 144 N.J.Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27, aff'd 144 N.J.Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976). D’Onofrio provided that, where the custodial parent seeks to move with the parties’ children to a place so geographically distant as to render weekly visitation impossible or impractical, and where the noncustodial parent objects to the move, the custodial parent should have the burden of first demonstrating that some real advantage will result to the new family unit from the move. The D’Onofrio opinion explained:
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Kasworth R. Baker, Judge.
Appellant Sheree Holland-sworth appeals the entry of an order by the Benton County Chancery Court that denied her request to relocate out of state with the children and changed custody from her to her ex-husband, appellee Keith Knyzewski. Sheree argues that the chancellor’s decision is clearly erroneous. We agree and reverse and remand.
A chancellor’s decision is reviewed de novo, but the chancellor’s findings will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous. See Wagner v. Wagner, 74 Ark. App. 135, 45 S.W.3d 852 (2001). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake was committed. Id. Under these facts, we are left with such a conviction.
The parties divorced on October 10, 2000. There were two children born of the marriage, Ethan, born February 1, 1996, and Katherine, born February 17, 1998. Pursuant to the divorce decree, Sheree had primary custody of the two children. Nonetheless, the parties, subsequent to the entry of the decree, agreed that each would have physical custody of the children one-half of the time until the oldest child entered kindergarten in the fall of 2001. Sheree remarried on December 31, 2000, and planned to relocate with the children to be with her new husband, Brian Hollandsworth, in Clarksville, Tennessee. On January 11, 2001, Keith filed a petition for a change of custody. Sheree filed a response asking for permission to relocate on January 17. The petitions were heard on April 26, 2001, and the judge entered an order granting a change of custody on May 21, 2001.
Keith lived in Rogers, Arkansas, with his parents. He worked nights, and was dependent upon his parents for the children’s care and supervision. When asked whether he would facilitate visitation with Sheree’s side of the family if he prevailed, Keith assured the chancellor that he would encourage it. However, he was concerned that if Sheree’s petition to relocate was granted, the children might have to move from Clarksville eventually due to Brian’s career in the military. He was also concerned that the children would be leaving their family and friends and would have to make new friends in Tennessee. Keith agreed that Sheree would be devastated if she could not move the children with her, as he would be if they were permitted to move away, but thought that the children’s needs would be better served in northwest Arkansas.
Sheree and her new husband Brian were expecting a child in October 2001. Sheree had worked as a waitress in northwest Arkansas but, due to Brian’s financial stability, she would have the opportunity to be a stay-at-home mother in Tennessee. She thought that the children would benefit from a two-parent household and the opportunity to have a relationship with their half-sibling. Sheree stated that Brian was a good step-parent and a good provider. She thought the children would be devastated if she were not permitted to take them. Both parties complimented the other on their parenting skills and on their ability to see to the children’s needs.
The chancellor announced her findings at the conclusion of the hearing, finding that Sheree’s petition should be denied, and Keith’s petition should be granted. Her findings included: that Sheree had the threshold burden of showing some real advantage to herself and the children in the proposed move; that she failed in that burden; that the children enjoyed a strong connection to their father, their extended family, and to northwest Arkansas; and that they had spent extensive amounts of time with their father since the divorce. The chancellor determined that neither party had improper motives for their respective requests and that Sheree would likely comply with any modified visitation orders, but the children’s best interests would not be served by permitting Sheree to relocate with them. This appeal followed.
Although the chancellor considered to some extent the factors articulated in Staab v. Hurst, 44 Ark. App. 128, 868 S.W.2d 517 (1994), her decision was clearly based on the finding that appellant, Sheree Hollandsworth, failed to meet the threshold burden of proving a real advantage to both the children and herself in the move. In reaching this conclusion, the chancellor relied heavily on this court’s holding in Hickmon v. Hickmon, 70 Ark. App. 438, 19 S.W.3d 624 (2000). However, the chancellor erred as a matter of law in holding that Sheree must, as a threshold matter, prove a real advantage specific to the children in the proposed move, and erred in interpreting Hickmon to require such proof. See Haas v. Haas, 74 Ark. App. 49, 44 S.W.3d 773 (2001) (reversing chancellor who indicated that custodial parent was required to show advantage unique to minor child). Hickmon held that a custodial parent seeking to relocate with the parties’ minor children must first meet the burden of demonstrating some real advantage to the children and himself or herself from the move. Hickmon, 70 Ark. App. at 445, 19 S.W.3d at 629. Because the factual concerns of visitation with the father and extended family were similar to the facts in Hickmon, the chancellor stated that she “felt compelled” to deny the mother’s request to relocate. Yet, we upheld the chancellor in Hickmon primarily on the basis that the psychologists who testified were tinited in their opinions that the move would have a detrimental psychological effect on the children. Hickmon, 70 Ark. App. at 446, 19 S.W.3d at 629-30; see also Parker v. Parker, 75 Ark. App. 90, 55 S.W.3d 773 (2001). The record in this case contains no evidence that the move would be psychologically detrimental to the children, and a correct analysis of the Staab factors favors granting the petition to relocate.
