IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION NATHAN L. HILL, ) Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 7:20-cv-00309 ) v. ) ) By: Elizabeth K. Dillon WARDEN STREEVAL, ) United States District Judge Respondent. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Nathan L. Hill, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus,pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his continued detention is unconstitutional. He is currently serving a life sentence, which was imposed by theUnited States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 1999. In his petition,Hill contends that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)is illegally holding him pursuant to that sentence. After review of the record, the court concludes that his petition must besummarily dismissed.1 Several months ago, the court dismissed a prior § 2241 petition by Hill, noting that jurisdiction was lacking over it. Hill v.Wardenof Lee Cty. U.S.P., No. 7:18-cv-00166, 2020 WL 908125 (W.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2020),appeal docketed, No.20-6305(4th Cir. Mar. 4, 2020). In its memorandum opinion doing so, the court set forth in detail Hill’s extensive efforts to challenge his conviction and/or sentencethrough various filings in different courts, including no less than five §2241 petitions. Id.at *1–3. As tothe petition beforeit, the court concluded that Hill failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in United States v. Wheeler,886F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018),for proceeding under §2241. It accordingly dismissed his §2241petition for lack of jurisdiction. Hill,2020 WL 908125, at *7. Hill appealed, and his appeal remains pending. 1 UnderRule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which may be applied to § 2241 cases under Rule 1(b), a court may summarily dismiss a petition when it is plain that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. In Hill’s current—and sixth—§ 2241 petition,he devotes many pages of his supporting memorandum to arguing that he is not attacking his original conviction or sentence, but is instead attacking the BOP’s authority to detain him.2 He states repeatedly, albeit in general terms,that he is challenging the “executionof his sentence.” (See, e.g.,Mem. Supp. Pet. 7,Dkt. No. 1-1.) He emphasizes that he is not asking that his conviction or sentence be vacated, but instead is
asking the court “to order the [BOP]to release him from illegal detention.” (Pet. 1, Dkt. No. 1.) Hill likewise states that this is his first “original writ of habeas corpus” and not a collateral attack on his conviction or sentence pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. §2255or pursuant to § 2241 and the savings clause in § 2255(e). Thus, he argues that he need not satisfy the tests of Wheeler or In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328(4th Cir. 2000),which set forth the requirements in the Fourth Circuit for challenging,pursuant to § 2241, asentence or conviction, respectively. He further argues that because this is a “plenary proceeding,” he is entitled to rely on“relevant law,” including Alleynev. United States,570 U.S. 99 (2013). (Mem. Supp. Pet.14.) In broad terms, Hill’s grounds for relief are: (1)his continuing detention is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)3; (2) the warden is “illegally withholding Hill from his liberty interest”in
violation of due process; (3) his continued detention violates the Thirteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) the warden is violating 18 U.S.C. § 4007 and the Appropriations Clauseby spending funds to detain Hill. All 2 Hill alsopoints to his efforts at exhaustingthe administrative remedies available through the BOP, attachingpertinent documents. (Dkt. No. 1-2.);Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing the exhaustion requirement, which applies absent specified exceptional circumstances). The courtis not relying on exhaustion grounds to dismissHill’spetition. 3Known as the Non-Detention Act,this provision states: “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). The Non-DetentionAct is not an obstacle to detentionpursuant to lower federal court judgmentsin a criminal case because Congress has conferred jurisdiction on those courts. See 18U.S.C. §3231(“The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”);see alsoArmstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2006)(holding that the Judiciary Act of 1789,which created lower federal courts,provides sufficient statutory authorization to detain personspursuant to a district court’s inherent contempt power). of these arguments, though, rely on the underlying premise that aspects of his criminal conviction or sentence are illegal, thus rendering his detentionillegal. That premise is based, in turn, on either Alleyne-related arguments or on his contention that an FBI agent on his prosecution team labored under a conflict of interest that deprived Hill of due process of law, arguments that Hill himself acknowledges he has raised on prior occasions.4
