Hill v. Workday, Inc.

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 14, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-06558
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION 7 8 ANTHONY C. HILL, Case No. 23-cv-06558-PHK 9 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 10 v. WORKDAY, INC., SUSAN DAHM, LISA MCFALL, AND KATIE HAUCK’S 11 WORKDAY, INC., et al., MOTIONS TO DISMISS 12 Defendants. Re: Dkts. 12, 23, 35

13 14 Now before the Court are the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Workday, Inc. 15 (“Workday”), Susan Dahm, Lisa McFall, and Katie Hauck, each seeking dismissal of Plaintiff 16 Anthony C. Hill’s Complaint asserting various causes of action in connection with Plaintiff Hill’s 17 employment at Defendant Workday. [Dkts. 12, 23, 35]. After thorough consideration of the briefs 18 and oral arguments, the Court issues this Order GRANTING all the Motions to Dismiss. Id. The 19 Court incorporates by reference its rulings and directives at the hearing on these motions, including 20 the Court’s verbal indication at the hearing that the Court was inclined to grant the motions to 21 dismiss with leave to amend. As discussed herein, Plaintiff Hill is GRANTED LEAVE TO 22 AMEND the Complaint and indeed the Court notes that, in compliance with the Court’s rulings at 23 the hearing on these motions, Hill has already filed his Amended Complaint. [Dkt. 53]. 24 BACKGROUND 25 I. ALLEGED FACTUAL BACKGROUND 26 The following background constitutes facts alleged by Plaintiff Hill, as detailed in his 27 Complaint. [Dkt. 1]. 1 A. Factual background of Plaintiff Hill and Defendants 2 Plaintiff Hill is a Maryland resident. [Dkt. 1 at 9]. Plaintiff Hill is a black male who worked 3 as in-house counsel for Defendant Workday. Id. at 11. Workday is a Delaware corporation 4 organized to do business in the State of California, with its headquarters in Alameda County. Id. 5 Specifically, Workday has an office in Pleasanton, California. Id. Plaintiff Hill began his 6 employment at Defendant Workday starting at or around early 2021. Id. at 58. 7 Defendant Hauck is a New York resident. Id. at 9. Defendant Hauck is a white female and 8 Plaintiff Hill’s direct supervisor. Id. at 21. 9 Defendant Dahm is a California resident. Id. at 9. Defendant Dahm is a white female and 10 Defendant Hauck reports to Defendant Dahm. Id. at 21. 11 Defendant McFall is a California resident. Id. at 9. 12 B. Allegations centered on Plaintiff Hill’s employment at Workday 13 Plaintiff Hill was hired as an attorney in the Workday legal department. Id. at 19. During 14 numerous, weekly one-on-one meetings, Plaintiff Hill sought a promotion from Defendant Hauck. 15 Id. at 21. Defendant Hauck suggested that Plaintiff Hill create a “plan” to be promoted. Id. at 21. 16 Plaintiff Hill created a “Career Growth and Continued Success Plan” for himself to be promoted 17 from Senior Counsel to Assistant General Counsel. Id. at 21. After reviewing the plan, Defendant 18 Hauck complimented Plaintiff Hill on the plan, but indicated that Plaintiff would need “at least one 19 year” as Senior Counsel. Id. at 21–22. Defendant Hauck told Plaintiff Hill that she would give the 20 “Career Growth and Continued Success Plan” to one of her other direct reports, a white female. Id. 21 at 22. Defendant Workday promoted that white female from Senior Counsel to Assistant General 22 Counsel shortly thereafter. Id. at 22. 23 In or around May 2021, Plaintiff Hill requested that Defendant Hauck hire an individual who 24 would assist Plaintiff Hill with his work. Id. at 22. Defendant Hauck responded that she did not 25 have funding for such a role. Id. at 22. Christine Fedrow, who leads the Workday Integrity Team, 26 informed Plaintiff Hill that the Integrity Team had funding for the role. Id. at 22–23. In June 2021, 27 Christina Strelow, a white female, was hired as the Program Manager for Federal Ethics and 1 Hill served as Ms. Strelow’s de facto manager/supervisor. Id. 2 In October 2021, Ashley Brown, a black female working in Defendant Workday’s Finance 3 Team, was having problems allegedly relating to race with her manager Ann Allen, a white female. 4 Id. at 24. Ms. Brown sought help from Plaintiff Hill; additionally, she asked Plaintiff Hill if he 5 thought she would be a suitable candidate for an open, interim, non-attorney role who would report 6 to Defendant Hauck. Id. Plaintiff Hill contacted Defendant Hauck and confidentially told her that 7 Ms. Brown believed she was having problems with her manager because of her race and inquired 8 about whether Ms. Brown might be interviewed for the open role. Id. Subsequently, Defendant 9 Hauck informed Plaintiff Hill that she had spoken to Ms. Allen about Ms. Brown, and Defendant 10 Hauck determined that Ms. Brown “would not be a good fit.” Id. Upon information and belief, Ms. 11 Brown’s employment with Workday ended shortly thereafter. Id. Upon information and belief, 12 Defendant Hauck did not report Plaintiff Hill’s race-based discrimination concerns. Id. at 25. 13 During the first week of January 2022, Plaintiff Hill met with Rich Sauer, Defendant 14 Workday’s Chief Legal Officer, regarding potentially creating a role titled “Lead or Head Public- 15 Sector Compliance Counsel” to handle Defendant Workday’s legal obligations. Id. at 20. Plaintiff 16 Hill indicated that he would be the ideal candidate for such a role. Id. Mr. Sauer was receptive to 17 the initiative and requested that Plaintiff Hill create a formal written document proposing the role. 18 Id. Plaintiff Hill provided the formal proposal to Mr. Sauer on January 7, 2022. Id. Mr. Sauer did 19 not respond to Plaintiff Hill. Id. Months later, Plaintiff Hill emailed Mr. Sauer regarding Plaintiff 20 Hill’s desire to be included in Defendant Workday’s Leadership Council on Legal Diversity Fellows 21 Program. Id. at 25–26. Mr. Sauer did not respond to Plaintiff Hill. Id. 22 In August of 2022, Defendants were preparing to host the “Rising” marketing event in 23 Orlando, Florida. Id. at 26. Defendants’ Sales Team wished to invite a former Baltimore City 24 government official to the “Rising” event. Id. Plaintiff Hill expressed a potential ethical problem 25 as the former Baltimore City government office was under investigation for alleged criminal conduct 26 that occurred while that the government official worked for the city. Id. After Plaintiff Hill 27 informed the Defendant Workday individuals associated with the “Rising” event about the potential 1 27. Defendant Hauck ordered Plaintiff Hill to review the Baltimore City contract to determine if 2 Defendants were legally prevented from inviting this individual, a task which Plaintiff Hill had 3 already previously performed. Id. After his second review of the contract, Plaintiff Hill drafted a 4 full analysis which indicated there was no legal prohibition to the invitation; rather, there was an 5 ethical prohibition. Id. Defendant Hauck responded only after Plaintiff Hill included all relevant 6 team members in an email requesting a decision from Defendant Hauck. Id. at 28. Ultimately 7 Defendant Hauck decided that the former official should not receive an invitation. Id. 8 In September 2022, Plaintiff Hill made a presentation to Defendants Dahm, McFall, and 9 Hauck, along with various Workday personnel including Mr. Sauer. Id. at 29. Plaintiff Hill was 10 assisted by Ms. Strelow. Id. At the meeting, Plaintiff Hill recommended that Defendant Workday 11 implement an annual compliance training which Plaintiff Hill had developed. Id. Defendant McFall 12 passionately disagreed with Plaintiff Hill’s recommendation. Id. Mr. Sauer overruled Defendant 13 McFall and requested that Plaintiff Hill work with Defendant McFall and others interested in 14 implementing the annual compliance training. Id. at 29–30. Defendant McFall was visibly angry 15 during this exchange. Id. at 30. 16 On September 16, 2022,1 Defendants Hauck and Dahm demoted Plaintiff allegedly without 17 just cause in retaliation. Id. at 31. The Complaint alleges that “Defendants arbitrarily and 18 capriciously prohibited Plaintiff from working with, receiving aid from, and/or supervising Ms. 19 Strelow[.]” Id. at 32. According to Plaintiff Hill, Defendant Hauck indicated that Defendant Dahm 20 made the decision to demote Plaintiff Hill. Id. Defendants Hauck and Dahm indicated a “desire to 21 ensure that ‘the resources we are using feel appropriately used and that we aren’t over taxing them.’” 22 Id. 23 On September 19, 2022, Plaintiff Hill, Defendant McFall, Ms. Fedrow, and Ms. Strelow 24 attended a Zoom conference call regarding the implementation of the annual compliance training. 25

