Hills v. City of Chula Vista

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: November 26, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-01067
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 23-cv-1067-DMS-DDL MANUEL LUKE HILLS,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND 13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS 14 CITY OF CHULA VISTA, CHULA PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED VISTA POLICE DEPARTMENT, 15 COMPLAINT; DENYING OFFICER SYMONETTE, OFFICER DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR A 16 LOPEZ, OFFICER MARTIN, OFFICER MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT; BANDY, SERGEANT ALVAREZ, 17 DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION CHIEF ROXANA KENNEDY, AND TO STRIKE 18 JOHN DOES 1 through 5, inclusive,

19 Defendants.

20 21 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Third 22 Amended Complaint (TAC, ECF No. 53) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Defendants’ Motion, 23 ECF No. 54). Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a response in opposition. (Plaintiff’s 24 Opposition, ECF No. 55).1 Defendants filed a reply. (Defendants’ Reply, ECF No. 56). 25 26 27 1 Plaintiff re-filed his response in opposition without leave of court. (ECF No. 58). The Court will only consider Plaintiff’s first filed response in opposition. It also appears that the two oppositions differ only 28 1 The Court found this matter to be suitable for resolution without oral argument pursuant to 2 Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). (ECF No. 57). For the reasons discussed below, Defendants’ 3 motion is granted in part and denied in part. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 The Court accepts the following allegations as true for the purpose of resolving 6 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. On November 30, 2022, between 8:00 and 9:30 PM, 7 Plaintiff was pulled over by Defendants Officers Symonette and Lopez, who were in two 8 different Chula Vista Police Department (“CVPD”) vehicles. (TAC ¶¶ 13–14). Plaintiff 9 did not put his vehicle into park and observed Defendant Symonette approach with his gun 10 drawn. (Id. ¶ 15). While Defendants Symonette and Lopez “aim[ed] their guns at 11 [Plaintiff],” Defendant Symonette “ordered Plaintiff to place his keys on the dashboard.” 12 (Id. ¶ 16). Then, Defendants Symonette and Lopez “forcefully pulled Plaintiff out of the 13 vehicle and promptly handcuffed him.” (Id. ¶ 17). 14 At some point during the interaction, Defendants Officers Martin and Bandy arrived. 15 (Id. ¶ 18). While Plaintiff was handcuffed and watched by Defendant Bandy, Defendants 16 Symonette, Lopez, and Martin searched Plaintiff’s vehicle without his consent or warrant. 17 (Id.). Defendant Symonette then arrested Plaintiff for driving under the influence, without 18 conducting a field sobriety test. (Id. ¶ 19). Then, Defendant Sergeant Alvarez arrived and 19 Plaintiff perceived him to act “in a hostile and dismissive manner.” (Id. ¶ 20). Defendant 20 Alvarez “order[ed] the towing of Plaintiff’s vehicle and his transportation to the police 21 station.” (Id.). 22 At the police station, Plaintiff was informed that the officers had received a warrant 23 to have Plaintiff’s blood drawn and his blood was “forcibly drawn against his will.” (Id. 24 ¶ 21). Plaintiff was not shown the warrant nor was he read his Miranda rights. (Id.). 25 Plaintiff was in custody for fourteen hours. (Id. ¶ 22). While in detention, an unnamed 26 officer broke his gold bracelet and his vehicle sustained damage to its front bumper. (Id.). 27 From these events, Plaintiff alleges to have suffered “emotional distress, depression, 28 anxiety, and flashbacks.” (Id. ¶ 23). 1 On June 8, 2023, Plaintiff, at first proceeding pro se, initiated this action against 2 Defendants City of Chula Vista, CVPD, and John Does 1 through 5. (ECF No. 1). Soon 3 after, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s original complaint pursuant to Rule 4 12(b)(6) and 12(f). (ECF No. 3). Plaintiff then retained counsel and filed his first amended 5 complaint on January 12, 2024, naming the current set Defendants. (ECF No. 34). On 6 March 15, 2024, Plaintiff, this time proceeding pro se, filed his Second Amended 7 Complaint (“SAC”) with leave from the Court. (ECF No. 46). Defendants then filed a 8 motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC (ECF Nos. 47–48) and this Court granted Defendants’ 9 motion with leave to amend. (ECF No. 52). On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed his TAC. 10 (ECF No. 53). 11 A. Claims 12 Plaintiff’s TAC alleges the following categories of claims against the following 13 Defendants: 14 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (individual capacity) for violations of the Fourth 15 Amendment right against unlawful detention and arrest against Defendants 16 Symonette, Lopez, and Martin. (TAC ¶¶ 24–30). 17 2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (individual capacity) for violations of the Fourth 18 Amendment right against excessive force against Defendant Symonette. (Id. 19 ¶¶ 31–40). 20 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (individual capacity) for violations of the Fourth 21 Amendment right against unlawful searches and seizures against Defendants 22 Symonette, Lopez, and Martin. (Id. ¶¶ 41–45). 23 4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell) for violation of the Fourth Amendment against 24 Defendants City of Chula Vista and CVPD. (Id. ¶¶ 46–52). 25 5. California Penal Code § 240 (Assault) and § 242 (Battery) against Defendant 26 Symonette. (Id. ¶¶ 53–60). 27 6. California Common Law False Imprisonment against Defendants Symonette, 28 Lopez, and Martin. (Id. ¶¶ 61–64). 1 7. California Government Code § 52.1 (Bane Act) against Defendants 2 Symonette, Lopez, and Martin. (Id. ¶¶ 65–72). 3 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for undetermined violations against Defendants Alvarez 4 (individual capacity), Bandy (individual capacity), and Chief Roxana 5 Kennedy (official and individual capacity). (Id. ¶ 11). 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss 8 on the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” 9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain 10 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 11 face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 12 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 13 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 14 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim 15 for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its 16 judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “Factual allegations must be enough 17 to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. If Plaintiff 18 “ha[s] not nudged” his “claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” the 19 complaint “must be dismissed.” Id. at 570. 20 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, a court must 21 “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light 22 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 519 23 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). But courts are not “required to accept as true allegations 24 that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” 25 In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. 26 Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). “[I]n general, courts must 27 construe pro se pleadings liberally.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). 28 When a court grants a motion to dismiss a complaint, it must then decide whether to 1 grant leave to amend. Leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), and “this policy is to be applied with extreme liberality.” Morongo 3 Band of Mission Indians v. Rose, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1990). Dismissal without 4 leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any 5 amendment,” Intri-Plex Techs. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007), or 6 “if the plaintiff had several opportunities to amend its complaint and repeatedly failed to 7 cure deficiencies.” Telesaurus VPC, LLC v. Power, 623 F.3d 998, 1003 (9th Cir. 2010). 