Hill’s petition must be dismissed for the same reasons the court dismissed his last §2241 petition. Specifically, despite his attempts to recharacterize his petition as a “traditional” habeas petition,as opposed to one attacking his conviction or sentence, his petition is clearly yet another attempt to challenge the conviction and sentence he is currently serving. As such, it cannot proceed here unless he satisfies Wheeler or Jones, which he cannot do.5 Putdifferently, his argument that his detention is illegal is premised entirely onhis conviction or sentence being
4 In a passing statement, Hillalsostates that he is at high risk to develop COVID-19and argues that this supports his release, although he says he is entitled to his liberty “even ifthere was no threat of COVID-19.” (Mem. Supp. Pet. 17–18.) The court finds it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether § 2241 is an appropriate vehicle for aconvicted federal prisoner to seek release based onthe risks posed by COVID-19. Compare, e.g.,Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-CV-00794, 2020 WL 1940882, at *5–6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2020)(discussing the issueand concluding that where prisoners confined in federal prison could use § 2241 where they sought not a commutation of their sentences, but to serve thesentences in home confinement until the risk of the virus abated)withSeth v. McDonough, No. 8:20-CV-01028-PX, 2020 WL 2571168, at*8 (D. Md. May 21, 2020)(concluding that challenges based on possibleexposure to COVID-19could not be broughtin §2241 because they were not challenges to the “fact or duration of confinement”), appeal docketed,No.20-6776 (4th Cir. May 26, 2020);seealso Coreas v. Bounds,Civil Action No. TDC-20-0780, 2020 WL 1663133, at *6(D. Md. Apr. 3, 2020) (reasoning that release from confinement on the basis of COVID-19 risks could be sought by an immigration detainee pursuant to §2241, but suggesting that§2241 would not be an avenue available to a convicted federal prisoner). Even if release were available on that basis under §2241—as opposed to seeking a modificationof his sentence from the sentencing court—Hill has not stated sufficient facts to entitle him to relief.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA ROANOKE DIVISION NATHAN L. HILL, ) Petitioner, ) Civil Action No. 7:20-cv-00309 ) v. ) ) By: Elizabeth K. Dillon WARDEN STREEVAL, ) United States District Judge Respondent. ) MEMORANDUM OPINION Nathan L. Hill, a federal inmate proceeding pro se, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus,pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his continued detention is unconstitutional. He is currently serving a life sentence, which was imposed by theUnited States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 1999. In his petition,Hill contends that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP)is illegally holding him pursuant to that sentence. After review of the record, the court concludes that his petition must besummarily dismissed.1 Several months ago, the court dismissed a prior § 2241 petition by Hill, noting that jurisdiction was lacking over it. Hill v.Wardenof Lee Cty. U.S.P., No. 7:18-cv-00166, 2020 WL 908125 (W.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2020),appeal docketed, No.20-6305(4th Cir. Mar. 4, 2020). In its memorandum opinion doing so, the court set forth in detail Hill’s extensive efforts to challenge his conviction and/or sentencethrough various filings in different courts, including no less than five §2241 petitions. Id.at *1–3. As tothe petition beforeit, the court concluded that Hill failed to satisfy the requirements set forth in United States v. Wheeler,886F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018),for proceeding under §2241. It accordingly dismissed his §2241petition for lack of jurisdiction. Hill,2020 WL 908125, at *7. Hill appealed, and his appeal remains pending. 1 UnderRule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, which may be applied to § 2241 cases under Rule 1(b), a court may summarily dismiss a petition when it is plain that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. In Hill’s current—and sixth—§ 2241 petition,he devotes many pages of his supporting memorandum to arguing that he is not attacking his original conviction or sentence, but is instead attacking the BOP’s authority to detain him.2 He states repeatedly, albeit in general terms,that he is challenging the “executionof his sentence.” (See, e.g.,Mem. Supp. Pet. 7,Dkt. No. 1-1.) He emphasizes that he is not asking that his conviction or sentence be vacated, but instead is