26 1 The Court notes that the Complaint states this event occurred in 2023. [Dkt. 1 at 31]. However, in the context of the Complaint, this appears to be an obvious typographical error and the Court 27 construes the Complaint to allege (or intend to allege) that this event occurred in 2022. Est. of 1 Id. at 30. Before Plaintiff Hill had an opportunity to say anything other than “hello,” Defendant 2 McFall stated, “everybody knows that you don’t want to work, Anthony!” Id. Plaintiff Hill 3 responded that the characterization was unfair as evidenced by many recommendations from 4 Defendant Workday leaders. Id. “Defendant McFall then angrily and loudly doubled down by 5 again impugning [Plaintiff Hill’s] work ethic and professional reputation in front of everyone[.]” 6 Id. After that video call, Plaintiff Hill told Defendant Hauck that “the optics look terrible for 7 Workday” and “the incident appeared racist to me[.]” Id. at 31. Defendant Hauck responded to 8 Plaintiff Hill by saying “OK, I understand.” Id. 9 On or around October 12, 2022, Plaintiff Hill asked Ms. Strelow for her help on the project 10 “in part, because his disabilities prevent him from doing this work completely on his own.” Id. 11 Defendants Hauck and Dahm “had been aware of Plaintiff’s cognitive and memory challenges since 12 he revealed these issues to them in August 2021, in addition to his other (digestive) disability from 13 chronic diverticulitis, for which Plaintiff has been periodically hospitalized since a 2012 surgery.” 14 Id. at 32 n.7. 15 After delivering the final work product, Defendants Hauck and Dahm asked Plaintiff Hill 16 “how” he managed to complete the project. Id. at 33. After being dissatisfied with Plaintiff Hill’s 17 initial response, Defendant Hauck “then clarified her question by explaining that it was ‘actually 18 much more tactical than substantive.’” Id. 19 On October 12, 2022, Plaintiff Hill was hospitalized in a Maryland medical facility “[d]ue 20 to stress, exhaustion, and trauma associated with this and other disparate, discriminatory, retaliatory, 21 harassing and hostile treatment of him by the Defendants[.]” Id. at 35. Before his hospitalization, 22 Plaintiff Hill sent two emails to Defendant Hauck. Id. at 35. The two emails stated: “‘I’m having a 23 medical emergency and am headed to the hospital’ followed by, ‘I’m in the hospital waiting room 24 now with my wife[,]’ respectively.” Id. at 35. Additionally, Plaintiff Hill sent an email to Defendant 25 Workday with a completed leave request form “wherein plaintiff commented to Defendant Hauck 26 he would be filing the required family and medical leave certification as soon as he could because 27 he would need to take extended medical leave beyond October 12th since he was being hospitalized 1 On October 13, 2022, Defendant Hauck responded to Plaintiff Hill stating in relevant part:

2 I wanted to pass along a bit of information (in case you need/want it) in response to your comment around FMLA in the time off 3 request you submitted last night. If you have any questions regarding FMLA, you can contact Unum (who handles 4 WORKDAY, INC.’s FMLA) at 866-865-9092. Feel free to also reach out to [the Defendants’ HR team] P&P via Service Hub and 5 they can provide additional direction. Please don’t worry about work and focus on feeling better. 6 7 Id. (alterations in Complaint). 8 On October 20, 2022, “Defendants caused police to be sent to Plaintiff’s home under the 9 pretense of a so-called ‘Workday Wellness Check.’” Id. at 36. Plaintiff Hill’s wife, Mrs. Hanadi 10 Hill, “arrived after dark at their Silver Spring, Maryland home with their two sons in tow, then ages 11 13 and 9.” Id. Mrs. Hill was confronted by three squad cars whose lights were flashing. Id. The 12 squad cars were full of armed Montgomery County Police Officers. Id. Mrs. Hill informed the 13 police officers that Plaintiff Hill was hospitalized at a Maryland medical facility. Id. at 36–37. 14 Then, the police instructed Mrs. Hill to call the Defendants and inform them of Plaintiff Hill’s 15 location. Id. 16 The following day Plaintiff Hill was told the news of the police encounter and had a “massive 17 panic attack.” Id. at 37. Plaintiff Hill drafted an email for his wife to send to Defendants Hauck 18 and Dahm stating in relevant part:

19 I want to reassure you that [my husband] Anthony is safe and receiving ongoing medical treatment at a Maryland facility. His 20 medical team has estimated that he will need approximately 3 more weeks before he is able to return to work full-time. 21 Id. Defendant Dahm replied, without Defendant Hauck on the email chain: 22 Dear Hanadi: Thank you so much for letting us know. We wish our 23 very best to you and Anthony. We have been in contact with our HR team and I am advised that they are in contact with you to support 24 your request. Please do reach out if there is anything further we can do to support you. 25 26 Id. at 38. 27 // 1 At some time following the “Workday Wellness Check,” Defendant Workday’s Human 2 Resources send the following email to Plaintiff Hill:

3 Hope you had a nice weekend! Yes, I can confirm that the Wellness Check was completed on 10/20. We will not be providing any further 4 documentation regarding the decision to conduct a Wellness Check. 5 Id. at 40. 6 Plaintiff Hill was discharged from the Maryland medical facility on November 10, 2022. Id. 7 at 35. Plaintiff Hill returned to work from inpatient treatment on November 22, 2022. Id. at 38 n.8. 8 After returning to work, Defendant Workday employees began contacting Plaintiff Hill “expressing 9 their concerns and condolences, and saying that they knew where and why Plaintiff had been 10 hospitalized even though Plaintiff never revealed this confidential medical information to these 11 individuals, the Defendants, or anyone else.” Id. 12 Plaintiff Hill’s treating physician placed him on a modified work schedule which was 13 communicated to Defendant Workday’s Human Resources and Defendant Hauck. Id. at 44. The 14 modified work schedule was approved and acknowledged by Defendant Hauck. Id. However, when 15 Plaintiff Hill returned to work, he discovered Defendants “had made numerous material additions 16 and alterations to [his] job duties[.]” Id. at 42. 17 On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff Hill had a meeting with Defendant Hauck, Chandler Morse, 18 Vice President and Head of Defendant Workday’s Corporate Affairs, and Matt Pincus, Defendant 19 Workday’s Senior Public Policy Manager. Id. at 26, 42. During the meeting, Defendant Hauck 20 spoke about a situation in which a client’s contracting attorney had to take personal leave for about 21 one month during a negotiation which slowed down the contracting cycle. Id. Defendant Hauck 22 said at the meeting “I wish I could just take the month off.” Id. “Mr. Morse reacted to Defendant 23 Hauck’s comment by putting both of his hands over his face and saying nothing. Mr. Pinkus laughed 24 nervously.” Id. Plaintiff Hill was mortified but said nothing and smiled. Id. During the following 25 one-on-one meeting with Plaintiff Hill, Defendant Hauck said to Plaintiff Hill that another Workday 26 employee named “Ann” “is always taking leave, I swear!” Id. 27 On January 13, 2023, Defendant Hauck contacted Plaintiff Hill via Slack, a work messaging 1 outside Plaintiff Hill’s modified work schedule. Id. Plaintiff Hill responded an hour later, still 2 outside his modified work schedule, that he would not be attending because of his medical leave. 3 Id. Defendant Hauck did not respond. Id. Plaintiff Hill reported the incident to Defendant 4 Workday’s Human Resources. Id. 5 On January 25, 2023, Plaintiff Hill attempted to take Paid Time Off to address personal 6 issues. Id. at 46. Defendant Workday requires employees to obtain managerial approval for their 7 Paid Time Off. Id. Defendant Hauck demanded that Plaintiff Hill justify why he needed to take 8 Paid Time Off. Id. Plaintiff Hill responded to Defendant Hauck that the demand made him “very 9 uncomfortable[,]” that he made contingency plans for his work schedule, and that he offered to 10 provide information from his doctors to “Unum” regarding the need to take Paid Time Off. Id. 11 Plaintiff Hill also gave context regarding his work schedule by indicating that he had been working 12 on various Defendant Workday projects starting earlier than 5:30 AM. Id. at 47. Plaintiff Hill stated 13 to Defendant Hauck that he had been working on these early morning projects with Vice President 14 Juliana Capata. Id. Plaintiff Hill had not informed any other Workday employee about his working 15 relationship with Ms. Capata and her team. Id. Defendant Hauck did not respond to Plaintiff Hill. 16 Id. Plaintiff Hill sent Ms. Capata information which she and her team requested that same day. Id. 17 The following day, Plaintiff Hill followed up with Ms. Capata after not receiving a response. 