Hilton v. State

2017 MT 195N
CourtMontana Supreme Court
DecidedAugust 8, 2017
Docket16-0352
StatusPublished

This text of 2017 MT 195N (Hilton v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Montana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hilton v. State, 2017 MT 195N (Mo. 2017).

Opinion

08/08/2017

DA 16-0352 Case Number: DA 16-0352

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2017 MT 195N

DUSTIN J. HILTON,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellee.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventeenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Phillips, Cause No. DV-2015-24 Honorable John C. McKeon, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Jeremy S. Yellin, Attorney at Law, Havre, Montana

For Appellee:

Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney General, Micheal S. Wellenstein, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Ed Amestoy, Phillips County Attorney, Malta, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: July 12, 2017

Decided: August 8, 2017

Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Michael E Wheat delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not

serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this

Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana

Reports.

¶2 Dustin J. Hilton (Hilton) appeals the Montana Seventeenth Judicial District

Court’s Order denying his petition for return of his driver’s license. We affirm.

¶3 On October 2, 2015, at about 11:30 p.m., Montana Highway Patrol Trooper Ohl

responded to a dispatch of a roll-over just outside Malta, Montana. When he arrived at

the scene Trooper Ohl found an abandoned vehicle off the roadway near a curve in the

road, which was upright but had obviously been rolled. At about midnight dispatch

advised Trooper Ohl that Hilton was the driver of the vehicle and that Hilton was at his

friend Tony Anderson’s house, about one and one half miles from the accident scene. An

officer retrieved Hilton from Anderson’s house and returned him to the accident scene.

While speaking with Hilton, Trooper Ohl observed that Hilton smelled strongly of

alcohol and his eyes were bloodshot and watery. Hilton admitted that he had been

drinking but only after the accident, which had occurred two or three hours earlier, and

after he had walked to Anderson’s house. Trooper Ohl had Hilton perform a number of

field sobriety tests which showed signs of impairment. The trooper asked Hilton to take a

preliminary alcohol screening test, which he refused. Hilton was arrested and charged

2 with DUI. Based on his refusal to take a preliminary alcohol screening test, Hilton’s

driver’s license was suspended.

¶4 Hilton filed a petition for the return of his driver’s license pursuant to § 61-8-403,

MCA, and the District Court held a hearing on Hilton’s petition. At the hearing, Hilton

challenged whether Trooper Ohl had “reasonable grounds” to believe that Hilton had

been driving while under the influence of alcohol. Trooper Ohl was the only testifying

witness. Based on the facts and observations testified to by the trooper, which were

thoroughly articulated in the District Court’s order, the District Court denied Hilton’s

petition.

¶5 We review a district court’s decision on a petition for reinstatement of a driver’s

license to determine whether the district court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous

and its conclusions of law were correct. Brunette v. State, 2016 MT 128, ¶ 11, 383 Mont.

458, 372 P.3d 476; Ditton v. DOJ Motor Vehicle Div., 2014 MT 54, ¶ 14, 374 Mont. 122,

319 P.3d 1268. The suspension of a driver’s license is presumed to be correct, and the

petitioner bears the burden of proving the State’s action was improper. Ditton, ¶ 14.

Furthermore, the district court, as trier of fact, determines witness credibility and the

weight to be given evidence. We do not substitute our judgment for that of the district

court. Seyferth v. DOJ, Motor Vehicle Div., 277 Mont. 377, 385, 922 P.2d 494, 499

(1996).

¶6 Here, the District Court weighed Hilton’s claims against the testimony of Trooper

Ohl and concluded that the Trooper’s testimony was more credible and provided him

with the necessary “reasonable grounds” to believe that Hilton had been driving while

3 under the influence of alcohol. Based on our review of the record and the District

Court’s findings of fact, we find no error in the District Court’s decision.

¶7 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of

our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion

of the Court, the District Court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, and the

conclusions of law are correct.

¶8 Affirmed.

/S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR /S/ BETH BAKER

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Related

Seyferth v. State, Dept. of Justice
922 P.2d 494 (Montana Supreme Court, 1996)
Ditton v. Department of Justice Motor Vehicle Division
2014 MT 54 (Montana Supreme Court, 2014)
Brunette v. State
2016 MT 128 (Montana Supreme Court, 2016)
Hilton v. State
2017 MT 195N (Montana Supreme Court, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
2017 MT 195N, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hilton-v-state-mont-2017.