Hill v. City of Chicago

2020 IL App (1st) 191587-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 2, 2020
• Docket: 1-19-1587
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2020 IL App (1st) 191587-U No. 1-19-1587 Order filed September 2, 2020 Third Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

ARIEL HILL AND JAMAL WOODS, ) ) Appeal from the Plaintiffs-Appellants, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County v. ) ) No. 17 L 7638 CITY OF CHICAGO, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ) CHICAGO POLICE OFFICER KEVIN R. JOHNSON, ) Honorable INDIVIDUALLY AND AS AGENT OF CITY OF ) Christopher Lawler, CHICAGO, ) Judge Presiding. ) Defendants-Appellees. )

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Gordon and Reyes concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We reverse the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment where there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Commander Johnson was executing and enforcing the law and whether he acted willfully and wantonly at the time of the traffic collision.

¶2 Plaintiffs, Ariel Hill and Jamal Woods, brought this action against defendants, City of

Chicago, a municipal corporation (the City), and Chicago police commander Kevin Johnson, No. 1-19-1587

following a traffic collision between Woods’s vehicle, in which Hill was a passenger, and

Commander Johnson’s unmarked police vehicle. Plaintiffs alleged that Commander Johnson acted

willfully and wantonly in entering an intersection against a red light and that his conduct directly

resulted in the vehicle collision that caused plaintiffs’ injuries. The circuit court granted

defendants’ motion for summary judgment finding that, based on the evidence presented,

defendants were entitled to immunity pursuant to Section 2-202 of the Local Governmental and

Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Act) ((745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2016)) because

Commander Johnson was executing and enforcing the law at the time of the collision and because

no reasonable trier of fact could find that Commander Johnson acted willfully and wantonly in

driving into the intersection.

¶3 On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the circuit court erred in granting defendants’ motion for

summary judgment where the court found, as a matter of law, that Commander Johnson was

executing and enforcing the law at the time of the collision and that Commander Johnson’s conduct

was not willful and wanton. Plaintiffs assert that the evidence presented demonstrated that there

was at least a genuine issue of material fact on these matters precluding the court’s entry of

summary judgment and that whether Commander Johnson acted willfully and wantonly was a

question of fact for the jury. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit

court and remand for further proceedings.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that on July 22, 2017, Woods was driving a vehicle

in which Hill was a passenger. Woods was driving westbound on Roosevelt Road near the

intersection with Union Street when Commander Johnson, who was driving an unmarked police

vehicle southbound on Union Street, began pursuing a vehicle. Plaintiffs asserted that Commander

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Johnson willfully and wantonly pursued the vehicle into the intersection and caused plaintiffs

injury.

¶6 Defendants filed an answer to the complaint in which they denied the allegations in the

complaint and raised the affirmative defense of comparative negligence. Defendants asserted that

Woods was negligent in his operation of his vehicle and that his negligence was, at least in part,

the proximate cause of Hill’s injuries. Defendants also filed a counterclaim in which they repeated

their comparative negligence theory. Defendants asserted that in the event they were held liable

for Hill’s injuries, Woods would be liable to pay a proportionate share of the judgment based on

his own negligence.

¶7 In his deposition, Commander Johnson testified that on July 22, 2017, he was stopped at a

red light at the intersection of Union Street and Roosevelt Road when a police pursuit drove by

him. Commander Johnson did not know the police pursuit was occurring behind him until he saw

the vehicles involved in the pursuit, but he was aware there was a pursuit on Interstate 290, the

Eisenhower Expressway. Commander Johnson saw a vehicle matching the description of the

vehicle involved in the pursuit on Interstate 290 drive past him at the red light on Union Street,

heading south. The vehicle was followed by a police vehicle. Commander Johnson testified that

he was not assigned to participate in the pursuit, but made the decision to assist with the pursuit

because of his role as a commander in the Chicago police department (CPD). Commander Johnson

testified that in such situations, he would generally make a radio call announcing his involvement

as the highest-ranking member on the scene, but he did not make such an announcement in this

case.

