[369]*369PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Walker Hobbie, Jr., qualified as a condidate for the Alabama Senate from new Senate District 26. Another candidate for the same office filed a contest with the State Democratic Executive Committee, hereinafter referred to as SDEC. The ground of contest is that Hobbie is not a resident of District 26. After a hearing before a subcommittee of SDEC on April 3, 1974, the contest was sustained.
Later that same day, Hobbie filed his complaint in the circuit court for declaratory relief and mandamus, seeking to have his name restored to the ballot for the primary election, and by amendment, asking that he not be denied the privilege to run for the office in the general election in November.
The matter was heard before the circuit court on April 8. SDEC filed a special appearance objecting to the court’s jurisdiction and moved to dismiss the complaint. The objections and motions were overruled, the case was heard on its merits and the trial court denied all relief prayed for by Hobbie and dismissed his complaint. He immediately appealed to this court and then requested that this court restrain the removal of his name from the ballot pending the appeal. That request was heard and granted on April 10. Both sides assured the court that the record and briefs could be here in less than a week. The temporary restraining order was issued, not on the merits, but because Hobbie’s name could be printed on the ballot and, if necessary, later blocked out and the machine lever locked, but if not printed, there would be no space reserved for his name if we later decided in his favor.
SDEC’s contention that neither the circuit court nor this court had jurisdiction presents a close question, but in view of the charge that the committee failed to apply the “liner” statute, Tit. 17, §§ 18, 19, Code 1940, and the obvious misconstruction of this court’s latest pronouncement in reference to Tit. 17, § 18, in an opinion of the Attorney General and in appellant’s brief, together with the doubt as to how the liner statute should be applied, and the tremendous public interest in new legislative district lines since the districts were redrawn by the Federal District Court in Sims v. Amos, 336 F.Supp. 924 (M.D.Ala.1972), this court rejects SDEC’s contentions as to lack of jurisdiction of this or the circuit court.
The Constitution of Alabama 1901, Section 47, provides in parts pertinent here: “Senators * * * shall have been * * * residents of their respective * * * districts for one year next before their election * * * and they shall reside in their respective * * * districts during their terms of office.”
Hobbie concedes that the house he lives in, and has lived in for several years, is in District 28, but his contention is that the liner statute gives him the right to elect whether he wants to vote and run in District 26 or 28 and that he has elected to vote and run in District 26. The pertinent [370]*370statutes are §§ 18 and 19 of Tit. 17, Code 1940, and they provide:
Ҥ 18. When the place of residence of any person is located partly in two or more counties or precincts, such persons may select the county or precinct of their residence, and to that end may file a statement in writing in the office of the judge of probate of the county selected, setting forth the locality of their residence and the lines passing through the same, together with the county or precinct selected for residence, which statement, when filed and recorded, shall establish the residence of the person filing it in the county or precinct of their selection.
“§ 19. Any person who may be declared to be a liner between counties or precincts, and shall have fixed his or her citizenship according to law and that may be hereafter provided in such cases, shall be construed a citizen and elector of the county or precinct in which he or she so fixes his or her citizenship, for all the purposes of this title.”
The dividing line between District 28, where Hobbie lives, and District 26, where he wants to be a candidate, is the center line of a paved public road which, at the place in question, runs roughly north and south. Hobbie’s house is on the west side of that road. It is about 120 feet west of the district line and is situated on a tract of 5.8 acres which surrounds his residence and all of this tract is on the west side of the road. The house, the garage, the adjacent structures and fields in this tract are wholly within District 28.
The land on the east side of the road directly across from Hobbie’s residence does not belong to him and is not used by him for residential purposes. The nearest residence on the east side facing Mr. Hobbie’s property is that of his brother. North of the brother’s residence on the east side of the road is a residence occupied by a black family and then comes the property that Hobbie owns on the east side of the road. The south line of Hobbie’s property on the east side of the road is some 400 feet north of the north line of Hobbie’s residence property on the west side of the road. Stated another way, if there were no road in existence, Hobbie’s property on the west side of the road would not corner or be adjacent or contiguous to any of his property on the east side of the road. An abandoned gin is situated on Hobbie’s property on the east side 'as are some equipment sheds.
