Himanshu Himanshu v. Jeremy Casey, Warden of the Imperial Regional Detention Center, et al.

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: March 4, 2026
• Docket: 3:26-cv-00951
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HIMANSHU HIMANSHU, Case No.: 26-CV-951 JLS (BLM)

12 Petitioner, ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND (2) DENYING AS 14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden of the MOOT MOTION FOR Imperial Regional Detention Center, et al., 15 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING Respondents. ORER 16 17 (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 18 Presently before the Court are Himanshu Himanshu’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 19 Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Pet.,” ECF No. 1) and Motion for Temporary 20 Restraining Order (“TRO,” ECF No. 2). Also before the Court is Respondents’ Return to 21 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Ret.,” ECF No. 4). Petitioner did not file a traverse. 22 See generally Docket. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART the 23 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) and DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for 24 Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 2). 25 BACKGROUND 26 Petitioner, a citizen of India, alleges that he has been detained by the United States 27 Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) Immigration and Customs Enforcement 28 1 (“ICE”) division at the Imperial Regional Detention Center since February 8, 2026. Pet. 2 at 2. Petitioner submits that he entered the United States on May 19, 2023, and was later 3 released on his own recognizance.1 Id. at 1. As a condition of release, Petitioner was 4 placed into Alternatives to Detention (“ATD”), which required regular check-ins with ICE. 5 Id. Respondents thereafter initiated removal proceedings against Petitioner. Id. Petitioner 6 obtained lawful employment as a commercial truck driver and complied with the 7 conditions of his release. Id. at 2. On February 8, 2026, ICE stopped Petitioner at a 8 highway checkpoint and re-detained him “without any legal cause, notice, or allegation of 9 wrongdoing.” Id. Petitioner alleges that his detention violates the Due Process Clause of 10 the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act. See generally id. 11 LEGAL STANDARD 12 A federal prisoner challenging the execution of his or her sentence, rather than the 13 legality of the sentence itself, may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district of 14 his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). The sole judicial 15 body able to review challenges to final orders of deportation, exclusion, or removal is the 16 court of appeals. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1252; see also Alvarez–Barajas v. Gonzales, 17 418 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 18 231, § 106(a)). However, for claims challenging ancillary or collateral issues arising 19 independently from the removal process—for example, a claim of indefinite detention— 20 federal habeas corpus jurisdiction remains in the district court. Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 21 443 F.3d 1069, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Jennings v. Rodriguez, 22 583 U.S. 281 (2018); Alvarez v. Sessions, 338 F. Supp. 3d 1042, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 23 (citations omitted). 24 / / / 25

