John B. Robbins, Judge.
This appeal arose from a bench-trial criminal conviction of appellant, Robert Stephen Hill, in Lonoke County, following a purported conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of controlled substance, methamphetamine, a Class C felony. Appellant argues that (1) the arresting officers lacked the requisite suspicion to detain him, as established by Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-203, (2) the arresting officers exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk and Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.4, (3) that appellant did not consent to the search of his person, and (4) that the denial of his motion to suppress was reversible error. Because appellant’s purported conditional guilty plea did not conform with Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) (2002), we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
On January 29, 2002, the trial court held a suppression hearing pursuant to appellant’s motion to suppress. During that hearing, the following facts developed in testimony. On September 5, 2000, England police officer Todd Brown received a dispatch to the home of Judy Holladay. When he arrived at that home, Hol-laday informed him that there had been a disturbance involving drugs. She told the officer that the suspects, a male and a female, were in a blue S-10 pickup truck. Holladay also stated that the suspects had crystal meth “on them.” Brown relayed that information to his chief. Brown testified that he “believed the suspect would be in possession of drugs after talking with Ms. Holladay.” Chief Cook later testified that he “would not characterize the stop as being for the sole purpose of finding drugs,” but that it was a stop conducted in response to a disturbance call. However, Cook also stated that there “were allegations of drugs being in the vehicle,” that he was “familiar with the people who made the complaint,” that this “was not an anonymous tip,” that there “were previous drug problems in that area and at that residence,” and that his department “had never used the informant before and [he] did not know if she has ever lied to [him].”
Chief Cook was the first to stop appellant’s vehicle based on the information thus received. Officer Brown arrived second. Appellant was the driver of the truck. Cook informed them of the reason for the stop. According to Cook’s testimony, he asked appellant out of the truck and conducted a “protective pat-down for weapons and found none.” After that, Cook checked appellant’s papers. Cook testified that he conducts pat-down searches as a matter of policy “whenever there is a possible narcotics or a disturbance involved or where there is a weapon present, whether it is reported or unreported.” However, Cook also testified that appellant had done nothing in his presence that would have led Cook to believe that appellant had weapons.
Appellant then gave verbal permission for the officers to search the truck. The officers did not find drugs or other contraband inside the vehicle. However, Chief Cook had noticed, and felt during the pat-down, a bulge in appellant’s right front jeans pocket. Thus, after completing the search of the vehicle, Chief Cook asked appellant “if he would mind showing [him] what he had in his right-hand front pocket.” Cook testified later that at that point he suspected that the item in appellant’s pocket might be a pill bottle often used in narcotics crimes. Appellant testified that Cook “stayed at [his] pocket and kept squeezing from the outside of [his] pants,” but that Cook never reached into the pocket. Appellant “complied” with the officer’s request and handed over a plastic bottle without a label — according to Cook, he did so “immediately, without hesitation.” Apparently, though, appellant at first just pulled out a lighter, upon which Cook specifically requested that he wanted to see the “round object” in appellant’s pocket. Cook specifically testified that he did not himself remove the item from appellant’s pocket because appellant then was not yet under arrest. When Cook asked appellant what was in the bottle, appellant claimed that he did not know. Appellant later testified that he believed the substance to be Tylenol because the bottle was a Tylenol bottle. Appellant also stated that he never looked into the botde, but that he had received it for headaches at the home of Berniece Holladay, Judy Holladay’s mother and a friend of his female passenger, where they had stopped earlier. Cook saw a white, powdery substance in the bottle. At that point, the officers arrested appellant and his passenger. Both arrestees received their Miranda readings at that time.
Because Chief Cook’s police car did not have a police camera and Officer Brown’s patrol unit arrived behind Cook’s patrol car, Brown did not use his police camera in the incident at issue.
Appellant testified that he did not know Judy Holladay, that he had not been at her house, and that he had not smoked drugs with her. He stated — when Chief Cook informed him of the reason for the stop — that his female passenger told him that “some girl had a problem with her.” The passenger later testified that Judy Holladay did not like her.
Toward the end of the hearing, counsel for appellant argued that the holding of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), required a conclusion that a Terry search was not warranted. Furthermore, counsel for appellant specifically argued that Ark. R. Crim. P. 11.1 requires a finding that consent cannot be the product of actual or implied duress or coercion, and that an officer asking a defendant to remove the items from his pocket would be more in the form of an order than a request. The trial court found that there was a conflict in testimony regarding whether the officer asked to see the contents of the pocket or whether he ordered appellant to empty his pockets. After hearing the State’s closing argument, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence.
On March 20, 2002, less than two months after the suppression hearing, appellant entered what he asserts to be a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of controlled substance, methamphetamine, a Class C felony. Appellant received a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, with 30 months suspended. From this, he brings the current appeal.