18 Id. The follow up did not receive a response. Id. A day or two later, Plaintiff Hill followed up with 19 Ms. Capata and/or her team. Id. at 48. The second follow up did not receive a response. Id. The 20 same week this incident was occurring, Plaintiff Hill visited Defendant Workday’s Pleasanton, 21 California, headquarters for a Summit. Id. At the Summit, Ms. Capata frowned and glared at 22 Plaintiff Hill during an in-person, small group, breakout meeting. Id. Ms. Capata had previously 23 always been friendly, kind, and talkative to Plaintiff Hill both when meeting in-person and remotely. 24 Id. 25 On January 27, 2023, Plaintiff Hill sent an email to Defendant Workday’s Senior Human 26 Resource representative, Lauren Eyler, requesting “immediate reassignment to the Workday 27 Integrity Team[.]” Id. at 49. “Defendants denied Plaintiff’s written reasonable accommodation 1 Workday Integrity Team. Id. Plaintiff Hill states that his disabilities, which include “but [are] not 2 limited to, acute anxiety, panic disorder, depression, and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder[,]” 3 prevented him from working within his current management reporting structure. Id. 4 Plaintiff Hill spoke to Ms. Eyler in March 2023. Id. at 42. During this meeting, Ms. Eyler 5 stated that “she attributed the changing of the essential job functions for Plaintiff’s position without 6 having engaged in the interactive process as a ‘simple mistake’ and dismissed it as ‘not a big deal.’” 7 Id. Further regarding the communications from Defendant Hauck outside of Plaintiff Hill’s 8 modified schedule, Ms. Eyler “dismissed the significance” stating that “you have so many schedules 9 that [Defendant Hauck] probably just got confused.” Id. at 44–45. Further, Plaintiff Hill asked Ms. 10 Eyler why Defendant Hauck “had chosen not to acknowledge or indicate in any way to him that she 11 had asked Plaintiff to attend the work meeting while he was on medical leave by mistake or ‘just 12 got confused’ if that is in fact what happened, Ms. Eyler asked Plaintiff, ‘how do I know that you 13 didn’t do anything to [alter] the Slack message?’” Id. at 45 (alteration in Complaint). Plaintiff 14 responded that he had not altered the conversation, to which Ms. Eyler responded that “well then 15 [Defendant Hauck] was probably just busy.” Id. at 45 (alteration in Complaint). 16 During March 2023, Ms. Eyler stated to Plaintiff Hill that Jazsmine Gordon, a Defendant 17 Workday Human Resource employee, was the sole Defendant Workday employee responsible for 18 the “Workday Wellness Check” “before suddenly stopping herself, apologizing, attempting to 19 retract her statement, and explaining that her Workday, Inc. superiors, who include the Defendants, 20 would not permit her to discuss the matter with Plaintiff[.]” Id. at 40–41. Additionally, Ms. Eyler 21 stated that Defendant Workday’s “anonymous” mandatory weekly surveys regarding “employment 22 experience” acted as both a “sword and a shield” “in retaliating against Plaintiff and other similarly 23 situated members of their workforce for engaging in protected activity.” Id. 50–51. Ms. Eyler 24 explained the surveys act as a “shield” when she and other Defendant Workday Human Resource 25 professionals review individuals’ past positive survey responses to “shield” Defendants and their 26 management from negative complaints. Id. at 51. In doing so, Ms. Eyler explained that this practice 27 allows Defendant Workday Human Resources to “attack the veracity of the employee complaint 1 department does not afford “any added credibility or ‘weight’ to complaints made by Workday, Inc., 2 employees, including Plaintiff, who in the past have refused to answer” the weekly surveys or who 3 in the past have answered the surveys with negative response. Id. at 51–52. Ms. Eyler informed 4 Plaintiff Hill that Defendant Workday’s Human Resources “had fully and fairly investigated his 5 claims and concluded that they all lacked merit.” Id. at 55. 6 On March 16, 2023, “Defendants (through Ms. Gordon) invited Plaintiff to an unplanned 7 meeting with Defendant Hauck to occur that afternoon for Plaintiff ‘to get reset and aligned with 8 [his] manager moving forward.’” Id. at 55 (alterations in Complaint). “Plaintiff politely replied to 9 the Defendants’ meeting request, asking Ms. Gordon to ‘please invite Chris Fedrow’ because 10 Plaintiff did not ‘feel comfortable’ or safe ‘meeting with just’ Defendant Hauck ‘alone’ considering 11 his persistent ‘medical limitations’ and ‘given the circumstances.’” Id. Plaintiff Hill’s request was 12 rejected, and Ms. Gordon stated that “Chris Fedrow is not your People Leader and it would be 13 inappropriate for her to join, however I will be joining the call with you.” Id. at 56. Plaintiff Hill 14 requested that the meeting be postponed so he could retain legal counsel. Id. Ms. Gordon responded 15 by stating that: “(a.) ‘cooperating in being managed is an essential function of [his] role[;]’ (b.) his 16 request to delay the meeting until he could retain legal counsel was actually a ‘refus[al] to attend 17 the meeting[;]’ and consequently (c.) Plaintiff would ‘be placed on paid administrative leave 18 effective immediately’ until Plaintiff stopped his ‘unacceptable’ ‘refusal to be managed by 19 [Defendant HAUCK].’” Id. at 57 (alterations in Complaint). 20 On March 21, 2023, Ms. Gordon informed Plaintiff about his paid administrative suspension. 21 Id. Five weeks later, Plaintiff Hill’s paid administrative leave stopped without explanation from 22 Defendants. Id. at 58. At some point prior to Plaintiff Hill’s paid administrative leave, Defendant 23 Hauck sent an email to her entire team thanking individuals by name for their hard work over the 24 previous year. Id. at 45. Plaintiff Hill was not included in the list of individuals thanked in 25 Defendant Hauck’s email. Id. 26 On May 1, 2023, Plaintiff Hill went on approved disability and medical leave. Id. at 58. 27 At the beginning of his employment, Plaintiff Hill negotiated a compensation package which 1 60% refresher of Plaintiff’s initial stock grant annually. Id. at 52. Plaintiff Hill received an RSU 2 refresher grant of approximately 23% of his initial stock grant in 2022. Id. Plaintiff Hill raised the 3 discrepancy with Defendant Hauck, who said she would speak to her superiors regarding the issue. 4 Id. Defendant Hauck later told Plaintiff Hill that, based on the conversation she had with her 5 superiors, Plaintiff Hill needed to accept the RSU refresher grant he had received. Id. Plaintiff Hill 6 was awarded only approximately half of the annual bonus payment “which medium to high- 7 performing Workday, Inc. employees like Plaintiff were promised by the company[.]” Id. Plaintiff 8 Hill’s counsel “asked the Defendants on his behalf twice to explain his unjustifiably low 2022 bonus 9 award, the Defendants initially stated that Plaintiff ‘needs to speak with [Defendant Hauck]’ to get 10 an answer.” Id. at 53. Afterwards, “Defendants refused to answer the question at all.” Id. Plaintiff 11 received no RSU refresher from Defendants in 2023. Id. at 52. 