Hodge v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA

• Court: District Court, D. Arizona
• Decided: October 10, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00932
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

9 Najib A Hodge, No. CV-24-00932-PHX-SHD

10 Plaintiff, ORDER

11 v.

12 JPMorgan Chase Bank NA,

13 Defendants. 14 15 Pending before the Court are ten motions filed by pro se Plaintiff Najib A. Hodge. 16 (Docs. 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 103, 109, 110, 112, 124.) They include a Motion to 17 Amend/Correct the Amended Complaint, (Doc. 92); a Motion for Leave to File Second 18 Amended Complaint, (Doc. 112); a Motion to Compel Discovery and Reserve Sanctions, 19 (Doc. 97, 98); a Motion to Enforce Binding Evidentiary Agreement, (Doc. 103); and 20 several motions to file supplementary evidence or to clarify the record, (Docs. 94, 96, 109, 21 110, 124). In addition to these motions, Hodge has entered seven Notices of Errata, (Docs. 22 95, 99, 104, 108, 113, 122, 123), and he has filed—without the Court’s leave—three 23 affidavits accompanied by supplementary exhibits, (Docs. 111, 116, 118). Hodge has also 24 filed several Notices which purport to clarify his claims. (Docs. 93, 120.) Each of Hodge’s 25 pending motions and filings is addressed below. 26 I. BACKGROUND 27 In April 2024, Hodge, an African American man, brought this action against 28 Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank NA (“J.P. Morgan”) alleging that J.P. Morgan 1 unlawfully terminated him from his position as an Associate Banker due to his race, color, 2 age, religion, and gender. (Doc. 5 at 4.) Hodge alleged that J.P. Morgan violated Title VII 3 of the Civil Rights Act; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”); the 4 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 5 at 3.) After 5 granting Hodge’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court screened his First 6 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and allowed Hodge to proceed with his Title VII claims of 7 discrimination and retaliation based on his race and color. (Docs. 7, 10.) His remaining 8 claims were dismissed. 9 J.P. Morgan answered Hodge’s FAC, (Doc. 22), and in November 2024, the Court 10 issued a Case Management Order, which set several deadlines for the parties, (Doc. 59). 11 Relevant here, the “deadline for joining parties, amending pleadings, and filing 12 supplemental pleadings” was December 6, 2024. (Doc. 59 (case management order); Doc. 13 81 (extending discovery and dispositive motion deadlines but otherwise affirming the case 14 management order)). Section 7 of the Case Management Order instructs that “[t]he parties 15 shall not file written discovery motions without leave of the Court.” (Doc. 59 at 5.) If a 16 “dispute arises and cannot be resolved despite sincere efforts to resolve the matter through 17 personal consultation (in person or by telephone), the parties shall jointly file (1) a brief 18 written summary of the dispute, not to exceed two pages per party, explaining the position 19 taken by each party, (2) a joint written certification that counsel or the parties have 20 attempted to resolve the matter through personal consultation and sincere efforts as 21 required by Local Rule 7.2(j) and have reached an impasse, and (3) copies of the contested 22 discovery requests.” (Id.) The Case Management Order further warns that “[d]iscovery 23 dispute filings that do not conform to [these] procedures . . . may be summarily stricken.” 24 (Id.) 25 II. DISCUSSION 26 A. Motions to Amend Complaint 27 On August 28, 2025, Hodge moved to amend the FAC to add new claims for “Racial 28 Discrimination and Contractual Interference under 42 U.S.C. § 1981”; “Hostile Work 1 Environment and Psychological Harm”; “Procedural Misconduct and Evidentiary 2 Sabotage”; “Defamation and Slander in Public Record”; and “Injunctive Relief for HR 3 Reform and Oversight Authority.” (Doc. 92 at 7–8). J.P. Morgan responded, (Doc. 101), 4 and Hodge replied (Doc. 107). On October 3, 2025, Hodge moved for leave to file his 5 Second Amended Complaint, which the Court construes as an attempt to comply with 6 Local Rule 15.1(a). (Doc. 112 (offering “Redlined Second Amended Complaint Pursuant 7 to Rule 15(a)(2) and LRCiv 15.1(a)”).) 