¶8 When Commander Johnson saw the vehicle and pursuing police vehicle drive by, he

activated his emergency lights and siren. Commander Johnson believed that there would be

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additional police vehicles pursuing the vehicle and he intended to block off traffic in the

intersection. Commander Johnson testified that he moved slowly forward into cross-traffic so that

no one would get hurt. When deciding whether to drive into the intersection, Commander Johnson

testified that he conducted a “balancing test” and considered the time of the day, the lighting, the

road conditions, the level of traffic, and the necessity to protect the public. Commander Johnson

also considered his ability to observe his surroundings and his ability to see cross-traffic. Before

Commander Johnson moved into the intersection, he could not see westbound traffic on Roosevelt

Road because his view was obstructed by other vehicles, a fence, and shrubbery. Commander

Johnson never saw the vehicle that struck his vehicle when he pulled out into the intersection

because the other vehicle was driving “too fast.”

¶9 Jamal Woods testified at his deposition that on July 22, 2017, shortly before midnight, he

was driving westbound on Roosevelt Road with Hill as his passenger. As he approached the

intersection with Union Street, the light at the intersection changed from red to green in his

direction of travel and he continued to drive west without slowing. Woods was unable to see the

intersection from further than a half-block away because the overpass “was like a hill” and he

could not see anything “directly in front of [him] a block beyond.” As he approached the

intersection, he observed a white SUV on his righthand side drive forward slightly into the

intersection, but then it stopped. Woods continued driving and the “next thing” he knew, he

collided with Commander Johnson’s vehicle. Woods did not see a police vehicle or any other

vehicle cross over Roosevelt Road from Union Street travelling south before the accident. Woods

did not hear any sirens or see any emergency lights prior to the collision and did not observe any

vehicles travelling westbound on Roosevelt Road that were stopped at the intersection with Union

Street. Woods testified that some shrubbery and bushes obscured his view of Union Street from

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Roosevelt Road and he was only able to see the white SUV because it pulled forward slightly into

the intersection. Woods testified he was driving 30 miles per hour at the time of the collision.

¶ 10 Gilberto Ruiz testified that he was sitting at a red light on Union Street waiting to make a

right turn onto Roosevelt Road when he observed a black vehicle drive through the red light

heading south. A police vehicle followed the black vehicle through the red light. After those

vehicles passed, Ruiz started to move his vehicle out of the way because he heard police sirens.

Ruiz testified that “within two to three seconds after the first police car that passed by was when

the impact happened.” Ruiz testified that he did not see the actual impact, but he heard it. He could

tell, however, that Commander Johnson’s police vehicle had activated its emergency lights before

entering the intersection. Maritza Ruiz (Maritza), Ruiz’s wife, who was sitting in the rear passenger

seat of Ruiz’s vehicle, testified that she observed Commander Johnson’s unmarked police vehicle

activate its emergency lights, but did not recall whether the vehicle also activated its siren. Maritza

further testified that Commander Johnson’s vehicle stopped at the edge of the intersection before

proceeding into the intersection of Roosevelt Road and Union Street.

¶ 11 Marcus Reynolds testified that he was driving east on Roosevelt Road when the light at the

intersection with Union Street turned green. Reynolds observed a vehicle drive through the red

light on Union Street and cross over Roosevelt Road. Reynolds then observed a marked police

vehicle with its emergency lights and siren activated follow the vehicle through the intersection.

Reynolds noticed an unmarked police vehicle that was facing south at the intersection on Union

Street activate its emergency lights and “hit [his siren] a couple of times.” The other vehicles at

the intersection began to move out of the way for the police vehicle. Reynolds noted that none of

the vehicles in the eastbound traffic on Roosevelt Road crossed the intersection even though there

was a green light because they could see the police vehicles. Reynolds then saw the collision

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between the Commander Johnson’s police vehicle and the vehicle Woods was driving. Reynolds

noted that four other police vehicles drove through the intersection after the collision.