In Staab v. Hurst, 44 Ark. App. 128, 133-35, 868 S.W.2d 517, 519-20 (1994), we articulated a framework by which courts should be guided in deciding relocation disputes. We said therein that achieving the “best interests of the child” remains the ultimate objective in resolving all child custody and related matters, and we adopted the rationale announced in D’Onofrio v. D’Onofrio, 144 N.J.Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27, aff'd 144 N.J.Super. 352, 365 A.2d 716 (App. Div. 1976). D’Onofrio provided that, where the custodial parent seeks to move with the parties’ children to a place so geographically distant as to render weekly visitation impossible or impractical, and where the noncustodial parent objects to the move, the custodial parent should have the burden of first demonstrating that some real advantage will result to the new family unit from the move. The D’Onofrio opinion explained:
Where the residence of the new family unit and that of the noncustodial parent are geographically close, some variation of visitation on a weekly basis is traditionally viewed as being most consistent with maintaining the parental relationship, and where, as here, that has been the visitation pattern, a court should be loath to interfere with it by permitting removal of the children for frivolous or unpersuasive or inadequate reasons.
D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d at 30.
D’Onofrio further provided that, where the custodial parent meets this threshold burden, the court should then consider a number of factors in order to accommodate the compelling interests of all the family members. These factors should include: (1) the prospective advantages of the move in terms of its likely capacity for improving the general quality of life for both the custodial parent and the children; (2) the integrity of the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move in order to determine whether the removal is inspired primarily by the desire to defeat or frustrate visitation by the noncustodial parent; (3) whether the custodial parent is likely to comply with substitute visitation orders; (4) the integrity of the noncustodial parent’s motives in resisting the removal; (5) whether, if removal is allowed, there will be a realistic opportunity for visitation in lieu of the weekly pattern which can provide an adequate basis for preserving and fostering the parent relationship with the noncustodial parent.
We hold that the chancellor erred in finding that a real advantage to the new family unit of Sheree and the children was not proven in this case. The evidence demonstrated that Sheree will benefit by living with her husband and the father of her expected child. The children will benefit from living in a two-parent household with their halBsibling. The family will benefit from the financial advantages of Brian’s career, which includes the benefit of allowing Sheree the opportunity to be a stay-at-home mother. These advantages are not insignificant, and they benefit the members of the family both individually and collectively.
We have previously held that both compelling job opportunities or the chance to finish an education provide a real advantage to the children and custodial parent. See Wagner v. Wagner, 74 Ark. App. 135, 45 S.W.3d 852 (2001); Hass v. Hass, 74 Ark. App. 49, 44 S.W.3d 773 (2001). The choice and opportunity to be a stay-at-home parent can be a compelling job opportunity providing a real advantage to the children. Our precedent also clearly acknowledges that “psychological and emotional aspects of relocation can be as advantageous as economic or educational aspects.” Parker v. Parker, 75 Ark. App. 90, 99, 55 S.W.3d 773, 779 (2001).
The chancellor’s findings reflect that the Staab factors weighed in favor of granting Sheree’s petition. In Staab:
We reversed the chancellor’s ruling and recognized that, while the best interests of the children remain the ultimate objective in resolving all child custody and related matters, the standard must be more specific and instructive to address parental relocation disputes. Determination of a child’s best interests cannot be made in a vacuum, we said, but requires that the interests of the custodial parent be taken into account as well. We further acknowledged that, following a divorce, children belong to a different family unit than they did when their parents lived together. The new family unit consists of the children and the custodial parent, and what is advantageous to the unit’s members as a whole, to each of its members individually, and to the way they relate to each other and function together is in the best interests of the children.
Parker, 75 Ark. App. at 98, 55 S.W.3d at 779.
In applying the Staab analysis, the chancellor specifically stated, “[t]he prospective advantages, I do think that Corporal Hollandsworth is a good influence in the lives of the children and in the life of Mrs. [Hollandsworth]. I think there is no doubt [Corporal Hollandsworth] will be a good provider. I have no question about that.” Moreover, she stated that, “Whether or not Sheree would comply with substitute visitation orders, I don’t have any doubt that she would. I believe that she would comply with whatever order the Court set out for her, that she would absolutely get the children to and from each visitation. I don’t think there is any improper motive by either of the parties.” Thus, when weighing the Staab factors, the chancellor clearly found that there was some benefit to the move. Even slight differences that are important to the custodial parent that offer distinct personal appeal may be significant enough to support a move. See Parker, supra.
Based on our de novo review of the facts in this case, we hold that the chancellor clearly erred in denying Sheree’s petition to relocate and in granting Keith’s petition to change custody. Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions to enter an order consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded. Pittman, J., concurs; Bird, J., concurs separately; Griffen and Vaught, JJ., agree. Stroud, C.J., Robbins, Crabtree, andRoAF, JJ., dissent.