asking the court “to order the [BOP]to release him from illegal detention.” (Pet. 1, Dkt. No. 1.) Hill likewise states that this is his first “original writ of habeas corpus” and not a collateral attack on his conviction or sentence pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. §2255or pursuant to § 2241 and the savings clause in § 2255(e). Thus, he argues that he need not satisfy the tests of Wheeler or In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328(4th Cir. 2000),which set forth the requirements in the Fourth Circuit for challenging,pursuant to § 2241, asentence or conviction, respectively. He further argues that because this is a “plenary proceeding,” he is entitled to rely on“relevant law,” including Alleynev. United States,570 U.S. 99 (2013). (Mem. Supp. Pet.14.) In broad terms, Hill’s grounds for relief are: (1)his continuing detention is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)3; (2) the warden is “illegally withholding Hill from his liberty interest”in
violation of due process; (3) his continued detention violates the Thirteenth Amendment and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment; and (4) the warden is violating 18 U.S.C. § 4007 and the Appropriations Clauseby spending funds to detain Hill. All 2 Hill alsopoints to his efforts at exhaustingthe administrative remedies available through the BOP, attachingpertinent documents. (Dkt. No. 1-2.);Timms v. Johns, 627 F.3d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 2010) (discussing the exhaustion requirement, which applies absent specified exceptional circumstances). The courtis not relying on exhaustion grounds to dismissHill’spetition. 3Known as the Non-Detention Act,this provision states: “No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a). The Non-DetentionAct is not an obstacle to detentionpursuant to lower federal court judgmentsin a criminal case because Congress has conferred jurisdiction on those courts. See 18U.S.C. §3231(“The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the states, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”);see alsoArmstrong v. Guccione, 470 F.3d 89, 103 (2d Cir. 2006)(holding that the Judiciary Act of 1789,which created lower federal courts,provides sufficient statutory authorization to detain personspursuant to a district court’s inherent contempt power). of these arguments, though, rely on the underlying premise that aspects of his criminal conviction or sentence are illegal, thus rendering his detentionillegal. That premise is based, in turn, on either Alleyne-related arguments or on his contention that an FBI agent on his prosecution team labored under a conflict of interest that deprived Hill of due process of law, arguments that Hill himself acknowledges he has raised on prior occasions.4
Hill’s petition must be dismissed for the same reasons the court dismissed his last §2241 petition. Specifically, despite his attempts to recharacterize his petition as a “traditional” habeas petition,as opposed to one attacking his conviction or sentence, his petition is clearly yet another attempt to challenge the conviction and sentence he is currently serving. As such, it cannot proceed here unless he satisfies Wheeler or Jones, which he cannot do.5 Putdifferently, his argument that his detention is illegal is premised entirely onhis conviction or sentence being
4 In a passing statement, Hillalsostates that he is at high risk to develop COVID-19and argues that this supports his release, although he says he is entitled to his liberty “even ifthere was no threat of COVID-19.” (Mem. Supp. Pet. 17–18.) The court finds it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether § 2241 is an appropriate vehicle for aconvicted federal prisoner to seek release based onthe risks posed by COVID-19. Compare, e.g.,Wilson v. Williams, No. 4:20-CV-00794, 2020 WL 1940882, at *5–6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 22, 2020)(discussing the issueand concluding that where prisoners confined in federal prison could use § 2241 where they sought not a commutation of their sentences, but to serve thesentences in home confinement until the risk of the virus abated)withSeth v. McDonough, No. 8:20-CV-01028-PX, 2020 WL 2571168, at*8 (D. Md. May 21, 2020)(concluding that challenges based on possibleexposure