This line between Districts 26 and 28 is the center line of a paved highway. It is quite obvious that the dividing line between the districts does not split the Hobbie property. His residence tract is on the west side of the road; the other property is on the east side of the road and even if the road had not been there, he could not walk from his tract where he lives to his property on the east side of the road without crossing the property of another. His home, his residence, his domicile are all on the 5.8 acre tract in District 28 on the west side of the road.
Under these facts, our conclusion must be that the “place of residence” of Walker Hobbie, Jr., under § 18, is in District 28 and not in District 26, and this is one of the reasons for our holding.
A second reason is the construction of § 18 in the decisions of this court. We have not been cited to, nor have we found, any case where a voter or a candidate has been adjudged a “liner” where the county, district or boundary did not run through or “split” the house in which he lived.
At common law, the liner was usually held to be a citizen of that territory where the majority of the rooms were located, or where he slept and ate. See application of Davy, 281 App.Div. 137, 120 N.Y.S.2d 450; Gray v. O’Banion, 22 Cal. App. 468, 138 P. 977; East Montpelier v. Barre, 79 Vt. 542, 66 A. 100, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874. There is some, discussion of [371]*371those matters in Danforth v. Nabors, 120 Ala. 430, 24 So. 891.
Hobbie had requested the Attorney General for an opinion as to whether he (Hobbie) could be considered a liner. In that request, Hobbie stated that his dwelling house was in new House District 82 and that the curtilage of his dwelling house and his residence extended across the road into new House District 78, (the same road that divided House Districts divided the Senate Districts.) The Attorney General, through an Assistant, replied in part as follows:
“You state that the curtilage of your house extends into both House Districts 78 and 82.
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[369]*369PER CURIAM.
Appellant, Walker Hobbie, Jr., qualified as a condidate for the Alabama Senate from new Senate District 26. Another candidate for the same office filed a contest with the State Democratic Executive Committee, hereinafter referred to as SDEC. The ground of contest is that Hobbie is not a resident of District 26. After a hearing before a subcommittee of SDEC on April 3, 1974, the contest was sustained.
Later that same day, Hobbie filed his complaint in the circuit court for declaratory relief and mandamus, seeking to have his name restored to the ballot for the primary election, and by amendment, asking that he not be denied the privilege to run for the office in the general election in November.
The matter was heard before the circuit court on April 8. SDEC filed a special appearance objecting to the court’s jurisdiction and moved to dismiss the complaint. The objections and motions were overruled, the case was heard on its merits and the trial court denied all relief prayed for by Hobbie and dismissed his complaint. He immediately appealed to this court and then requested that this court restrain the removal of his name from the ballot pending the appeal. That request was heard and granted on April 10. Both sides assured the court that the record and briefs could be here in less than a week. The temporary restraining order was issued, not on the merits, but because Hobbie’s name could be printed on the ballot and, if necessary, later blocked out and the machine lever locked, but if not printed, there would be no space reserved for his name if we later decided in his favor.
SDEC’s contention that neither the circuit court nor this court had jurisdiction presents a close question, but in view of the charge that the committee failed to apply the “liner” statute, Tit. 17, §§ 18, 19, Code 1940, and the obvious misconstruction of this court’s latest pronouncement in reference to Tit. 17, § 18, in an opinion of the Attorney General and in appellant’s brief, together with the doubt as to how the liner statute should be applied, and the tremendous public interest in new legislative district lines since the districts were redrawn by the Federal District Court in Sims v. Amos, 336 F.Supp. 924 (M.D.Ala.1972), this court rejects SDEC’s contentions as to lack of jurisdiction of this or the circuit court.
The Constitution of Alabama 1901, Section 47, provides in parts pertinent here: “Senators * * * shall have been * * * residents of their respective * * * districts for one year next before their election * * * and they shall reside in their respective * * * districts during their terms of office.”