12 Plaintiff Hill never received a single, formal negative performance review or evaluation 13 since he was hired. Id. at 53. Plaintiff Hill received numerous positive written acknowledgments 14 celebrating his work. Id. 15 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 16 On December 11, 2023, Plaintiff Hill filed the instant action in the Superior Court for the 17 County of Alameda. Id. at 2. Plaintiff Hill alleges various causes of actions against Defendants 18 Workday, Dahm, McFall, and Hauck in connection with Plaintiff Hill’s employment at Defendant 19 Workday. [Dkt. 1]. The causes of action are as follows: 20 (1) race discrimination pursuant to the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”); 21 (2) disability discrimination pursuant to the FEHA; (3) retaliation pursuant to the FEHA; 22 (4) harassment pursuant to the FEHA; 23 (5) failure to maintain discrimination and harassment free work environment pursuant to the 24 FEHA; 25 (6) failure to engage in the interactive process and provide reasonable accommodations in 26 violation of FEHA and California Family Rights Act (“CFRA”); 27 (7) CFRA interference and retaliation in violation; 1 (9) promissory fraud under the California Civil Code; 2 (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress; 3 (11) violations of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”); and 4 (12)2 violations of the right to privacy pursuant to the California Constitution. Id. 5 Plaintiff Hill asserts all twelve causes of action against Defendant Workday. Dkt. 1. 6 Plaintiff Hill asserts the fourth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of actions against Defendants 7 Dahm, McFall, and Hauck. Id. Plaintiff Hill seeks relief in various forms of money damages and 8 equitable relief. Id. at 81–82. 9 On January 11, 2024, Defendant Workday moved to dismiss the Complaint. [Dkt. 12]. On 10 January 26, 2024, Defendant Dahm moved to dismiss the Complaint. [Dkt. 23]. On March 5, 2024, 11 Defendants Hauck and McFall moved to dismiss the Complaint. [Dkt. 35]. Plaintiff Hill properly 12 and timely responded to all the motions to dismiss, and the Defendants properly and timely replied 13 to all of Plaintiff Hill’s responses. [Dkts. 16 (Plaintiff Hill’s Opp. to Defendant Workday), 26 14 (Defendant Workday’s reply), 32 (Plaintiff Hill’s Opp. to Defendant Dahm), 34 (Defendant Dahm’s 15 reply), 36 (Plaintiff Hill’s Opp. to Defendants Hauck and McFall), 39 (Defendants Hauck and 16 McFall’s reply)]. On May 3, 2024, the Court heard oral argument from all Parties on all the motions 17 to dismiss. [Dkt. 49]. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS all the motions to dismiss 18 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 19 LEGAL STANDARD 20 The familiar standards on a motion to dismiss are well-known and not subject to dispute for 21 the instant motions. “The Rule 12(b)(6) standard requires a complaint to ‘contain sufficient factual 22 matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Wilhelm v. Rotman, 23 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2000)). 24 Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is “a context-specific task that requires 25 the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 26 2 Plaintiff Hill denotes this cause of action as a duplicate “tenth cause of action” which the Court 27 assumes is a typographical error. [Dkt. 1]. The Court will assume there is a twelfth cause of action. 1 (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000)). Detailed factual allegations are not 2 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 3 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 4 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A pleading must “contain either direct or inferential allegations 5 respecting all the material elements necessary to sustain recovery under some viable legal theory.” 6 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562 (citing Car Carriers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101, 1106 (7th 7 Cir. 1984)). In other words, the allegations must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . 8 claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 9 DISCUSSION 10 I. ORAL ARGUMENT CONCESSIONS 11 At oral argument, the Court questioned both Parties on various issues that were raised in the 12 motions before the Court. Audio Recording: Hearing on Joint Discovery Dispute in Anthony Hill 13 v. Workday, Inc., No. 23-cv-06558-PHK, at 1:55 (May 3, 2024) (in the U.S. District Court in the 14 Northern District of California’s Clerk’s Office filed for this case) (hereinafter “Hearing”). Plaintiff 15 Hill and Defendants all agree that California law provides for a legal presumption against the 16 extraterritorial application of California law. Id. Plaintiff Hill concedes that he has only spent a 17 week in California for work and he spends most of his work time outside of California. Id. 18 Most significantly, counsel for Plaintiff Hill conceded that the recitation and interjection of 19 facts in the opposition briefs, where such factual assertions are not in the original Complaint, amount 20 to a tacet admission of the need for Plaintiff Hill to amend his Compliant. Id. at 1:56. As such, at 21 the hearing on these motions the Court GRANTED all four Motions to Dismiss and GRANTED 22 Plaintiff Hill LEAVE TO AMEND the Complaint. [Dkt. 49]. For the sake of brevity, the Court 23 addresses the major deficiencies found in the Complaint. 24 II. THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF CALIFORNIA LAW 25 Despite being a resident of Maryland, Plaintiff Hill asserts various causes of action pursuant 26 to California law. [Dkt. 1]. The Parties both agree that there exists a legal presumption against the 27 extraterritorial application of California law. Hearing at 1:55. However, the Parties disagree on the 1 for each cause of action. Id. at 1:55–2:05. As such, the Court addresses the presumption against 2 the extraterritorial application of California law for each cause of action. 3 A. Claims pursuant to FEHA and the CRFA - First to Seventh Causes of Action 4 The FEHA and CRFA both provide legal protections for employees under California law. 5 The question in this case is whether Plaintiff Hill, admittedly a resident of Maryland, is entitled to 6 the extraterritorial application of both the FEHA and CFRA to him and his employment. All Parties 7 agree on the legal standard for determining whether or not there is proper extraterritorial application 8 of California state law pursuant to FEHA and CRFA claims. Hearing at 2:02. The analysis for the 9 extraterritorial application of California law for the purposes of the CFRA is identical to the analysis 10 for the FEHA. Sexton v. Spirit Airlines, Inc., No. 21-cv-00898-TLN (AC), 2023 WL 1823487, at 11 *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2023); accord Hearing at 2:02. 12 California courts “presume the Legislature did not intend a statute to be ‘operative, with 13 respect to occurrences outside the state, . . . unless such intention is clearly expressed or reasonably 14 to be inferred from the language of the act or from its purpose, subject matter or history.’” Sullivan 15 v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal. 4th 1191, 1207 (2011) (quoting Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc. v. 16 Superior Court, 19 Cal. 4th 1036, 1059 (1999); N. Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 4 17 (1916)). As discussed in detail below, the Court finds that Plaintiff Hill’s Complaint is facially 18 deficient to overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial application of California law as 19 outlined in Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207, and its progeny. See Sexton, No. 21-cv-00898-TLN (AC), 20 2023 WL 1823487, at *4. 21 While “the FEHA imposes no residency requirement on either the employer or the person 22 aggrieved and no limitation based on where the conduct occurred[,]” “the majority of courts in 23 California and other jurisdictions have found that the extraterritorial application of FEHA is 24 determined by the situs of both [(1)] employment and [(2)] the material elements of the cause of 25 action, as opposed to residence of the employee or the employer.” Russo v. APL Marine Servs., 26 Ltd., 135 F. Supp. 3d 1089, 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d, 694 F. App’x 585 (9th Cir. 2017) 27 (collecting cases); Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, (h)(1). Here, the Parties disagree on the application of 1 factor in turn. 2 1. Situs of Employment 3 The first factor for evaluating extraterritorial application of the FEHA and CFRA is the situs 4 of employment. Situs of employment consists of the employee’s “principal place of work,” the 5 employee’s “definite base of operations,” or the “location where the employee’s work holds a 6 substantial connection to.” Sexton, No. 21-cv-00898-TLN (AC), 2023 WL 1823487, at *3 (quoting 7 Elzeftawy v. Pernix Grp., Inc., 477 F. Supp. 3d 734, 777 (N.D. Ill. 2020)). 