8 “A district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is ‘particularly broad’ where the 9 plaintiff has previously amended.” Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 726 F. 3d 1124, 1133 (9th 10 Cir. 2013). 11 III. DISCUSSION 12 A. Request for Judicial Notice 13 Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) permits judicial notice of any fact “not subject to 14 reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial 15 jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy 16 cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b); Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, 17 Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). “A court may take judicial notice of matters of 18 public record without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. 19 But a court cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” 20 Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999 (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 669 (9th Cir. 21 2001)). 22 Defendants asks this Court to take judicial notice (1) of Plaintiff’s Government 23 Claim for damages, (2) City of Chula Vista’s denial of Plaintiff’s Government Claim, and 24 (3) the Blood Sample Warrant #66366 issued by the Superior Court of California, San 25 Diego. (Defendants’ Motion, at 42–44). Plaintiff did not address Defendants’ request for 26 judicial notice in his response in opposition. 27 The Court takes judicial notice of the filing date and alleged content of Plaintiff’s 28 Government Claim for damages, the City of Chula Vista’s denial of Plaintiff’s Government 1 Claim, and the existence of the blood warrant. These particular details are not subject to 2 reasonable dispute because they can be accurately and readily determined from sources 3 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. See Clarke v. Upton, 703 F. Supp. 2d 4 1037, 1042 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (taking judicial notice of filing date, alleged content, and 5 rejection of California Government Tort claims); Davis v. Zimmerman, No. 17-cv-1230- 6 BAS-NLS, 2018 WL 1806101, at *6 n.5 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018) (taking judicial notice 7 of claim and state entity’s response); see also Bryan v. City of Carlsbad, 297 F. Supp. 3d 8 1107, 1115–16 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (taking judicial notice of the existence of a warrant as 9 public record). The Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of the facts alleged in 10 Plaintiff’s Government Claim for damages or the facts alleged in the blood warrant. These 11 details are subject to reasonable dispute. See Bryan, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1116 (declining to 12 take judicial notice of the “reasonably disputable facts” contained in a warrant). 13 B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (individual capacity) 14 To state a claim for relief under § 1983, Plaintiff must sufficiently allege “(1) a 15 violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) 16 proximately caused (3) by conduct of a ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” 17 Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). Defendants only contest whether 18 Plaintiff suffered a violation of his federal rights. (Defendants’ Motion, at 24–31). 19 1. Fourth Amendment – Unlawful detention and arrest 20 To state an unlawful detention claim under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth 21 Amendment, a plaintiff must allege that he was detained without reasonable suspicion. 22 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). Reasonable suspicion exists when, “in light 23 of the totality of the circumstances, the officer had a particularized and objective basis for 24 suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” U.S. v. Basher, 629 F.3d 25 1161, 1165 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Berber-Tinoco, 510 F.3d 1083, 1087 26 (9th Cir. 2007)). 27 “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth 28 Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” 1 Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). “Probable 2 cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers 3 (or within the knowledge of the other officers at the scene), a prudent person would believe 4 the suspect had committed a crime.” Id. at 966. “If probable cause exists, it provides a 5 complete defense.” Estate of Silva by and through Allen v. City of San Diego, 6 No. 18cv02282 L (MSB), at *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2022) (citing Hutchinson v. Grant, 796 7 F.2d 288, 290 (9th Cir. 1986)). 8 Plaintiff’s TAC asserts that the initial stop by Defendant Symonette and subsequent 9 arrest by Defendants Symonette, Lopez, and Martin were without reasonable suspicion or 10 probable cause and were therefore unlawful. (TAC ¶¶ 24–30). Defendants argue that 11 Officers Symonette and Martin did have probable cause—observing, inter alia, Plaintiff 12 “driv[ing] erratically,” “not stop[ping] at multiple blinking red lights,” and “[u]pon 13 stopping Plaintiff, . . . objective symptoms of Plaintiff being under the influence.” 14 (Defendants’ Motion, at 25–26). 15 Defendants ultimately misconstrue Plaintiff’s TAC. Defendant’s arguments are not 16 based on the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s TAC—rather, Defendants’ arguments are based on 17 their own allegations. Nowhere in Plaintiff’s TAC does Plaintiff allege that he was driving 18 “erratically” or acting in a way that objectively justified detaining and arresting Plaintiff. 19 Because the Court is obligated to construe Plaintiff’s alleged facts “in the light most 20 favorable to the nonmoving party,” the Court finds that Plaintiff’s TAC alleges sufficient 21 facts to show that he was detained without reasonable suspicion and arrested without 22 probable cause. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims with 23 respect to Fourth Amendment violations for unlawful detention and arrest. 24 2. Fourth Amendment – Excessive Force 25 The Fourth Amendment protects against the unreasonable seizure of persons. U.S. 26 Const. amend. IV. The Clause is applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. 27 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963). “Even if a seizure is reasonable in a 28 particular circumstance, how that seizure is carried out must also be reasonable.” Estate of 1 Strickland v. Nevada Cnty., 69 F.4th 614, 619 (9th Cir. 2023) (emphasis in original). “So 2 the Fourth Amendment also prohibits the use of excessive force. Our ‘calculus of 3 reasonableness’ in these circumstances ‘must embody allowance for the fact that police 4 officers are often forced to make split-second judgments’ and we do not apply the ‘20/20 5 vision of hindsight.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)) (citations 6 omitted). 7 A Fourth Amendment excessive force § 1983 claim is cognizable where “officers 8 employed an ‘objectively unreasonable’ amount of force under the ‘totality of the 9 circumstances.’ This inquiry requires balancing ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on 10 the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental 11 interests at stake.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396) (citations omitted). Courts 12 consider “(1) ‘the type and amount of force inflicted,’ (2) the severity of the crime at issue,’ 13 (3) ‘whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others,’ 14 and (4) ‘whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 15 flight.’” Id. (quoting O’Doan v. Sanford, 991 F.3d 1027, 1037 (9th Cir. 2021). “But this 16 list isn’t exhaustive; [courts] may also consider other relevant factors, such as ‘the 17 availability of less intrusive alternatives to the force employed, whether proper warnings 18 were given[,] and whether it should have been apparent to officers that the person they used 19 force against was emotionally disturbed.’” Id. (quoting S.B. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 864 20 F.3d 1010, 1013 (9th Cir. 2017)). “Of these, the ‘immediate threat to safety’ factor is the 21 most important.’” Peck v. Montoya, 51 F.4th 877, 887 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Rice v. 22 Morehouse, 989 F.3d 1112, 1121 (9th Cir. 2021)). 