¶ 12 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in which they contended that

Commander Johnson and the City were immune from liability pursuant to section 2-202 of the

Act. Section 2-202 of the Act provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission

in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and

wanton conduct.” Defendants asserted that the uncontroverted evidence showed that Commander

Johnson was assisting in a police pursuit and was therefore executing and enforcing the law at the

time of collision. Defendants asserted that the City and Commander Johnson were therefore

immune from liability with regard to negligent conduct and that defendants could be held liable

only if Commander Johnson acted willfully and wantonly. Defendants asserted that the evidence

presented demonstrated that Commander Johnson did not act willfully and wantonly as that phrase

was defined in the Act and, therefore, asked the court to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint.

¶ 13 In response, plaintiffs asserted that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Commander Johnson was executing and enforcing the law at the time of the collision. Plaintiffs

further asserted that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Commander Johnson’s

conduct was willful and wanton.

¶ 14 In granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the circuit court found the

depositions, together with a video of the collision, showed that Commander Johnson was operating

a police vehicle when he witnessed a police pursuit while stopped at a red light. Commander

Johnson then engaged the vehicle’s emergency lights and “possibly” the sirens and moved into the

intersection to control traffic where Woods’s vehicle collided with Commander Johnson’s police

vehicle. The court found that these facts supported only one conclusion: “that as a Police

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Commander who witnessed a live police pursuit, Commander Johnson executed or enforced the

law by turning on his emergency lights and trying to control traffic.” The court noted that it was

during this process of executing and enforcing the law that the collision occurred. The court found

that Commander Johnson’s conduct was not willful and wanton because no reasonable trier of fact

could find that Commander Johnson’s actions showed utter indifference or conscious disregard for

the safety of others or their property. As such, the court found that, as a matter of law, Commander

Johnson’s conduct occurred while he was executing and enforcing the law and was not willful and

wanton. The court concluded that Commander Johnson’s conduct therefore fell within the scope

of section 2-202 of the Act and that he and the City were immunized from liability. Accordingly,

the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. This appeal follows.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 On appeal, plaintiffs assert that the court erred in finding that, as a matter of law,

Commander Johnson was executing and enforcing the law at the time of the crash and that his

conduct was not willful and wanton. Plaintiffs assert that there were questions of fact regarding

whether Commander Johnson was attempting to join the pursuit or whether he was merely

attempting to control traffic as he testified. Plaintiffs further assert that there was a question of fact

as to whether Commander Johnson activated the siren on his vehicle prior to entering the

intersection and whether Commander Johnson could properly see cross-traffic on Roosevelt Road

before he entered the intersection. Plaintiffs assert that these factual questions precluded the court’s

entry of summary judgment.

¶ 17 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and

admissions on file establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2016); Carney v. Union

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Pacific R.R. Co., 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 25. In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact

exists, the court construes the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits against the moving party and

liberally in favor of the opposing party. Carney, 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 25 (citing Mashal v. City of

Chicago, 2012 IL 112341, ¶ 49). A genuine issue of material fact exists “where the material facts

are disputed or, if the material facts are undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different

inferences from the undisputed facts.” Mashal, 2012 IL 112341, ¶ 49. We review summary

judgment rulings de novo. Carney, 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 25 (citing Bruns v. City of Centralia, 2014

IL 116998, ¶ 13).

¶ 18 A. Executing and Enforcing

¶ 19 Plaintiffs first contend that the court erred in finding as a matter of law that Commander

Johnson was executing and enforcing the law at the time of crash. Plaintiffs assert that whether a

police officer is executing and enforcing the law is a factual determination reserved for the trier of

fact. Plaintiffs contend that the circuit court ignored evidence that showed that Commander

Johnson was not executing and enforcing the law because there was no objective requirement that

he do so and that the court ignored contradictions in Commander Johnson’s deposition testimony

and the police reports of the collision.