8 Plaintiff Hill’s Complaint is factually deficient as to situs of employment. Plaintiff Hill is a 9 resident of Maryland and owns a Maryland home – and when he was in need of extended medical 10 hospitalization, he went to a hospital in Maryland. [Dkt. 1 at 9, 35–36]. Even viewing the Complaint 11 in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is clear on the face of the pleading that he was a remote 12 employee of Workday, living and working out of Maryland rather than California. Additionally, 13 Plaintiff Hill concedes that he has only spent a week in California for work and he spends most of 14 his work time outside of California. Hearing at 1:55. 15 2. Situs of the Material Elements of the Claims 16 The second factor for evaluating extraterritorial application of the FEHA and CFRA is the 17 situs of the material elements of the cause of action. In order to establish the situs of the material 18 elements of the cause of action, a plaintiff is required to establish a substantial connection of the 19 situs of legally relevant events to California. Sexton, No. 21-cv-00898-TLN (AC), 2023 WL 20 1823487, at *4 (citing Elzeftawy, 477 F. Supp. 3d 777). The case law requires that a significant 21 aggregation of alleged events must occur within California. Drolla v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. 22 A104161, 2004 WL 2750328, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2004) (unpublished). 23 To determine whether a party has established a substantial connection to California, courts 24 look to the “location of where the core of the alleged wrongful conduct occurred.” Id. “The Ninth 25 Circuit has analyzed this factor by evaluating whether the core of the claim, such as a termination 26 decision, occurred within California.” Sexton, No. 21-cv-00898-TLN (AC), 2023 WL 1823487, at 27 *4 (citing English v. Gen. Dynamics Mission Sys., Inc., 808 F. App’x 529, 530 (9th Cir. 2020)). “In 1 where the termination decision was made as a crucial element of the claim because this decision 2 gives rise to the liability of the conduct.” Sexton, No. 21-cv-00898-TLN (AC), 2023 WL 1823487, 3 at *4 (citing English, 808 F. App’x at 530; accord Guillory v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., 2007 WL 4 102851, at *4 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. Jan. 17, 2007) (unpublished). 5 The Complaint does not establish a substantial connection to California as the situs of the 6 material elements of the cause of action. Defendant Hauck, Plaintiff’s supervisor, resides and works 7 remotely from New York. [Dkt. 1 at 9]. Plaintiff only cites to the one-week Summit in California 8 where Defendant Hauck allegedly colluded with Ms. Capata to further ostracize Plaintiff Hill, ruin 9 his reputation, and prevent him from working with colleagues. [Dkt. 1 at 48]. There is insufficient 10 allegations as to the location where the termination decision was made, and the fact that Plaintiff’s 11 direct supervisor worked and lived in New York is particularly significant in this regard. The 12 allegations in the Complaint regarding the one-week business trip to California are not enough to 13 establish a substantial connection to California, especially compared to the amount of time Plaintiff 14 worked and interacted with his supervisor and others while he was working from Maryland. 15 Plaintiff Hill does not allege facts, other than a purported sneer while in California, to establish 16 material or relevant events occurring in California, much less a significant aggregation of alleged 17 events occurring in California. Drolla, 2004 WL 2750328, at *4. Plaintiff Hill’s Complaint does 18 not allege, for example, that any significant aggregation of material elements of his claims occurred 19 or were even ratified in California. 20 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss with respect to all 21 causes of action against all Defendants predicated on the FEHA and the CFRA without prejudice. 22 Plaintiff Hill is granted leave to amend the Complaint by May 24, 2024 (and, as noted, Plaintiff Hill 23 has already filed his Amended Complaint, see dkt. 53). 24 B. Claim pursuant to California Labor Code § 1102.5 – Eighth Cause of Action 25 As with the FEHA and CFRA, the issue for this cause of action is whether Plaintiff Hill (a 26 resident of Maryland who works remotely from Maryland for a California-based company) is 27 entitled to the protections of California Labor Code § 1102.5. Several courts have analyzed the 1 California Labor Code for an extraterritorial plaintiff. Vidrio v. United Airlines, Inc., No. CV15- 2 7985 PSG (MRWX), 2017 WL 1034200 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2017), rev’d and remanded sub nom. 3 Ward v. United Airlines, Inc., 986 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2021) (discussing multiple flight attendant 4 cases and determining that the factors relevant to analyzing the Labor Code’s applicability are (1) 5 the employer’s citizenship, and (2) the employee’s state of residence and (3) whether/how much the 6 employee worked in California) (reversed and remanded on other grounds); Shook v. Indian River 7 Transp. Co., 236 F. Supp. 3d 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d, 716 F. App’x 589 (9th Cir. 2018) 8 (California’s wage and rest break laws do not apply to work performed outside California by 9 Plaintiffs who were California residents and who worked for a Florida-based trucking company); 10 Campagna v. Language Line Servs., Inc., No. 08-cv-02488-EJD, 2012 WL 1565229 (N.D. Cal. May 11 2, 2012) (holding plaintiff did not have a claim under Labor Code section 2802 against her California 12 employer for failing to pay job-related “necessary expenses” of a home phone line and Internet 13 access where plaintiff worked remotely from her home in Iowa); Weinberg v. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, 14 No. 8:15-CV-01260-KES, 2017 WL 6543822 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017), aff’d sub nom. Weinberg 15 v. Valeant Pharms. N. Am., LLC, 765 F. App’x 328 (9th Cir. 2019) (denying summary judgment 16 because the only evidence of Plaintiff’s connection to California was that Plaintiff “worked on a 17 number of financial and infrastructure systems based in California, New Jersey, and Canada.”). 18 Unlike the FEHA, the test for extraterritorial application of the California Labor Code is not 19 explicitly framed as a two-element (or multi-factor) test. Thus, as with many areas of the law, the 20 Court examines the issue here based on application of analogous precedent (discussed above) as 21 guidance for the contours of the test for the extraterritorial application of the California Labor Code. 22 In light of the case law cited and discussed above, Plaintiff Hill’s Complaint does not sufficiently 23 allege facts to overcome the presumption against the extraterritorial application of the California 24 Labor Code. Plaintiff Hill’s allegations are much more analogous to those cases which have rejected 25 extraterritorial application of California’s Labor Code. Like the Plaintiffs in Shook, 236 F. Supp. 26 3d 1165, and Campagna, No. 08-cv-02488-EJD, 2012 WL 1565229, Plaintiff Hill does not allege 27 that he primarily works in California (and indeed he admits that he lives in Maryland and worked 1 instance when he travelled to California for work, and that was for a short period of time for a 2 company Summit. Id. at 48. 3 Defendant Workday proposed that the Court utilize the FEHA extraterritorial analysis 4 (including the general presumption against extraterritorial application of California law) for 5 evaluating the extraterritorial application of California Labor Code § 1102.5. Hearing at 2:05. 6 Plaintiff Hill had no objections to the Court applying the FEHA’s extraterritoriality legal standard 7 to this issue. Hearing at 2:06. Because California courts have neither rejected nor expressly adopted 8 the FEHA extraterritoriality test for purposes of the California Labor Code, out of an excess of 9 caution and in addition to the analysis of case law under the California Labor Code itself (discussed 10 above), the Court incorporates by reference its analysis of the extraterritoriality issue under the 11 FEHA. And as discussed above and for the same reasons, the Court finds that the Plaintiff has not 12 overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of California law and has not satisfied 13 this FEHA-based two-element situs test for extraterritorial application of the California Labor Code. 14 Thus, even under this alternative legal standards framework for extraterritoriality agreed to by the 15 Parties, the Court finds insufficient basis for the extraterritorial application of the California Labor 16 Code. 17 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Workday’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to 18 the eighth cause of action under the California Labor Code without prejudice. Plaintiff Hill is 19 granted leave to amend the Complaint by May 24, 2024 (and, as noted, Plaintiff has already filed 20 his Amended Complaint, see dkt. 53). 