8 1. Local Rule 15.1(a) 9 As an initial matter, Hodge has not complied with Local Rule 15.1(a). Pro se 10 litigants are expected to comply with the Local Rules and failure to do so is grounds for 11 summary denial of motions to amend. Lachcik v. Maricopa Cnty. B. of Comm’r, 2016 WL 12 4367138, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2016) (noting that Local Rule 15.1(a) “carries the force of law” 13 and that “[c]ourts in this district routinely deny motions for leave to amend for failure to 14 comply with LRCiv 15.1(a)” (citation modified)); Young v. Nooth, 539 Fed. App’x 710, 15 711 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that denial of a pro se plaintiff’s motion to amend for failure 16 to comply with local rules was not an abuse of discretion). 17 The necessity of complying with Rule 15.1(a) is highlighted by the various filings 18 in this case. Hodge’s proposed Second Amended Complaint, submitted with his original 19 motion to amend, does not “indicate in what respect it differs from the pleading which it 20 amends.” LRCiv. 15.1(a). And although Hodge submitted a “Redlined Second Amended 21 Complaint” with his subsequent motion for leave to amend, (Doc. 112), the redlines do not 22 appear to reflect changes made to the First Amended Complaint, (Doc. 5)—the operative 23 complaint—or to the proposed complaint submitted with his first motion to amend. 24 (Compare Doc. 92-1 with Doc. 112-2.) It is thus unclear which pleading Hodge seeks to 25 amend, let alone what new allegations are raised, or old allegations removed. 26 Further, the proposed amended complaint appears to incorporate by reference 27 exhibits that were stricken from the record because they were “not in compliance with Rule 28 7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Doc. 90 (Order striking Hodge’s “Statement 1 of Facts and Supporting Exhibits” (Doc. 88)), see Doc. 92-3 (“Reaffirmation of Affidavit 2 – Exhibit A” apparently referencing Doc. 88).) Even if stricken exhibits could be 3 incorporated by reference—which they cannot—incorporation by reference is not 4 permitted by Local Rule 15.1(a). See LRCiv. 15.1(a) (“The proposed amended pleading 5 must not incorporate by reference any part of the preceding pleading, including exhibits.”). 6 Because Hodge has failed to comply with the Local Rules, his motion to amend, (Doc. 92), 7 and motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, (Doc.112), will be denied. 8 2. Rule 16(b)(4) 9 In addition to violating the Local Rules, Hodge has not demonstrated that he is 10 entitled to amend his Complaint. “Generally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) 11 liberally allows for amendments to pleadings.” Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 12 1271, 1294 (9th Cir. 2000). But when the court has entered a pretrial scheduling order that 13 “establish[es] a timetable for amending the pleadings,” a request for leave to amend is 14 governed by Rule 16(b)(4). Id. Under that rule, a scheduling order “may be modified only 15 for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Thus, when a party 16 moves to amend the pleadings after the deadline set by the scheduling order, they must 17 show “good cause” for their delay. Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1291. “[T]hen, if good cause be 18 shown, the party must demonstrate that amendment [is] proper under Rule 15.” Johnson 19 v. Mammoth Rec., Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 608 (9th Cir. 1992) (quotation and citation marks 20 omitted). 21 “A court’s evaluation of good cause is not coextensive with an inquiry into the 22 propriety of the amendment under Rule 15.” Id. at 609 (citation modified). “Unlike Rule 23 15(a)’s liberal amendment policy which focuses on the bad faith of the party seeking to 24 interpose an amendment and the prejudice to the opposing party, Rule 16(b)’s good cause 25 standard primarily considers the diligence of the party seeking the amendment.” Id. If the 26 moving party “was not diligent, the inquiry should end.” Id. 27 Here, the deadline to amend the pleadings was December 6, 2024. (Doc. 59.) 28 Hodge moved to amend the FAC on August 28, 2025—more than eight months after the 1 deadline had passed. (Doc. 92.) Hodge does not explain the delay, and states only that the 2 proposed amendment is “submitted in good faith and seeks to clarify jurisdiction, expand 3 factual allegations, and incorporate a full evidentiary record supported by indexed exhibits 4 and sworn affidavits.” (Doc. 92 at 1). 