¶ 20 Section 2-202 of the Act provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for his act or

omission in the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful

and wanton conduct.” (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2016). Relatedly, Section 2-

109 of the Act provides that “[a] local public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from an act

or omission of its employee where the employee is not liable.” 745 ILCS 10/2-109 (West 2016).

Immunity is available under these provisions where a public employee is “engaged in a course of

conduct designed to carry out or put into effect any law.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Chicago, 112 Ill.

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2d 211, 221 (1986). However, immunity does not attach where an officer is engaged in routine

elements of his official duties, such as conducting routine patrol. Bruecks v. County of Lake, 276

Ill. App. 3d 567, 568 (1995) (citing Leaks v. City of Chicago, 238 Ill. App. 3d 12 (1992)). “The

question of whether a police officer is executing and enforcing the law is a factual determination

which must be made in light of the circumstances involved in each case. [citation] However, where

the evidence is undisputed or susceptible to only one possible interpretation, the question may be

decided as a matter of law.” Hudson v. City of Chicago, 378 Ill. App. 3d 373, 388 (2007).

¶ 21 Here, we find, contrary to the circuit court’s conclusion, that the evidence in this case was

not undisputed or susceptible to only one possible interpretation. For instance, police reports of

the incident indicate that Commander Johnson told the investigating officer that he intended to

become involved in the pursuit. At his deposition, however, Commander Johnson testified that he

intended only to provide traffic control. Although Commander’s Johnson’s role in the pursuit is

uncertain, what is clear is that he was not assigned to participate in the pursuit or provide traffic

control, nor did he know whether his assistance was even necessary. Commander Johnson testified

that as a commander in the CPD, he could assign himself to participate in the pursuit. He testified,

however, that in such circumstances, he would put out a radio call announcing his involvement.

He acknowledged at his deposition that he did not do so in this case. Indeed, Commander Johnson’s

testimony shows that he did not inform anyone of his intention to join the pursuit or provide traffic

control and no one involved in the pursuit requested his assistance. This court has found that an

officer was not executing and enforcing the law where “there was no specific indication in the

record that traffic control was actually required or requested or that the officers engaged in the

actual pursuit required or requested backup.” Hudson, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 392.

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¶ 22 Commander Johnson also testified that before he saw the pursuit drive past him, he was on

routine patrol duty. As noted, immunity does not attach where an officer is engaged in routine

elements of his official duties, such as conducting routine patrol. Bruecks, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 568.

Thus, whether immunity attached in this case depends on whether Commander Johnson’s role

changed from routine patrol to another non-routine element of his official duties prior to the

collision such that he was “engaged in a course of conduct designed to carry out or put into effect

any law.” Fitzpatrick, 112 Ill. 2d at 221. Such a question is a factual determination reserved for

the trier of fact. See Hudson, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 388-89 (collecting authority). As noted,

Commander Johnson was not assigned to participate in the pursuit or provide traffic control, he

did not announce that he was going to participate in the pursuit or provide traffic control, and he

did not know whether traffic control was even necessary because he did not know if there were

more emergency vehicles involved in the pursuit that would drive through the intersection. We

therefore find that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded the trial court’s entry

of summary judgment on the issue of whether Commander Johnson was executing and enforcing

the law at the time of the collision. We express no opinion regarding the merits of plaintiffs’ claim

or Commander Johnson’s immunity under section 2-202, but hold that the court’s entry of

summary judgment was improper in light of these factual issues.

¶ 23 B. Willful and Wanton

¶ 24 We next address plaintiffs’ contention that the court erred in finding as a matter of law that

Commander Johnson did not act willfully and wantonly at the time of the incident. As noted,

section 2-202 of the Act provides that “[a] public employee is not liable for his act or omission in

the execution or enforcement of any law unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton

conduct.” (Emphasis added.) (745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2016). Plaintiffs assert that Commander

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Johnson acted willfully and wantonly because the evidence showed that he could not see

westbound traffic on Roosevelt Road before he drove into the intersection. Plaintiffs contend that

Commander Johnson acknowledged that it was not safe for him to enter the intersection and that

his conduct violated a CPD order regarding when a police officer may enter an intersection against

a red light. Plaintiffs also assert that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether

Commander Johnson activated his siren before entering the intersection.

