Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad

49 S.E.2d 481, 229 N.C. 236, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 470

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 22, 1948

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 49 S.E.2d 481 (Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Hill v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, 49 S.E.2d 481, 229 N.C. 236, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 470 (N.C. 1948).

Pincite

Opinion

Dkvin, J.

Fpon the evidence presented, as it appears of record, the judgment of nonsuit was properly entered. The evidence fails to show, under the circumstances here, any duty incumbent upon the workmen on the cars, in unloading crosstics in the usual way, to anticipate the *238 movements and position of the plaintiff at the time of injury. Equally the evidence is wanting in probative value to show negligent failure on their part to perforin a duty owed the plaintiff which proximately caused the injury complained of. Stated briefly, the evidence fails to make out a case of actionable negligence.

The plaintiff, however, insists that under the case of Griswold v. Gardner, 155 F. (2), 333, decided 15 May, 1946 (certiorari denied, 329 U. S., 725), this action coming within the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and having been instituted for an injury to an employee of an interstate railroad, the court had no authority to grant a motion for nonsuit and take the case from the jury. In other words, it is suggested that the ruling of the Federal Courts has had the effect of converting the Federal Employers’ Liability Act from a negligence statute into a workmen’s compensation law, regardless of the question of negligence. But we cannot take this view. The Act itself, while depriving the defendant of certain common law defenses, bottoms the liability of the employer for injury to an employee upon negligence. In the case cited one Circuit J udge concurred in the result but disagreed with the statement that the Supreme Court had converted the Federal Employers’ Liability Act into a compensation law, and the District Judge dissented.

In Wolfe v. Jlenwood, 162 F. (2), 998, decided 7 July, 1947 (cer-tiorari denied), it was said: “But defendant’s obligation was not such as to impose liability for injury regardless of due care and regardless of whether the injury was one reasonably to be anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence of defendant’s act. In order to recover under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, plaintiff had the burden of proving that defendant was negligent, and that such negligence in whole or in part caused Wolfe’s injuries . . . The recent Supreme Court decisions do not hold that a jury question is presented in every Federal Employers’ Liability Act case. The plaintiff must still establish negligence of defendant as a contributing cause of injury. . . . The Federal Employers’ Liability Act does not subject a railroad to that degree of liability imposed by a workmen’s compensation law', nor place the railroad in the position of an insurer of its employees.” To the same effect is the holding in Echenrode v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 71 Fed. Sup., 764.

In Ellis v. Union. Pacific R. Co., 329 U. S., 649 (decided 3 February, 1947), the Court said : “The Act does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty. The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur. And that negligence must be in whole or in part the cause of the injury.” See also Brady v. Southern Ry. Co.. 320 U. S., 476; Tenant v. R. R., 321 U. S., 29; Blair v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 323 U. S., 600.

*239 Plaintiff’s exceptions to tbe ruling of the court on questions of evidence we find without substantial merit.

The judgment of nonsuit is

Affirmed.

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Dkvin, J.

Fpon the evidence presented, as it appears of record, the judgment of nonsuit was properly entered. The evidence fails to show, under the circumstances here, any duty incumbent upon the workmen on the cars, in unloading crosstics in the usual way, to anticipate the *238 movements and position of the plaintiff at the time of injury. Equally the evidence is wanting in probative value to show negligent failure on their part to perforin a duty owed the plaintiff which proximately caused the injury complained of. Stated briefly, the evidence fails to make out a case of actionable negligence.

The plaintiff, however, insists that under the case of Griswold v. Gardner, 155 F. (2), 333, decided 15 May, 1946 (certiorari denied, 329 U. S., 725), this action coming within the provisions of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, and having been instituted for an injury to an employee of an interstate railroad, the court had no authority to grant a motion for nonsuit and take the case from the jury. In other words, it is suggested that the ruling of the Federal Courts has had the effect of converting the Federal Employers’ Liability Act from a negligence statute into a workmen’s compensation law, regardless of the question of negligence. But we cannot take this view. The Act itself, while depriving the defendant of certain common law defenses, bottoms the liability of the employer for injury to an employee upon negligence. In the case cited one Circuit J udge concurred in the result but disagreed with the statement that the Supreme Court had converted the Federal Employers’ Liability Act into a compensation law, and the District Judge dissented.

In Wolfe v. Jlenwood, 162 F. (2), 998, decided 7 July, 1947 (cer-tiorari denied), it was said: “But defendant’s obligation was not such as to impose liability for injury regardless of due care and regardless of whether the injury was one reasonably to be anticipated or foreseen as a natural consequence of defendant’s act. In order to recover under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, plaintiff had the burden of proving that defendant was negligent, and that such negligence in whole or in part caused Wolfe’s injuries . . . The recent Supreme Court decisions do not hold that a jury question is presented in every Federal Employers’ Liability Act case. The plaintiff must still establish negligence of defendant as a contributing cause of injury. . . . The Federal Employers’ Liability Act does not subject a railroad to that degree of liability imposed by a workmen’s compensation law', nor place the railroad in the position of an insurer of its employees.” To the same effect is the holding in Echenrode v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 71 Fed. Sup., 764.

In Ellis v. Union. Pacific R. Co., 329 U. S., 649 (decided 3 February, 1947), the Court said : “The Act does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty. The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that injuries occur. And that negligence must be in whole or in part the cause of the injury.” See also Brady v. Southern Ry. Co.. 320 U. S., 476; Tenant v. R. R., 321 U. S., 29; Blair v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 323 U. S., 600.

*239 Plaintiff’s exceptions to tbe ruling of the court on questions of evidence we find without substantial merit.

The judgment of nonsuit is

Affirmed.

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49 S.E.2d 481, 229 N.C. 236, 1948 N.C. LEXIS 470, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hill-v-atlantic-coast-line-railroad-nc-1948.

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