Hill v. The State of Georgia

• Court: District Court, S.D. Georgia
• Decided: March 20, 2025
• Docket: 1:24-cv-00219
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

LORRIE HILL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV 124-219 ) THE STATE OF GEORGIA; CARLETTA ) SIMS BROWN; A. DREW POWERS; and ) McCALLA RAYMER LEIBERT PIERCE ) LLC, ) ) Defendants. ) ________________________________________________________

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ________________________________________________________ Plaintiff filed the above-captioned case on December 3, 2024. (Doc. no. 1.) The following day, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, (doc. no. 3), which United States District Judge J. Randal Hall denied on December 5, 2024, (doc. no. 4). That same day, because Plaintiff paid the initial filing fee and is proceeding pro se, the Court provided her with basic instructions regarding the development and progression of this case. (Doc. no. 5.) The Court explained Plaintiff is responsible for serving all Defendants and directed the Clerk of Court to attach a copy of Rule 4 to the December 5, 2024 Order, so Plaintiff could determine the appropriate method of service for each Defendant. (Id. at 1.) The Court specifically informed Plaintiff that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), she had ninety days from the complaint filing to accomplish service and failure to accomplish service could result in dismissal of the case. (Id.) When the ninety days for effecting service under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) expired and there was no evidence any Defendant had been served, the Court entered an Order on March 5, 2025, directing Plaintiff to show cause why this case should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to timely effect service. (Doc. no. 7.) Plaintiff did not respond. Plaintiff has not shown good cause for failing to timely effect service, and the Court finds no other circumstances warrant another extension of the service period. The Advisory

Committee Note to Rule 4(m) provides guidance as to factors that may justify an extension of time for service. Such considerations include if a defendant is evading service or if the statute of limitations would bar a refiled action. Horenkamp v. Van Winkle & Co., 402 F.3d 1129, 1132-33 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4(m), 1193 Amd.). The record does not reflect any attempt by Plaintiff to cure or effect service beyond the three proof of delivery notices filed shortly after commencement of the case, (see doc. no. 6), let alone suggest any Defendant may be evading service.

Moreover, although it is not entirely clear based on the information in the complaint whether a refiled action would be time-barred, because Plaintiff has not responded to the Court’s show cause order or otherwise taken any action to advance the case since December 2024, which is when she filed her complaint, motion for a temporary restraining order, and delivery proof notices, Plaintiff has effectively abandoned her case. A district court has authority to manage its docket to expeditiously resolve cases, and this authority includes the

power to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with a court order. Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing & Landscape Serv., Inc., 556 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)); see also Eades v. Ala. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 298 F. App’x 862, 863 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“District courts possess the ability to dismiss a case . . . for want of prosecution based on two possible sources of authority: Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) or their inherent authority to manage their dockets.”’). Additionally, the Local Rules of the Southern District of Georgia provide that an “assigned Judge may, after notice to counsel of record, sua sponte .. . dismiss any action for want of prosecution, with or without prejudice . . . [for] [w]illful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court; or [a]ny other failure to prosecute a civil action with reasonable promptness.” Loc. R. 41.1(c). Finally, dismissal without prejudice is generally appropriate pursuant to Rule 41(b) where a plaintiff has failed to comply with a court order, “especially where the litigant has been forewarned.” Owens v. Pinellas Cty. Sheriffs Dep’t, 331 F. App’x 654, 655 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)); see also Loc. R. 41.1(b) (Court may dismiss an action sua sponte for “willful disobedience or neglect of any order of the Court’). In sum, Plaintiff commenced this case over ninety days ago, and the Court has warned Plaintiff on multiple occasions that failure to effect service would lead to dismissal of the entire case. (See doc. nos. 5, 7.) Accordingly, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS this case be DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to timely effect service on Defendants and abandonment of the case. See Schnabel v. Wells, 922 F.2d 726, 728-29 (11th Cir. 1991); Eades, 298 F. App’x at 863; Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of March, 2025, at Augusta, Georgia. fh. k bo BRIAN K ERPS UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA