Hill v. Pinnacle on the Park

2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: August 1, 2023
• Docket: 2-22-0427
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U No. 2-22-0427 Order filed August 1, 2023

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

HOWARD J. HILL, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Lake County. Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) v. ) No. 22-LM-243 ) PINNACLE ON THE PARK; ) PINNACLE BAYSIDE DEVELOPMENT ) US LP; and PINNACLE INTERNATIONAL ) DEVELOPMENT, INC., ) Honorable ) Michael B. Betar, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Schostok concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Communications to verify plaintiff’s qualifications as co-signer for his son’s lease of an apartment in California were insufficient to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over lessors.

¶2 Plaintiff, Howard, J. Hill, appeals pro se from a judgment dismissing his lawsuit against

defendants, Pinnacle on the Park, Pinnacle Bayside Development US LP, and Pinnacle

International Development, Inc., for lack of personal jurisdiction. Because defendants did not have 2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U

the required minimum contacts with Illinois to invoke specific personal jurisdiction over them, we

affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 In the circuit court of Lake County, plaintiff filed a two-count amended complaint against

defendants. The complaint alleged as follows. Plaintiff resided in Antioch and worked in

Northbrook. Plaintiff’s son, Theo Hill, applied to rent an apartment in California. Defendants

(Pinnacle) were California businesses that owned and managed the apartment building.

¶5 During the rental application process, Theo was informed that he needed a guarantor on

the lease. Theo asked plaintiff to be the guarantor, and plaintiff agreed. Plaintiff asked Pinnacle

what documents he must provide. Pinnacle informed him that he would need to complete the

standard rental application, which Pinnacle supplied to plaintiff electronically. Plaintiff noted on

the application that he was acting only as Theo’s guarantor. Plaintiff then returned the completed

application via e-mail with a subject line stating, “ ‘Theo Hill Guarantor Information.’ ” Plaintiff

included with the e-mail four recent pay stubs showing that his place of employment was in

Northbrook.

¶6 Pinnacle, in turn, asked him to submit proof that he owned his home in Antioch and that

his property taxes were current. Plaintiff provided the information via e-mail with a subject line

stating, “ ‘Theo Hill Guarantor.’ ”

¶7 Shortly before Theo was to move in, Pinnacle e-mailed plaintiff and provided electronic

access to additional documents he was told he must sign before Theo could move in. The access

was provided through a “ ‘leasing account’ ” (an online portal) and Pinnacle gave plaintiff a

username identifying him as a cosigner. Subsequently, plaintiff provided additional requested pay

stubs in an e-mail with a subject line stating, “ ‘Theo Hill rental application cosign.’ ” Pinnacle’s

-2- 2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U

leasing consultant, Erica Gross, acknowledged receipt of the information via an e-mail with a

subject line referring to a “ ‘cosign.’ ”

¶8 That same day, Pinnacle e-mailed plaintiff, thanking him for his rental application and

notifying him that it had been approved. Because the only application that plaintiff had submitted

was the one in which he noted that he was applying as Theo’s guarantor, plaintiff understood the

e-mail as approving him as guarantor.

¶9 The day before Theo was to move in, Gross provided plaintiff with a rental agreement and

instructed him to initial and sign it so that Theo could move in. Plaintiff did so. However, because

the only areas for initials or signature on the agreement were designated for either “ ‘Resident’ ”

or “ ‘Landlord,’ ” plaintiff initialed or signed in the areas identified for “ ‘Resident.’ ”

¶ 10 On July 13, 2021, Pinnacle e-mailed plaintiff, informing him that there was “ ‘a pending

balance’ ” with Pinnacle. Plaintiff quickly responded, and asked for specific information regarding

the pending balance. Pinnacle did not answer his request.

¶ 11 About eight months later, Pinnacle informed plaintiff by e-mail that there was a

“ ‘past[-]due balance’ ” on the apartment. The e-mail did not specify the past-due amount. Plaintiff

responded to the e-mail within the hour and asked Pinnacle to specify the amount past due. The

next day, Pinnacle advised plaintiff by e-mail that Theo had not paid rent since July 2021 and that

Pinnacle had sent out monthly balance-due statements. Plaintiff responded that he had never

received any such statements even though Pinnacle had his e-mail, home, and work addresses.