26 1 The Notice to Appear issued to Petitioner, see Pet., Ex. A, states that Petitioner “arrived in the United 27 States . . . on or about May 19, 2023,” and “w[as] not then admitted or paroled after inspection by an 28 Immigration Officer.” However, it appears that on May 21, 2023, Petitioner was “[r]eleased on OREC.” 1 DISCUSSION 2 I. Jurisdiction 3 Respondent argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) 4 because Petitioner’s claims arise from DHS’s decision to commence removal proceedings. 5 Ret. at 3–4. The Court disagrees. 6 Section 1252(g) provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or 7 claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney 8 General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any 9 alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Section 1252(g) should be read “narrowly” 10 as to apply “only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her ‘decision 11 or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders.’” 12 Ibarra-Perez v. United States, No. 24-631, 2025 WL 2461663, at *6 (9th Cir. Aug. 27, 13 2025) (quoting Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 482, 14 487 (1999)). Section 1252(g) “does not prohibit challenges to unlawful practices merely 15 because they are in some fashion connected to removal orders.” Id. at *7. Section 1252(g) 16 does not bar due process claims. Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1052–53 (9th Cir. 1998) 17 (finding that the petitioners’ objective was not to review the merits of their proceeding, but 18 rather “to enforce their constitutional rights to due process in the context of those 19 proceedings”). 20 Here, Petitioner does not challenge the decision to commence removal proceedings 21 or any act to adjudicate or execute a removal order. Rather, Petitioner is challenging the 22 revocation of his release without justification or consideration of his individualized 23 circumstances. See generally Pet. Petitioner is enforcing his “constitutional rights to due 24 process in the context of the removal proceedings—not the legitimacy of the removal 25 proceedings or any removal order.” Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-CV-2180-DMS-MMP, 2025 26 WL 2549431, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025). Therefore, § 1252(g) does not strip the Court 27 of jurisdiction. 28 / / / 1 II. Due Process 2 Petitioner argues that the summary revocation of his release on his own recognizance 3 without justification or consideration of his individualized circumstances violates the Due 4 Process Clause. Pet. at 4. The Court agrees. 5 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, 6 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “[T]he Due 7 Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether 8 their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 9 U.S. 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2001). “[I]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles 10 aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 11 306 (1993). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a hearing before the 12 State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 13 (1990). “Even individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose 14 liberty the government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their 15 liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, No. 25-cv-5632-PCP, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 16 25, 2025) (citations omitted). Although the initial decision to detain or release an 17 individual may be within the government’s discretion, “the government’s decision to 18 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that 19 individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[] to live up to the 20 . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)). 21 “Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending 22 removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected 23 liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (citing 24 Romero v. Kaiser, No. 22-cv-20508, 2022 WL 1443250, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 2022)). 25 Respondents contend that as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 26 Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and therefore his alleged statutory and 27 constitutional violations fail. Ret. at 4. The Court disagrees. Petitioner was released on 28 his own recognizance upon entering the United States. Pet. at 3. Petitioner is not a newly 1 arrived noncitizen seeking admission at the border, as Petitioner has been in the United 2 States since 2023. Id. Petitioner is not merely an “applicant for admission” at the border 3 with minimal due process rights; Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining out 4 of custody. See, e.g., Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *4 (“[Petitioner’s] release from ICE 5 custody after her initial apprehension reflected a determination by the government that she 6 was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community, and [Petitioner] has a strong interest 7 in remaining at liberty unless she no longer meets those criteria.”); Noori, 2025 WL 8 2800149, at *10 (“Petitioner is not an ‘arriving’ noncitizen but one that has [been] present 9 in our country for over a year. This substantial amount of time indicates he is afforded the 10 Fifth Amendment’s guaranteed due process before removal.”); Matute v. Wofford, No. 25- 11 cv-1206-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2817795, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2025) (finding 12 petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his release). 13 As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 14 procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 15 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient 16 to satisfy the Due Process Clause, the Court must apply the Matthews factors. See 17 Matthews, 424 U.S. at 335. Courts must consider: (1) “the private interest that will be 18 affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 19 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 20 procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government’s interest including the function involved 21 and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 22 requirement would entail.” Id. 23 The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the Government’s 24 revocation of Petitioner’s release without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be 25 heard, denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has 26 a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody pursuant to his release. “Freedom 27 from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical 28 restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 1 U.S. at 690. Petitioner has an interest in remaining continuing to work as a commercial 2 truck driver. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482 (“Subject to the conditions of [her] parole, 3 [she] can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the 4 other enduring attachments of normal life.”). 5 Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 6 release on his own recognizance was revoked without providing him a reason for 7 revocation or giving him an opportunity to be heard. Pet. at 4. Since DHS’s determination 8 that Petitioner should be granted release because he posed no danger to the community and 9 was not a flight risk, there is no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. 10 Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1760 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“Release reflects a determination 11 by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). 12 Petitioner has no criminal record, has not been arrested or otherwise in criminal trouble, 13 and works as a truck driver. Pet. at 4. “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law 14 prohibits federal agents from rearresting [her] merely because [she] is subject to removal 15 proceedings. Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of materially 16 changed circumstances—namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact dangerous or has 17 become a flight risk. . . .” Saravia, 280 F. Supp. 3d at 1760. Respondents, failing to address 18 Petitioner’s Due Process argument in their response, do not point to any material 19 circumstances that have changed that would warrant reconsideration of his deferred action 20 status. See generally Ret. “Where as here, ‘the petitioner has not received any bond or 21 custody hearing,’ ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty is high’ because neither 22 the government nor [Petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any 23 valid basis for her detention.” Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 24 No. 25-cv-801-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)) 25 (cleaned up). 26 Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 27 and a hearing is “low.” See Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, 28 at *6; Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2019) (“If the 1 government wishes to re-arrest [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps 2 toward doing so; but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). Respondents fail 3 to point to any burdens on the Government if it were to have provided proper notice, 4 reasoning, and a pre-deprivation hearing. See generally Ret. 5 Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release on his 6 recognizance in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is unlawful. See, e.g., 7 Alegria Palma v. Larose et al., No. 25-cv-1942 BJC (MMP), slip op. 14 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8 11, 2025) (granting a TRO based on a procedural due process challenge to a revocation of 9 parole without a pre-deprivation hearing); Navarro Sanchez, 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 10 (granting a writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner from custody to the conditions of her 11 preexisting parole on due process grounds). 12 III. Attorney’s Fees 13 Petitioner has requested costs and attorney’s fees in this action pursuant to the Equal 14 Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. Pet. at 10. The EAJA provides in part: 15 A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an 16 application for fees and other expenses which shows that the 17 party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection, and the amount sought, including an 18 itemized statement from any attorney . . . representing or 19 appearing in behalf of the party stating the actual time expended and the rate at which fees and other expenses were 20 computed. The party shall also allege that the position of the 21 United States was not substantially justified. Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be 22 determined on the basis of the record . . . which is made in the 23 civil action for which fees and other expenses are sought. 24 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). 25 The Court will consider an application requesting reasonable fees and costs under 26 the EAJA that is filed within thirty days of the judgment. 27 / / / 28 / / / I CONCLUSION 2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS IN PART Petitioner’s Petition for Writ 3 ||of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1), DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary 4 ||Restraining Order (ECF No. 2), and ORDERS Respondents to immediately release 5 Petitioner from custody subject to the conditions of his preexisting release with no 6 || additional requirements. The Court ORDERS, prior to any re-detention of Petitioner, that 7 || Petitioner is entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation of his release and a hearing 8 ||before a neutral decision maker to determine whether detention is warranted. The 9 ||Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that 10 || Petitioner poses a danger to the community or a risk of flight.” The Parties are ORDERED 11 |/to file a Joint Status Report by March 20, 2026, confirming that Petitioner has been 12 released. Lastly, Petitioner’s attorney is directed to submit an attorney fee application and 13 || corresponding billing records within thirty (30) days of this Order, and Respondents are 14 |/instructed to file any opposition within fourteen (14) days of Petitioner’s attorney fee 15 || application. 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: March 4, 2026 . tt 18 pee Janis L. Sammartino 19 United States District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 07 ? This relief has been granted in similar matters. See, e.g., Matute, 2025 WL 2817795, at *8; Pinchi, 2025 WL 2084921, at *5; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1097 (E.D. Cal. 2025); Martinez 28 7005. y. Andrews, No. 25-CV-1035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28,