Hobus v. Hobus

540 N.W.2d 158, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 220, 1995 WL 703510
CourtNorth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedNovember 30, 1995
DocketCiv. 950052
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 540 N.W.2d 158 (Hobus v. Hobus) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hobus v. Hobus, 540 N.W.2d 158, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 220, 1995 WL 703510 (N.D. 1995).

Opinion

SANDSTROM, Justice.

The Grand Forks district court entered a judgment declaring Michael J. Hobus’ paternity and ordering him to pay past and future child support for Jennifer Hobus. Michael Hobus appeals from the child support portions of the judgment. He contends his obligation to support the child was terminated by appointment of a legal guardian; he voluntarily terminated his parental rights “although [he] did not follow the formalities;” and he was absolved of responsibility to support the child because of an agreement between his sister and the child’s mother. If he has an obligation to support the child, he contends the amount of support set is wrong because it does not consider his responsibility to support other children living with him. We affirm.

I

Jennifer Lynn Hobus was born on August 17, 1983, to Michael Hobus (Hobus) and Susan Belk (Belk). Hobus is listed as Jennifer’s father on her birth certificate.

In December 1986, Dian Hurt (Michael Hobus’ sister) was granted guardianship of Jennifer Hobus. In February 1994, Dian Hurt (Hurt) began receiving AFDC benefits for the care of Jennifer. Grand Forks County social services sought a finding of Hobus’ paternity and child support payments from Hobus.

This matter was heard in district court on January 19, 1995. In his answer and at the hearing, Hobus, acting pro se, admitted he was Jennifer’s father. The remaining issues before the court were whether Hobus was obligated for future and past child support, and whether Hobus is obligated to pay for health insurance. Hobus contends he entered into an oral contract with Belk and Hurt, terminating his parental obligations to Jennifer. The date of the alleged oral contract is not clear in the record.

At the time of the hearing, Hobus resided with Lori Dohman and their three children. Hobus refused to furnish information concerning his co-habitee’s income to the court for an accurate child support determination. The court found Hobus is Jennifer’s father and ordered him to pay ongoing child support in the amount of $168 per month, based on an average monthly salary of $803. Ho-bus was also ordered to reimburse county social services $3,357 for support paid on his behalf from 1991 through January of 1995. The district court ordered Hobus to pay for the child’s health insurance under the “usual statutory language” providing an obligor who can obtain medical insurance at no or minimal cost shall provide coverage for the child.

The district court had jurisdiction under N.D.C.C. § 27-05-06. The appeal is timely under N.D.RApp.P. 4(a). This Court has jurisdiction under N.D. Const. Ait. VI, § 6 and N.D.C.C. § 28-27-01.

II

Hobus argues the child support award is clearly erroneous because he is no longer legally responsible to provide for the child. Hobus contends his parental responsibilities were severed when Hurt was decreed Jennifer’s guardian. Hobus also contends he voluntarily terminated his parental rights and responsibilities in an oral agreement between Belk and Hurt.

A trial court’s findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. N.D.R.Civ.P. 52(a). To reverse, the reviewing court must be left with a definite and firm conviction a mistake has been made, even though some evidence *161 may support the decision. In The Matter of the Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 517 (N.D.1993). A district court’s conclusions of law are fully reviewable on appeal. Throndset v. Hawkenson, 532 N.W.2d 394, 397 (N.D.1995).

A

Hobus claims his obligations to support his child ended when Hurt was named the child’s legal guardian.

A parent of a child is obligated “to care for, protect, support, educate, give moral guidance to, and provide a home for the child.” Adoption of Matter of J.W.M., Matter of, 532 N.W.2d 372, 379 (N.D.1995). N.D.C.C. § 30.1-27-09 states the guardian is “not legally obligated to provide from his own funds for the ward.” Parental obligations are not dismissed by the appointment of a guardian, any more than they are by the presence of a stepparent. See Mougey v. Salzwedel, 401 N.W.2d 509, 512 (N.D.1987) (holding the legal obligation of a stepfather to support a child does not end the obligation of the child’s natural father to provide support). On the contrary, the appointment of a guardian should indicate to the parent a need to better fulfill parental obligations. This argument is without merit.

B

Hobus next contends he is not responsible to provide support for his child because he voluntarily terminated his rights.

North Dakota law does not provide for voluntary termination of parental rights without court order. N.D.C.C. § 27-20-44(1) provides a court may terminate parental rights when the child is abandoned, or deprived, or when written consent of the parent is acknowledged before the court.

Hobus did not present any evidence he complied with the statute in seeking to terminate his parental rights. See Sprynczynatyk v. Celley, 486 N.W.2d 230 (N.D.1992) (parental obligations not terminated where parent did not comply with statute). Fulfillment of the statutory factors for the proper termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and convincing evidence to terminate those rights. In the Interest of B.M., 335 N.W.2d 321, 323 (N.D.1983) (quoting In Interest of J.A., 283 N.W.2d 83, 92 (N.D.1979)). “[T]he best interest of the child is one factor to be considered in determining the necessity of terminating parental rights.” In Interest of D.S., 325 N.W.2d 654, 659 (N.D.1982). The best interests of the child are not always served by allowing parents to voluntarily terminate their parental obligations.

In addition, Hobus’ motive for terminating his parental rights in his child at this time is suspect. Parents may not voluntarily terminate their rights in a child to avoid support payments. Matter of Welfare of S.F., 482 N.W.2d 500, 503 (Minn.App.1992).

Hobus did not properly terminate his parental rights and continues to be obligated to support his child.

C

Hobus contends that through an oral contract he bargained away his parental obligations.

Hobus’ attempt to contract away his parental obligations is without effect. Parents who attempt to alter their parental responsibilities may be subject to criminal sanctions. “No parent may assign or otherwise transfer his rights or duties with respect to the care and custody of his child. Any such transfer or assignment, written or otherwise, is void.” N.D.C.C. § 14-10-05.

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Bluebook (online)
540 N.W.2d 158, 1995 N.D. LEXIS 220, 1995 WL 703510, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hobus-v-hobus-nd-1995.