Hilton v. Construction Co.

216 S.W. 1034, 202 Mo. App. 672, 1919 Mo. App. LEXIS 155
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals
DecidedDecember 2, 1919
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 216 S.W. 1034 (Hilton v. Construction Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hilton v. Construction Co., 216 S.W. 1034, 202 Mo. App. 672, 1919 Mo. App. LEXIS 155 (Mo. Ct. App. 1919).

Opinions

This is a suit in the nature of an equitable garnishment against the Universal Construction Company and the City of St. Louis for materials sold to a sub-contractor of a prime contractor for public work. The suit was instituted in behalf of the Hunkins-Wilkins Lime Cement Company and R.L. Hilton, alleging that the city entered into a contract with the defendant Universal Construction Company for the construction of a public sewer, which contract provided that the city should pay for same on monthly estimates of the amount of work performed and should retain 15 per cent until the completion of the work; that the plaintiffs furnished materials to a sub-contractor on the *Page 675 work, J.W. Farley Company, and to their trustee, they having afterwards been declared a bankrupt. The prayer of the petition was for an order on the city to pay out of the retained percentage in its possession the amount due the plaintiffs, the sewer having been completed.

The suit as to the original plaintiffs was afterwards dismissed on their applications and they were permitted to withdraw, their claims having been paid and discharged. In the meantime, however, intervening petitions were filed in the suit in behalf of the Suburban Supply Company, the Lorimer Gallagher Company and Lumaghi Coal Company.

In their intervening petitions the Suburban Supply Company and the Lumaghi Coal Company repeat substantially the allegations contained in the plaintiffs petition, and allege that they had furnished to the sub-contractor Farley Company, coal which was used by said Farley Company for the construction of said sewer, and that their claims against said sub-contractor remain unpaid; the Suburban Supply Company alleging that there was due to it $425.74, and the Lumaghi Coal Company alleging that the value of the coal furnished by it was $822.06.

The Lorimer Gallagher Company by its intervening petition repeat substantially the allegations of the plaintiff's petition, and alleges that it furnished material in the shape of lumber to the sub-contractor of said sewer of the reasonable value of $359.63, which lumber was used in the construction of said sewer, and which sum remains due and unpaid.

All of these intervenors pray for an order on the city to pay to them out of the fund in the city's possession belonging to the Universal Construction Company the amounts claimed in their respective intervening petitions.

The defendant, Universal Construction Company, denied generally the allegations of the intervening petitions. *Page 676

The cause, upon motion of the plaintiffs, was referred to a Referee, who after hearing the evidence, filed a report recommnding that as to the claims of the Suburban Supply Company and Lumaghi Coal Company a judgment be rerdered in favor of the defendants, and as to the claim of Lorimer Gallagher Company for furnishing the lumber it was recommended that a judgment be rendered in favor of interventor, Lorimer Gallagher Company, in the sum of $358, being the reasonable value of the lumber furnished, and that the same be paid out of the money in the hands of the City of St. Louis.

On exceptions being duly filed to the Referee's report, the Circuit Court overruled the exception filed by the defendant, Universal Construction Company to that part of the report recommending judgment in favor of Lorimer Gallagher Company, and sustained the exceptions filed on behalf of the Suburban Supply Company and the Lumaghi Coal Company, and thereupon entered judgment in behalf of these intervenors for the amounts reported by the Referee, being the reasonable value of the materials furnished as found by him, and ordered that the intervenors be paid their respective claims out of the fund adjudged to be due Universal Construction Company from the City of St. Louis.

After taking the customary steps the defendant Universal Construction Company, appealed the cause to the Supreme Court. That court transferred the cause to this court, holding that the amount involved was within our jurisdiction, and that the city was a mere nominal party and did not appeal. [Hilton et al. v. Universal Const. Co. et al., not yet officially reported, but see 212 S.W. 867.]

The contract under which the work was let is a combination contract and bond between the Universal Construction Company, the City of St. Louis, and the Fidelity Deposit Company which signed as security for the faithful performance of the contract *Page 677 on the part of the Universal Construction Company. By this contract and bond it is provided, that if the contractor shall fail to pay the laborers employed on the work or to pay for materials used therein, the Sewer Commissioner may withhold his certificate for everything in excess of 85 per cent of the value of the work done until he shall be satisfied that all claims for labor or materials are paid. In addition, the said contract and bond provides, that the Universal Construction Company shall pay the proper parties all amounts due for material and labor usedand employed in the performance thereof. (Italics ours).

There is little dispute in the record as to the essential facts. As to the coal claims of the Suburban Supply Company and Lumaghi Coal Company, it appears from the record that this coal was furnished and delivered by the interventors to a sub-contractor, Farley Company, and was used by the said sub-contractor for making steam in locomotives drawing small cars, carrying materials used in and about the sewer in question, upon a track running from one end of the sewer to the other, and also for carrying dirt along the side of the sewer as the dirt was taken the cars, which cars were moved from one place to another, along the sewer, that is, the dirt was placed on the from the trench with a steam shovel and dumped on to cars with the steam shovel and taken from the trench at one place and moved to another place and dumped back into the sewer from the cars after the masonry and brickwork was completed. The coal was also used for operating stationary engines which furnished the power for the steam shovel and also for machines which hoisted and moved the materials which were taken from and placed in the sewer.

As to the lumber claim of the Lorimer Gallagher Company, it appears that this lumber was furnished to the sub-contractor for the purpose of bracing up the sides of the ditch to keep it from caving in while *Page 678 the men were engaged in the work of putting in the brickwork and masonry. It is unquestioned that the lumber in the amount claimed by this intervenor was delivered to the sub-contractor which used it for the purpose stated. It appeared that a part of the lumber was left in the ditch after the work was completed, as they were unable to remove it, and that, however, they did remove a part of it, which part had been used for the purpose stated, and there is evidence to the effect that after it was removed it was washed away by floods of the River des Peres. When the contractor left the work none of the lumber was taken away from the work: it was either left in the ditch, they being unable to remove it, or it was washed away by the floods.

The question presented by this appeal is whether this material in the form of coal and lumber used in the manner heretofore stated is material within the terms of the contract and bond referred to between the contractor and the city.

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Bluebook (online)
216 S.W. 1034, 202 Mo. App. 672, 1919 Mo. App. LEXIS 155, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hilton-v-construction-co-moctapp-1919.