23 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Symonette violated his Fourth Amendment right 24 against excessive force when Defendant Symonette pointed a loaded firearm at Plaintiff. 25 (TAC ¶¶ 36). Plaintiff also cites to Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco, 598 26 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2010), for authority that “pointing a loaded gun at a suspect, especially 27 when the suspect poses no immediate threat, constitutes excessive force under the Fourth 28 Amendment.” (Id. ¶ 37). Defendants counter by arguing that Plaintiff’s TAC only offers 1 conclusory statements to show that he was complying with the officer’s commands. 2 (Defendants’ Motion, at 27–28). 3 The facts, as alleged in Plaintiff’s TAC, are sufficient to plausibly state a Fourth 4 Amendment excessive force claim under § 1983. “Pointing a loaded gun at a suspect, 5 employing the threat of deadly force, is use of a high level of force.” Espinosa, 595 F.3d 6 at 537. “[P]ointing guns at persons who are compliant and present no danger is a 7 constitutional violation.” Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582, 587 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 8 Baird v. Renbarger, 576 F.3d 340, 346 (7th Cir. 2009)). Plaintiff’s TAC does not allege 9 any facts evincing noncompliance with or threats to Defendant Symonette, or any attempt 10 by Plaintiff to flee. Nor could the traffic stop be construed as a particularly severe alleged 11 crime. Based on the present allegations, which the Court must accept as true at this stage 12 of the pleadings, Officer Symonette’s drawing and pointing of a loaded firearm at Plaintiff 13 was an objectively unreasonable amount of force when balanced against the government’s 14 need for such force. Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims 15 with respect to Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. 16 3. Fourth Amendment – Unlawful Search2 17 The Fourth Amendment also protects against “unreasonable searches.” U.S. Const. 18 amend. IV. “[S]earches typically must be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by an 19 independent judicial officer. However, there are exceptions to this general rule, including 20 the ‘automobile exception,’ under which a warrantless search of a vehicle is permitted ‘if 21 there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.’” United 22 States v. Faagai, 869 F.3d 1145, 1149–50 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Brooks, 23 610 F.3d 1186, 1193 (9th Cir. 2010)) (citations omitted). 24 25

26 2 While Plaintiff’s heading states a claim for “unlawful search and seizure under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” (TAC, 27 at 9), Plaintiff only alleges “unlawful search[es]” under the Fourth Amendment. (TAC ¶¶ 42–45). Accordingly, the Court interprets this section of Plaintiff’s TAC to only allege Fourth Amendment 28 1 Plaintiff’s TAC alleges that Defendants Symonette, Lopez, and Martin lacked 2 probable cause to search his vehicle during the traffic stop. (TAC ¶¶ 42–45). Plaintiff’s 3 TAC also alleges that because Defendants conducted a search without a warrant and 4 without any of the applicable exceptions to the general requirement of probable cause, the 5 search was unlawful. (Id.). Defendants argue that they lawfully searched Plaintiff’s 6 vehicle because they had probable cause to detain and arrest Plaintiff. (Defendants’ 7 Motion, at 25–27). 8 As discussed above, Plaintiff’s TAC alleges sufficient facts to show that he was 9 detained without reasonable suspicion and arrested without probable cause. Thus, based 10 on the record presently before the Court, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently 11 alleged that Defendants unlawfully searched his vehicle. Accordingly, the Court declines 12 to dismiss Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims with respect to Fourth Amendment violations for 13 unlawful searches. 14 C. Qualified Immunity 15 Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity if (1) “the officer’s conduct 16 violated a statutory or constitutional right; and if (2) “that right was ‘clearly established’ at 17 the time of the incident.” Shane v. County of San Diego, 677 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1134 (S.D. 18 Cal. 2023). Because this Court concludes that Plaintiff’s TAC sufficiently alleges 19 violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful detention, arrest, 20 searches, and excessive force, the only question that remains is whether those rights were 21 “clearly established” at the time of the incident. 22 “For the purposes of qualified immunity, a right is clearly established if ‘a reasonable 23 officer would recognize that his or her conduct violates that right under the circumstances 24 faced, and in light of the law that existed at that time.’” Shane, 677 F. Supp. 3d at 1134 25 (quoting Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2006)). “The right 26 must be settled law, meaning that it must be clearly established by controlling authority or 27 a robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Id. (quoting Tuuamalemalo v. 28 Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 2019)). “The court need not, however, find ‘a prior 1 case with identical, or even materially similar facts’; it is enough that ‘the preexisting law 2 provided the defendants with fair warning that their conduct was unlawful.’” Id. (quoting 3 Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065). “If a right is not clearly established, the defendant is entitled 4 to qualified immunity. If the right is clearly established, the court determines ‘whether the 5 defendant’s conduct was objectively legally reasonable given the information possessed by 6 the defendant at the time of his or her conduct.’” Id. (quoting Lawerence v. U.S., 340 F.3d 7 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2003)) (citations omitted). “[T]he plaintiff . . . ‘bears the burden of 8 showing that the rights allegedly violated were clearly established.” Shafer v. Cnty. of 9 Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1118 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 10 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000)). Plaintiff “must either explain why [his] case is obvious under 11 existing general principles or, more commonly, show specific cases that control or reflect 12 a consensus of non-binding authorities in similar situations.” Waid v. Cnty. of Lyon, 87 13 F.4th 383, 388 (9th Cir. 2023). 14 “When defendants assert qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss under Rule 15 12(b)(6), dismissal is not appropriate unless the court can determine, based on the 16 complaint itself, that qualified immunity applies. While courts may consider qualified 17 immunity at the pleadings stage, the Ninth Circuit has noted that ‘[d]etermining claims of 18 qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage raises special problems for legal decision 19 making.’ The Ninth Circuit has also observed that, by considering qualified immunity at 20 the pleadings stage, ‘the courts may be called upon to decide far-reaching constitutional 21 questions on a nonexistent factual record.’ In considering qualified immunity, the court 22 must accept the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and construe them in the 23 light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Shane, 677 F. Supp. 3d at 1134–35 (first quoting 24 Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2019); and then quoting Kwai Fun Wong v. 25 United States, 373 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkie v. 26 Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007)) (citations omitted). 27 28 1 1. Unlawful Detention, Arrest, and Search 2 “Cases ‘cast at a high level of generality’ are unlikely to establish rights with the 3 requisite specificity. Waid, 87 F.4th at 388 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 4 199 (2004) (per curiam)). However, “in an obvious case, these standards can ‘clearly 5 establish’ the answer, even without a body of relevant case law.” Brosseau, 854 U.S. at 6 199. To support his argument that his Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful 7 detention, arrest and searches were clearly established at the time of his interaction with 8 Defendants, Plaintiff cites to a bevy of cases that generally stand for the proposition that 9 police officers need reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause or a warrant to arrest 10 an individual or conduct a warrantless search. (TAC ¶¶ 24–29, 41–45). 