¶ 25 “Willful and wanton conduct” is defined as “a course of action which shows an actual or

deliberate intention to cause harm or which, if not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or

conscious disregard for the safety of others or their property.” 745 ILCS 10/1-210 (West 2016).

Ordinarily, whether a public official’s conduct is willful and wanton is a question of fact for the

jury. Bielema ex rel. Bielema v. River Bend Community School District No. 2, 2013 IL App (3d)

120808, ¶ 12. “However, the court may determine as a matter of law whether conduct is willful

and wanton if the evidence so overwhelmingly favors one party that a contrary determination

cannot stand.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Brown v. Chicago Park District,

220 Ill. App. 3d 940, 943 (1991)). Here, we cannot say that the evidence presented so

overwhelming favors defendants such that a contrary determination could not stand.

¶ 26 Instead, the factual record reveals numerous inconstancies, discrepancies, and disputed

issues of material fact. For instance, at his deposition, Commander Johnson testified that he was

only attempting to provide traffic control. The police report and crash report from the incident,

however, indicate that Commander Johnson was “trying to assist in a vehicle pursuit” and “actively

in assistance of a pursuit.” The distinction is significant because it informs which Chicago Police

Department General Orders were applicable to Commander Johnson’s conduct. At Commander

Johnson’s deposition, plaintiffs presented two Chicago Police General Orders: G03-03-01 and

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G03-03-02. General Order G03-03-01 concerns the operation of emergency vehicles in pursuits.

At his deposition, Commander Johnson testified that the only section of General Order G03-03-01

that applied to him was Section X. At the time of his deposition, Section X of the General Order

G03-03-01concerned the district commander’s responsibilities after the pursuit to review and

prepare a report detailing the pursuit. General Order G03-03-01 sec. X (now sec. XII). Essentially,

Commander Johnson testified that because he was not part of the pursuit, General Order G03-03-

01 did not apply to his operation of his police vehicle at the time of the incident. The discrepancies,

however, between his testimony regarding his conduct and the police reports regarding the incident

create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Commander Johnson was part of the pursuit

and, thus, whether General Order G03-03-01 applied to him.

¶ 27 There is also insufficient evidence in the record to conclude, as a matter of law, that General

Order G03-03-01 did not apply to Commander Johnson even if he were only planning to provide

traffic control as he testified. Commander Johnson indicated that he was providing traffic control

to aid with a police pursuit. A reasonable trier of fact could find that in such a situation he was

therefore required to comply with General Order G03-03-01, which governs emergency vehicle

operation in pursuits. If the trier of fact did so conclude, it would then be required to make the

factual determination of whether Commander Johnson complied with the provisions of that general

order. For instance, the order requires the pursuing officers to conduct a balancing test in order to

determine whether the “necessity to immediately apprehend the fleeing suspect outweighs the level

of inherent danger created by a motor vehicle pursuit.” General Order G03-03-01 sec. II (now sec.

IV). Commander Johnson testified that he conducted a “balancing test” prior to making the

determination to drive into the intersection, but the factors he testified that he considered, such as

the road conditions, the level of traffic, the weather, and the necessity to protect the public,

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encompassed only some of the factors outlined in the general order. A trier of fact would thus be

required to determine whether Commander Johnson’s balancing test complied with the test set out

in the general order. We recognize that a police officer’s violation of a policy or general order is

not per se willful and wanton conduct, but it is evidence that a trier of fact may consider along

with all the other evidence presented in the case in determining whether an officer acted willfully

and wantonly. Morton v. City of Chicago, 286 Ill. App. 3d 444, 454 (1997).