5 “[E]ven under the liberal Rule 15 standard ‘late amendments to assert new theories 6 are not reviewed favorably when the facts and the theory have been known to the party 7 seeking amendment since the inception of the cause of action.’” Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1295 8 (quoting Acri v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1398 9 (9th Cir. 1986)). Hodge’s new claims are all based on the same factual allegations asserted 10 in his FAC. Indeed, inasmuch as it is discernable from the various versions of Hodge’s 11 proposed amended complaint, the only new factual allegations relate solely to his 12 estimation of damages, but do not alter the operative facts underlying this dispute. See 13 (Docs. 92-4–92-11 (affirming the factual allegations in the FAC but adding new allegations 14 regarding the type and amount of damages sought)). Despite every indication that this 15 information was available to Hodge “since the inception of” this case, Hodge offers no 16 “explanation for [his] failure to amend [his] complaint” prior to the deadline for 17 amendment. Coleman, 232 F.3d at 1295; see also Johnson, 974 F.2d at 609–10 (noting 18 that it was the plaintiff’s “burden . . . [to] prosecute his case properly,” and that failure to 19 do so is “precisely the kind of case management Rule 16 is designed to eliminate”). 20 Two of Hodge’s new claims could conceivably arise from facts not available to him 21 until after the deadline to amend the pleadings. These claims challenge J.P. Morgan’s 22 conduct during discovery. (Doc. 92-1 at 8.) Hodge alleges that J.P. Morgan engaged in 23 “discovery obstruction,” failed to respond to requests for production, submitted 24 “inadmissible evidence,” and slandered him in documents filed on the Court’s public 25 docket. (Doc. 92-1 at 5, 8.) Hodge’s quarrel with J.P. Morgan’s conduct during discovery 26 may only be raised through the discovery dispute process, not by amending his complaint. 27 (See Doc. 59 at 5 (outlining the procedure for discovery disputes).) See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 28 1 (authorizing sanctions for discovery abuses).1 2 In short, Hodge has not demonstrated “good cause” to modify the Court’s 3 scheduling order, as he presents no evidence that he was diligent in seeking to amend his 4 complaint. See Cano v. Schriro, 236 F.R.D. 437, 439 (D. Ariz. 2006) (denying pro se 5 plaintiff’s motion to amend for failure to demonstrate “good cause” when he missed the 6 court’s deadline by four months and did not “demonstrate any evidence showing he was 7 diligent in attempting to meet the scheduling order”). His motion to amend (Doc. 92) and 8 for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 112) will therefore be denied. 9 B. Motions Regarding Discovery Disputes 10 On September 1, 2025, Hodge filed a Motion to Compel Discovery and Reserve 11 Sanctions. (Docs. 97, 98.) The motion requests that the Court compel J.P. Morgan to 12 respond to certain Requests for Production served on July 10, 2025, and seeks to “reserve 13 the right to seek sanctions under Rule 37(b) and (e) for sustained procedural obstruction 14 and revived inadmissible evidence.” (Doc. 97 at 2.) J.P. Morgan responded, (Doc. 102), 15 and Hodge replied, (Doc. 107). 16 On September 19, 2025, Hodge filed a Motion to Enforce Binding Evidentiary 17 Agreement and a Motion to Strike. (Doc. 103.) In this motion, Hodge seeks to enforce a 18 “binding evidentiary agreement” which he asserts “jointly and permanently excluded the 19 year-end report and all related performance allegations” from discovery. (Id. at 3.) J.P. 20 Morgan responded, (Doc. 114), and Hodge replied, (Doc. 119). 21 The Case Management Order outlines the procedures for resolving discovery 22 disputes. (Doc. 59.) Hodge has been reminded of these procedures before, (Docs. 69, 89), 23 but continues to file written papers regarding discovery disputes without leave from the 24 Court and without complying with the Case Management Order or Local Rule 7.2(j). To 25 1 Hodge is apparently aware of this; four days after he filed his first motion to amend, 26 he filed a Motion to Compel Discovery and Reserve Sanctions which addresses the same 27 conduct. (See Doc. 97). Recently, Hodge also filed a “Notice” that appears to withdraw his “Defamation and Slander in Public Record Claim” because it “is now reflected in 28 the . . . sanctions posture under Rule 37 and Rule 11(c).” (Doc. 120 at 2.) 