Hobbs v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Co.

965 S.W.2d 194, 1998 Mo. App. LEXIS 87, 1998 WL 20829
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedJanuary 20, 1998
Docket72362
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 965 S.W.2d 194 (Hobbs v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hobbs v. Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Co., 965 S.W.2d 194, 1998 Mo. App. LEXIS 87, 1998 WL 20829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

RHODES RUSSELL, Judge.

Plaintiff Mark Hobbs appeals from summary judgment entered in favor of Farm Bureau Town & Country Insurance Company (“insurer”) on plaintiffs action to recover uninsured motorist benefits under his parents’ automobile insurance policies. The trial court granted insurer’s motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff coverage under the uninsured motorist provisions of his parents’ policies. The issue on appeal is whether the trial court correctly determined that plaintiff was not entitled to uninsured motorist coverage resulting from an accident with an uninsured automobile while plaintiff was operating his parents’ tractor. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiff’s damages resulted from personal injuries he sustained on August 11, 1995, when an uninsured automobile collided with the tractor plaintiff was operating on Highway C in Scott County. Plaintiff’s parents were the owners of the tractor. At the time of the accident, plaintiff was twenty years old and lived with his parents. Prior to the accident, insurer had issued eleven automobile insurance policies to plaintiff’s parents, each of which provided $800,000 uninsured motorist protection to an insured when injured by an uninsured motorist.

Plaintiff’s parents received a letter from insurer’s claims representative denying plaintiff uninsured motorist coverage. Specifically, the letter stated that:

The policy excludes coverage for “bodily injury to an insured while occupying a motor vehicle (other than an insured vehicle) owned by the named insured, his spouse, or a relative, or through being struek by such a motor vehicle ...” The policy definition of motor vehicle reads “a land motor vehicle or trailer other than (a) a farm tractor or any vehicle, equipment, or machinery designed for use principally off public roads while not upon public roads ...” As Mark was operating a farm tractor on a public road at the time of the accident, coverage under the Uninsured Motorist provisions of your policy are specifically excluded.

Plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cape Girardeau County. Plaintiff asserted two counts in his petition. In Count I, plaintiff alleged that he was struck by an uninsured motorist, and that he was covered by the uninsured motorist provisions in his parents’ insurance policies. Plaintiff further alleged that insurer’s refusal to pay his claim for damages constituted vexatious refusal to pay under sections 875.296 and 375.420, RSMo 1994. 1 In Count II, plaintiff alleged, that in the event plaintiff was not afforded uninsured motorist coverage because of the exclusionary provision, then plaintiff’s failure to have uninsured motorist coverage was caused by insurer and its agent’s negligence.

Both plaintiff and insurer moved for summary judgment on Count I. In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff alleged that he was a policy insured under the terms of the eleven automobile insurance policies, and that as an insured he was entitled to uninsured motorist coverage. In insurer’s motion for summary judgment, it alleged that plaintiff was excluded from uninsured motorist coverage under the policies in that plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was occupying a motor vehicle (other than an insured automobile) owned by the named insureds (plaintiffs parents).

The trial court granted insurer’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I and denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I. Thereafter, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Count II of his petition without prejudice. This appeal follows.

Plaintiff raises four points on appeal. In his first point, plaintiff contends the trial *196 court erred in granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment and denying his motion for summary judgment because under section 379.203, any exclusionary clause, unambiguous or otherwise, which attempts to restrict uninsured motorist coverage to policy insureds injured by uninsured motorists is void because it violates Missouri’s public policy. In his second point, plaintiff maintains that the trial court erred in granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment because insurer’s policy definition, which attempts to define a farm tractor as a motor vehicle when it is on a public highway, is void because it conflicts with the statutory definition of motor vehicle contained in section 303.020(5). In his third point, plaintiff argues the trial court erred in granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment in that he was entitled to coverage under a “reasonable expectations” interpretation of the policies. In his fourth and final point, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment because insurer’s policy definitions in its other owned vehicle exclusion are confusing, contradictory, and ambiguous, and therefore, must be interpreted strictly against insurer to provide coverage. Because we find point number four to be dispositive, we do not address plaintiff’s first three points.

The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there is no genuine factual dispute and where the prevailing party can be determined as a matter of law. ITT Commercial Finance Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this court applies the same standard as the trial court. Id. Thus, no deference is given to the trial court’s judgment. Id.

The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law for the court. Killian v. Tharp, 919 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Mo.App.1996). Insurance policy language which is unambiguous must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. American Economy Insurance Co. v. Otte, 869 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Mo.App.1993); Fred Weber, Inc. v. Granite State Insurance Co., 829 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Mo.App.1992). Thus, we turn to the provisions of the automobile insurance policies in order to determine whether “as a matter of law” the policy is unambiguous and whether plaintiff’s damages are covered under the uninsured motorist provisions.

The insurance policies first define the following relevant terms:

1. Automobile- means a self-propelled, land motor vehicle with at least four wheels, not operated on rails or crawler treads, but does not mean (a) a farm type tractor or any other vehicle, equipment, or machinery designed for use principally off the public roads, or (b) a vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises.
⅜ ⅜ * * *
4. Described automobile- means the vehicle described in the Declarations and includes a temporary substitute automobile as herein defined.
5.

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Bluebook (online)
965 S.W.2d 194, 1998 Mo. App. LEXIS 87, 1998 WL 20829, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hobbs-v-farm-bureau-town-country-insurance-co-moctapp-1998.