Pinnacle replied that he should have received the past-due statements because he resided at the

apartment.

¶ 12 Plaintiff e-mailed Pinnacle and expressed his desire to terminate his obligation under the

lease. He “request[ed] an agreement from Pinnacle stating what he owed, taking into consideration

-3- 2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U

Pinnacle’s failure to provide him due notice of Theo’s defaults.” Pinnacle responded that plaintiff

would have to pay the full amount of Theo’s back rent. On March 10, 2022, Pinnacle e-mailed

plaintiff, claiming that he lived in the apartment and was responsible for the full balance of the

unpaid rent.

¶ 13 In count I of his amended complaint, plaintiff alleged a claim for fraudulent inducement to

enter into the rental agreement for the apartment. Specifically, he alleged that Pinnacle’s false

representations led him to initial and sign the rental agreement as part of Pinnacle’s plan to claim

that he was a resident and not merely a guarantor and to avoid notifying him in Illinois of the past-

due rent. Count II alleged a claim for breach of contract.

¶ 14 The trial court sua sponte ordered plaintiff to submit a memorandum explaining how the

court had personal jurisdiction over Pinnacle. Plaintiff did so, contending that the court had

specific jurisdiction over Pinnacle.

¶ 15 Pinnacle thereafter filed a motion under section 2-301(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure

(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-301(a) (West 2020)), seeking dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Pinnacle asserted that it never had the required minimum contacts with Illinois to support specific

jurisdiction. In support of its motion, Pinnacle attached the affidavit of Carlos Inzunza, its property

manager. Inzunza averred that (1) the apartment was in California, (2) the rent was payable in

California, (3) no representative of Pinnacle ever physically went to Illinois regarding the lease,

(4) no performances or obligations under the lease were to be rendered or accepted in Illinois,

(5) all communications with plaintiff were electronic, and (6) plaintiff electronically signed the

lease.

¶ 16 Plaintiff filed a response to the motion to dismiss, to which he attached his affidavit. He

averred, in pertinent part, that Pinnacle had required him to submit proof of his (1) employment in

-4- 2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U

Illinois, (2) Illinois income, (3) Illinois residence, (4) Illinois driver’s license, and (5) payment of

Illinois property taxes. He further averred that Pinnacle electronically sent all rental documents to

him in Illinois and that he completed them all in Illinois. Thus, plaintiff contended that Pinnacle

had the minimum contacts necessary to subject it to specific personal jurisdiction in Illinois.

¶ 17 The trial court issued a written order granting Pinnacle’s motion to dismiss. The order did

not provide the court’s rationale. Plaintiff, in turn, filed this timely appeal.

¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 19 On appeal, plaintiff contends that Illinois courts have personal jurisdiction over Pinnacle

pursuant to section 2-209 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2020)). Specifically, he asserts

that Pinnacle transacted business in Illinois (735 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(1) (West 2020)), committed a

tort in Illinois (735 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(2) (West 2020)), made or performed a contract in Illinois (735

ILCS 5/2-209(a)(7) (West 2020)), and was otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction under the

catchall provision of section 2-209(c) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2020)).

¶ 20 It is well settled that the plaintiff has the burden to establish a prima facie basis to exercise

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Russell v. SNFA, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 28. When,

as here, a trial court decides a jurisdictional question solely on documentary evidence, without an

evidentiary hearing, our review is de novo. Id. Any conflicts in the pleadings and affidavits must

be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, but the defendant may overcome a prima facie case for

jurisdiction by offering uncontradicted evidence that defeats jurisdiction. Id.

¶ 21 Because of the coextensive nature of the Illinois long-arm statute (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West

2020)) and due process requirements, Illinois courts no longer need to apply the first step

traditionally employed in personal jurisdiction analysis, which is to examine whether the defendant

performed any of the enumerated acts under the long-arm statute. Zamora v. Lewis, 2019 IL App

-5- 2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U

(1st) 181642, ¶ 44. Put another way, the long-arm statute is satisfied when due process concerns

are satisfied, regardless of whether the defendant performed any acts identified in the long-arm

statute. Id. Likewise, personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute is improper if the due process

requirements are not satisfied. Id. Where, as here, there is no claim that Illinois due process

protections differ from those of federal due process, we do not consider our long-arm statute

separately from federal due process concerns. Id.