11 Taking the allegations in Plaintiff’s TAC as true and construing them in the light 12 most favorable to Plaintiff, as this Court is required to do, the Court finds that Plaintiff has 13 met his burden to demonstrate that his alleged violated rights were clearly established at 14 the time of the incident with Defendants. Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unlawful 15 detention, arrest, and search claims, as currently pled, are “obvious cases” under general 16 Fourth Amendment principles. Plaintiff’s TAC does not allege any facts that would serve 17 as the basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Nor do Defendants offer any 18 evidence to be incorporated by reference that would supplement Plaintiff’s allegations.3 19 Furthermore, based on the present allegations, the Court finds that Defendants’ conduct 20 was not objectively legally reasonable given the information they possessed at the time of 21 their conduct. Accordingly, the Court finds that qualified immunity does not shield 22 Defendants from Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment § 1983 unlawful detention, arrest, and 23 search claims. 24 25

26 3 Simply submitting body camera footage does not guarantee a finding of reasonable suspicion or probable 27 cause. See, e.g., Lechner v. LVMPD, 696 F. Supp. 3d 963, 990 (D. Nev. 2023) (noting that body camera footage showed that defendant officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain 28 1 2. Excessive Force 2 Plaintiff points to Espinosa v. City and County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 528 (9th 3 Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds Cnty. of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 581 U.S. 420 4 (2017) to support his excessive force argument. (Id. ¶ 37). The relevant excessive force 5 claim in Espinosa involved a residential confrontation by defendant police officers who 6 pointed loaded guns at a suspect. Espinosa, 595 F.3d at 537. In affirming the district 7 court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s excessive 8 force claims, the Ninth Circuit noted that the suspect “had not been accused of any crime,” 9 “had not caused the officers to forcible enter the home,” “did not present a danger to the 10 public,” could not escape from defendant police officers, and generally received 11 suggestions that the suspect posed “some risk of harm.” Id. The Court also benefits from 12 Thompson v. Rahr, 885 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2018), where the Ninth Circuit held that 13 “pointing guns at persons who are compliant and present no danger is a constitutional 14 violation.” Thompson, 885 F.3d at 587 (quoting Baird, 576 F.3d at 346). 15 As with Plaintiff’s other Fourth Amendment claims, the Court finds that Plaintiff 16 has met his burden to demonstrate that his Fourth Amendment right against excessive force 17 was clearly established at the time of the incident. Plaintiff’s excessive force claim appears 18 to also be obvious under Fourth Amendment principles. Nothing in Plaintiff’s TAC 19 suggests that Plaintiff was noncompliant with or posed a threat to Defendant Symonette. 20 Again, based on the present allegations, the Court finds that Defendant Symonette’s 21 conduct was not objectively legally reasonable given the information he possessed at the 22 time of their conduct. Thus, the Court finds that qualified immunity does not shield 23 Defendant Symonette from Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment § 1983 excessive claim. 24 D. Monell Claims 25 Plaintiff alleges Monell claims against Defendants City of Chula Vista and CVPD 26 on theories that City of Chula Vista has “policies, customs, and practices” that violated 27 Plaintiff’s constitutional rights or “fail[ed] to adequately train and supervise its officers.” 28 (TAC ¶ 47). A municipality cannot be vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of its 1 employees, but a municipality can be liable for deprivations of constitutional rights 2 deriving from the execution of a municipality’s policies or customs. Monell v. Dep’t of 3 Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a Monell claim under 4 § 1983, a plaintiff must sufficiently allege “(1) he was deprived of a constitutional right; 5 (2) the [local government] had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate indifference 6 to [the plaintiff's] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the 7 constitutional violation.” Lockett v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 8 2020). The plaintiff must show a “direct causal link” between the policy and the 9 constitutional deprivation. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1075 (9th Cir. 10 2016) (en banc). 11 “A ‘policy’ is ‘a deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among 12 various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with 13 respect to the subject matter in question.’” Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 14 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 15 2006)). A plaintiff can satisfy Monell’s policy requirement in one of three ways. First, a 16 plaintiff can show that a local government acted “pursuant to an expressly adopted official 17 policy.” Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 973 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Thomas v. 18 Cnty. of Riverside, 763 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014)). Second, “a public entity may be 19 held liable for a ‘longstanding practice or custom.’ Such circumstances may arise when, 20 for instance, the public entity ‘fail[s] to implement procedural safeguards to prevent 21 constitutional violations’ or, sometimes, when it fails to train its employees adequately.” 22 Id. (citations omitted). Third, a plaintiff can show that “the individual who committed the 23 constitutional tort was an official with final policy-making authority” or that “such an 24 official ‘ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and the basis for it.’” 25 Id. at 974 (quoting Clouthier v. Cnty. of Contra Costa, 591 F.3d 1232, 1250 (9th Cir. 26 2010)). 27 Plaintiff attempts to allege a “policy” under an express and longstanding practice or 28 custom theory, but not under a final policy making authority or ratification theory. (TAC 1 ¶ 48). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Defendants 2 had a “policy” that caused his alleged constitutional rights violations. 3 1. Expressly Adopted Policy 4 Plaintiff’s TAC does not allege any expressly adopted policy by Defendants. 5 Plaintiff simply concludes that “[t]he City of Chula Vista, acting through its Police 6 Department, had a policy, practice, or custom of conducting traffic stops and arrests in a 7 manner that violated the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals.” (TAC ¶ 48). Because 8 this is a conclusory allegation, the Court declines to accept it as true. See In re Gilead Scis. 9 Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d at 1055. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege a Monell claim under 10 an expressly adopted policy theory. 11 2. Longstanding Practice or Custom: Failure-to-train Theory 12 “Failure to train may amount to a policy of ‘deliberate indifference,’ if the need to 13 train was obvious and the failure to do so made a violation of constitutional rights likely.” 14 Doughtery v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Canton v. 15 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). “To allege a failure to train, a plaintiff must include 16 sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference (1) of a constitutional violation; (2) of a 17 municipal training policy that amounts to a deliberate indifference to constitutional rights; 18 and (3) that the constitutional injury would not have resulted if the municipality properly 19 trained their employees.” Benavidez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153–54 (9th 20 Cir. 2021). “A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is 21 ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to 22 train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). “[G]enerally, a single instance of 23 unlawful conduct is insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under section 1983.” 