Hoenack v. Litchfield Elementary School District No. 79

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

AUGUST JEREMY HOENACK, No. 24-6765 D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01903-JJT Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

LITCHFIELD ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 79, a political subdivision of the State of) Arizona; JOANNE M. GUNNING; JENNIFER N. MACLENNAN Esquire, Attorney; KIMBERLY A. MORAN; DANIELLE E. CLYMER; MELISSA A. ZUIDEMA; UNKNOWN PARTIES, John Does I-X; Jane Does 1-X; White Corporations, I-X; Black Partnerships, 1-X; Gray Limited Liability Companies, 1-X; and Yellow Trusts, 1-X,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 22, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: CANBY, BENNETT, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

August Jeremy Hoenack appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging First Amendment and state law

claims arising from his membership on the board of Litchfield Elementary School

District No. 79 (“the District”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo. Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Hoenack

failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the District violated

his First Amendment rights or state law. See White v. City of Norwalk, 900 F.2d

1421, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a local governmental body does not

violate the First Amendment when, during a meeting, it restricts speech that is off-

topic or that disrupts, disturbs, or otherwise impedes the orderly conduct of the

meeting); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783 P.2d 781, 785-88 (Ariz.

1989) (discussing requirements of claims for defamation, false light invasion of

privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under Arizona common

law); see also Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-431.01-431.03 (requiring public bodies

to have open meetings and provide public notice of meetings, and allowing public

bodies to hold executive sessions in certain circumstances).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hoenack’s motion

for reconsideration because Hoenack failed to establish grounds for relief. See Sch.

2 24-6765 Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (9th

Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for relief under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting in part the

District’s motion for attorney’s fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (permitting an award

of reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a § 1983 action); Ariz. Rev.

Stat. Ann. § 12-349(A)(1) (requiring an award of attorney’s fees against a party

who “[b]rings . . . a claim without substantial justification”); Citizens for Free

Speech, LLC v. County of Alameda, 953 F.3d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 2020) (setting

forth standard of review and explaining circumstances under which a prevailing

defendant is entitled to attorney’s fees).

We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

Hoenack’s and the District’s motions to transmit physical video evidence

(Docket Entry Nos. 13 and 21) are granted. The District’s request for leave to file

an application for attorney’s fees, set forth in its answering brief, is denied without

prejudice. See Fed. R. App. P. 38 (requiring a separate motion for fees and costs).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-6765