Hollander v. Institute for Research on Women & Gender at Columbia University

Second Circuit

Hollander v. Institute for Research on Women & Gender at Columbia University

372 F. App'x 140

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedApril 16, 2010

Docket09-1910

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 372 F. App'x 140 (Hollander v. Institute for Research on Women & Gender at Columbia University) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hollander v. Institute for Research on Women & Gender at Columbia University, 372 F. App'x 140 (2d Cir. 2010).

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Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Roy Den Hollander 1 appeals from the judgment of the district court dated April 30, 2009 (Kaplan, J.), adopting the Report and Recommendation dated April 15, 2009 by United States Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox, and granting defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of standing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and specification of issues on appeal.

“The party seeking judicial review bears the burden of alleging facts that demonstrate its standing.” Green Island Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 577 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Plaintiff alleges that the existence of Columbia University’s Women’s Studies Program and the corresponding lack of an equivalent “Men’s Studies Program” inflicts harm on certain men as a class by, inter alia, promoting “misandry-femi-nism,” promoting feminism as a religion, and robbing men of an equivalent educational experience. As to the plaintiffs discrimination-based claims, the district court properly dismissed the action for lack of standing as to all defendants because the plaintiffs claims of harm amount to the kind of speculative harm for which courts cannot confer standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (stating that “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and *142 footnote omitted); Gully v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 341 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir.2003) (same). Nor has plaintiff made out the requirements for taxpayer standing for his Establishment Clause claim. See DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 405 (2d Cir.2001). Thus, with no occasion to reach any of plaintiffs’ further arguments on appeal — about which we share, in any event, the district court’s grave doubts — we AFFIRM the dismissal of the action for substantially the reasons stated in Judge Fox’s thorough Report and Recommendation as adopted by the district court.

1

. William A. Nosal was a Class Representative when the case was before the district court and as of the filing of the appeal at bar, but has since withdrawn.

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SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-Appellant Roy Den Hollander 1 appeals from the judgment of the district court dated April 30, 2009 (Kaplan, J.), adopting the Report and Recommendation dated April 15, 2009 by United States Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox, and granting defendants’ motions to dismiss for lack of standing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and specification of issues on appeal.

“The party seeking judicial review bears the burden of alleging facts that demonstrate its standing.” Green Island Power Auth. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 577 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Plaintiff alleges that the existence of Columbia University’s Women’s Studies Program and the corresponding lack of an equivalent “Men’s Studies Program” inflicts harm on certain men as a class by, inter alia, promoting “misandry-femi-nism,” promoting feminism as a religion, and robbing men of an equivalent educational experience. As to the plaintiffs discrimination-based claims, the district court properly dismissed the action for lack of standing as to all defendants because the plaintiffs claims of harm amount to the kind of speculative harm for which courts cannot confer standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (stating that “the plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical”) (internal quotation marks, citations, and *142 footnote omitted); Gully v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 341 F.3d 155, 160 (2d Cir.2003) (same). Nor has plaintiff made out the requirements for taxpayer standing for his Establishment Clause claim. See DeStefano v. Emergency Housing Group, Inc., 247 F.3d 397, 405 (2d Cir.2001). Thus, with no occasion to reach any of plaintiffs’ further arguments on appeal — about which we share, in any event, the district court’s grave doubts — we AFFIRM the dismissal of the action for substantially the reasons stated in Judge Fox’s thorough Report and Recommendation as adopted by the district court.

1

. William A. Nosal was a Class Representative when the case was before the district court and as of the filing of the appeal at bar, but has since withdrawn.

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372 F. App'x 140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hollander-v-institute-for-research-on-women-gender-at-columbia-ca2-2010.

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