24 Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1154. “[I]n rare instances, single constitutional violations are so 25 inconsistent with constitutional rights that even such a single instance indicates at least 26 deliberate indifference of the municipality.” Id. at 1153. However, single-incident liability 27 under a failure-to-train theory is inapplicable where “[local government] employees are not 28 making life-threatening decisions.” Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1154–55. The Supreme Court 1 “posed [a] hypothetical example of a city that arms its police force with firearms and 2 deploys the armed officers into the public to capture fleeing felons without training the 3 officers in the constitutional limitation on the use of deadly force. . . . The Court sought not 4 to foreclose the possibility, however rare, that the unconstitutional consequences of failing 5 to train could be so patently obvious that a city could be liable under § 1983 without proof 6 of a pre-existing pattern of violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 63–64. 7 Plaintiff supports his failure-to-train theory with a single incident—the traffic stop 8 and arrest occurring on November 30, 2022. (TAC ¶¶ 13–14). From this single incident, 9 from which the alleged Fourth Amendment rights violations arose, Plaintiff concludes that 10 Defendant City of Chula Vista had a policy of deliberate indifference to constitutional 11 violations. (TAC ¶ 48). However, unlike the single-incident hypothetical in Connick, 12 Plaintiff’s single incident only involves an alleged “high level of force.” Espinosa, 595 13 F.3d at 537. Therefore, Plaintiff’s single incident is insufficient to establish the existence 14 of a policy or custom for Monell liability. See Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1154. 15 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Monell claims. 16 E. State Law Claims 17 1. Statute of Limitations 18 Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot add state law claims to his amended complaint 19 because the statute of limitations have run and that the relation back doctrine cannot save 20 Plaintiff’s “new” state law claims. (Defendants’ Motion, at 18–19). However, Plaintiff’s 21 state law assault, battery, and Bane Act claims have not yet expired. See Cal. Civ. Proc. 22 Code § 335.1 (“Within two years: An action for assault, battery, or injury to, or for the 23 death of, an individual caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another.”); Fenters v. 24 Yosemite Chevron, 761 F. Supp. 2d 957, 995–96 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (holding Bane Act claims 25 involving personal injury to have a two-year statute of limitations under Cal. Civ. Proc. 26 Code § 335.1). Because Plaintiff alleges his injuries to have occurred on November 30, 27 2022, Plaintiff had until November 30, 2024 to allege these state law claims against 28 Defendants. He did just that. See ECF No. 34. 1 Plaintiff’s state law false imprisonment claims pose a separate inquiry. According 2 to Defendants, they appear to have run: The statute of limitations for California false 3 imprisonment claims is one year, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(c) (“Within one year: An 4 action for . . . false imprisonment.”), Plaintiff did not name Defendants until his first 5 amended complaint on January 12, 2024, and Plaintiff did not raise false imprisonment as 6 a claim until his SAC on March 15, 2024. Defendants’ Motion, at 18–19; ECF No. 34; 7 ECF No. 46. 8 Defendants are ultimately incorrect. While Plaintiff’s original complaint named 9 “John Does 1-5” as defendants, (ECF No. 1, at 3), Plaintiff also added the badge numbers 10 and last names of Officers Symonette, Lopez, Martin, Bandy, and Alvarez and included in 11 his complaint an attachment matching the badge numbers to the five Defendants. (Id. at 3, 12 7). Because the Court is obligated to construe pro se pleadings liberally, and since Plaintiff 13 was proceeding pro se when he filed his first complaint, the Court construes Plaintiff to 14 have listed Officers Symonette, Lopez, Martin, Bandy, and Alvarez as Defendants in his 15 first complaint. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, 16 the Court finds that Plaintiff timely named those five Defendants in his original complaint.4 17 Furthermore, while not specifically argued by Defendants, Plaintiff’s state law false 18 imprisonment claims against Defendants Symonette, Lopez, and Martin relate back to the 19 original complaint under Rule 15(c). Under Rule 15(c)(1)(B), “[a]n amendment to a 20 pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when: the amendment asserts a 21 claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or 22 attempted to be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Indeed, 23 Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claims—which were first formally raised in his SAC on 24 March 15, 2024 and were hinted at in his original complaint—directly arose out of the 25 26 27 4 The Court’s analysis here excludes Defendant Chief Kennedy. For reasons discussed below, all claims against Chief Kennedy are dismissed. Accordingly, the Court declines to address any statute of limitations 28 1 alleged unlawful detention and arrest alleged in his original complaint. See ECF No. 1, at 2 4; ECF No. 46, at 12–13. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s false imprisonment 3 claims relate back to his timely original complaint. 4 2. Immunity under California Government Code § 820.2; § 820.4; and 5 California Penal Code § 847(b)(1) 6 Defendants also assert immunity under California Government Code §§ 820.2, 7 820.4, and California Penal Code § 847(b)(1). Under the circumstances of this case, none 8 of these statutes afford Defendants immunity from Plaintiff’s state law claims. See 9 Liberal v. Estrada, 632 F.3d 1064, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (“As a matter of law, section 820.2 10 immunity does not apply to an officer’s decision to detain or arrest a suspect.”), abrogated 11 in part on other grounds by Hampton v. California, 83 F.4th 754 (9th Cir. 2023); Cal. 12 Gov’t Code § 820.4 (“Nothing in this section exonerates a public employee from liability 13 for false arrest or false imprisonment.”); Robinson v. Solano County, 278 F.3d 1007, 1016 14 (9th Cir. 2002) (“California denies immunity to police officers who use excessive force in 15 arresting a suspect.”). Under the text of California Penal Code § 847(b)(1), immunity from 16 civil liability only applies if “[t]he arrest was lawful, or the peace officer, at the time of the 17 arrest, had reasonable cause to believe the arrest was lawful.” Cal. Penal Code § 847(b)(1). 18 Because the Court finds that Defendants did not have any basis for reasonable suspicion or 19 probable cause for the detention and arrest, Defendants should not be afforded this 20 immunity. 21 3. Presentment of Claims Under the Government Claims Act 22 Under the California Government Claims Act, “[a] plaintiff must present a timely 23 written claim for damages to the [public] entity” before suing that entity. Shirk v. Vista 24 Unified Sch. Dist., 42 Cal. 4th 201, 208 (2007), superseded in part by statute on other 25 grounds, Cal. Gov’t Code § 905(m), as recognized in Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1, 3 Cal. 5th 26 903, 914 (2017). “Since 1988, such claims must be presented to the government entity no 27 later than six months after the cause of action accrues. Accrual of the cause of action for 28 purposes of the government claims statute is the date of accrual that would pertain under 1 the statute of limitations applicable to a dispute between private litigants. Timely claim 2 presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but is . . . ‘a condition precedent to 3 plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant.’ Complaints that do not allege facts 4 demonstrating either that a claim was timely presented or that compliance with the claims 5 statute is excused are subject to a general demurrer for not stating facts sufficient to 6 constitute a cause of action.” Id. at 208–09 (quoting State of California v. Superior Court, 7 32 Cal. 4th 1234, 1240 (2004)) (citations omitted). 