Hinton v. Interstate Guaranty Insurance

470 S.E.2d 292, 220 Ga. App. 699
CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia
DecidedMay 23, 1996
DocketA95A1842
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 470 S.E.2d 292 (Hinton v. Interstate Guaranty Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hinton v. Interstate Guaranty Insurance, 470 S.E.2d 292, 220 Ga. App. 699 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).

Opinions

Birdsong, Presiding Judge.

Appellant Lynn Hinton, plaintiff in this personal injury case, seeks coverage by her uninsured motorist carrier, Interstate Guaranty Insurance Company, for damages arising out of her collision with a farm tractor being used to haul a mobile home.

Defendants Kendrick et al. were using Billy Kendrick’s farm tractor to haul a mobile home after sunset on a county road. They had no permit to haul a mobile home and were not using a specialized vehicle as required by Department of Transportation regulations. The trailer was 14 feet wide. The tractor driver was cited for having a load too wide, no amber lights on escort, no wide load sign on escort, towing after dark, and an improper towing vehicle. Kendrick’s tractor was not covered by liability insurance.

The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendant Interstate Guaranty Insurance Company, finding that “a farm tractor is not a motor vehicle for purposes of the uninsured motorist statute.” Appellant Hinton contends the trial court erred in “holding that a farm tractor engaged in a non-agricultural activity is not a motor vehicle for purposes of the Georgia Uninsured Motorist Statute.” Held:

1. The insurer contended, and the trial court found, that this [700]*700farm tractor was not a motor vehicle for purposes of the uninsured motorist law because the insurance code provision requiring liability insurance (OCGA § 33-34-2) designates a “motor vehicle” as being a vehicle having more than three load-bearing wheels “of a kind required to be registered” by Georgia “laws . . . relating to motor vehicles designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads, and highways and driven by power other than muscular power.” OCGA § 33-34-2 (1).

The Georgia Uninsured Motorist Statute was not intended to provide all-risk coverage to the citizens of this state. OCGA § 33-7-11 (a) (1) pertinently provides that an automobile or motor vehicle liability policy, as identified therein, shall not be issued or delivered in this state, “unless it contains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.” This statute on its face reveals the intent of the legislature that the covered risk be limited to those damages arising from incidents involving the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.

OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (1) provides a statutory definition of those motor vehicles which are deemed to be “uninsured.” However, no definition is provided within the statute of the term “motor vehicle” itself and accordingly, we must examine statutes in pari materia to determine which statutory definition of a “motor vehicle,” if any, applies to the uninsured motorist statute. Compare State Farm &c. Co. v. Guest, 203 Ga. App. 711, 712 (417 SE2d 419) (physical precedent only) where, in construing the provisions of OCGA § 33-7-11 (b) (2), the then-existing in pari materia statutes, OCGA §§ 33-34-2 (6) and 40-1-1 (33) were examined and their provisions applied. In doing so, the Guest court held it could not be concluded that a tire assembly was a motor vehicle within the meaning of the uninsured motorist statute. Id.

The “laws . . . relating to motor vehicles designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads and highways” are given in Title 40 of the Official Code of Georgia. OCGA § 40-1-1 (33) defines “motor vehicle” as “every vehicle which is self-propelled.” However, the crucial inquiry defining “motor vehicle” in the insurance code (OCGA § 33-34-2 (1)) is whether a particular self-propelled vehicle is required to be registered under the “laws of this state relating to motor vehicles designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads, and highways and driven by power other than muscular power.” OCGA § 33-34-2 (1). OCGA § 40-2-20 (a), promulgated in the chapter pertaining to registration and licensing of motor vehicles, requires registration of “tractors,” except as provided in § 40-2-20 (b), which excepts from registration any tractor “used only for agricultural purposes.” OCGA § 40-2-20 (b) (2).

[701]*701The trial court correctly ruled that this farm tractor is not a motor vehicle for the purposes of uninsured motorist coverage. Although the provisions for uninsured motorist coverage are remedial in purpose and therefore must be broadly construed to accomplish the legislative purpose (Smith v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 246 Ga. 50, 51 (268 SE2d 632); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Rhoden, 170 Ga. App. 704, 705 (318 SE2d 175)), the construction of a statute must square with common sense and reasoning. Tuten v. City of Brunswick, 262 Ga. 399, 404 (7) (a) (i) (418 SE2d 367). To subject a farm tractor, which is not primarily designed to operate in an everyday driving environment upon the public roadways but is designed primarily for agricultural purposes, to a statutory categorization of “uninsured motor vehicle,” does not follow a prudent rule of reason. It was not without major public policy considerations that the legislature elected to exempt farm tractors from motor vehicle registration requirements. It is sometimes but a very fine line separating legitimate statutory construction and unauthorized judicial legislation (Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Sheriff, 210 Ga. App. 299, 302 (5) (436 SE2d 14)); it would cross this line to hold that a farm tractor is an uninsured motorist vehicle. Additionally, it is most reasonable to conclude that the legislature desired to provide uninsured motorist coverage for persons injured by motor vehicles designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads, and highways (OCGA § 33-34-2 (1)), as it is those uninsured motor vehicles which daily pose the greatest risk and danger to the public. Conversely, a farm tractor poses a far lesser degree of danger to those on public streets, roads and highways, and public policy provides no overriding reason to require such vehicles to be treated in the same manner as vehicles designed primarily for operation upon the public streets, roads, and highways.

State Farm &c. Co. v. Guest, supra, is factually distinguishable and not controlling as to the disposition of this case.

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Bluebook (online)
470 S.E.2d 292, 220 Ga. App. 699, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hinton-v-interstate-guaranty-insurance-gactapp-1996.