1 name a few defects, Hodge’s discovery motions (1) do not indicate that he made “sincere 2 efforts to resolve the matter through personal consultation (in person or by telephone)”; (2) 3 are not filed jointly; and (3) far exceed the page and form requirements established by the 4 Case Management Order. “Discovery dispute filings that do not conform to [the] 5 procedures” outlined in the Case Management Order “may be summarily stricken.” (Doc. 6 59 at 5.) Hodge’s Motion to Compel Discovery and Reserve Sanctions and his Motion to 7 Enforce Binding Evidentiary Agreement and Motion to Strike will thus be summarily 8 stricken. 9 C. Additional Notices and Motions 10 Over the last month, Hodge has filed various other documents on the docket. (Docs. 11 93, 94, 96, 109, 110, 111, 116, 118, 120, 122, 123.) Three of these are motions seeking 12 leave to file additional evidence or to review, clarify, and supplement the record. (Doc. 13 109, 110, 124.) These motions appear to be tied to Hodge’s motions to amend his 14 complaint, and to compel discovery, and will be denied as moot. Additionally, Hodge has 15 filed two sur-replies to his original motion to amend, (Doc. 117, 121); these also will be 16 stricken. See Hernandez v. Brewer, 2018 WL 6002499, at *1 n.1 (D. Ariz. 2018) (“A sur- 17 reply is not permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7 or District of Arizona Local 18 Rule 7.2 . . . . [which] only allows a party to file one response in opposition of any motion.” 19 (citation modified)). 20 Hodge is cautioned that “it is [his] responsibility to articulate [his] arguments in 21 each of [his] filings, and [to] take sufficient time to include all arguments that [he] wishes 22 to raise in the first instance.” Drevaleva v. U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 2021 WL 23 4924770, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 2021). Hodge’s “failure to do so, leading to later efforts to 24 supplement [his] filings, is inefficient and results in a needlessly lengthy docket.” Id. 25 (denying the plaintiff’s motions to file supplemental briefs because she failed to explain 26 why she could not have raised her additional arguments in the normal course of briefing). 27 Hodge’s repeated filings of Notices of Errata—nearly one for each of his pending 28 motions—is further evidence that he has not taken sufficient time to ensure his motions are 1 ready for the Court’s review. Hodge is reminded that access to the electronic filing system 2 is a privilege, and “any misuse of the ECF system will result in immediate discontinuation 3 of this privilege and disabling of the password assigned to the party.” (Doc. 71 (order 4 granting Hodge ECF access).) 5 Hodge has also filed two “Renewed Motions to Clarify the Record and Affirm 6 Compliance with Procedural Rules.” (Docs. 94, 96.) These motions seek a court order 7 that confirms that Hodge is complying with the Local Rules and discovery requests, is not 8 engaging in ex parte communication, and is making “good faith efforts to resolve discovery 9 disputes.” (Doc. 94 at 2; Doc. 96 at 3.) Not only is the Court unable to affirm Hodge’s 10 compliance with court orders and local rules, but these motions are also not properly 11 presented. The motions do not raise any active dispute between the parties, relate to any 12 motion pending before the court, or “cite the rule that authorizes the court to take such 13 action.” Kenner v. United States, 2025 WL 1950867, at *2 (D. Nev. 2025); see LRCiv. 14 7.2(a) (motions must be supported by a memorandum that “set[s] forth the points an 15 authorities relied upon in support of the motion.”). Hodge’s motions amount to an 16 improper request for an advisory opinion declaring him immune from Rule 37 or Rule 11 17 sanctions, before any such motion has been brought and without the presentation of any 18 evidence from either party as to the propriety of his conduct during litigation. (See e.g., 19 Doc. 96 at 3 (requesting that the Court “clarify that no adverse inference or sanction shall 20 arise from [a prior] filing”).) Both motions will therefore be stricken. 21 Hodge has also entered two “Notices,” (Docs. 93, 111), and two affidavits 22 accompanied by evidentiary exhibits, (Docs. 116, 118). No motion that requires the 23 production of evidence is pending. And Hodge’s Notices do not seek any specific action 24 from the Court, nor do they relate to any other pending motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a) 25 (“A request for a court order must be made by motion.”). Rather they appear to simply 26 “alert the court to something that occurred or that [Hodge] perceives” to be improper. 