United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit
Nos. 24-1204, 24-1696
REDZO HODZIC; EDINA HODZIC,
Petitioners,
v.
PAMELA J. BONDI, United States Attorney General,
Respondent.*
PETITIONS FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
Before
Barron, Chief Judge, Gelpí and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.
Melanie Shapiro, with whom Law Office of Melanie Shapiro, LLC, was on brief, for petitioners.
Taryn L. Arbeiter, with whom Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Walter Bocchini, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, and Leslie McKay, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, were on brief, for respondent.
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Pamela J. Bondi is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Merrick B. Garland as respondent. March 19, 2026 GELPÍ, Circuit Judge. In these consolidated petitions
for review, Edina and Redzo Hodzic (the "Hodzics") seek review of
the Board of Immigration Appeals's (BIA) orders denying their
motion to reopen sua sponte and their motion to reconsider. The
Hodzics contend that the BIA's denial of their motion to reopen
rested on legal and constitutional errors. We deny the Hodzics'
petitions for review.
I. BACKGROUND
We gather our background from the administrative record,
which includes the Hodzics' testimony before the immigration judge
("IJ") in October 2001. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Arevalo v. Garland,
112 F.4th 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2024).
A. Entry into the United States
Edina Hodzic is a native and citizen of Serbia, formerly
part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Her husband, Redzo
Hodzic, is a native and citizen of the Republic of North Macedonia,
formerly part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The Hodzics are Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) who, prior to entering
the United States, lived in the Sandzak region of Serbia. In their
brief, the Hodzics refer to the Bosnian genocide that took place
between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Kosovo War
that ended in 1999 to describe the conditions existing in their
region right before they left Sandzak in 2000.
- 3 - Edina testified before the IJ that the Hodzics fled from
Serbia in May 2000 because they grew fearful of the increased
presence of Serbian military forces in Sandzak following the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) bombing of Serbia in 1999.
They worried that conditions in Serbia or North Macedonia would
not be safe for their soon-to-be-born child.
On June 22, 2000, the Hodzics entered the United States
by presenting forged Slovenian passports at Dulles International
Airport in Virginia. During an interview with an Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) inspector at Dulles, the Hodzics
expressed fear of returning to Serbia and North Macedonia.
Accordingly, the INS (now the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)) referred them for an interview with an asylum officer.
After the asylum officer determined that the Hodzics had a credible
fear of persecution, they were paroled into the United States and
placed in removal proceedings.
B. Procedural History
On June 26, 2000, the INS filed Notices to Appear with
the Immigration Court in Arlington, Virginia. The INS charged the
Hodzics as removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) for
fraudulently or willfully misrepresenting a material fact to
procure admission into the United States and under
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) for lacking a valid entry document at the
time of their application for admission. The Notices to Appear
- 4 - listed the time and date of the hearings as "to be determined."
On July 7, 2000, the Arlington Immigration Court sent a second
Notice of Hearing in Removal Proceedings, which specified that
both cases were scheduled for a Master Hearing on August 17, 2000,
at 9:00 a.m. In August 2000, the venue for the removal proceedings
changed to the Immigration Court in Boston, Massachusetts. The
Hodzics had their first master calendar hearing on November 2,
2000, where they submitted written pleadings to the charges
contained in the Notices to Appear and requested the opportunity
to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the
Convention Against Torture.
In March 2001, Edina filed an I-589 Application for
Asylum and Withholding of Removal and designated Redzo as a
derivative applicant. The application listed four grounds for
asylum: persecution based on her religious identity "as a [Muslim]
from the region of Sandzak in Serbia,"1 imputed political opinion
"due to the political activities of the Bosnian/[Muslim]
community," nationality, and membership in a particular social
group (the Bosniak community of Sandzak).
In October 2001, the IJ heard testimony from the Hodzics
regarding the I-589 Application. In March 2002, the IJ issued a
As a Bosnian Muslim growing up in the Sandzak region, Edina 1
was "aware of the risks of openly identifying with the . . . Bosniak community" and had to practice her religion in secret.
- 5 - written decision finding the Hodzics removable as charged and
ineligible for relief and protection from removal. In April 2002,
the Hodzics appealed this decision and in April 2004, the BIA
dismissed the appeal. The Hodzics then filed a petition for review
with this Court, which was voluntarily dismissed. See Judgment,
Hodzic v. Gonzales, No. 04-1684 (1st Cir. Oct. 25, 2006).