8 Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law Assault, Battery, False 9 Imprisonment, and Bane Act claims for failure to comply with the California Government 10 Claims Act. (Defendants’ Motion, at 29–30). The noncompliance, according to 11 Defendants, is Plaintiff’s “fail[ure] to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act” 12 in his TAC. (Id. at 32). 13 Plaintiff is not required to specifically allege in his complaint that he has complied 14 with the Government Claims Act. Rather, Plaintiff’s TAC needs only “allege facts 15 demonstrating either that a claim was timely presented or that compliance with the claims 16 statute is excused.” Shirk, 42 Cal. 4th at 209; see also Moore v. Twomey, 120 Cal. App. 17 4th 910, 914 (2004) (“Government Code section 945.6 requires ‘any suit brought against a 18 public entity’ to be commenced no more than six months after the public entity rejects the 19 claim. A civil action is ‘commenced’ by filing a complaint with the court.” (quoting Cal. 20 Gov’t Code § 945.6(a)(1)) (citations omitted)). Plaintiff’s TAC alleges neither. 21 Nonetheless, the evidence Defendants submitted, regarding Plaintiff’s presentment of 22 claims to the City of Chula Vista, Office of the City clerk on January 17, 2023, 23 (Defendants’ Motion, at 48), the denial of the claim on February 20, 2023, (id. at 53), and 24 the fact that Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on June 8, 2023, collectively demonstrate 25 that Plaintiff complied with the six-month deadline to file his state law claims following 26 the denial by the City of Chula Vista of Plaintiff’s Government Claims Act claims. 27 Therefore, Plaintiff’s TAC ultimately did what it was required to do under the Government 28 Claims Act. 1 Defendants further argue that Plaintiff violated the aforementioned six-month 2 presentment deadline set forth in Cal. Gov’t Code § 945.6(a)(1) by failing to specifically 3 allege Defendants Symonette, Lopez, Martin, Bandy, Alvarez, and Chief Kennedy in his 4 first Complaint. (Defendants’ Motion, at 32). Because the City of Chula Vista, Office of 5 the City Clerk, sent a written denial of Plaintiff’s claims on February 20, 2023, Defendants 6 assert that Plaintiff had until August 20, 2023 to file or amend his complaint to name the 7 individual city Defendants. (Defendants’ Motion, at 29). While Plaintiff timely filed his 8 initial complaint before August 20, 2023, he did not name the aforementioned Defendants 9 until his first amended complaint on January 12, 2024. 10 Defendants’ argument is ultimately unpersuasive. First, as a threshold matter, the 11 Court interprets Plaintiff’s TAC to not allege any state-law claims against Chief Kennedy. 12 (TAC ¶¶ 65–72). Defendant’s statute of limitations arguments as they relate to when Chief 13 Kennedy was named are not dispositive. Second, as discussed above, the Court liberally 14 interprets Plaintiff’s initial complaint to have named Officers Symonette, Lopez, Martin, 15 Bandy, and Alvarez as Defendants because he included their badge numbers and last names 16 in his complaint. (ECF No. 1, at 3, 7). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s TAC 17 complied with the Government Claims Act’s six-month deadline to commence an action 18 against a public entity. 19 4. California Penal Code § 240 (Assault) and § 242 (Battery) 20 Assault is “[a]n unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent 21 injury on the person of another.’” Cal. Penal Code § 240. To sufficiently allege a civil 22 claim for assault under California law, Plaintiff must allege that “(1) defendant[s] acted 23 with intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, or threatened to touch plaintiff in a 24 harmful or offensive manner; (2) plaintiff reasonably believed she was about to be touched 25 in a harmful or offensive manner or it reasonably appeared to plaintiff that defendant was 26 about to carry out the threat; (3) plaintiff did not consent to defendant's conduct; (4) 27 plaintiff was harmed; and (5) defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing 28 plaintiff's harm.” Yun Hee So v. Sook Ja Shin, 212 Cal. App. 4th 652, 668–69 (2013). 1 Battery is “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of 2 another.” Cal. Penal Code § 242. To sufficiently allege a civil claim for battery under 3 California law, Plaintiff must allege that “(1) defendant intentionally did an act that resulted 4 in harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person, (2) plaintiff did not consent to 5 the contact, and (3) the contact caused injury, damage, loss or harm to the plaintiff.” 6 Garcia v. City of Merced, 637 F. Supp. 2d 731, 747 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 7 “Physical injury is not a required element of either assault or battery.” Kisesky v. 8 Carpenters’ Trust for So. California, 144 Cal. App. 3d 222, 232 (1983). Furthermore, 9 “[u]nder California law, a defendant cannot be convicted of both assault and battery, as 10 every battery includes an element of assault, ‘and is, in fact, a consummated assault.’” Id. 11 (quoting People v. Lopez, 47 Cal. App. 3d 8, 15 (1975)). 12 However, “[a] police officer ‘may use reasonable force to make an arrest, prevent 13 escape or overcome resistance.” C.B. v. Sonora Sch. Dist., 691 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1187 14 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Brown v. Ransweiler, 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 526–27 (2009)). 15 Therefore, plaintiffs alleging civil claims of assault and battery must also sufficiently allege 16 “that [Defendant Officers] used unreasonable force against [them] to make a lawful arrest 17 or detention.” Arpin v. Santa Clara “Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 18 2001). “Determination whether an officer breached such duty is ‘analyzed under the 19 reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment to the United [States] Constitution.’ 20 Thus, the question is whether a peace officer’s actions were objectively reasonable based 21 on the facts and circumstances confronting the peace officer.” Knapps v. City of Oakland, 22 647 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1166 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 23 Cal. App. 4th 1077, 1102 (2004), abrogated in other part by Hayes v. Cnty. of San Diego, 24 57 Cal. 4th 622 (2013)). 25 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s TAC either fails to allege all the required elements 26 or only provides conclusory statements to support his civil claims for assault and battery. 27 (Defendants’ Motion, at 33–34). Plaintiff disagrees. (Plaintiff’s Opposition, at 3–4). 28 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Symonette “point[ed] a firearm at Plaintiff’s head,” 1 “pull[ed] Plaintiff out of his vehicle and handcuff[ed] him.” (TAC ¶¶ 55–56). From these 2 actions, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered, inter alia, “emotional distress” and “mental 3 anguish.” (TAC ¶ 59). 4 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s TAC sufficiently alleges torts of assault and battery 5 against Defendants Symonette. Furthermore, as discussed above, the Court finds Plaintiff 6 plausibly alleges Defendant Symonette used unreasonable force when he pointed his gun 7 at Plaintiff without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Accordingly, the Court 8 declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s assault and battery claims. 9 5. California Common Law False Imprisonment 10 “‘False imprisonment is the unlawful violation of the personal liberty of another.’ 11 The elements of a tortious claim of false imprisonment are: (1) the nonconsensual, 12 intentional confinement of a person, (2) without lawful privilege, and (3) for an appreciable 13 period of time, however brief.’” Knapps, 647 F. Supp. at 1165 (first quoting Cal. Penal 14 Code § 236; and then quoting Lyon v. Fire Ins. Exch., 161 Cal. App. 4th 880, 888 (2008)). 15 “California law protects a law enforcement officer from liability for false arrest or false 16 imprisonment where the officer, acting within the scope of his or her authority, either (1) 17 effects a lawful arrest or (2) has reasonable cause to believe the arrest is lawful.” Marsh v. 18 San Diego Cnty., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1054 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (citing Cervantes v. United 19 States, 330 F.3d 1186, 1188 (9th Cir. 2003)).5 20 Plaintiff’s TAC levies false imprisonment claims against Defendants Symonette, 21 Lopez, and Martin. (TAC ¶¶ 61–64). Defendants do not dispute the first or third elements 22 of false imprisonment. At issue is whether Plaintiff’s detention was “without lawful 23 privilege.” Plaintiff argues that because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion or 24 probable cause, the arrest was therefore unlawful. Defendants contend Plaintiff “fail[ed] 25 26