27 Kenner, 2025 WL 1950867, at *2. 28 “The court’s docket is not a repository for the parties’ evidence.” Hinojos v. Weir, 1 2025 WL 2337103, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2025). Nor is the docket the appropriate avenue to 2 continually file notices or supplementary evidence fine-tuning arguments made in motions 3 past. See Kenner, 2025 WL 1950867, at *2. (advising that repeated filing of notices, 4 “clog[s] the docket, confuse[s] the record, and only further delay[s] [the] case”); Dragomir 5 v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 2025 WL 2337104, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2025) (“Plaintiff should 6 not be filing evidence with the Court outside of a Motion.”). Hodge has been warned that 7 filings that do not comply with Rule 7 will be stricken. (See Doc. 89.) Accordingly, 8 Hodge’s notices (Docs. 93, 111, 120) and affidavits and supplementary evidence (Docs. 9 116, 118) will be stricken. 10 D. Future Filings 11 Hodge has repeatedly filed supplemental evidence, improper sur-replies, notices 12 requesting no specific relief, and duplicative motions. Neither the Federal Rules, Local 13 Rules, or common practice permit a party to engage in such serial briefing. “Every paper 14 filed with the [court], no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the 15 institution’s limited resources,” and “part of the Court’s responsibility is to see that these 16 resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” In re McDonald, 17 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989). As a result, Hodge may not file supplements to pleadings or 18 briefs without prior leave of the Court, and any further disregard for the Local Rules or 19 court orders—particularly the discovery dispute procedures outlined in the Case 20 Management Order—may result in sanctions, including, but not limited to, revocation of 21 Hodge’s electronic filing privileges. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (permitting courts to require a 22 litigant to “satisfy personally . . . excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably 23 incurred” where the litigant's conduct “so multiplies the proceedings in any case 24 unreasonably and vexatiously”); Williams v. Campbell, 2023 WL 9051244, at *1 (D. Idaho 25 2023) (“The Court has broad discretion in implementing case management tools, especially 26 in cases such as this one, where Plaintiff's litigation style—excessive in all respects— 27 diminishes the Court's ability to adjudicate this case and timely adjudicate the other cases 28 on its docket.”). 1 Accordingly, 2 IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Amend/Correct the Amended Complaint || (Doc. 92) and the Motion to For Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 112) are 4|| denied. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motions to Compel Discovery and Reserve || Sanctions, (Docs. 97, 98), and the Motion to Enforce Binding Evidentiary Agreement and 7|| Motion to Strike, (Doc. 103), are stricken. 8 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the First Motion for Leave to File Late 9|| Evidence, (Doc. 109), and the First Motion for Leave to Review and Supplement 10 || Evidentiary Record, (Doc. 110), and the Motion to Supplement, (Doc. 124) are denied as 11 || moot. 12 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Reply in Response to 92 Motion, (Doc. 13 || 117), and the Supplemental Reply, (Doc. 121), are stricken. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Renewed Motions to Clarify the Record 15 || and Affirm Compliance with Procedural Rules, (Docs. 94, 96), are stricken. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Notice re: Procedural Deficiency Unfiled 17 || Discovery Requests, (Doc. 93); the Supplemental Notice with Affidavit re: 97 Motion, (Doc. 111); the Affidavit Authenticating Communication, Reinforcing Employment 19]|| Relationship, and Clarifying, (Doc. 116); the Supplement in Support re: 104 Notice of 20 || Errata, (Doc. 118); and the Notice re: Clarification of Scope of Claims, (Doc. 120), are stricken. 22 Dated this 10th day of October, 2025. 23 / 24 / 25 ) x *6 H le Sharad H. Desai 27 United States District Judge 28

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