Hill v. Board of Commissioners

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Hill v. Board of Commissioners

129 S.E. 154, 190 N.C. 123, 1925 N.C. LEXIS 22

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 16, 1925

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 129 S.E. 154 (Hill v. Board of Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hill v. Board of Commissioners, 129 S.E. 154, 190 N.C. 123, 1925 N.C. LEXIS 22 (N.C. 1925).

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Opinion

Stagy, C. J.

The basis of' the present action is the alleged unconstitutionality of chapter 46, Public-Local Laws, Extra Session, 1924.

It is contended, in the first place, that the act in question is violative of Article II, sec. 29, of the Constitution, which provides, in part, as follows: “The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private, or special act or resolution . . . authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or discontinuing of highways, streets, or alleys.”

In Brown v. Comrs., 173 N. C., 598, it was said that the prohibition of this section of the Constitution was against direct legislation to accomplish the things therein enumerated by any local, private, or special act of the General Assembly. Such is not the purpose or . effect of the statute now before us.' The designated highway is one of the principal thoroughfares' in Gates County, and connects two important State highways, numbers 30 and 32, which themselves traverse the county and several others. Furthermore, all the bridges of the various townships are transferred to the care and supervision of the county commissioners. *125 We do not find tbe act in conflict with Article II, sec. 29, of tbe Constitution. S. v. Kelly, 186 N. C., 365, and cases there cited.

Nor can it be bold invalid, according to plaintiffs’ contention, as violative of tbe provisions of tbe Constitution (1) against taking property without due process of law (Article I, sec. 17) or (2) pledging the faith of tbe county, except for a necessary expense, without a vote of a majority of tbe qualified electors therein (Article VII, sec. 7), or (3) levying a tax in disregard of tbe rule of uniformity in taxation (Article VII, sec. 9).

Plaintiffs have proceeded on tbe theory that tbe act authorizes a county tax for local township roads; whereas, from tbe facts agreed, it appears that tbe designated road forms an essential part of a countywide scheme, affording improved highway facilities to every township in the county and benefiting all.

Again, it would seem that the act here challenged is only declaratory of, or supplementary to, the powers given the defendant under the general law. Road Com. v. Comrs., 188 N. C., 362. Such would apparently save its constitutionality.

The exceptions are not allowed.

Affirmed.

Varser, J., not sitting.

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Stagy, C. J.

The basis of' the present action is the alleged unconstitutionality of chapter 46, Public-Local Laws, Extra Session, 1924.

It is contended, in the first place, that the act in question is violative of Article II, sec. 29, of the Constitution, which provides, in part, as follows: “The General Assembly shall not pass any local, private, or special act or resolution . . . authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, maintaining, or discontinuing of highways, streets, or alleys.”

In Brown v. Comrs., 173 N. C., 598, it was said that the prohibition of this section of the Constitution was against direct legislation to accomplish the things therein enumerated by any local, private, or special act of the General Assembly. Such is not the purpose or . effect of the statute now before us.' The designated highway is one of the principal thoroughfares' in Gates County, and connects two important State highways, numbers 30 and 32, which themselves traverse the county and several others. Furthermore, all the bridges of the various townships are transferred to the care and supervision of the county commissioners. *125 We do not find tbe act in conflict with Article II, sec. 29, of tbe Constitution. S. v. Kelly, 186 N. C., 365, and cases there cited.

Nor can it be bold invalid, according to plaintiffs’ contention, as violative of tbe provisions of tbe Constitution (1) against taking property without due process of law (Article I, sec. 17) or (2) pledging the faith of tbe county, except for a necessary expense, without a vote of a majority of tbe qualified electors therein (Article VII, sec. 7), or (3) levying a tax in disregard of tbe rule of uniformity in taxation (Article VII, sec. 9).

Plaintiffs have proceeded on tbe theory that tbe act authorizes a county tax for local township roads; whereas, from tbe facts agreed, it appears that tbe designated road forms an essential part of a countywide scheme, affording improved highway facilities to every township in the county and benefiting all.

Again, it would seem that the act here challenged is only declaratory of, or supplementary to, the powers given the defendant under the general law. Road Com. v. Comrs., 188 N. C., 362. Such would apparently save its constitutionality.

The exceptions are not allowed.

Affirmed.

Varser, J., not sitting.

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129 S.E. 154, 190 N.C. 123, 1925 N.C. LEXIS 22, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-v-board-of-commissioners-nc-1925.

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