1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 DASHON HINES, Case No.: 3:23-cv-02180-RBM-DTF
10 Plaintiff, ORDER: 11 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 APPLE, MOTION TO PROCEED IFP; 13 Defendant. (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 14 15 [Doc. 2] 16 17 18 Plaintiff Dashon Hines (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) and an 19 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”) (Doc. 2). For the reasons set 20 forth below: Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is GRANTED and the Complaint (Doc. 1) is 21 DISMISSED for failing to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 22 I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 23 All parties instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States, except an 24 application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 27 fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does 28 1 § 1914(a); S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 4.5(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, however, a litigant who, 2 because of indigency, is unable to pay the required fees or security to commence a legal 3 action may petition the court to proceed without making the payment. 28 U.S.C. § 4 1915(a)(1). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that 5 the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. 6 Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). The facts in an affidavit regarding poverty 7 must be stated “with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. (quoting United 8 States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). The determination of indigency 9 falls within the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 10 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 11 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion states that he is “unable to pay the costs of these proceedings.” 12 (Doc. 2 at 1.) He asserts that he has no sources of income other than public assistance and 13 food stamps amounting to $633 per month. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff indicates he has no bank 14 accounts or assets. (Id. at 2–3.) 15 After considering Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot afford 16 to pay the filing fee in this case and is financially eligible to proceed in forma pauperis 17 (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is 18 GRANTED. 19 II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 20 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 21 subject to mandatory, sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if the action “(i) is 22 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 23 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting 25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is “not limited to prisoners”). In addition to reviewing IFP 26 complaints under § 1915, “[f]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that 27 they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide 28 jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson 1 ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). Courts address the issue of subject 2 matter jurisdiction first, as “[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold 3 matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and 4 is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 5 83, 94–95 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 6 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 7 jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 8 Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff fails to state any 9 claim, the Complaint must be DISMISSED. 10 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 11 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 12 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this 13 limited jurisdiction, . . . and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 14 asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff bears the burden 15 of establishing “subject matter jurisdiction.” See Watson v. Chessman, 362 F. Supp. 2d 16 1190, 1194 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (“The court will not . . . infer allegations supporting federal 17 jurisdiction; federal subject matter [jurisdiction] must always be affirmatively alleged.”) 18 (citations omitted). Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, a pleading must include “a 19 short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 8(a)(1). 21 Subject matter jurisdiction may be based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity 22 jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity). Plaintiff’s 23 Complaint contains no statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 1– 24 3.) Plaintiff seems to have experienced issues with his phone and internet service that he 25 has been unable to resolve to his satisfaction with customer service. (Id.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 8 9 DASHON HINES, Case No.: 3:23-cv-02180-RBM-DTF
10 Plaintiff, ORDER: 11 v. (1) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 12 APPLE, MOTION TO PROCEED IFP; 13 Defendant. (2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT 14 15 [Doc. 2] 16 17 18 Plaintiff Dashon Hines (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) and an 19 Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP Motion”) (Doc. 2). For the reasons set 20 forth below: Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is GRANTED and the Complaint (Doc. 1) is 21 DISMISSED for failing to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 22 I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 23 All parties instituting a civil action in a district court of the United States, except an 24 application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. 25
26 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative 27 fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does 28 1 § 1914(a); S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 4.5(a). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, however, a litigant who, 2 because of indigency, is unable to pay the required fees or security to commence a legal 3 action may petition the court to proceed without making the payment. 28 U.S.C. § 4 1915(a)(1). “An affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient where it alleges that 5 the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. 6 Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). The facts in an affidavit regarding poverty 7 must be stated “with some particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. (quoting United 8 States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981)). The determination of indigency 9 falls within the district court’s discretion. Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 854, 10 858 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 506 U.S. 194 (1993). 11 Plaintiff’s IFP Motion states that he is “unable to pay the costs of these proceedings.” 12 (Doc. 2 at 1.) He asserts that he has no sources of income other than public assistance and 13 food stamps amounting to $633 per month. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff indicates he has no bank 14 accounts or assets. (Id. at 2–3.) 15 After considering Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, the Court finds that Plaintiff cannot afford 16 to pay the filing fee in this case and is financially eligible to proceed in forma pauperis 17 (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s IFP Motion is 18 GRANTED. 19 II. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 20 A complaint filed by any person proceeding IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is 21 subject to mandatory, sua sponte review and dismissal by the Court if the action “(i) is 22 frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) 23 seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 24 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting 25 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is “not limited to prisoners”). In addition to reviewing IFP 26 complaints under § 1915, “[f]ederal courts have an independent obligation to ensure that 27 they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and therefore they must raise and decide 28 jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or elect not to press.” Henderson 1 ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011). Courts address the issue of subject 2 matter jurisdiction first, as “[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold 3 matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and 4 is ‘inflexible and without exception.’” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 5 83, 94–95 (1998) (alteration in original) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 6 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 7 jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 8 Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and Plaintiff fails to state any 9 claim, the Complaint must be DISMISSED. 10 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 11 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. 12 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this 13 limited jurisdiction, . . . and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 14 asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Thus, a plaintiff bears the burden 15 of establishing “subject matter jurisdiction.” See Watson v. Chessman, 362 F. Supp. 2d 16 1190, 1194 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (“The court will not . . . infer allegations supporting federal 17 jurisdiction; federal subject matter [jurisdiction] must always be affirmatively alleged.”) 18 (citations omitted). Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, a pleading must include “a 19 short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 8(a)(1). 21 Subject matter jurisdiction may be based on federal question jurisdiction or diversity 22 jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity). Plaintiff’s 23 Complaint contains no statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction. (Doc. 1 at 1– 24 3.) Plaintiff seems to have experienced issues with his phone and internet service that he 25 has been unable to resolve to his satisfaction with customer service. (Id. at 1 (“Plaintiff 26 has made several attempts to resolve the issues with Apple only to be met with Apple staff 27 with little or none [sic] english communication skills.”).) He alleges that “Apple has 28 continue[d] to bill the Plaintiff for services which were not provide[d] as outlined in the 1 memorandum of law and attach[ed] exhibits . . . .” (Id. at 2.) However, the attached 2 exhibits, exceeding 70 pages, consist only of the following printouts: a Wikipedia page 3 summarizing litigation involving Defendant over decades (Doc. 1-2); parts of Defendant’s 4 website, including its online store, phone comparisons, contact and customer support 5 pages; and Plaintiff’s online account information (Doc. 1-3). 6 On the civil cover sheet, Plaintiff selects the box for “Federal Question” and 7 identifies “41 U.S.C. Code section 6503” and “Breach of Contract” in the Cause of Action 8 section. (Doc. 1-1.) However, § 6503 applies to contracts “made by an agency of the 9 United States.”2 41 U.S.C. § 6502. Section 6503 has no application to the minimal facts 10 stated in the Complaint and certainly does not create federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiff 11 also does not appear to allege any basis for diversity jurisdiction. For diversity jurisdiction, 12 each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants, and the 13 “amount in controversy” must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). While Plaintiff seeks 14 “$1,000,000.00 (one million dollars)” in relief, the allegations of his Complaint do not 15 support that statement. 16 Accordingly, this action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter 18 jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). 19 B. Failure to State a Claim 20 “A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, 21 however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 22 drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal citations 23 omitted) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “section 24 25 2 Another district court reached this same conclusion in dismissing another of Plaintiff’s 26 cases. See Hines v. HP Inc., Case No. 24-cv-3995-TLT, Doc. 10 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2024) 27 (finding no federal question jurisdiction based on § 6503 because statute “only applies to contracts ‘made by an agency of the United States’ and there are no governmental entities 28 1 1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an [IFP] complaint that 2 fails to state a claim.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). 3 To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain 4 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 5 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 6 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a 7 plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative 8 level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A claim is facially plausible when the factual allegations 9 permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 10 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 11 As discussed above, Plaintiff does not identify any claims in his Complaint and the 12 statute cited on Plaintiff’s civil cover sheet does not apply to the allegations concerning his 13 issues with customer service. (See Sec. I.A.) Even liberally construing Plaintiff’s 14 Complaint, Plaintiff fails to meet the minimal pleading requirements to avoid dismissal 15 pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is also DISMISSED for 16 failure to state a claim. 17 In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended 18 complaint to attempt to cure the deficiencies identified above. However, the Court cautions 19 Plaintiff that this is not an opportunity to pursue meritless claims or a case for which the 20 Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.3 If Plaintiff chooses to amend, the amended 21
22 3 The Court notes that Plaintiff is subject to pre-filing orders in the United States Court of 23 Appeals for the Second Circuit and at least three district courts—the Western District of New York, where he resides, the Southern District of New York, and the Northern District 24 of New York—based on his filing of frivolous cases. See Hines v. Office of Temporary 25 and Disability Assistance Staff, Consolidation of Case Nos. 21-1629, 21-1648, 21-1651, 21-1665, 21-1914, 2021 WL 5016611 (2nd Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (noting May 2016 “leave- 26 to-file sanction against Petitioner Dashon Hines” and denying leave to file “because the 27 appeals do not depart from Petitioner’s prior pattern of vexatious filings”) (citing In re Dashon Hines, 2d Cir. 15-4094); Hines v. New York State Division of Human Rights Staff, 28 1 |}pleading must be filed on or before February 28, 2025. If Plaintiff does not file an 2 ||amended pleading, this case will remain closed without further order of the Court. 3 Ht. CONCLUSION 4 Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs IFP Motion (Doc. 2) is GRANTED. This case 5 |}is DISMISSED on screening pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim and lack 6 || of subject matter jurisdiction. If Plaintiff chooses to amend, the amended complaint must 7 || be filed on or before February 28, 2025. If no amended pleading is filed, the action will 8 ||remain closed without further order of the Court. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10 || Dated: February 14, 2025 Fp ; ? L > i HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 || Hines, Case No. 1:21-PF-0006 (GTS), 2022 WL 168901 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2022); Hines 28 v. IRS, Case No. 1:20-me-0014-RJA, Doc. 6 (W.D.N.Y Feb. 13, 2024) (summarizing Plaintiff's litigation history, including sanction order and dismissing case).