21 C. Claim of promissory fraud pursuant to California Civil Code §§ 1572, 1709, & 1710 - Ninth Cause of Action 22 23 As with the preceding causes of action, the issue for this cause of action is whether Plaintiff 24 Hill (a resident of Maryland who works remotely from Maryland for a California-based company) 25 is entitled to assert promissory fraud under the California Civil Code. The general presumption 26 against extraterritorial application of California law applies here, as with other causes of action. 27 Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207. 1 substantive law for promissory fraud, courts have analogously analyzed the extraterritorial 2 application of causes of action for fraud pursuant to California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) 3 and Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”). Ehret v. Uber Techs., Inc., 68 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 4 1127–32 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (analyzing the extraterritorial application of California Law of UCL 5 claims in connection with purported violations of California Civil Code §§ 1572, 1709, 1710, 1750 6 and California Business and Professions Code § 17500). 7 “Under California law, the relevant inquiry for whether a state law is being applied 8 extraterritorially is not the location of employment or where the contract was formed, but rather 9 whether ‘the conduct which gives rise to liability . . . occurs in California.’” Leibman v. Prupes, 10 No. 14-cv-09003-CAS, 2015 WL 3823954, at *7 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2015) (collecting cases). 11 Plaintiff Hill’s promissory fraud cause of action does not allege that the conduct which gives rise to 12 liability occurred in California. Instead, Plaintiff Hill only alleges, in the light most favorable to 13 him, that his employment contract was formed under California law. [Dkt. 1 at 73]. As with the 14 preceding causes of action, the Complaint fails to adequately allege sufficient facts regarding any 15 conduct which would give rise to liability occurring in California. As noted, Defendant Hauck 16 (Plaintiff’s direct supervisor) works in New York. [Dkt. 1 at 9]. The only allegations linking alleged 17 liability to California center on the one-week trip to California, which is inadequate because nothing 18 that happened during that trip is directly relied upon in the Complaint as conduct giving rise to 19 liability for promissory fraud. There is no allegation that Ms. Capata’s “sneering” conduct is in any 20 way related to promissory fraud and Plaintiff Hill’s stock options. 21 Defendant Workday proposed that the Court use the FEHA’s test for extraterritorial analysis 22 for analyzing whether or not there should be extraterritorial application of California law of 23 promissory fraud including California Civil Code §§ 1572, 1709, & 1710. Hearing at 2:06. Plaintiff 24 Hill requested additional briefing to address this specific issue. Id. Because the Court is granting 25 Defendants’ motion to dismiss with leave to amend, the Court denies Plaintiff Hill’s request for 26 additional briefing as moot. Id. at 2:18 (Plaintiff Hill does not object to the denial of request for 27 additional briefing). 1 the ninth cause of action for promissory fraud under California Civil Code §§ 1572, 1709, & 1710 2 without prejudice. Plaintiff Hill is granted leave to amend the Complaint by May 24, 2024 (and, as 3 noted, Plaintiff has already filed his Amended Complaint, see dkt. 53). 4 D. Claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress - Tenth Cause of Action 5 Plaintiff Hill asserts a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress under 6 California tort law against all named Defendants. [Dkt. 1 at 76]. Again, the central issue is whether 7 Plaintiff (a Maryland resident who worked from Maryland) can assert a claim under California tort 8 law. The general presumption against extraterritorial application of California law applies here, as 9 with other causes of action. Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207. 10 As with the California Labor Code, the California courts have not expressly reduced the test 11 for extraterritorial application of California tort law to a specified set of factors (unlike for 12 extraterritoriality inquiries under the FEHA). Here, the Parties propose different legal standards. 13 Defendants propose that the Court use the FEHA’s extraterritoriality analysis for evaluating whether 14 Plaintiff has overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of California law and thus 15 whether Plaintiff is properly entitled to assert intentional infliction of emotional distress claims here 16 under California substantive tort law. Hearing at 2:07. By contrast, Plaintiff Hill proposes that the 17 Court use the legal test discussed in Urban v. Tesla, Inc., No. 22-cv-07703-PCP, 2023 WL 6796021, 18 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2023). Id. at 2:09. 19 The Court rejects Defendant’s proposed legal test for extraterritoriality here. The test 20 outlined in Urban v. Tesla, Inc., No. 22-cv-07703-PCP, 2023 WL 6796021, at *3, does not relate to 21 the extraterritorial application of California law; rather, the test in that case centers on the 22 applicability of choice of law to claims, specifically whether the court should apply California’s 23 choice of law provisions or the choice of law provisions of the state of residence of the out-of-state 24 plaintiff. Id. The Urban court found that the out-of-state plaintiff, who was a “Florida citizen and 25 resident ‘at all times relevant to this action[,]’” could potentially assert a cause of action under 26 California law based on California choice of law provisions. Id. However, the Court acknowledged 27 there exists a factual scenario where the out-of-state plaintiff could not bring a cause of action under 1 The issue and the legal test outlined in Urban v. Tesla, Inc., No. 22-cv-07703-PCP, 2023 2 WL 6796021, at *3–4, are inapplicable to this case. The Parties are not disputing choice of law 3 issues here; rather, the Parties concede in their briefing that California substantive law is applicable. 4 [Dkts. 16 (Plaintiff Hill’s Opp. to Defendant Workday), 26 (Defendant Workday’s reply), 32 5 (Plaintiff Hill’s Opp. to Defendant Dahm), 34 (Defendant Dahm’s reply), 36 (Plaintiff Hill’s Opp. 6 to Defendants Hauck and McFall), 39 (Defendants Hauck and McFall’s reply)]. By contrast, here 7 the Parties dispute whether California law applies extraterritorially to an out-of-state plaintiff. The 8 Court finds the Urban v. Tesla legal test and analysis to be unhelpful to the issue before the Court 9 on the instant motion. 10 Even though California state courts have not defined the explicit contours of the standard 11 for extraterritorial application of intentional infliction of emotional distress under California 12 substantive law, precedent is instructive that there must exist a recognizable nexus between the 13 alleged harm and the State of California. Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207. 14 Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a nexus between the alleged harms that constitute 15 intentional infliction of emotional distress and the state of California. The gravamen of allegations 16 constitute: (1) the alleged discriminatory remarks made during a September 19, 2022, virtual 17 videoconference which Plaintiff attend from his Maryland workspace, see dkt. 1 at 30; (2) Defendant 18 Workday allegedly conducting a wellness check which caused Maryland police officers to appear 19 at Plaintiff Hill’s Maryland home, id. at 80, and (3) Ms. Capata frowning and glaring at Plaintiff 20 Hill in an in-person, small group, breakout meeting at the Defendant Workday California Summit, 21 id. at 48. The Court finds that these facts, as alleged, do rise to the level of overcoming the 22 presumption against the extraterritorial application of California law. Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207. 23 Because California courts have neither rejected nor expressly adopted the FEHA 24 extraterritoriality test for purposes of California tort law (particularly for intentional infliction of 25 emotional distress), out of an excess of caution and in addition to the analysis under Sullivan and 26 California’s general presumption against extraterritorial application (discussed above), the Court 27 incorporates by reference its analysis of the extraterritoriality issue under the FEHA. And as 1 presumption against extraterritorial application of California law and has not satisfied this FEHA- 2 based two-element test for extraterritorial application of California substantive law for intentional 3 infliction of emotional distress. Thus, even assuming the Court were to adopt this alternative legal 4 standards framework for extraterritoriality proposed by Defendants, the Court finds insufficient 5 basis for the extraterritorial application of California substantive law for intentional infliction of 6 emotional distress. 7 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss with respect to the 8 tenth cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress without prejudice. Plaintiff Hill 9 is granted leave to amend the Complaint by May 24, 2024 (and, as noted, Plaintiff has already filed 10 his Amended Complaint, see dkt. 53). 11 E. Claims for violations of CMIA pursuant to California Civil Code § 56 et seq. - Eleventh Cause of Action 12 13 Plaintiff Hill brings a cause of action for purported violations of the California 14 Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (“CMIA”) pursuant to California Civil Code § 56 et seq. 15 against all named Defendants. [Dkt. 1 at 77]. As with the previous causes of action, the central 16 issue is whether Plaintiff (a Maryland resident who worked from Maryland) can assert a claim under 17 California’s CMIA. The general presumption against extraterritorial application of California law 18 applies here, as with other causes of action. Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207. 19 As with the California Labor Code, the California courts have not expressly reduced the test 20 for extraterritorial application of the CMIA claims to a specific set of factors, such as are applied 21 for extraterritoriality inquiries under the FEHA. Here, the Parties propose different legal standards. 22 Defendants propose that the Court use the FEHA’s extraterritoriality analysis for evaluating whether 23 Plaintiff has overcome the presumption against extraterritorial application of California law and thus 24 whether Plaintiff is properly entitled to assert intentional infliction of emotional distress claims here 25 under California substantive tort law. Hearing at 2:13. 26 By contrast and as with the preceding cause of action, Plaintiff Hill proposes that the Court 27 use the legal test discussed in Urban v. Tesla, Inc., No. 22-cv-07703-PCP, 2023 WL 6796021, at *3 1 extraterritoriality for the same reasons as explained above with regard to the tenth cause of action. 2 The Urban test relates to analyzing choice of law provisions, and is inapplicable to analyzing 3 whether an out-of-state plaintiff can assert a claim under California’s CMIA. 4 Even though California state courts have not defined the explicit contours of the standard 5 for extraterritorial application of the CMIA, precedent is instructive that there must exist a 6 recognizable nexus between the alleged harm and the State of California. Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 7 1207. Here, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a nexus between the alleged conduct which is 8 asserted to violate the CMIA and the state of California. The gravamen of allegations constitute: 9 (1) Defendant Workday allegedly conducting a wellness check which caused Maryland police 10 officers to appear at Plaintiff Hill’s Maryland home, dkt. 1 at 80, (2) emails between Defendants 11 and Plaintiff Hill’s wife concerning his medical issues, dkt. 1 at 35–38, and (3) comments from 12 other unidentified Workday employees to Plaintiff indicating that they knew about his medical 13 issues and hospitalization, dkt. 1 at 38 n.8. The Court finds that these facts, as alleged, do rise to 14 the level of overcoming the presumption against the extraterritorial application of California law. 15 Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207. 16 Even though California state courts have not defined the explicit contours of the standard 17 for the extraterritorial application of California law (particularly for CMIA claims), out of an excess 18 of caution and in addition to the analysis under Sullivan and California’s general presumption 19 against extraterritorial application (discussed above), the Court incorporates by reference its analysis 20 of the extraterritoriality issue under the FEHA. And, as discussed above, for the same reasons, the 21 Court finds that the Plaintiff has not over come the presumption against extraterritorial application 22 of California law and has not satisfied this FEHA-based test for extraterritorial application of 23 California substantive law for CMIA claims. Thus, even under this alternative legal standards 24 framework for extraterritoriality agreed to by the Parties, the Court finds insufficient basis for the 25 extraterritorial application of California law for CMIA claims. 26 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss with respect to the 27 eleventh cause of action asserting CMIA claims without prejudice. Plaintiff Hill is granted leave to 1 Complaint, see dkt. 53). 2 F. Claims pursuant to the California Constitution - Twelfth Cause of Action 3 Plaintiff Hill brings this cause of action against all named Defendants. Id. at 79. As with 4 the previous causes of action, the central issue is whether Plaintiff (a Maryland resident who worked 5 from Maryland) can assert a claim under the California Constitution, that is whether he can properly 6 assert rights under the California Constitution extraterritorially. The general presumption against 7 extraterritorial application of California law applies here, as with other causes of action. Sullivan, 8 51 Cal. 4th at 1207. 9 Defendants proposed that the Court utilize the FEHA extraterritoriality analysis for the 10 purpose of analyzing whether Plaintiff can overcome the presumption against extraterritorial 11 application of the claims under the California Constitution. Hearing at 2:16. 12 Plaintiff Hill requests the Court utilize the test outlined in Urban v. Tesla, Inc., No. 22-cv- 13 07703-PCP, 2023 WL 6796021, at *3. Hearing at 2:16. For the same reasons explained above, the 14 Court rejects utilizing the test outlined in Urban because it is inapposite here. 15 Even though California state courts have not defined the explicit contours of the standard 16 for extraterritorial application of the California Constitution, precedent is instructive that there must 17 exist a recognizable nexus between the alleged harm and the State of California. Sullivan, 51 Cal. 18 4th at 1207. Here, the asserted California Constitution violations are predicated on the same alleged 19 facts as the alleged CMIA violations. [Dkt. 1 at 31–42, 77–82]. Plaintiff Hill does not sufficiently 20 allege a nexus between the alleged conduct which is asserted to violate the California Constitution, 21 on the one hand, and the State of California, on the other hand. The gravamen of allegations are 22 that: (1) Defendant Workday allegedly contacted local police in Maryland regarding a wellness 23 check on Plaintiff which caused Maryland police officers to appear at Plaintiff Hill’s Maryland 24 home, dkt. 1 at 80, (2) emails between Defendants and Plaintiff Hill’s wife concerning his medical 25 issues, dkt. 1 at 35–38, and (3) comments from other unidentified Workday employees to Plaintiff 26 indicating that they knew about his medical issues and hospitalization, dkt. 1 at 38 n.8. The Court 27 finds that these facts, as alleged, do rise to the level of overcoming the presumption against the 1 resident nor a citizen of the State of California. Sullivan, 51 Cal. 4th at 1207. 