¶ 28 Even assuming General Order G03-03-01 did not apply as a matter of law, there was a

question of fact regarding whether Commander Johnson complied with General Order G03-03-02,

which concerns the operation of police vehicles in nonpursuit situations. Commander Johnson

testified that General Order G03-03-02 applied to him and was a “standing order.” Plaintiffs assert

that Commander Johnson violated the portion of the order that requires officers engaged in

nonpursuit emergency vehicle operation to “proceed through intersections and traffic signals only

after determining it is reasonable and safe to proceed.” General Order G03-03-02 sec. III(A)(5),

(B)(2) 1. At his deposition, Commander Johnson acknowledged that he could not see westbound

traffic on Roosevelt Road before he entered the intersection because his view was obstructed by

other vehicles, a fence, and shrubbery. Despite his inability to see cross-traffic, however,

Commander Johnson drove into the intersection where his vehicle collided with the vehicle Woods

was driving. Commander Johnson testified that his actions were necessary to protect the public,

however, there was no evidence presented regarding whether Commander Johnson’s actions were,

1 We note that section III(A) of General Order G03-03-02 applies to marked police vehicles, while section III(B) applies to unmarked police vehicles. Section III(B)(2) provides that officers driving unmarked vehicles, as Commander Johnson was in this case, must “comply with the provisions of items II [sic] A-2 through 7 of this directive” in nonpursuit situations. Although this provision refers to section II of the general order rather than section III, it is clear from the context that this provision is intended to refer to section III(A), thus setting similar standards for the operation of marked and unmarked police vehicles.

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in fact, necessary, or whether it was reasonable for him to believe so. For instance, Commander

Johnson testified that he did not know whether additional pursuit vehicles would be driving

through the intersection. Because the fleeing vehicle and the pursuit vehicle had already driven

through the intersection, there would be no need for Commander Johnson to provide traffic control

if no other emergency vehicles were driving through the intersection.

¶ 29 Commander Johnson could have mitigated the risks of driving into the intersection without

the ability to see westbound traffic by activating his vehicle’s siren. However, there was conflicting

evidence regarding whether Commander Johnson activated his siren. Commander Johnson

testified that he activated his siren, but Woods testified that he did not hear a siren. Ruiz testified

that he heard police sirens, but did not specify they came from Commander Johnson’s vehicle, and

his wife, Maritza, testified that she did not recall hearing sirens. Reynolds testified that he heard

Commander Johnson’s siren, but testified that Commander Johnson did not run the siren

continuously and only “hit [his siren] a couple of times.” Moreover, a CPD report chronicling the

collision contained conflicting information regarding whether Commander Johnson’s siren was

activated. The report in question, a Department Vehicle Traffic Crash or Damage Report,

memorializes the collision and is signed by Commander Johnson. In the section of the report for

describing the crash, someone 2 wrote: “Trying to assist a vehicle pursuit, vehicle entered

intersection with lights and siren activated at which point vehicle travelling westbound struck the

driver’s side of the car.” (Emphasis added.) However, in a separate section of the report, detailing

which emergency equipment was used, the boxes next to “light bar” and “flashing light” are

marked, but the box next to “siren” is not. Commander Johnson testified that he did not fill out the

2 Commander Johnson testified that he did not recognize the handwriting on the crash report.

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report, but that when he signed it, he did not change any of the information contained on the report

because “[t]he report had already been submitted in review” and he “would not alter [his] official

document.” However, it remains unclear why Commander Johnson would sign off on the report

given the inconsistent information about whether he activated his vehicle’s siren.

¶ 30 Accordingly, we find that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded the trial

court’s entry of summary judgment on the issue of whether Commander Johnson acted willfully

and wantonly at the time of the incident. As with our conclusion on the “executing and enforcing

the law” element of section 2-202, we express no opinion on the merits of plaintiffs’ claim or

Commander Johnson’s immunity under section 2-202, but we find that the court’s entry of

summary judgment was improper given the factual issues identified above.

¶ 31 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 32 For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this order.

¶ 33 Reversed and remanded.

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