Hobbie concedes that the house he lives in, and has lived in for several years, is in District 28, but his contention is that the liner statute gives him the right to elect whether he wants to vote and run in District 26 or 28 and that he has elected to vote and run in District 26. The pertinent [370]*370statutes are §§ 18 and 19 of Tit. 17, Code 1940, and they provide:
Ҥ 18. When the place of residence of any person is located partly in two or more counties or precincts, such persons may select the county or precinct of their residence, and to that end may file a statement in writing in the office of the judge of probate of the county selected, setting forth the locality of their residence and the lines passing through the same, together with the county or precinct selected for residence, which statement, when filed and recorded, shall establish the residence of the person filing it in the county or precinct of their selection.
“§ 19. Any person who may be declared to be a liner between counties or precincts, and shall have fixed his or her citizenship according to law and that may be hereafter provided in such cases, shall be construed a citizen and elector of the county or precinct in which he or she so fixes his or her citizenship, for all the purposes of this title.”
The dividing line between District 28, where Hobbie lives, and District 26, where he wants to be a candidate, is the center line of a paved public road which, at the place in question, runs roughly north and south. Hobbie’s house is on the west side of that road. It is about 120 feet west of the district line and is situated on a tract of 5.8 acres which surrounds his residence and all of this tract is on the west side of the road. The house, the garage, the adjacent structures and fields in this tract are wholly within District 28.
The land on the east side of the road directly across from Hobbie’s residence does not belong to him and is not used by him for residential purposes. The nearest residence on the east side facing Mr. Hobbie’s property is that of his brother. North of the brother’s residence on the east side of the road is a residence occupied by a black family and then comes the property that Hobbie owns on the east side of the road. The south line of Hobbie’s property on the east side of the road is some 400 feet north of the north line of Hobbie’s residence property on the west side of the road. Stated another way, if there were no road in existence, Hobbie’s property on the west side of the road would not corner or be adjacent or contiguous to any of his property on the east side of the road. An abandoned gin is situated on Hobbie’s property on the east side 'as are some equipment sheds.
This line between Districts 26 and 28 is the center line of a paved highway. It is quite obvious that the dividing line between the districts does not split the Hobbie property. His residence tract is on the west side of the road; the other property is on the east side of the road and even if the road had not been there, he could not walk from his tract where he lives to his property on the east side of the road without crossing the property of another. His home, his residence, his domicile are all on the 5.8 acre tract in District 28 on the west side of the road.
Under these facts, our conclusion must be that the “place of residence” of Walker Hobbie, Jr., under § 18, is in District 28 and not in District 26, and this is one of the reasons for our holding.
A second reason is the construction of § 18 in the decisions of this court. We have not been cited to, nor have we found, any case where a voter or a candidate has been adjudged a “liner” where the county, district or boundary did not run through or “split” the house in which he lived.
At common law, the liner was usually held to be a citizen of that territory where the majority of the rooms were located, or where he slept and ate. See application of Davy, 281 App.Div. 137, 120 N.Y.S.2d 450; Gray v. O’Banion, 22 Cal. App. 468, 138 P. 977; East Montpelier v. Barre, 79 Vt. 542, 66 A. 100, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 874. There is some, discussion of [371]*371those matters in Danforth v. Nabors, 120 Ala. 430, 24 So. 891.
Hobbie had requested the Attorney General for an opinion as to whether he (Hobbie) could be considered a liner. In that request, Hobbie stated that his dwelling house was in new House District 82 and that the curtilage of his dwelling house and his residence extended across the road into new House District 78, (the same road that divided House Districts divided the Senate Districts.) The Attorney General, through an Assistant, replied in part as follows:
“You state that the curtilage of your house extends into both House Districts 78 and 82. If this is true, then you may select your residency from these two districts, pursuant to Sections 18 and 19.”