Lack of Jurisdiction to Hear Appeal
Notably, the State does not argue that appellant’s attempted conditional guilty plea fails to comply with the requirements of Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) (2002). However, whether a defendant has complied with Rule 24.3(b) is a jurisdictional question, see Ray v. State, 328 Ark. 176, 941 S.W.2d 427 (1997), and as such, we must raise the issue sua sponte. When a defendant pleads guilty to a charge, he or she waives the right to appeal that conviction. Green v. State, 334 Ark. 484, 978 S.W.2d 300 (1998). For relevant purposes before us, only a conditional plea pursuant to Rule 24.3(b) enables a defendant to retain the right to appeal an adverse suppression ruling. Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 1(a) (2002); Barnett v. State, 336 Ark. 165, 984 S.W.2d 444 (1999).
Rule 24.3(b) states:
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John B. Robbins, Judge.
This appeal arose from a bench-trial criminal conviction of appellant, Robert Stephen Hill, in Lonoke County, following a purported conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of controlled substance, methamphetamine, a Class C felony. Appellant argues that (1) the arresting officers lacked the requisite suspicion to detain him, as established by Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.1 and Ark. Code Ann. § 16-81-203, (2) the arresting officers exceeded the scope of a Terry frisk and Ark. R. Crim. P. 3.4, (3) that appellant did not consent to the search of his person, and (4) that the denial of his motion to suppress was reversible error. Because appellant’s purported conditional guilty plea did not conform with Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) (2002), we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
On January 29, 2002, the trial court held a suppression hearing pursuant to appellant’s motion to suppress. During that hearing, the following facts developed in testimony. On September 5, 2000, England police officer Todd Brown received a dispatch to the home of Judy Holladay. When he arrived at that home, Hol-laday informed him that there had been a disturbance involving drugs. She told the officer that the suspects, a male and a female, were in a blue S-10 pickup truck. Holladay also stated that the suspects had crystal meth “on them.” Brown relayed that information to his chief. Brown testified that he “believed the suspect would be in possession of drugs after talking with Ms. Holladay.” Chief Cook later testified that he “would not characterize the stop as being for the sole purpose of finding drugs,” but that it was a stop conducted in response to a disturbance call. However, Cook also stated that there “were allegations of drugs being in the vehicle,” that he was “familiar with the people who made the complaint,” that this “was not an anonymous tip,” that there “were previous drug problems in that area and at that residence,” and that his department “had never used the informant before and [he] did not know if she has ever lied to [him].”
Chief Cook was the first to stop appellant’s vehicle based on the information thus received. Officer Brown arrived second. Appellant was the driver of the truck. Cook informed them of the reason for the stop. According to Cook’s testimony, he asked appellant out of the truck and conducted a “protective pat-down for weapons and found none.” After that, Cook checked appellant’s papers. Cook testified that he conducts pat-down searches as a matter of policy “whenever there is a possible narcotics or a disturbance involved or where there is a weapon present, whether it is reported or unreported.” However, Cook also testified that appellant had done nothing in his presence that would have led Cook to believe that appellant had weapons.
Appellant then gave verbal permission for the officers to search the truck. The officers did not find drugs or other contraband inside the vehicle. However, Chief Cook had noticed, and felt during the pat-down, a bulge in appellant’s right front jeans pocket. Thus, after completing the search of the vehicle, Chief Cook asked appellant “if he would mind showing [him] what he had in his right-hand front pocket.” Cook testified later that at that point he suspected that the item in appellant’s pocket might be a pill bottle often used in narcotics crimes. Appellant testified that Cook “stayed at [his] pocket and kept squeezing from the outside of [his] pants,” but that Cook never reached into the pocket. Appellant “complied” with the officer’s request and handed over a plastic bottle without a label — according to Cook, he did so “immediately, without hesitation.” Apparently, though, appellant at first just pulled out a lighter, upon which Cook specifically requested that he wanted to see the “round object” in appellant’s pocket. Cook specifically testified that he did not himself remove the item from appellant’s pocket because appellant then was not yet under arrest. When Cook asked appellant what was in the bottle, appellant claimed that he did not know. Appellant later testified that he believed the substance to be Tylenol because the bottle was a Tylenol bottle. Appellant also stated that he never looked into the botde, but that he had received it for headaches at the home of Berniece Holladay, Judy Holladay’s mother and a friend of his female passenger, where they had stopped earlier. Cook saw a white, powdery substance in the bottle. At that point, the officers arrested appellant and his passenger. Both arrestees received their Miranda readings at that time.
Because Chief Cook’s police car did not have a police camera and Officer Brown’s patrol unit arrived behind Cook’s patrol car, Brown did not use his police camera in the incident at issue.
