Hillhouse v. C. W. Matthews Contracting Co.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Hillhouse v. C. W. Matthews Contracting Co.

143 S.E.2d 686, 112 Ga. App. 73

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedJuly 13, 1965

Docket41343

StatusPublished

Cited by6 cases

This text of 143 S.E.2d 686 (Hillhouse v. C. W. Matthews Contracting Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Hillhouse v. C. W. Matthews Contracting Co., 143 S.E.2d 686, 112 Ga. App. 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965).

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Opinions

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

“It is a well settled rule that pleadings must be construed in the light of their omissions as well as their averments. Houston v. Pollard, 217 Ga. 184 (121 SE2d 629); Strother v. Kennedy, 218 Ga. 180, 186 (127 SE2d 19).” Reserve Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 107 Ga. App. 311, 313 (130 SE2d 236). And if an inference unfavorable to the right of the party claiming a right under such pleadings may be fairly drawn from the facts stated therein, such inference will prevail in determining the rights of the parties. See Chalverus v. Wilson Mfg. Co., 212 Ga. 612 (1) (94 SE2d 736), and citations.

The plaintiff alleged that he gave a turn signal and proceeded to make a left turn at a time when the intersection was clear of oncoming traffic. However, there was no allegation that there was no oncoming traffic “so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard,” as required by Code Ann. § 68-1651, before the plaintiff would obtain the right of way in such intersection. Nor did the allegation that the plaintiff observed the defendant’s truck after he had reached the southeast corner of such intersection show such oncoming traffic was not an immediate hazard at the time the plaintiff began to make his left turn, there being no facts alleged as to why the defendant’s truck was not visible to the plaintiff.

Therefore, construing the petition in the light of its averments as well as its omissions, under Code § 105-603, the plaintiff, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences of the defendant’s negligence by waiting until oncoming traffic was not so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, and the allegations of negligence all being allegations of acts observable to the plaintiff if he had looked, and based, either directly or indirectly, on the excessive speed of the defendant’s agent, failed to set forth a cause of action against the defendant, and the judgment of the trial court sustaining the defendant’s general demurrer was not error for any reason assigned.

[76]*76 Judgment affirmed.

Eberhardt, J., concurs. Pannell, J., concurs, specially.

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Nichols, Presiding Judge.

“It is a well settled rule that pleadings must be construed in the light of their omissions as well as their averments. Houston v. Pollard, 217 Ga. 184 (121 SE2d 629); Strother v. Kennedy, 218 Ga. 180, 186 (127 SE2d 19).” Reserve Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 107 Ga. App. 311, 313 (130 SE2d 236). And if an inference unfavorable to the right of the party claiming a right under such pleadings may be fairly drawn from the facts stated therein, such inference will prevail in determining the rights of the parties. See Chalverus v. Wilson Mfg. Co., 212 Ga. 612 (1) (94 SE2d 736), and citations.

The plaintiff alleged that he gave a turn signal and proceeded to make a left turn at a time when the intersection was clear of oncoming traffic. However, there was no allegation that there was no oncoming traffic “so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard,” as required by Code Ann. § 68-1651, before the plaintiff would obtain the right of way in such intersection. Nor did the allegation that the plaintiff observed the defendant’s truck after he had reached the southeast corner of such intersection show such oncoming traffic was not an immediate hazard at the time the plaintiff began to make his left turn, there being no facts alleged as to why the defendant’s truck was not visible to the plaintiff.

Therefore, construing the petition in the light of its averments as well as its omissions, under Code § 105-603, the plaintiff, by the exercise of ordinary care, could have avoided the consequences of the defendant’s negligence by waiting until oncoming traffic was not so close as to constitute an immediate hazard, and the allegations of negligence all being allegations of acts observable to the plaintiff if he had looked, and based, either directly or indirectly, on the excessive speed of the defendant’s agent, failed to set forth a cause of action against the defendant, and the judgment of the trial court sustaining the defendant’s general demurrer was not error for any reason assigned.

[76]*76 Judgment affirmed.

Eberhardt, J., concurs. Pannell, J., concurs, specially.

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143 S.E.2d 686, 112 Ga. App. 73, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hillhouse-v-c-w-matthews-contracting-co-gactapp-1965.

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