2 Furthermore, Defendants argue that a claim under the California Constitution entitles 3 Plaintiff Hill only to injunctive or equitable relief, and not compensatory or other damages. Dkt. 4 12 at 33 (citing Cousin v. Sharp Healthcare, 681 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1128 (S.D. Cal. 2023); Dkt 23 5 at 20 (citing Cousin, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 1128); Dkt. 35 at 29 (citing Cousin, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 6 1128). Defendants argue that the failure to seek any cognizable relief for this cause of action renders 7 the assertion of this cause of action to be legally deficient. [Dkt. 12 at 33; Dkt. 23 at 20; Dkt. 35 at 8 29]. Plaintiff Hill does not argue otherwise. [Dkts. 16, 32, 36]. 9 Here, Plaintiff Hill’s Complaint seeks no injunctive or equitable relief directed to this twelfth 10 cause of action asserting violations under the California Constitution. [Dkt. 1 at 79–82]. To the 11 extent the Complaint seeks injunctive relief, that prayer for relief is directed to other causes of action 12 and is not directed to the California Constitution’s privacy issues raised by the twelfth cause of 13 action. Specifically, the Complaint only seeks equitable relief in the form of “an injunction against 14 age, gender, disability and race-based harassment, discrimination, and retaliation in the future[.]” 15 Id. at 81. The twelfth cause of action (under the California Constitution) is not directed to age, 16 gender, disability, or race based-harassment, discrimination, or retaliation. Rather, the twelfth cause 17 of action is sub-titled “Violations of the Right to Privacy in Violation of the California Constitution, 18 Art. 1, § 1” and asserts that the defendants violated his right to privacy for the same reasons recited 19 with regard to the CMIA cause of action. [Dkt. 1 at 79-82]. 20 Under California law, a constitutional claim is legally insufficient where it fails to seek the 21 proper relief. Moore v. Rodriguez, No. 20-cv-01481-BAS-BGS, 2021 WL 2222590, 2021 U.S. Dist. 22 LEXIS 103725 (S.D. Cal. June 2, 2021) (“California's ‘constitutional provision protecting the right 23 of privacy . . . supports a cause of action for an injunction’ but it does not confer on a litigant a 24 private right of action for damages.”) (internal citation omitted); Cousin, 681 F. Supp. 3d at 1128 25 (dismissing a constitutional right of privacy claim under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the 26 plaintiff sought monetary damages rather than injunctive relief). Here, Plaintiff fails to seek proper 27 relief for his asserted cause of action under the California Constitution. Thus, for this additional 1 twelfth cause of action is legally insufficient and thus this claim should be dismissed. 2 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss with respect to the 3 twelfth cause of action pursuant to the California Constitution. As noted, Plaintiff has already filed 4 his Amended Complaint. See Dkt. 53. The Court further notes that Plaintiff no longer asserts a 5 cause of action under the California Constitution. Id. 6 III. CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST DEFENDANT HAUCK 7 Plaintiff Hill has asserted four causes of action against Defendant Hauck. [Dkt. 1 at 66 8 (Harassment in violation of the FEHA), 76 (Intentional infliction of emotional distress), 77 (CMIA 9 violations), 79 (Violations of the California constitution)]. Plaintiff Hill alleges that Defendant 10 Hauck is a resident of New York. Id. at 9. Separate from the other Defendants, Defendant Hauck 11 has moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. [Dkt. 35 at 12]. 12 “California’s long-arm statute allows courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendants 13 to the extent permitted by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.” Core-Vent 14 Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993); Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10. 15 “Because California’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process 16 requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same.” 17 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2004). 18 The Ninth Circuit has “established a three-prong test for analyzing a claim of specific 19 personal jurisdiction: (1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or 20 consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he 21 purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking 22 the benefits and protections of its laws; (2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to 23 the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair 24 play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (citing 25 Lake v. Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1987)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying 26 the first two prongs of the test.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (citing Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 27 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990)). 1 has personal jurisdiction over Defendant Hauck. The Complaint has insufficient allegations to 2 support such a finding. The Complaint relies on the fact that Defendant Hauck is an employee of 3 Defendant Workday, which has its headquarters in California. [Dkt. 1 at 11]. Plaintiff Hill does not 4 adequately allege that Defendant Hauck’s actions occurred in California or were directed towards 5 California. [Dkt. 1 at 24–26 (Ms. Brown related allegations), 27–29 (“Rising” event allegations), 6 31–33 (alleged demotion), 35–37 (wellness check in Maryland), 44 (work schedule related 7 allegations)]. Even taking the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, all of the material 8 acts taken by (or failed to be taken by) Defendant Hauck took place remotely. And, because Plaintiff 9 Hill admits that Defendant Hauck resides in New York, even construing the Complaint in the light 10 most favorable to Plaintiff, any remote actions taken by or involving Hauck occurred where she 11 resides and from where she works (New York). Id. at 11. Thus, the causes of action against 12 Defendant Hauck do not arise out of or relate to forum-related activities. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d 13 at 802. 14 The original Complaint fails to allege that Defendant Hauck purposefully directed her 15 activities to California. Id. By definition, because Plaintiff Hill is a resident of Maryland, any 16 activities Defendant Hauck undertook to supervise or communicate with him were at best directed 17 to him in Maryland. The Complaint contains no allegations that Defendant Hauck purposefully 18 availed herself of the privilege of conducting activities in California, and no allegations that she 19 invoked the benefits and protections of California laws. Id. 20 Finally, the Court finds that, because Defendant Hauck is a resident of New York who 21 supervised Plaintiff (a Maryland resident), asserting personal jurisdiction is not reasonable and does 22 not comport with fair play and substantial justice. Id. The Complaint has insufficient allegations 23 against Defendant Hauck’s actions which would reasonably lead her to believe she may be hauled 24 into court in California with regard to this matter. 25 In briefing and at oral argument, Plaintiff offered no evidence, averments of new facts, or 26 exhibits which would in any way supplement or support a finding of personal jurisdiction over 27 Defendant Hauck. See Hearing, passim. Plaintiff never sought jurisdictional discovery and, based ] Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant Hauck’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to all 2 || causes of action asserted against her as an individually named Defendant. The Court notes that 3 Plaintiff has already filed his Amended Complaint [Dkt. 53] which no longer names Defendant 4 || Hauck as a named individual Defendant. 5 CONCLUSION 6 For the reasons stated above and for the reasons discussed on the record at the Motion to 7 || Dismiss hearing, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 8 || Dkts. 12, 23, 35; Hearing at 1:55. Plaintiff Hill was and is granted leave to amend the Complaint 9 || by May 24, 2024 (and, as noted, Plaintiff has already taken advantage of this leave to amend and he 10 || has already filed his Amended Complaint, see dkt. 53). 1] IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 Dated: June 14, 2024

United States Magistrate Jud gistrate Judge 16

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