UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION ______
JAMES HOBBS,
Plaintiff, Case No. 1:25-cv-159
v. Honorable Sally J. Berens
HOLLY LEA et al.,
Defendants. ____________________________/ OPINION This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the
summons continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”). Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1 Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Discussion Factual Allegations Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in Manistee, Manistee County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues MDOC Grievance Manager Richard Russell, and the following ECF staff: Department Manager Holly Lea, Department Manager Kelly Lutz, Warden M. Burgess, and Grievance Coordinator T. Bassett. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
In Plaintiff’s complaint, he alleges that on October 21, 2024, Defendant Lea responded to a step I grievance that Plaintiff had filed about his “parole guidelines grid score,” which Plaintiff
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207 n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”). believes “is wrong” for a number of reasons.2 (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff details several calculation errors, and states that when he returned to prison on January 27, 2022, “[he] was reclassified as a parole violator,” and Defendant Lutz “did not even check the information and signed her name agreeing with [Defendant] Lea.” (Id.) Subsequently, in November of 2024, Defendant Burgess denied Plaintiff’s step II grievance
about the matter. (Id., PageID.3–4.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant Bassett failed to timely process Plaintiff’s grievances. (See id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff then sought reconsideration of the denial, and Defendant Russell denied Plaintiff’s grievance appeal on December 16, 2024. (See id.) Based on the foregoing allegations, the Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise Fourteenth Amendment due process claims regarding his parole eligibility and the handling of his grievances. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, and he asks the Court “to have [the] Parole Board conduct an interview with [Plaintiff] [and] to have the facility (ECF) change [his] parole guidelines grid score . . . to its proper score, which [would] make[] [Plaintiff] an average probability for parole.”3 (See id., PageID.5.)
2 In this opinion, the Court corrects the capitalization, punctuation, and spelling in quotations from Plaintiff’s complaint. 3 Plaintiff does not specifically request that he be released from prison; instead, he asks for an interview with the Parole Board. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking release from incarceration, in Preiser v. Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court held that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973). The Supreme Court specifically rejected the proposition that a suit under Section 1983 provided a viable alternate path to obtain that relief. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff’s complaint challenges the fact or duration of his incarceration and seeks release from incarceration, it must be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Section 1983 upon which the relief he seeks may be granted. See Adams v. Morris, 90 F. App’x 856, 858 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that dismissal is appropriate where Section 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges fact or duration of confinement). Moreover, the Court will not construe this action as a federal habeas corpus action “because habeas relief is available only to prisoners who are in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,” and “[t]here is no Failure to State a Claim A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
constitutional right to parole and the laws of Michigan do not create a liberty interest in parole.” Walton v. Michigan, 115 F. App’x 786, 787 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); see also Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23–24 (7th Cir. 1997) (discussing that the reasons for not construing a Section 1983 action as one seeking habeas relief include (1) potential application of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), (2) differing defendants, (3) differing standards of Section 1915(a)(3) and Section 2253(c), (4) differing fee requirements, (5) potential application of second or successive petition doctrine or three-strikes rules of Section 1915(g)). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983
is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). A. Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Claims 1. Claims Regarding Parole Eligibility The Court first construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise a procedural due process claim regarding his right to receive parole. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) the deprivation occurred without the requisite due process of law. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006), narrowed on other grounds as recognized by Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 442 n.3 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Swihart v. Wilkinson, 209 F. App’x 456,
458 (6th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim based on a right to parole fails to raise a claim of constitutional magnitude because he has no liberty interest in being released on parole. Indeed, there is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally released before the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a parole system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Id. at 7, 11; Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991). In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164–65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, noting “the broad powers of the Michigan authorities to deny parole,” held that the Michigan system does not create a liberty interest in parole. The Sixth
Circuit reiterated the continuing validity of Sweeton in Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2011). In Crump, the Sixth Circuit held that the adoption of specific parole guidelines since Sweeton does not lead to the conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high probability of parole. See id.; see also Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App’x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003). In addition, the Sixth Circuit has rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause is implicated when changes to parole procedures and practices have resulted in incarcerations that exceed the subjective expectation of the sentencing judge. See Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 369 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, the Michigan Supreme Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the Michigan system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603–04 (Mich.
1999). Under this authority, Plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of liberty until he has served his maximum sentence.4 The discretionary parole system in Michigan holds out “no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be obtained.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. Thus, any calculations regarding Plaintiff’s parole eligibility and any failure or refusal by the Michigan Parole Board to consider Plaintiff for, or grant him, parole does not implicate a federal right. In the absence of a liberty interest, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of his procedural due process rights.
4 Plaintiff’s “maximum discharge date” is June 30, 2026. See MDOC Offender Tracking Information System, https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=763503 (last visited Apr. 15, 2025). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against Defendants regarding his parole eligibility will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 2. Claims Regarding Grievances The Court also construes Plaintiff’s complaint to raise Fourteenth Amendment due process claims regarding his use of the grievance procedure. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3–4
(alleging that Defendants Lea, Burgess, and Russell denied his grievances and that Defendant Bassett failed to timely process Plaintiff’s grievances).) Various courts have repeatedly held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). And Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf, No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir.
Mar. 28, 1994). Therefore, any intended procedural due process claim regarding Plaintiff’s use of the grievance procedure will be dismissed. Furthermore, Section 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendants liable due to their supervisory positions, he fails to state such a claim. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough; nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. See Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002); Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300); see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995)). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendants encouraged or condoned the conduct of their subordinates, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct. And any conclusory allegations of supervisory responsibility are insufficient to show that these Defendants were personally involved in the alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers, 368 F.3d at 888. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s due process claims against Defendants regarding their handling of Plaintiff’s grievances will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. B. Substantive Due Process Claims To the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise a substantive due process claim regarding the Michigan Parole Board’s refusal to grant Plaintiff parole, as explained below, he fails to state such a claim. “Substantive due process . . . serves the goal of preventing governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used.” Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Howard v. Grinage, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996)). Specifically, “[s]ubstantive due process ‘prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” Prater v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “Conduct shocks the conscience if it ‘violates the decencies of civilized conduct.’” Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573,
589 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)). Here, although Plaintiff believes that Defendants have incorrectly calculated his parole eligibility score, the facts alleged in the complaint fall short of showing the sort of egregious conduct that would support a substantive due process claim. Cf. Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that framing an inmate by planting evidence may violate substantive due process where a defendant’s conduct shocks the conscience and constitutes an “egregious abuse of governmental power”), overruled in other part by Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc); Davis v. Gallagher, No. 1:16-cv-1405, 2016 WL 7403941, *4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2016).
Accordingly, any intended Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Conclusion Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 611. For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: April 18, 2025 /s/ Sally J. Berens SALLY J. BERENS United States Magistrate Judge