Holland v. Hartford Computer
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1842
JOHN R. HOLLAND,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
HARTFORD COMPUTER EXCHANGE, INC., AND RONALD TALBOT,
Defendants, Appellees.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Rya W. Zobel, U.S. District Judge] ___________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________
____________________
Robert P. Sherman with whom Leonard G. Learner and David R. __________________ ____________________ _________
DeVeau were on brief for appellant. ______
Scott A. Faust with whom Gregory C. Keating was on brief for _______________ ___________________
appellees.
____________________
____________________
COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge. Plaintiff John Holland ______________________
asserts that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for defendants on his claim of constructive discharge
and on various other causes of action stemming from his departure
from his job as a computer salesman for Hartford Computer
Exchange (HCE). Our review of the record and caselaw persuades
us that, based on the evidence offered, no reasonable jury could
find that Holland was discharged. Because this determination is
fatal to most of his claims, and the remaining allegation of
breach of contract also fails as a matter of law, we affirm the
district court's judgment in its entirety.
A district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de __
novo. Bourque v. FDIC, No. 94-1568, slip op. at 7 (1st Cir. Dec. ____ _______ ____
28, 1994). We examine the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant, and must affirm if the parties' proof reveals
"`that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"
Id. (citation omitted). ___
An issue is only "genuine" if there is sufficient
evidence to permit a reasonable jury to resolve the
point in the nonmoving party's favor . . . while a fact
is only "material" if it has "`the potential to affect
the outcome of the suit under the applicable law.'"
Id. at 7-8 (citations omitted). ___
The central question in this appeal is whether Holland is
entitled to jury consideration of his constructive discharge
claim. The district court's negative answer had two separate
prongs. First, it determined that, on the facts presented, no
-2-
reasonable jury could conclude other than that Holland
voluntarily left the defendants' employ. Second, it held that
the facts underlying the allegation of constructive discharge are
insufficient as a matter of law to support such a claim. In our
view, it is unnecessary to dwell on Holland's intent because, as
the district court found and as we shall explain below, the
undisputed facts fall far short of establishing a termination.
Cf. Vega v. Kodak Caribbean, Ltd., 3 F.3d 476, 481 (1st Cir. ___ ____ ______________________
1993) ("An employee's perceptions cannot govern a claim of
constructive discharge if, and to the extent that, the
perceptions were unreasonable.").1
A constructive discharge occurs when an employer
"deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so
intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary
resignation," Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325-26 ____ ___________________
(2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted), cited in Radvilas v. Stop & ________ ________ ______
Shop, Inc., 18 Mass. App. Ct. 431, 439 n.14, 466 N.E.2d 832, 838 __________
n.14 (1984). See also Vega, 3 F.3d at 480 (to establish ___ ____ ____
constructive discharge plaintiff must show that his work was "so
arduous or unappealing, or working conditions so intolerable,
that a reasonable person would feel compelled to forsake his job
rather than to submit to looming indignities"); Alicea Rosado v. _____________
____________________
1 As a practical matter, of course, there is no difference
between the district court's two holdings. The conclusion that
the allegations failed as a matter of law to establish a
termination leads inexorably to a finding that Holland left HCE
voluntarily.
-3-
Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977).2 A change _______________
for the worse in the quality of working conditions is not itself
enough to satisfy the standard; a constructive discharge involves
a "drastic reduction" in the circumstances of one's employment.
Alicea Rosado, 562 F.2d at 120. Holland's claim of _____________
constructive discharge rests upon the fact that his commission
percentage was reduced from 40 percent to 30 percent in July
1993.3 Holland therefore needs to show that withdrawal of ten
percent of his commission made his employment at HCE
"intolerable," effectively compelling him to leave.
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