27 5 This standard is also codified in Cal. Gov’t Code Section 820.4, as discussed in Defendants’ Motion. 28 1 to plead essential facts such as why no reasonable suspicion or probable cause existed to 2 legally effectuate the detention then arrest.” (Defendants’ Motion, at 34). 3 As discussed above, Plaintiff’s TAC sufficiently alleges that the Defendant 4 Officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain and probable cause or a warrant to arrest 5 Plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore sufficiently alleges claims for false imprisonment against 6 Defendants Symonette, Lopez, and Martin. Accordingly, based on the present record, the 7 Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claims against Defendants 8 Symonette, Lopez, and Martin. 9 6. Bane Act 10 The Thomas Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”) is codified in California Civil Code 11 § 52.1. “The essence of a Bane Act claim is that the defendant, by the specified improper 12 means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff from 13 doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff to do 14 something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” Cornell v. City and Cnty. 15 of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 791–92 (2017). Violations of the federal and 16 California Constitution are all Bane Act violations. See Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1(b). “The 17 elements of a Bane Act claim are essentially identical to the elements of a § 1983 claim, 18 with the added requirement that the government official had a ‘specific intent to violate’ a 19 constitutional right.” Hughes v. Rodriguez, 31 F.4th 1211, 1224 (9th Cir. 2022). 20 The Ninth Circuit has held that “the Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, 21 intimidation[,] or coercion element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the 22 constitutional violation alleged” so long as the claimant shows the defendant had a 23 “specific intent” to commit the constitutional violation. Reese v. County of Sacramento, 24 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018). The specific intent requirement is satisfied where the 25 defendant acted with “[r]eckless disregard of the right at issue.” Estate of Serna v. County 26 of San Diego, No. 20-cv-2096-LAB-MSB, 2022 WL 827123, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 27 2022) (quoting Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 804) (alteration in original). 28 1 A local government can be vicariously liable for its employees’ Bane Act violations 2 under a theory of respondeat superior. See Gant v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608 (9th 3 Cir. 2014) (explaining that “[u]nder California law, public entities are liable for actions of 4 their employees within the scope of employment,” including for Bane Act claims) (citing 5 Cal. Gov't Code § 815.2(a)). 6 a. Constitutional Rights 7 Plaintiff alleges the following constitutional rights violations under the Bane Act: 8 (1) his Fourth Amendment and California state right to be free from unreasonable searches 9 and seizures; and (2) his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. (TAC ¶ 69). As 10 discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s TAC sufficiently alleges violations of his 11 constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures (with respect to excessive 12 force). However, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts demonstrating how his Fourteenth 13 Amendment due process rights have been violated. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES 14 Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim with respect to violations of his Fourteenth Amendment due 15 process rights. 16 b. Specific Intent 17 To sufficiently allege specific intent in a Bane Act claim, Plaintiff must satisfy two 18 requirements. First, the right at issue must be “clearly delineated and plainly applicable 19 under the circumstances of the case.” Cornell, 17 Cal. App. 5th at 803. Second, the 20 defendant must have “commit[ted] the act in question with the particular purpose of 21 depriving the citizen victim of his enjoyment of the interests protected by that . . . right.” 22 Id. 23 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s TAC has not “stated facts sufficient to allege an 24 unlawful act with the specific intent to violate Plaintiff’s right to freedom from 25 unreasonable seizure, excessive force, and warrantless searches.” (Defendants’ Motion, at 26 34). Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ argument in his opposition. 27 Ultimately, Plaintiff’s TAC does not sufficiently allege specific intent for his Bane 28 Act claims. Plaintiff has successfully articulated rights that are “clearly delineated and 1 plainly applicable under the circumstances” of this case because the Court finds that 2 Plaintiff has stated § 1983 Fourth Amendment individual capacity claims. Nonetheless, 3 Plaintiff’s TAC is silent regarding any allegations as to intent or reckless disregard—which 4 courts in the Ninth Circuit have held to be sufficient when joined with allegations of 5 constitutional rights violations to establish specific intent in a Bane Act claim. See Smith v. 6 City of Marina, 709 F. Supp. 3d 926, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (“At the motion to dismiss 7 stage, however, allegations of conduct that violates constitutional rights coupled with 8 allegations that the conduct was done with reckless disregard for a party’s rights can be 9 sufficient to establish specific intent.”); see also Velasquez, Jr. v. City of Hayward, No. 24- 10 cv-1221-TSH, 2024 WL 4780887, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2024) (same). Accordingly, 11 the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims with respect to his federal and state 12 rights against unreasonable searches and seizures with leave to amend. 13 F. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for undetermined violations by Defendants Alvarez 14 (individual capacity), Bandy (individual capacity), and Chief Roxana 15 Kennedy (official and individual capacity) 16 In this Court’s earlier order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s SAC 17 for failure to state a claim, the Court granted Defendants’ motion regarding Plaintiff’s 18 § 1983 claims against Defendants Alvarez, Bandy, and Chief Kennedy because Plaintiff 19 failed to allege any facts to support a finding of liability under § 1983 against them. (ECF 20 No. 52, at 7). Plaintiff’s TAC still fails to allege facts suggesting that Defendants Alvarez 21 and Bandy are liable in their individual capacity as members of CVPD, or that Defendant 22 Chief Kennedy is liable in her official or individual capacity as Chief of CVPD. 23 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Alvarez, 24 Bandy, and Chief Kennedy. 25 G. Rule 12(e) Motion for More Definite Statement 26 A motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) is proper if the at-issue 27 pleading “is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” 28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “A motion for a more definite statement must be considered in light 1 of the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a).” Beckner v. El Cajon Police Dep’t, No. 07- 2 0509 W(BLM), 2007 WL 2873406, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007). “Thus, a motion for 3 a more definite statement should not be granted unless the defendant literally cannot frame 4 a responsive pleading.” Id. 5 The Court finds that the parts of Plaintiff’s TAC that the Court has not dismissed are 6 sufficiently pled to put Defendants on notice of the claims against them. Defendants can 7 and have drafted responsive pleadings against those claims. Accordingly, the Court 8 DENIES Defendant’s alternative motion for more definite statement. 