On June 9, 2005, while the petition for review was
pending in this Court, the Hodzics filed a motion to reopen removal
proceedings with the BIA, seeking adjustment of status based on an
approved employment-based visa for Redzo. The BIA denied the
motion on December 27, 2005, finding it untimely. The Hodzics
then sought reconsideration of the BIA's denial of the motion to
reopen, which the BIA denied on April 13, 2006.
On April 29, 2006, the Hodzics filed Applications to
Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status ("Adjustment
Applications"). Following a jointly filed motion to reopen
submitted by the Hodzics and DHS, the BIA reopened proceedings and
remanded the record to the IJ on September 29, 2006. The IJ then
terminated the removal proceedings solely to permit the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to adjudicate
their applications for adjustment of status. On September 24,
2009, the USCIS denied the Adjustment Applications, finding that
the Hodzics "sought admission to the United States by fraud or
willful misrepresentation" and thus were inadmissible under 8
- 6 - U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Their case was then transferred back
to the Boston Immigration Court, where the IJ ultimately ordered
the removal of Redzo to North Macedonia, and in the alternative,
to Serbia, and the removal of Edina to the former Republic of
Yugoslavia. The Hodzics subsequently filed an appeal with the
BIA, which the BIA dismissed on May 21, 2013.
In March 2020, the Hodzics filed a motion to reopen sua
sponte before the BIA. On July 9, 2021, the BIA denied the motion
to reopen.
On July 28, 2021, the Hodzics filed another motion to
reopen sua sponte. On this occasion, the Hodzics argued that
Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (2021), introduced a
"fundamental change in case law" that made them eligible for non-
lawful permanent resident cancellation of removal. Niz-Chavez
held that a notice to appear sufficient to trigger the "stop-time
rule" is a single document containing all the information required
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(l),2 and that inadequate or incomplete
notices to appear cannot be cured by one or more subsequent
notices. Id. at 170. The Hodzics argued that DHS never issued
2 Nonpermanent residents who have been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of ten years may be eligible for a form of discretionary relief known as cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). Under the "stop-time rule" set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A), this period of continuous physical presence ends when the noncitizen is served a notice to appear under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). Pereira v. Sessions, 585 U.S. 198, 201 (2018).
- 7 - them a "sufficient" notice to appear and they had thus "accrued
the required ten-year continuous presence." They also alleged
that their removal would result in "exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship" to their relatives, given their daughter's
medical conditions.3 Lastly, the Hodzics submitted letters
attesting to their good moral character and documents showing their
lack of criminal history.
On February 21, 2024, the BIA denied the Hodzics' 2021
motion to reopen. The BIA considered their record, including the
2020 and 2021 motions to reopen, as well as their circumstances,
and ultimately held that the Hodzics did not present an
"exceptional situation" that warranted reopening. The Hodzics
filed a motion to reconsider the BIA's decision in March 2024,
which was denied by the BIA in June 2024. The Hodzics now seek
review of their 2020 motion to reopen sua sponte and 2024 motion
to reconsider.
3The Hodzics' first-born child, Emma, suffers from severe medical issues. Emma was born with craniosynostosis, a condition that requires remodeling surgeries to correct deformities in her skull. Edina also has "end-stage liver disease." In a letter dated February 28, 2020, Dr. Irun Bhan, a transplant hepatologist at Massachusetts General Hospital, stated that "it is necessary for [Edina] to be under the care of a hepatology subspecialist at a tertiary referral center" where her condition can be "properly managed." The Hodzics worry that Edina and their daughter would not receive proper healthcare if both were to return to their home countries.
- 8 - II. DISCUSSION
Although the Hodzics challenge the resolution of their
motion to reopen sua sponte and their motion to reconsider, they
fail to address the latter in the discussion section of their
opening brief. Only after the Government drew attention to this
omission did the Hodzics attempt to raise the issue in their reply
brief. Our case law is clear that "[a]rguments raised for the
first time in an appellate reply brief [are] ordinarily deemed
waived." United States v. Mojica-Ramos, 103 F.4th 844, 849 n.3
(1st Cir. 2024) (second alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Casey, 825 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2016)). Accordingly,
the Hodzics' arguments regarding the denial of the motion to
reconsider are waived.
We now move on to address the Hodzics' challenges to the
denial of their motion to reopen sua sponte. Because they bear on
the jurisdictional inquiry, we first discuss the avenues available
to noncitizens seeking to reopen their removal proceedings. We
then turn to each asserted legal and constitutional error in turn.
A noncitizen may file two types of motions to reopen:
(1) statutory motions to reopen under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7) and
(2) motions to reopen sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2. The
statutory motion to reopen is part of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, whereas the motion to reopen sua sponte is a
creature of regulations promulgated by the Attorney General.