¶ 22 In all cases involving a nonresident defendant, before a court may subject the defendant to

in personam jurisdiction, due process requires that the defendant have certain minimum contacts

with the forum state such that maintenance of the suit there does not offend traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice. Russell, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 34.

¶ 23 The relevant inquiry under the minimum contacts test depends on whether the plaintiff

seeks general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Id., ¶ 36. Because plaintiff here relies

only on specific jurisdiction, we need to discuss only that option.

¶ 24 Specific jurisdiction requires a showing that (1) the defendant purposefully directed its

activities at the forum state and (2) the cause of action arose out of or relates to the defendant’s

contacts with the forum state. Id., ¶ 40. Under specific jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant may

be subjected to the forum state’s jurisdiction based on “certain single or occasional acts in the

state,” but only concerning matters related to those acts. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 25 Here, the pleadings and affidavits do not show that Pinnacle purposely directed its activities

at Illinois. It is undisputed that Pinnacle operated rental property in California. Further, the rental

agreement was for property located in California. Also, Pinnacle had no physical presence in

Illinois nor sent any representative to Illinois regarding the rental transaction. More importantly,

Pinnacle never sought out plaintiff as either a tenant or a guarantor. Indeed, it was Theo who

-6- 2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U

requested that plaintiff act as guarantor, and plaintiff freely agreed. All that Pinnacle did in that

regard was supply plaintiff with the required documents related to Theo’s rental application.

Plaintiff’s mere completion of those documents in Illinois did not constitute meaningful contact

between Pinnacle and Illinois. Similarly, Pinnacle’s electronic communications with plaintiff over

many months were nothing more than incidental contact initiated by Theo’s application.

¶ 26 Plaintiff points out that Pinnacle required him to provide information based on his being

an Illinois resident, such as proof of his employment, home ownership, and driver’s license.

However, Pinnacle’s requests had nothing to do with plaintiff’s Illinois connections per se but

were intended simply to verify his qualifications as guarantor. The information requests were

merely a byproduct of plaintiff’s application to be a guarantor. Indeed, as discussed, it was Theo

who proposed plaintiff as a guarantor. Thus, Theo, not Pinnacle, triggered the need for that

information.

¶ 27 We conclude that Pinnacle—a California business—did not purposely direct its activities

at Illinois when it required certain information from plaintiff—an Illinois resident—after he agreed

to serve as guarantor for his son’s rental of a California apartment owned by Pinnacle.

Accordingly, Pinnacle did not have minimum contacts with Illinois such that subjecting it to

litigation in Illinois would be reasonable under traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice. Thus, plaintiff did not establish a prima facie basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over

Pinnacle in Illinois.

¶ 28 Further, we note that plaintiff’s reliance on Keller v. Henderson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 605

(2005), is misplaced. In Keller, this court held that Illinois had specific jurisdiction over an out-of-

state defendant who sold an airplane to an Illinois resident. Id. at 608, 614. We so held because

(1) the defendant retained an Illinois agent to broker the sale; (2) the agent, on behalf of the

-7- 2023 IL App (2d) 220427-U

defendant, listed and advertised the plane in Illinois; (3) the defendant agreed to send the plane to

Illinois, where it remained until the sale was finalized; and (4) the defendant hired the plaintiff’s

decedent, an Illinois resident, to transport the plane to Illinois. Id. at 609, 614-15. Accordingly, we

concluded that there were minimum contacts sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over the

defendant. Id. at 614. Here, defendants were nowhere close to having the Illinois contacts present

in Keller. Thus, Keller does not support plaintiff’s position.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 Because Pinnacle did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois, we need not

decide whether the claims in the amended complaint arose out of or were related to Pinnacle’s

contacts with Illinois. See Russell, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 40. Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we

affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.

¶ 31 Affirmed.

-8-