The opinion of the Attorney General and counsel for appellant construe a paragraph in the latest opinion of this court on the liner statute to be broader than permitted under the facts of that case, Woodall v. City of Gadsden, 278 Ala. 634, 179 So.2d 759, which reads:
“The only other vote assailed is that of Mrs. Maybrene Wagnon. It appears that a part of her home is within the area to be annexed and a part is without the area. The trial court found that under the provisions of Title 17, § 18, Code of 1940, recompiled 1958, that Mrs. Wagnon was allowed to elect which area she preferred to be in. We agree. This statute was enacted to abrogate the artificial and technical rules existing under case law under these circumstances. We think it is clear that she made her election by voting in this election. We are not persuaded that this legislature intended to provide a remedy only when the home of the person was situated on a county or precinct line, but rather we think it was intended to apply in any case where a political line is so drawn that the residence is situated partly on one side and partly on another.”
The facts were that a surveyor had checked the houses of several people who had voted in an election to see if they lived in the territory to be annexed. As to Mrs. Wagnon’s house, he testified that about a foot of the front porch was within the area to be annexed and the balance of the house was outside the area. The trial court so found and ruled that Mrs. Wag-non’s vote should be counted because she was considered as a liner. This ruling was assigned as error on appeal and this court affirmed after making the statement quoted supra.
“Out of the facts the law arises.” This was a frequent and favorite saying of Dean A. J. Farrah, for many years Dean of the School of Law at the University of Alabama. The Statement from Woodall must be read in connection with the facts in that case. When so read, “the artificial and technical rules existing under case law” were the strict rules of the common law and our statute abrogated those rules to the extent that a person could be considered a liner for voting purposes if the boundary line went through any part of his dwelling house just so long as part of the house was on one side and part on the other, regardless of the size of either part.
The statute, Tit. 17, §§ 18 and 19, abolished consideration of the matters of curtilage, etc. and established a simple test to determine the eligibility of a person to vote in a particular county, precinct or district. If a county, precinct or district line passes through a person’s duelling house, the person may vote in and run as a candidate from either county, precinct or district after making his or her choice according to law.
If the line in question does not pass through the dwelling house so that part of the house lies partly in one county, precinct or district and the other part lies in a different county, precinct or district, then the person living in that house is not a liner and is a citizen and elector of the county, precinct or district in which the dwelling house is situated.
[372]*372In our form of representative government, our legislative representatives come from specified areas, and our constitution of 1901 requires that they reside in those specific areas for at least one year prior to their election, § 47; Butler v. Amos, 292 Ala. 260, 292 So.2d 645, 1974. Hobbie lives in District 28 and even though he preferred to run in District 26, he must abide by the new district line and vote or run for legislative office in District 28 so long as he lives in that district.
Much emphasis was laid in brief and oral argument on the fact that Hobbie’s well and mail box were on the east side of the road. That fact would not be controlling but we do make two observations about this claim.
Hobbie testified that the well, including the pump connected therewith, was some two or three hundred feet on the east side of the road and that the well “furnishes water for all my cattle on this side of the highway, my father and my uncle’s residence and all my cattle and my tenant’s house.” It was also “hooked up” to furnish water to another house. In reality, this is a private, family waterworks system.
As to the mail box being on the east side of the road, it has long been customary for mail boxes to be put on the side of the road which would be on the right hand side of the approaching mail carrier.
This court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court on April 24, 1974, and announced that decision. Since time was urgent, the opinion was not then prepared but it was noted that an opinion would follow. This opinion is in compliance therewith. McCutcheon v. Thomas, 261 Ala. 688, 75 So.2d 649; Ex parte Brassell, 261 Ala. 265, 73 So.2d 907.
The judgment of the circuit court is due to be affirmed. In view of our holding, no action is required on the cross-appeal or SDEC’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The temporary restraining order issued by this court pending appeal is hereby discharged.
Affirmed.
MERRILL, COLEMAN, HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, McCALL, FAULKNER and JONES, JJ., concur.
HEFLIN, C. J., concurs in the result.
MADDOX, J., dissents.