- 9 - Only one statutory motion to reopen is allowed, and it
ordinarily must be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a
final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7). If a statutory
motion to reopen is untimely or number-barred, a petitioner may
request that the BIA reopen the proceedings sua sponte.
The BIA has discretion to grant or deny motions to reopen
sua sponte under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which provides:
The Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision. . . . The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board, subject to the restrictions of this section. The Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the moving party has made out a prima facie case for relief.
Sua sponte reopening is "an extraordinary remedy
reserved for truly exceptional situations." Phimmady v. Bondi,
128 F.4th 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2025) (quoting G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec.
1132, 1133-34 (BIA 1999)). Even if faced with such "exceptional
situations," the BIA "is not required -- by regulation or its own
decisions -- to reopen proceedings sua sponte." Charles v.
Garland, 113 F.4th 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2024) (quoting Bonilla v.
Lynch, 840 F.3d 575, 585 (9th Cir. 2016)).
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
While appellate courts have jurisdiction to review
denials of motions for statutory reopening, Reyes Mata v. Lynch,
576 U.S. 143, 149 (2015), we generally lack jurisdiction to review
- 10 - BIA decisions on motions to reopen sua sponte, Gyamfi v. Whitaker,
913 F.3d 168, 176 (1st Cir. 2019). Courts cannot
"evaluate . . . agency action for 'abuse of discretion'" when "no
judicially manageable standards are available for judging how and
when [the BIA] should exercise its discretion." Id. (second
alteration in original) (quoting Luis v. INS, 196 F.3d 36, 40 (1st
Cir. 1999)). Thus, such decisions are left to the discretion of
the BIA and are not subject to review by this Court. Id.
However, we do have limited jurisdiction to review BIA
denials of motions to reopen sua sponte when these are premised on
legal or constitutional error. Phimmady, 128 F.4th at 22; see
also Thompson v. Barr, 959 F.3d 476, 481 (1st Cir. 2020)
("[S]ometimes there are judicially manageable standards to apply
even when the relief sought is purely discretionary -- as is the
case with motions to reopen sua sponte."). In such cases, "it is
appropriate to 'remand to the BIA so it may exercise its authority
against the correct legal background.'" Phimmady, 128 F.4th at 22
(quoting Thompson, 959 F.3d at 483).
For this Court to exercise jurisdiction, a petitioner
must allege claims of constitutional or legal error that are at
least "colorable." See Gyamfi, 913 F.3d at 177. For a claim to
be colorable, "the argument advanced must, at the very least, have
some potential validity." Pan v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 80, 84 (1st
Cir. 2007). "In determining whether a petitioner has raised a
- 11 - colorable constitutional claim or question of law, substance must
triumph over form. . . . Put another way, we must look to the meat
of the petitioner's arguments, not to the packaging in which they
are wrapped." Ramirez-Matias v. Holder, 778 F.3d 322, 326 (1st
Cir. 2015).
The Government argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction
to consider the BIA's decision because the Hodzics do not raise
any colorable legal or constitutional claims. Although this Court
generally has an obligation to determine whether it has
jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits, see Phimmady, 128
F.4th at 21, we may "bypass[] enigmatic jurisdictional questions
in circumstances in which precedent clearly adumbrates the result
on the merits," Paye v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2024)
(alteration in original) (quoting Royal Siam Corp. v. Chertoff,
484 F.3d 139, 144 (1st Cir. 2007)). We may exercise hypothetical
jurisdiction "[w]here a 'case poses a question of statutory, not
Article III, jurisdiction' and where 'a decision on the merits
will favor the party challenging the court's jurisdiction.'"
Johansen v. Liberty Mut. Grp. Inc., 118 F.4th 142, 148 (1st Cir.
2024) (quoting Caribe Chem Distribs., Corp. v. S. Agric.
Insecticides, Inc., 96 F.4th 25, 28 (1st Cir. 2024)). Here, the
jurisdictional question is statutory, see Thompson, 959 F.3d at
483, and the Hodzics' challenges to the BIA's decision clearly
fail. Thus, hypothetical statutory jurisdiction is proper.
- 12 - The Hodzics allege that the BIA committed several legal
and constitutional errors, which we review de novo. See Santos
Garcia v. Garland, 67 F.4th 455, 460 (1st Cir. 2023); Benitez v.
Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2021).
B. Claims of Legal Error
The Hodzics contend that the BIA's denial of their motion
to reopen sua sponte rested on three legal errors. They first
argue that the BIA failed to apply the statutory definition of
"exceptional circumstances" to the BIA's "exceptional situations"
standard. Second, they assert that the BIA's decision was
"arbitrary and capricious" because it did not provide an
explanation as to why their circumstances were not considered
"exceptional." Third, they argue that the BIA erred because it
failed to determine that a "fundamental change in case law"
constitutes "exceptional circumstances." And fourth, they claim
that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Loper Bright
Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), prohibits this Court
from deferring to the BIA's decision. We address each claim in
turn.
1. The Exceptional Situations Standard
The Hodzics argue that the BIA's failure to apply the
statutory definition of "exceptional circumstances" found in 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1) when determining that their case did not
present "an exceptional situation" constitutes legal error. In so
- 13 - doing, the Hodzics confuse the statutory definition of
"exceptional circumstances," 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1), with the
"exceptional situations" standard created through BIA precedent.
The term "exceptional circumstances," as used in 8
U.S.C. § 1229a, applies to motions to reopen under
§ 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i), which governs motions to rescind removal
orders that an IJ issues in the noncitizen's absence, due to his
or her failure to appear in removal proceedings. Such orders may
be rescinded "upon a motion to reopen filed within 180 days after
the date of the order of removal if the [noncitizen] demonstrates
that the failure to appear [before the IJ] was because of
exceptional circumstances (as defined in subsection (e)(1))."4 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(i). Because the Hodzics' motion to reopen
sua sponte does not fall under this statutory authority, the
application of the "exceptional circumstances" definition was not
required.
When reviewing motions to reopen sua sponte under 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2, on the other hand, the BIA applies the
"exceptional situations" standard. Charles, 113 F.4th at 23
"Exceptional circumstances" are defined as "exceptional 4
circumstances (such as battery or extreme cruelty to the [noncitizen] or any child or parent of the [noncitizen], serious illness of the [noncitizen], or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the [noncitizen], but not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the [noncitizen]." 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(1).
- 14 - (quoting Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 585). This standard developed
through BIA precedent. See J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (BIA
1997). As other circuit courts have acknowledged, no "statutory,
regulatory, or case law definition" exists for this term.
Cuevas-Nuno v. Barr, 969 F.3d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting
Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 586). The "exceptional situations" standard,
therefore, does not arise from the same authority or apply in the
same context as the "exceptional circumstances" definition.
It thus cannot be legal error for the BIA to refuse to
cross-apply the statutory definition of "exceptional
circumstances" when finding that the Hodzics did not present an
"exceptional situation" warranting reopening. The Hodzics' claim
regarding the application of the "exceptional situation" standard
clearly fails.
2. Arbitrary and Capricious
The Hodzics next argue that the BIA's determination was
"arbitrary and capricious" because it did "not provide any
explanation as to why their circumstances were insufficient" to
reopen their case. The Hodzics argue that the BIA was required to
state "with sufficient particularity and clarity" the reasons for
denying relief. To support their argument, the Hodzics cite to
case law concerning reviews of BIA decisions following timely
appeals, not motions to reopen sua sponte. See Sulaiman v.
Gonzales, 429 F.3d 347, 350 (1st Cir. 2005); Gailus v. INS, 147
- 15 - F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 1998). The Hodzics do not point to any
controlling precedent that establishes such a requirement for BIA
denials of sua sponte reopenings. Thus, their argument fails as
a matter of law.
3. Fundamental Change in Case Law
We now turn to the Hodzics' third claim of legal error.
They contend that the BIA erred in failing to determine that a
fundamental change in case law constituted "exceptional
circumstances" warranting reopening.5 In their motions to reopen,
the Hodzics argued that "the proceedings should be reopened and
remanded based on Niz-Chavez v. Garland to allow them to apply for
cancellation of removal." (Citation omitted.). The BIA did not
specifically address their argument. Now on appeal, the Hodzics
assert that the BIA's decision to deny reopening in spite of
Niz-Chavez conflicts with BIA precedent that establishes that
fundamental changes in case law constitute "exceptional
circumstances."
The Hodzics' argument rests on a faulty premise. Citing
to G-D-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1132 (BIA 1999), they suggest that the
BIA was required to reopen their removal proceedings once it
identified a "fundamental change in case law." But
5 We take the Hodzics' mention of "exceptional circumstances" to refer to the "exceptional situations" standard discussed in Section II.B.1.
- 16 - G-D- establishes only that, in certain situations, a fundamental
change in case law may constitute an "exceptional situation." Id.
at 1135. And, as we have discussed, the BIA has discretion to
deny motions to reopen sua sponte, even when "exceptional
situations" are present. Charles, 113 F.4th at 23 (quoting
Bonilla, 840 F.3d at 585). Thus, even if the BIA had found that
there was a fundamental change in case law, it was under no
obligation to reopen proceedings. See id.
The Hodzics also fail to explain why the BIA erred in
its, albeit implicit, treatment of Niz-Chavez. They do not argue
that the BIA misunderstood or misapplied that decision, or that
its denial rested on an incorrect view of governing law. Instead,
they merely assert -- without analysis and in a single paragraph
of their brief -- that Niz-Chavez compelled reopening. That is
insufficient to bring this case within the narrow jurisdictional
exception permitting review. Our jurisdiction is limited to
correcting misunderstandings of the law such that the BIA can
exercise its discretion under the correct legal premises. See
Phimmady, 128 F.4th at 22. We thus conclude that the Hodzics'
claim of legal error based on the Niz-Chavez decision is meritless.
4. Loper Bright Argument
The Hodzics cite Loper Bright to broadly argue that this
Court "cannot defer to [the BIA] where there is ambiguity" and
must "exercise[] [its] independent judgment in deciding whether
- 17 - [the BIA] acted within its statutory authority." See 603 U.S. at
412. Loper Bright construed the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
to require courts reviewing agency actions to determine de novo
the "meaning of statutory provisions," Id. at 394, overruling the
Chevron doctrine, which had required a reviewing court to defer to
an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute so long as it
set forth a "permissible construction of the statute," id. at 397
(quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)). Thus, after Loper Bright, courts no
longer need to and, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
"may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply
because a statute is ambiguous." Id. at 413.
None of legal challenges posed by the Hodzics require us
to review the BIA's interpretation of an ambiguous statute.
Rather, the Hodzics' claims stem from the BIA's discretionary
authority in considering motions to reopen sua sponte. See 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). Because we do not face a question of statutory
interpretation, and because the Hodzics do not argue that Loper
Bright applies beyond the APA context, Loper Bright is inapposite
to our analysis. See Zapet-Alvarado v. Bondi, 152 F.4th 329, 336
n.6 (1st Cir. 2025). The Hodzics' challenge to the BIA's
determination on these grounds is therefore meritless.
- 18 - C. Claims of Constitutional Error
We now turn to the Hodzics' assertions of constitutional
error. The Hodzics bring two distinct challenges under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. First, they argue that the
lack of "reliability in [the BIA's] sua sponte
determinations . . . deprived [them] of procedural due process."
Second, they claim that the BIA violated their substantive due
process right to "family integrity" or "familial association."
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be
"deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." U.S. Const. amend. V. "[T]he Due Process Clause applies to
all 'persons' within the United States," including noncitizens.
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001).
The Due Process Clause has both procedural and
substantive components. Procedural due process
"guarantee[s] . . . that, before a significant deprivation of
liberty or property takes place at the state's hands, the affected
individual must be forewarned and afforded an opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."
Maldonado-González v. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth., 158 F.4th 27,
34 (1st Cir. 2025) (alterations in original) (quoting
González-Droz v. González-Colón, 660 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011)).
Substantive due process, however, "bar[s] certain government
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
- 19 - implement them." Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986);
see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)
("Substantive due process prevents the government from engaging in
conduct that shocks the conscience . . . or interferes with rights
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." (citation modified)).
We will address each of the Hodzics' due process claims in turn.
First, as to the Hodzics' procedural due process claim,
this Court has held that "[t]he BIA's exercise of its 'purely
discretionary' sua sponte authority," as in this case, "does not
create a cognizable liberty interest." Reyes, 886 F.3d at 188
(quoting Matias, 871 F.3d at 72). Because the Hodzics do not have
a cognizable liberty interest in the BIA's decision, their
procedural due process claim lacks merit.
Second, the Hodzics assert a substantive due process
violation based on the deprivation of their fundamental liberty
interest in family integrity. Indeed, parents have a fundamental
liberty interest in "the care, custody, and control of their
children." Foote v. Ludlow Sch. Comm., 128 F.4th 336, 345 (1st
Cir. 2025), petition for cert. filed, No. 25-77 (U.S. July 18,
2025). In their brief, however, the Hodzics only reference the
right to family integrity in passing. They make mere conclusory
statements that the BIA's actions violated their constitutional
rights. Accordingly, the Hodzics' substantive due process claim
is waived for lack of development. See United States v. Zannino,
- 20 - 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]ssues adverted to in a
perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed
argumentation, are deemed waived.").
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petitions for review are
denied.
- 21 -