Holcomb v. Commissioner Dept. of Soc. Serv., No. Cv970566407 (Dec. 11, 1997)

1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13006
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedDecember 11, 1997
DocketNo. CV970566407
StatusUnpublished

This text of 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13006 (Holcomb v. Commissioner Dept. of Soc. Serv., No. Cv970566407 (Dec. 11, 1997)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Holcomb v. Commissioner Dept. of Soc. Serv., No. Cv970566407 (Dec. 11, 1997), 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13006 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]MEMORANDUM OF DECISION The plaintiff Claude Holcomb appeals the decision of the fair hearing officer upholding the action of the defendant Department of Social Services (department) reducing his state supplement benefits. CT Page 13007

The record reflects the following facts. The plaintiff has severe cerebral palsy and requires a motorized wheelchair for mobility and assistance with his daily activities. Since prior to 1988, the plaintiff has been a recipient of both federal supplemental security income (SSI) and state supplement benefits. Until March 1996, the plaintiff lived alone in a one bedroom apartment. At that time he moved into a two bedroom apartment with another person. In August 1996, the department notified the plaintiff that it intended to reduce his state supplement benefits from $418 a month to $277 a month effective September 1, 1996, because he was no longer eligible for the Conversion Needs Item (CNI) allowance. Later, the department notified the plaintiff that these benefits would be reduced from $277 a month to $145 a month effective October 1, 1996, because his living situation had changed to a shared living arrangement. The plaintiff requested a hearing on these proposed reductions, and the hearing was held on October 8, 1996. At the hearing, the plaintiff appeared without representation and communicated through a communication board. On October 18, 1997, the hearing officer issued a decision denying the plaintiff's appeal. From that decision, the plaintiff filed this appeal.

The hearing officer concluded that "[because] the appellant moved to another living arrangement and the number of people in the living arrangement changed, the department correctly proposed to reduce the appellant's State Supplement award by the amount of the CNI ($140.90)." (Return of Record ("ROR"), p. 4.) The hearing officer also concluded that since the plaintiff was in a shared living arrangement his shelter allowance should be reduced to the maximum allowance of $200 monthly. (ROR, p. 4.)

In this appeal, the plaintiff claims that the department's decision is erroneous on the law, clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record and an abuse of discretion. See General Statutes §4-183(j). The heart of his appeal is that the regulation that was applied to reduce his benefits violates the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that:

1) the department's eligibility criteria for the CNI precludes individuals with a progressive disability from receiving the benefit of the CNI; CT Page 13008

2) the department's administration of the CNI violates the mandate of the ADA that a public entity not utilize criteria that substantially impair the accomplishment of the objectives of the entity's program;

3) the department has an obligation under the ADA to make a reasonable modification of its policies.

(Plaintiff's Memorandum, pp. 8-10.) In addition, the plaintiff argues that even if the court finds that the CNI was properly eliminated, the plaintiffs monthly shelter allowance should not have been reduced from $400 based on living alone to $200 for shared living.

A basic principle of administrative law is that the scope of the court's review is very limited. "Our Supreme Court has established a firm standard that is appropriately deferential to agency decision making, yet goes beyond a mere judicial `rubber stamping' of an agency's decisions. Connecticut Light Power v.Dept. of Public Utilities Control, 219 Conn. 51, 57,591 A.2d 1231 (1991); Woodbury Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,174 Conn. 258, 260, 386 A.2d 232 (1978). Courts will not substitute their judgment for that of the agency where substantial evidence exists on the record to support the agency's decision, and where the record reflects that the agency followed appropriate procedures. Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency,226 Conn. 579, 587, 628 A.2d 1286 (1993); Lieberman v. State Board ofLabor Relations, 216 Conn. 253, 262, 579 A.2d 505 (1990); Baerstv. State Board of Education, 34 Conn. App. 567, 571, 642 A.2d 76, cert. denied, 230 Conn. 915, 645 A.2d 1018 (1994)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cabasquini v. Commissioner of SocialServices, 38 Conn. App. 522, 525-26, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 906 (1995). General Statutes § 4 183(j) in part provides:

The court shall affirm the decision of the agency unless the court finds that substantial rights of the person appealing have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (6) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.

CT Page 13009

"Even as to questions of law, [t]he court's ultimate duty is only to decide whether, in light of the evidence, the [agency] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Conclusions of law reached by the administrative agency must stand if the court determines that they resulted from a correct application of the law to the facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts. . . . NewHaven v. Freedom of Information Commission, 205 Conn. 767, 774,535 A.2d 1297 (1988)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission, 228 Conn. 158,164-65 (1993).

The regulations governing the state supplement benefits program are found in the Uniform Policy Manual. The particular regulation at issue here is the special needs provision entitled "Conversion Needs Item." UPM § 4525.65 applies to individuals, such as the plaintiff, who received state supplement benefits prior to January 1, 1988.

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Related

Kornblau v. Dade County
86 F.3d 193 (Eleventh Circuit, 1996)
Woodbury Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
386 A.2d 232 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1978)
City of New Haven v. Freedom of Information Commission
535 A.2d 1297 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1988)
Lieberman v. State Board of Labor Relations
579 A.2d 505 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1990)
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Department of Public Utility Control
591 A.2d 1231 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1991)
Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency
628 A.2d 1286 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1993)
Perkins v. Freedom of Information Commission
635 A.2d 783 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1993)
Baerst v. State Board of Education
642 A.2d 76 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1994)
Cabasquini v. Commissioner of Social Services
662 A.2d 145 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1995)
Cameron v. Alander
664 A.2d 332 (Connecticut Appellate Court, 1995)

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Bluebook (online)
1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13006, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/holcomb-v-commissioner-dept-of-soc-serv-no-cv970566407-dec-11-connsuperct-1997.