Hodge v. Rykers Islands

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 17, 2024
Docket1:24-cv-05737
StatusUnknown

This text of Hodge v. Rykers Islands (Hodge v. Rykers Islands) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hodge v. Rykers Islands, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK SHAKEEM HODGE, Plaintiff, 24-CV-5737 (LTS) -against- ORDER TO AMEND RYKERS ISLAND, Defendant. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff brings this action pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated during his detention at Rikers Island.1 By order dated July 30, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within 60 days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

1 Plaintiff spells the facility’s name as “Rykers Island,” but the usual spelling is Rikers Island. 2 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND The complaint sets forth the following facts. On January 1, 2015, in Plaintiff’s housing area on Rikers Island, “many inmates” assaulted him, breaking his back “in 4 places,” and also breaking his neck, face, nose, eye sockets, hip, and skull. (ECF 1 ¶ III.) Correction officers also punched and stepped on him. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges, without further explanation,3 the court room know[s] about my injuries and civil rights that saw me when I was in there. The court room have my IEEE I beleave – is a collection of networking standards that cover the physical and data link layer specification for technologies such was Ethernet and wireless. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $350 million in damages. (Id. ¶ IV.) DISCUSSION A. Section 1983 Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). The Court does not reach this analysis, however, because Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient on two threshold grounds. First, claims cannot be brought against Rikers Island as a defendant and the claims appear to be untimely. Claims against Rikers Island Rikers Island is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See generally Whitley v. Westchester Cty. Corr. Fac. Admin., ECF 1:97-CV-420, 1997 WL 659100, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 1997) (correctional facility or jail is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against Rikers Island are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

3 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All capitalization, spelling, grammar, and punctuation are as in the original unless otherwise indicated. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint to name a different Defendant or Defendants, he must allege facts showing each defendants’ direct and personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the

alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). City of New York It may be Plaintiff’s intention to sue the City of New York. When a plaintiff sues a municipality under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the municipality’s employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the municipality itself caused the violation of the plaintiff’s rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under . . . section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such deprivation.”) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978)); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011). In other

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Hodge v. Rykers Islands, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hodge-v-rykers-islands-nysd-2024.