HILLSBOROUGH CTY. AVIATION A. v. Cone Bros. Contr. Co.

285 So. 2d 619
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
DecidedApril 27, 1973
Docket72-1027
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 285 So. 2d 619 (HILLSBOROUGH CTY. AVIATION A. v. Cone Bros. Contr. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court of Appeal of Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
HILLSBOROUGH CTY. AVIATION A. v. Cone Bros. Contr. Co., 285 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Ct. App. 1973).

Opinion

285 So.2d 619 (1973)

HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY AVIATION AUTHORITY, a Public Body Corporate, Appellant,
v.
CONE BROTHERS CONTRACTING COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, Appellee.

No. 72-1027.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

April 27, 1973.
Rehearing Denied November 28, 1973.

Stewart C. Eggert, Allen, Dell, Frank & Trinkle, Tampa, for appellant.

J. Rex Farrior, Jr., Shackleford, Farrior, Stallings & Evans, Tampa, for appellee.

MANN, Chief Judge.

The Aviation Authority sought, in two counts, damages from Cone for its alleged failure to complete contracted work on time. The first count sought liquidated damages under a clause[1] reciting the difficulty *620 of determining exact damages for delay in completion of the Tampa International Airport and fixing rates at which liquidated damages were to be paid, a much higher rate being applicable to delay in the completion of work critical to the use of the airport. The second count is based on a clause[2] which emphasizes the *621 importance of certain phases of the work which must be scheduled compatibly with other work, in accordance with the critical path method of contract scheduling. The damages claimed under Count II are alleged to result from payments the Authority was required to make to other subcontractors on account of their losses attributable to Cone's departure from the critical path.

The trial judge held these clauses incompatible, and granted summary judgment on Count II, leaving the Authority only the agreed upon liquidated damages. We must reverse.

In the interpretation of contracts, it must be assumed that each clause has some purpose, and if the question is, as here, whether clauses are compatible or contradictory, the court should interpret the contract in such a way as to give effect to every provision, unless such an interpretation distorts the plain meaning of the agreement. It is not inconceivable that the drafters of a contract — here, the Authority — might pull stock language out of the file in compiling the agreement, and interpretation against the draftsman — the main support of the judgment appealed from — might result in the exclusion of actual damages by the liquidated damages clause. If the tenor of the agreement suggested inadvertent inclusion of the actual damages clause, we would think the appellee's position well taken, but in Section 5 the word "certain" appears repeatedly and the tenor of the instrument suggests that the parties contemplated a liquidated damages clause (that in Section 4) to cover the damages sustained by the Authority as a result of delay in the use of the new airport. Section 5, however, suggests that failure to comply with critical path scheduling will subject the Authority to liability to other subcontractors, on account of which actual damages may be assessed against Cone.

The Authority relies on Hathaway & Co. v. United States, 1919, 249 U.S. 460, 39 S.Ct. 346, 63 L.Ed. 707, in which the contract stated "The contractor shall pay, in addition to the liquidated damages hereinbefore specified, all expenses for inspection and superintendence." The Supreme Court determined that "there is no reason why parties competent to contract may not agree that certain elements of damage difficult to estimate shall be covered by a provision for liquidated damages and that other elements shall be ascertained in the usual manner." (249 U.S. at 464, 39 S.Ct. at 347) This certainly makes sense, and refutes the appellee's quotation from Corpus Juris Secundum[3] to the effect that both liquidated and actual damages should not be awarded. This is true enough when we are discussing double recovery for the same element of damages, but if we attribute to the contract of these parties any meaning at all it must appear that there are some elements subjected to determination under the liquidated damages clause, while those arising under Section 5 are treated separately. The trial judge will, of course, insure that the Authority does not recover twice for the same element of damages.

We think that the interpretation of this contract is governed by the general principle stated in Restatement of Contracts, Sections 235(c) and 236(a):

§ 235(c) A writing is interpreted as a whole and all writings forming part of the same transaction are interpreted together.
* * * * * *
§ 236(a) An interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful and effective meaning to all manifestations of intention is preferred to an interpretation which *622 leaves a part of such manifestations unreasonable, unlawful or of no effect.

These contract provisions are compatible. Count II should be reinstated. To the extent that Paragraph 5 provides for damages for elements not covered by Paragraph 4, it should be given effect.

Reversed and remanded.

LILES and BOARDMAN, JJ., concur.

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

The appellee begins its petition for rehearing by stating: "First, let there be no mistake that the absolute and unequivocal law of the United States prohibits the award of both liquidated damages and actual damages for the same elements of damage." We agree. It may have passed unnoticed, but we specifically said in our original opinion, "The trial judge will, of course, insure that the Authority does not recover twice for the same element of damages." In denying this petition for rehearing we would point simply to the language of Paragraph 4.1 of the parties: "Since both parties recognize that precise actual damages for delay are impossible of agreed determination, the fixed agreed and liquidated damages, described in General Conditions shall be as follows: ..." Paragraph 5, quoted in our original opinion, differentiates critical path scheduling from complete job scheduling, emphasizes that certain work is subject to the critical path method of scheduling and goes on to say: "In the event that the contractor fails to complete any of the various work elements in the allotted time, he shall be liable for additional costs, if any, which are incurred by the Owner because of failure of the Contractor to complete such work within such time limits."

We thought we made it clear in our original opinion that damages recoverable under Paragraph 5 are limited to additional costs. Damages on account of delay are covered by Paragraph 4.1 and are liquidated. We thus made it clear that there is to be no double recovery for the same element of damages. The petition for rehearing is denied.

BOARDMAN and GRIMES, JJ., concur.

NOTES

[1] Schedule I

The Contractor for the work set forth under Schedule I in the proposal and Contract shall perform fully, entirely and in a satisfactory and acceptable manner the work contracted for within four hundred and twenty (420) calendar days.

3.2 Schedule II

The Contractor for the work set forth under Schedule II in the proposal and Contract shall perform fully, entirely and in a satisfactory and acceptable manner the work contracted for within one hundred and twenty (120) calendar days.

4.1 Schedule I

Since both parties recognize that precise actual damages for delay are impossible of agreed determination, the fixed agreed and liquidated damages, described in General Conditions shall be as follow:

1.

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285 So. 2d 619, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hillsborough-cty-aviation-a-v-cone-bros-contr-co-fladistctapp-1973.