to COVID-19could not be broughtin §2241 because they were not challenges to the “fact or duration of confinement”), appeal docketed,No.20-6776 (4th Cir. May 26, 2020);seealso Coreas v. Bounds,Civil Action No. TDC-20-0780, 2020 WL 1663133, at *6(D. Md. Apr. 3, 2020) (reasoning that release from confinement on the basis of COVID-19 risks could be sought by an immigration detainee pursuant to §2241, but suggesting that§2241 would not be an avenue available to a convicted federal prisoner). Even if release were available on that basis under §2241—as opposed to seeking a modificationof his sentence from the sentencing court—Hill has not stated sufficient facts to entitle him to relief. For example, he does not offer details concerning any medical risk particular to him as a result of COVID-19or any facts concerning any alleged outbreak or failures at his current place ofincarceration. Instead, his statement that thecoronavirus pandemic supports his release seems to be amere afterthought. Indeed, hementions coronavirus onlyin one place and only in several lines ofhis 38- page supporting memorandum, and he does not reference it at all in his listed groundsfor relief. (SeePet.4–5.) Nor does he allege that he has exhausted his administrative remedies as to this issue. 5 His arguments based on Alleyne do not satisfy the Wheeler requirements for the reasons set forth inthe court’smemorandum opinion in his last § 2241 case. Hill,2020 WL 908125, at *5–6. His claims concerning the conflict of interest also fail to satisfy Jones or Alleyne. Among other reasons, he fails to identify any substantive law that changed such that the conduct of which he was convicted is deemed not to be criminal, the second Jones requirement. 226 F.3d at 333–34. Nor does he identify any settled substantive law that changed after his direct appeal and first § 2255 and was deemed to apply retroactively on collateral review, the secondWheeler requirement. 886 F.3d at429. illegal, not on any independent action by the BOP—except its justified insistencethat it must detain him consistent with the valid criminal judgment against him. Indeed, he does not make any arguments as to why the BOP’s “execution” of his sentence is otherwise unlawful. He simply cites to the same grounds on whichhe has reliedinone or more of his prior petitions, all of which—in fact—rely on the invalidation of his conviction or sentence.
Hill attempts to piece together language from various cases to support his contention that this is a viable strategy for obtaining release. And he relies on a number of cases that are distinguishable or arise in other contexts. By way of example only,Hill relies on United States v. Slade,No. 1:08CR00024-005, 2019 WL 3061200(W.D. Va. July 12, 2019),to support his contention that he can rely on Alleyne, despite its non-retroactivity on collateral review. In Slade, the court was addressing, in its role as the sentencing court, a request for relief under the First Step Act. The court reasoned that although Alleyne was not retroactive on collateral review, the court had to separately address whether it was retroactive in the context of sentence reductions. Id.at *3. Similarly, elsewhere in his supporting memorandum, Hill argues that his
situationis “analogous to a prisoner who files a [18 U.S.C. §3582] motion,”(Mem. Supp. Pet. 14). He is incorrect. Whetherbrought under § 3582or the First Step Act, motions in which aconvicted prisoner requests areduction in his sentence are filed with the sentencingcourt, not with the court in the district where he is incarcerated. Moreover, those motions are direct challenges to the prisoner’s sentence. Again, the circular nature of Hill’s reasoning is apparent in his reliance on those cases. In an effort to avoid the Wheeler requirements that preclude his proceeding in this court, he insists he is not attacking his sentence. But in his attempt to do an end-run around the Wheeler requirements,he then relies on cases involving direct challenges to a sentence. Those cases cannot help him. In short, Hill’s attempts to characterize his petitionas a “traditional” writ of habeas corpus that does not attack his criminal judgment fails, most particularlybecause the only grounds he offers insupport of his detention are grounds that challenge the validity of his conviction or sentence. Andnone of those grounds satisfy Jones or Wheeler so as to allow him to proceed under § 2241. See supra note5.
CONCLUSION Forthe foregoing reasons, Hill’s § 2241 petition will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. An appropriate order will be entered. Entered: June 9, 2020.
/s/ Elizabeth K. Dillon Elizabeth K. Dillon United States District Judge