9 H. Rule 12(f) Motion to Strike 10 Defendants seek to dismiss or strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages and 11 attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (Defendants’ Motion, at 36–37). In 12 particular, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot recover attorneys’ fees and costs because 13 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and cannot recover attorneys’ fees. (Id. at 36). 14 Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, “the [district] court, in its discretion, may allow the 15 prevailing party [in a § 1983 case], other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee 16 as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). It is well settled law that under § 1988, pro se 17 litigants cannot recover attorneys’ fees. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991) (“A 18 rule that authorizes awards of counsel fees to pro se litigants—even if limited to those who 19 are members of the bar—would create a disincentive to employ counsel whenever such a 20 plaintiff considered himself competent to litigate on his own behalf.”). However, Plaintiff, 21 at some point during this litigation, was represented by counsel and presumably incurred 22 legal fees. See, e.g., ECF No. 34; ECF Nos. 42–44. Defendants cite to no case law that 23 would prevent Plaintiff from recovering those fees should he prevail. Furthermore, the 24 Ninth Circuit has generally allowed pro se litigants to recover costs separate from 25 attorneys’ fees. See Merrell v. Block, 809 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1987) (remanding to 26 district court a determination of costs incurred by pro se litigant relating to the litigation). 27 According, the Court declines to grant Defendants’ request to strike Plaintiff’s request for 28 attorneys’ fees and costs. 1 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s TAC fails to sufficiently allege “the requisite 2 ‘evil motive or intent,’ pursuant to California Civil Code Section 3294(a), or ‘oppression, 3 fraud, or malice’ on the part of any individual” for Defendant to recover punitive damages. 4 (Id.). Defendants are ultimately incorrect. It is true that “California law governs Plaintiff’s 5 substantive claim for punitive damages under California Civil Code § 3294.” Clark v. 6 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 F.R.D. 405, 406 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Under California 7 law, Plaintiff must plead that Defendants “engaged in ‘oppression, fraud, or malice.’ 8 Malice is conduct intended ‘to cause injury to the plaintiff’ or ‘despicable conduct’ carried 9 out ‘with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.’” Terpin v. AT 10 And T Mobility LLC, 118 F.4th 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2024) (first quoting Cal. Civ. Code 11 § 3294(a); and then quoting Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(c)(1)). 12 However, “the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern the punitive damages claim 13 procedurally with respect to the adequacy of the pleadings.” Id.; see also Clark v. Allstate 14 Ins. Co., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1018 (S.D. Cal. 2010) (“Where state law directly conflicts 15 with applicable provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts must 16 apply the Federal Rules—not state law.”); Bass v. First Pac. Networks, Inc., 219 F.3d 1052, 17 1055 n.2 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state 18 law claims is bound to apply the law of the forum state to the same extent as if it were 19 exercising its diversity jurisdiction.”). Under the less demanding federal pleading standard 20 pursuant to Rule 9(b), Plaintiff’s TAC needs only “include a ‘short and plain’ prayer for 21 punitive damages that relies entirely on unsupported and conclusory averments of malice 22 or fraudulent intent.” Clark, 106 F. Supp. at 1019; Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, 23 knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.”). 24 Plaintiff’s TAC sufficiently alleges malice. (TAC ¶¶ 31–40). Accordingly, the Court 25 declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s punitive damages request at this time. 26 I. Leave to Amend 27 “A district court may deny a plaintiff leave to amend if it determines that…the 28 plaintiff had several opportunities to amend its complaint and repeatedly failed to cure 1 deficiencies.” Telesaurus VPC, LLC, 623 F.3d at 1003. “[W]here the plaintiff has 2 previously been granted leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite 3 particularity to its claims, the district court's discretion to deny leave to amend is 4 particularly broad.” Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 5 2009). 6 This is Plaintiff’s fourth complaint. The Court previously provided Plaintiff with 7 leave to amend his complaint to cure the deficiencies in his SAC. Plaintiff’s TAC 8 reintroduces his Monell claims from his first amended complaint, except with less 9 specificity as to the policy, practice, or custom he alleges to have violated his constitutional 10 rights. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants Alvarez, Bandy, and Chief Kennedy 11 remain insufficient due to a lack of alleged facts and specificity in his pleadings. Because 12 Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to cure these deficiencies in his amended pleadings, those 13 claims are dismissed without leave to amend. Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims are dismissed 14 with leave to amend—except for Plaintiff’s alleged violation of his Fourteenth Amendment 15 Due Process rights, which is dismissed without leave to amend since Plaintiff has gradually 16 diminished any specific allegations regarding this claim from his first through third 17 amended complaint. 18 IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 19 Based on the foregoing, 20 1. The Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 individual capacity 21 claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment right against unlawful detention 22 and arrest against Defendants Symonette, Lopez, and Martin. 23 2. The Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 individual capacity 24 claim for violations of the Fourth Amendment right against excessive force against 25 Defendant Symonette. 26 3. The Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 individual capacity 27 claims for violations of the Fourth Amendment right against unlawful searches 28 against Defendants Symonette, Lopez, and Martin. 1 4. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Monell claims against 2 Defendants City of Chula Vista and CVPD without leave to amend. 3 5. The Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff's assault and battery claims against 4 Defendant Symonette. 5 6. The Court declines to dismiss Plaintiffs false imprisonment claims against 6 Defendants Symonette, Lopez, and Martin. 7 7. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's Bane Act claims against Defendants 8 Symonette, Lopez, and Martin with leave to amend—except for Plaintiff's Bane 9 Act claim for violation of his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process nghts, which 1s 10 dismissed without leave to amend. 11 8. The Court DISMISSES Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Alvarez, 12 Bandy, and Chief Kennedy without leave to amend. 13 9. The Court DENIES Defendants’ alternative motion for more definitive statement. 14 10.The Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff's requests for attorney’s 15 fees, costs, and punitive damages. 16 Plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this Order to file any amended 17 complaint. 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. 19 || Dated: November 26, 2024 < | □ 20 fr s Yn - 1 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw, Chief Judge United States District Court 22 23 24 25 26 27 28