Appellant testified that he did not know Judy Holladay, that he had not been at her house, and that he had not smoked drugs with her. He stated — when Chief Cook informed him of the reason for the stop — that his female passenger told him that “some girl had a problem with her.” The passenger later testified that Judy Holladay did not like her.
Toward the end of the hearing, counsel for appellant argued that the holding of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), required a conclusion that a Terry search was not warranted. Furthermore, counsel for appellant specifically argued that Ark. R. Crim. P. 11.1 requires a finding that consent cannot be the product of actual or implied duress or coercion, and that an officer asking a defendant to remove the items from his pocket would be more in the form of an order than a request. The trial court found that there was a conflict in testimony regarding whether the officer asked to see the contents of the pocket or whether he ordered appellant to empty his pockets. After hearing the State’s closing argument, the trial court denied the motion to suppress the evidence.
On March 20, 2002, less than two months after the suppression hearing, appellant entered what he asserts to be a conditional plea of guilty to the charge of possession of controlled substance, methamphetamine, a Class C felony. Appellant received a sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, with 30 months suspended. From this, he brings the current appeal.
Lack of Jurisdiction to Hear Appeal
Notably, the State does not argue that appellant’s attempted conditional guilty plea fails to comply with the requirements of Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b) (2002). However, whether a defendant has complied with Rule 24.3(b) is a jurisdictional question, see Ray v. State, 328 Ark. 176, 941 S.W.2d 427 (1997), and as such, we must raise the issue sua sponte. When a defendant pleads guilty to a charge, he or she waives the right to appeal that conviction. Green v. State, 334 Ark. 484, 978 S.W.2d 300 (1998). For relevant purposes before us, only a conditional plea pursuant to Rule 24.3(b) enables a defendant to retain the right to appeal an adverse suppression ruling. Ark. R. App. P. — Crim. 1(a) (2002); Barnett v. State, 336 Ark. 165, 984 S.W.2d 444 (1999).
Rule 24.3(b) states:
With the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to review of an adverse determination of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. If the defendant prevails on appeal, he shall be allowed to withdraw his plea.
Our supreme court has interpreted Rule 24.3(b) to require strict compliance with the requirement that the right to appeal be reserved in writing. Barnett v. State, supra. This is so even when there has been an attempt to enter a conditional plea below. Ray v. State, supra. In addition, the writing must be contemporaneous with the defendant reserving his or her right to appeal. Tabor v. State, 326 Ark. 51, 930 S.W.2d 319 (1996). We also look for an indication that the conditional plea was entered with the approval of the trial court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney. Noble v. State, 314 Ark. 240, 862 S.W.2d 234 (1993).
In the present case, the record contains a writing entitled “GUILTY PLEA AGREEMENT,” with the handwritten word “Conditional” appearing above it. The document is signed by the prosecuting attorney, appellant’s attorney, and appellant, with a handwritten date of March 20, 2002, and a court file stamp of the same date. The document contains the following pre-typed list of rights:
I understand that I have the following rights:
(a) The right to remain silent and make no statements.
(b) The right to be represented by an attorney.
(c) The right to a speedy, public trial by a jury which must unanimously find me guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of any charge.
(d) The right to be found guilty of a lesser charge and/or punishment than the original charge.
(e) The right to personally confront and cross-examine every witness, and the right to call witnesses to testify for me.
(f) [Illegible.]
(g) The right to question all facts, circumstances and evidence, and the right to confront and raise all legal issues, rights and theories.
(h) To file a petition within 30 days that my attorney was ineffective, and my right to appeal be thus extended 30 days past a hearing on this motion.
I understand that if I plead guilty I give up and waive all my rights, and if the plea is accepted by the Court, it cannot be changed nor the punishment reduced.
By pleading-guilty I will lose my right to vote and the right to possess firearms. I may also incur employment and various other indirect problems from this conviction.
Each prior or later conviction can increase the time of punishment required before parole eligibility [sic].
No one has threatened me nor promised me anything that has caused me to plead guilty.
I understand the Prosecuting Attorney will make a sentence recommendation to the Court based on our plea agreement, but if the plea agreement is not accepted, my guilty plea will be withdrawn and the statements herein will not be held or used against
I hereby plead guilty to having committed the above stated crime(s), and understand by doing so I give up all my rights.
Appellant hand-initialed every enumerated item quoted above, from (a) to (h), except (f), by marking them with “RSH” on the left hand margin. Item (f) has been marked out to the point of being illegible.
Applying Barnett v. State, supra, to the instant case, we hold that appellant failed to strictly comply with Rule 24.3(b). The document does not specifically state that appellant reserves his right to appeal the outcome of the suppression hearing. Rather, the document contains language to the effect that if he pleads guilty, he gives up and waives all his rights. Moreover, the document fails to demonstrate that the trial court approved a conditional plea. Therefore, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Bird, J., agrees Griffen, J., concurs.