Hoid v. Xinis

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 2, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3711
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

EDWARD HOID, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03711 (UNA) ) ) PAULA XINIS, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and

Application for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”), ECF No. 2. The Court denies

Plaintiff’s IFP Application, and for the reasons discussed below, it dismisses this matter without

prejudice.

Plaintiff, a resident of Utah, sues multiple federal judges, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and the Federal Communications Commission. See Compl. at 1, 3–4, 7–8. The

Complaint totals 332 pages and is comprised of assorted theories predicated on Plaintiff’s belief

that the federal executive and judiciary are “plotting on and executing the destruction of America,”

due to their “loyalty to foreign cultures,” and that they have infiltrated, directly and remotely,

Plaintiff’s life in myriad negative ways. See generally Compl. He demands assorted injunctions

and $90 million in damages. See id. at 328–29.

Pro se litigants must comply with the Federal and Local Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239–40 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure requires complaints to contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the

court’s jurisdiction [and] (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009);

Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The Rule 8 standard ensures that

defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive

answer and an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata applies. Brown

v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). When a pleading “contains an untidy assortment

of claims that are neither plainly nor concisely stated, nor meaningfully distinguished from bold

conclusions, sharp harangues and personal comments [,]” it does not fulfill the requirements of

Rule 8. Jiggetts v. D.C., 319 F.R.D. 408, 413 (D.D.C. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Cooper v. D.C., No.

17-7021, 2017 WL 5664737 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2017). Put differently, “[a] confused and rambling

narrative of charges and conclusions . . . does not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.” Cheeks

v. Fort Myer Constr. Corp., 71 F. Supp. 3d 163, 169 (D.D.C. 2014) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted).

The instant Complaint falls within this category. It is neither short nor plain, see Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a), its allegations cannot be described as simple, concise, or direct, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(d)(1), and the paragraphs are not limited to a single set of circumstances, see Fed. R. Civ. P.

10(b). As presented, the Complaint is simply “too unwieldy to proceed.” See Spence v. U.S. Dep’t

of Vet. Affairs, No. 19-cv-1947, 2022 WL 3354726, at *11 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2022), aff’d, 109

F.4th 531 (D.C. Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 594 (2024). “Courts have often dismissed

complaints that contain bloated and disorganized allegations such as this for violations of Rule 8.”

Id. (citing Unfoldment, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, No. 07-cv-1717, 2007 WL 3125236, at *1–2

(D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2007) (dismissing 61-page complaint); Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 668–71

(D.C. Cir. 2004) (affirming dismissal without prejudice of 61-page complaint and striking of 119-

page complaint); Nichols v. Holder, 828 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253–54 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing 140- page complaint because it was “prolix, redundant, [and] bloated with unnecessary detail,” falling

far short of Rule 8(d)’s requirement that each allegation be “simple, concise, and direct”); Brown v.

Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 499 (D.D.C. 1977) (finding that the complaint failed to comply with

Rule 8(a) and because it was “outrageously long-winded and redundant, and hides the substance

of its claims within its prolixity. Defendants should not be forced to spend time and energy in

attempting to decipher Hamrick’s utterly confusing and lengthy pleading.”)).

To be clear, it “is not merely the length . . . that warrants dismissal for violating Rule 8; the

disorganized and convoluted nature of the allegations counsel that result as well.” Spence, 2022

WL 3354726, at *12 (citing Nichols, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 252) (“[U]necessary prolixity in a pleading

places an unjustified burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are

forced to select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage.”)) (other citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). Here, neither the Court nor the Defendants can plausibly understand

Plaintiff’s intended claims or entitlement to relief, if any. Indeed, Plaintiff’s allegations are largely

frivolous and strain credulity. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (a court shall

dismiss a complaint as frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the

wholly incredible.”); Crisafi v. Holland, 655 F.2d 1305, 1307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (a court shall

dismiss a complaint as frivolous when it “postulates events and circumstances of a wholly fanciful

kind.”).

For these reasons, the Complaint, ECF No. 1, and this case, are dismissed without

prejudice. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: January 2, 2026 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge