LAGARDE, Justice.
Appellant, Theotis Lee Hodge, appeals his conviction of retaliation1 in a trial before the court on January 14, 1987, following his nolo contendere plea pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. Appellant’s punishment was assessed by the court at two years in the Texas Department of Corrections. On appeal, Hodge, pro se, asserts three points of error; namely: (1) that the trial court erred in dismissing two motions to dismiss because “good cause was shown;” (2) that the indictment is fundamentally defective for failure to state an offense; and (3) that his nolo contendere plea was not voluntarily or knowingly made.
In point of error number one, Hodge complains that the trial court erred in overruling his first “Motion for Dismissal of Prosecution” filed on November 14, 1986, and his second “Motion to Dismiss Prosecution” which was filed on January [355]*35512, 1987. The 1986 motion alleges that Hodge’s warrantless arrest was illegal because of lack of probable cause. There is no indication in the record on appeal that Hodge ever requested, or obtained, a hearing on the illegal arrest issue. Further, the record reflects that at a subsequent “Motion to Suppress Testimony Concerning Arrest” hearing, Hodge affirmatively stated that he had no objection to the nature of the arrest and, based on his waiver of objection, requested that the court deny the State the opportunity to prove probable cause for the arrest. Consequently, Hodge has waived any right to complain of this issue on appeal. See Parker v. State, 545 S.W.2d 151, 155 N. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (appellate court may only consider recor d presented); Stevenson v. State, 456 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.1970) ( appellate court will only consider evidence in appellate record.)
Concerning the January 12, 1987 motion, Hodge appears to urge that the mistrial declared on January 6, 1987 establishes that he is entitled to a dismissal because the State failed to prove its case and, therefore, retrial is barred by the double jeopardy clause. The record on appeal does not establish the basis of the mistrial and is insufficient to provide a basis for our review of this complaint. While Hodge’s self-serving pleading is before us, we cannot accept allegations as true unless they are supported by the appellate record. Brown v. State, 523 S.W.2d 238, 240-41 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Consequently, Hodge’s first point of error is overruled.
In his second point of error, Hodge contends that the indictment under which he was convicted is fundamentally defective. The indictment charges Hodge with retaliation and, in relevant part, states that Hodge
did unlawfully then and there knowingly and intentionally threaten to harm and injure T.D. Weeks, by an unlawful act, to-wit: threatened to kill the said T.D. Weeks in retaliation for and on account of the service of T.D. Weeks, a peace officer.
The above language “tracks” the language of the statutory offense of retaliation, which reads, in relevant part, as follows:
A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for or on account of the service of another as public servant, witness, prospective witness, or informant.
Tex.Penal Code § 36.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Subject to rare exceptions, an indictment which tracks the words of the penal statute in question is legally sufficient and the State need not allege facts which are merely evidentiary in nature. Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). We find no exception here; consequently, we hold that the indictment is not fundamentally defective for failure to state an offense.
In a pro se motion to quash filed on January 13, 1987, Hodge alleged that “[tjhis indictment goes to an act, an unlawful act but fails to describe the act, the unlawful act, as to how the defendant is supposed to have threatened to kill Officer Weeks.” We understand Hodge to be complaining that the indictment fails to describe the manner and means, verbally or bodily, by which he is alleged to have threatened to kill T.D. Weeks. In the face of a timely motion to quash, the indictment must allege on its face the facts necessary to show that the offense was committed, to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, and to give the defendant notice of precisely what he is charged with. DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), citing American Plant Food v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). In determining whether the indictment sufficiently charges an offense, we must read the indictment as a whole. DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 67, citing Dennis v. State, 647 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) and Church v. State, 552 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). Further, the notice provided by the indictment must be examined from the perspective of the accused in light of his constitu[356]*356tional presumption of innocence. DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 68, citing King v. State, 594 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
Where a defendant has timely raised the claim of inadequate notice, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held:
The general rule is that a motion to quash will be allowed if the facts sought are essential to give notice. However, unless a fact is essential, the indictment need not plead evidence relied on by the State. Smith v. State, 502 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966). [Emphasis in original.]
DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 67, quoting Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
Hodge relies primarily on Doyle v. State, 661 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), wherein the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction and held that Doyle’s motion to quash the indictment against him for retaliation should have been sustained for failure of the indictment to specify the manner and means whereby the threat was communicated.
In Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), recently reaffirmed in DeVaughn, supra, 749 S.W.2d at 67, the Court of Criminal Appeals indicated that claims of inadequate notice should be addressed as follows:
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
LAGARDE, Justice.
Appellant, Theotis Lee Hodge, appeals his conviction of retaliation1 in a trial before the court on January 14, 1987, following his nolo contendere plea pursuant to a plea bargain agreement. Appellant’s punishment was assessed by the court at two years in the Texas Department of Corrections. On appeal, Hodge, pro se, asserts three points of error; namely: (1) that the trial court erred in dismissing two motions to dismiss because “good cause was shown;” (2) that the indictment is fundamentally defective for failure to state an offense; and (3) that his nolo contendere plea was not voluntarily or knowingly made.
In point of error number one, Hodge complains that the trial court erred in overruling his first “Motion for Dismissal of Prosecution” filed on November 14, 1986, and his second “Motion to Dismiss Prosecution” which was filed on January [355]*35512, 1987. The 1986 motion alleges that Hodge’s warrantless arrest was illegal because of lack of probable cause. There is no indication in the record on appeal that Hodge ever requested, or obtained, a hearing on the illegal arrest issue. Further, the record reflects that at a subsequent “Motion to Suppress Testimony Concerning Arrest” hearing, Hodge affirmatively stated that he had no objection to the nature of the arrest and, based on his waiver of objection, requested that the court deny the State the opportunity to prove probable cause for the arrest. Consequently, Hodge has waived any right to complain of this issue on appeal. See Parker v. State, 545 S.W.2d 151, 155 N. 6 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (appellate court may only consider recor d presented); Stevenson v. State, 456 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.1970) ( appellate court will only consider evidence in appellate record.)
Concerning the January 12, 1987 motion, Hodge appears to urge that the mistrial declared on January 6, 1987 establishes that he is entitled to a dismissal because the State failed to prove its case and, therefore, retrial is barred by the double jeopardy clause. The record on appeal does not establish the basis of the mistrial and is insufficient to provide a basis for our review of this complaint. While Hodge’s self-serving pleading is before us, we cannot accept allegations as true unless they are supported by the appellate record. Brown v. State, 523 S.W.2d 238, 240-41 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). Consequently, Hodge’s first point of error is overruled.
In his second point of error, Hodge contends that the indictment under which he was convicted is fundamentally defective. The indictment charges Hodge with retaliation and, in relevant part, states that Hodge
did unlawfully then and there knowingly and intentionally threaten to harm and injure T.D. Weeks, by an unlawful act, to-wit: threatened to kill the said T.D. Weeks in retaliation for and on account of the service of T.D. Weeks, a peace officer.
The above language “tracks” the language of the statutory offense of retaliation, which reads, in relevant part, as follows:
A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly harms or threatens to harm another by an unlawful act in retaliation for or on account of the service of another as public servant, witness, prospective witness, or informant.
Tex.Penal Code § 36.06(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988). Subject to rare exceptions, an indictment which tracks the words of the penal statute in question is legally sufficient and the State need not allege facts which are merely evidentiary in nature. Moreno v. State, 721 S.W.2d 295, 300 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Phillips v. State, 597 S.W.2d 929, 934 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). We find no exception here; consequently, we hold that the indictment is not fundamentally defective for failure to state an offense.
In a pro se motion to quash filed on January 13, 1987, Hodge alleged that “[tjhis indictment goes to an act, an unlawful act but fails to describe the act, the unlawful act, as to how the defendant is supposed to have threatened to kill Officer Weeks.” We understand Hodge to be complaining that the indictment fails to describe the manner and means, verbally or bodily, by which he is alleged to have threatened to kill T.D. Weeks. In the face of a timely motion to quash, the indictment must allege on its face the facts necessary to show that the offense was committed, to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, and to give the defendant notice of precisely what he is charged with. DeVaughn v. State, 749 S.W.2d 62, 67 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), citing American Plant Food v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 603 (Tex.Crim.App.1974). In determining whether the indictment sufficiently charges an offense, we must read the indictment as a whole. DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 67, citing Dennis v. State, 647 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.1983) and Church v. State, 552 S.W.2d 138, 140 (Tex.Crim.App.1977). Further, the notice provided by the indictment must be examined from the perspective of the accused in light of his constitu[356]*356tional presumption of innocence. DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 68, citing King v. State, 594 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).
Where a defendant has timely raised the claim of inadequate notice, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held:
The general rule is that a motion to quash will be allowed if the facts sought are essential to give notice. However, unless a fact is essential, the indictment need not plead evidence relied on by the State. Smith v. State, 502 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Cameron v. State, 401 S.W.2d 809 (Tex.Cr.App.1966). [Emphasis in original.]
DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 67, quoting Thomas v. State, 621 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Crim.App.1981).
Hodge relies primarily on Doyle v. State, 661 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), wherein the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction and held that Doyle’s motion to quash the indictment against him for retaliation should have been sustained for failure of the indictment to specify the manner and means whereby the threat was communicated.
In Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 903 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), recently reaffirmed in DeVaughn, supra, 749 S.W.2d at 67, the Court of Criminal Appeals indicated that claims of inadequate notice should be addressed as follows:
The important question is whether a defendant had notice adequate to prepare his defense. The first step in answering this question is to decide whether the charging instrument failed to convey some requisite item of “notice.” If sufficient notice is given, this ends our inquiry. If not, the next step is to decide whether, in the context of the case, this had an impact on defendant’s ability to prepare a defense, and, finally how great an impact.
For purposes of this opinion, we assume, but do not decide, that the indictment is insufficient to convey to Hodge the manner or means, whether bodily or verbally, by which Hodge is alleged to have threatened to kill Officer T.D. Weeks. We proceed then to the second step of Adams and consider whether, in the context of the case, this deficiency of notice had an impact on Hodge’s ability to prepare a defense, and, if so, how great an impact. DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 70. We turn now to that consideration.
Article 21.19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure states:
An indictment shall not be held insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon be affected, by reason of any defect of form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.
TEX.CODE CRIM.PRO. art. 21.19 (Vernon 1966).
Initially, we must consider whether the defect alleged by Hodge is one of form, requiring an analysis pursuant to article 21.19, or one of substance, to which article 21.19 would not apply. It might be said that by earlier concluding that the indictment is not fundamentally defective, we have already concluded that the alleged defect is one of form, not substance. To further explicate this dichotomy, however, we look to American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex.Crim.App.1974).
Following a thorough discussion of the requirements as to form and substance, as found in Chapter 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court of Criminal Appeals, in that case concluded:
Unless the deficiency under Article 21.-21(7),[2] supra, be of such a degree as to utterly fail to charge that an offense against the law was committed by the defendant (cf. Art. 27.08(1), supra), then it is objectionable only as to form and not as to substance. This distinction between an objection to the charge based on substance and one based on form, subtle though it be, is well founded in [357]*357reason, in justice, and in the logic of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
We conclude, therefore, that here the alleged defect as to notice is one of form, not substance. Having so concluded, we then apply article 21.19 as authorized by Adams, 707 S.W.2d at 903, and undertake to determine whether the alleged defect prejudiced the substantial rights of Hodge. To be entitled to a reversal based on trial court error in overruling his motion to quash, Hodge must affirmatively show harm. Opdahl v. State, 705 S.W.2d 697, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (applying the old Craven3 rule). In the process of determining whether harm is shown, we look to all of the record, including the statement of facts. Craven at 490.
Examination of the pretrial motions filed by Hodge, particularly his Motion to Dismiss the prosecution, reflects that Hodge was in fact sufficiently on notice as to the offense with which he was charged so as to be able to prepare an adequate defense. Incorporated by reference and attached to the Motion to Dismiss as Exhibit A is the arrest report and as Exhibit B is the offense report of the Dallas Police Department. The offense report states the following under the heading of “narrative:”
Arrestee Hodge told complainant Weeks if he would take the handcuffs off and drop the charges for arresting him, he would beat his ass once they were out of the squad car. At the book in area at Lew Sterrett, Arrestee Hodge told complainant Weeks once he got out of jail that he was going to find him and kill complainant. Arrestee also told complainant Weeks that he should be worried.
The original indictment against Hodge was enhanced with a prior conviction for burglary of a building and a second prior conviction for aggravated rape. Thus, a sentence of life imprisonment was authorized. Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, both enhancement paragraphs were dismissed in exchange for Hodge’s plea of nolo contendere and a sentence of two years in the Texas Department of Corrections. This minimal sentence further tends to negate harm. Although we concede that the plea of nolo contendere itself, pursuant to a plea bargain, did not waive Hodge’s right to complain of defects in the indictment, we read Craven as requiring a due consideration of all trial court proceedings in determining harm. See Opdahl at 699. The record reveals that as a consequence of the plea bargain, Hodge forsook the need to defend himself and thereby no longer stood to profit trial-wise from those additional specifications he sought to have included in the indictment. Under these circumstances, we hold that in order to establish harm, Hodge must come forward with some factual justification other than the meagemess of the specifications which do appear in the indictment. This he has failed to do. We conclude, therefore, in the context of the case, that any deficiency in the indictment had no impact on Hodge’s ability to prepare a defense. DeVaughn, 749 S.W.2d at 70. No harm has been shown requiring reversal. Opdahl, 705 S.W.2d at 699; TEX.K.APP.P. 81(b)(2). Consequently, we overrule Hodge’s second point of error.
In his third point, Hodge urges that his plea of nolo contendere was not knowingly and voluntarily made. Hodge’s point of error and arguments thereunder are insufficient to preserve error. He fails to specifically point to error in the record but states only conclusions. Nothing is presented for review. See Braudrick v. State, 572 S.W.2d 709, 711-12 (Tex.Crim.App.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 923, 99 S.Ct. 1252, 59 L.Ed.2d 477; Berghahn v. State, 696 S.W.2d 943, 951 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1985, pet. ref’d.).
Assuming, arguendo, that the point is preserved, we nonetheless overrule the point. Hodge’s testimony in the record reflects that all statutory admonishments were met in all respects. See TEX.CODE [358]*358CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp.1987). Hodge’s third point is without merit and is overruled.
Affirmed.
HOWELL, J., dissents.